O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

domingo, 11 de agosto de 2013

E por falar em espionagem...

História

Brasil espionou vizinhos na ditadura, revela arquivo

Arquivos secretos e inéditos desclassificados pelo Arquivo Nacional, em Brasília, descrevem o esquema de espionagem organizado pelo país

Veja.com, 11/08/2013

Ernesto Geisel, ex-presidente da Petrobras
Ernesto Geisel, ex-presidente da Petrobras (Carlos Namba )
Se hoje reclama da espionagem dos EUA, durante a ditadura o governo brasileiro criou uma rede oficial de recolhimento de dados sigilosos na tentativa de monitorar os segredos militares e estratégicos dos países vizinhos da América Latina. É o que mostram arquivos secretos e inéditos do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas (EMFA), que foram desclassificados pelo Arquivo Nacional, em Brasília. Os documentos mostram que, numa reunião do órgão, em agosto de 1978, foi criado o "Plano de Informações Estratégicas Militares", que descreve o esquema de espionagem organizado pelo Brasil.
A tarefa era clara: fornecer ao governo brasileiro informações estratégicas e secretas dos países da América Latina, deixando apenas EUA e Canadá de fora do plano. O documento mostra que essa missão caberia não apenas a adidos militares brasileiros no exterior, mas também ao Itamaraty. "O Ministério das Relações Exteriores atenderá às necessidades de informações estratégicas militares dos países da América Latina onde as Forças Armadas não estejam representadas por adidos militares", diz o documento.
Uma detalhada planilha explica ainda o que cada órgão de inteligência deveria investigar nos países vizinhos. Cinco órgãos de busca participavam dessa coleta de informações estratégicas -- quatro deles eram vinculados às Forças Armadas e o quinto era o Itamaraty, a quem cabia a tarefa mais ampla na captação de dados.
Informações - As informações contidas no documento não deixam dúvidas de que o objetivo era descobrir segredos militares dos vizinhos. Entre as tarefas estão a coleta de informações sobre a estrutura geral dos ministérios militares; sua organização e funcionamento; composição de cada Força; comandos; efetivos e equipamentos; distribuição e ordem de batalha; serviço militar; forças terrestres, navais, aéreas e combinadas; zonas defendidas; bases e obras permanentes no interior e no litoral; estrutura de defesa antiaérea, instalações subterrâneas; organização logística de forças terrestre, naval e aérea; contingente demográfico em idade militar, criação de animais de guerra, população de equinos, material bélico e até atividades de guerrilheiros, entre muitos outros itens. Todas essas planilhas receberam a classificação de secretas pelo EMFA.
A periodicidade do envio dessas informações também estava definida no plano. A maioria deveria ser enviada anualmente, seguindo uma data fixada pelos militares. O levantamento sobre a organização das Forças Armadas dos vizinhos, por exemplo, deveria ser enviado todos os anos em abril, assim como os dados sobre instalações de defesa. Informações sobre logística militar tinham como prazo de entrega o mês de julho, mesmo prazo estipulado para envio de informações sobre movimentos guerrilheiros nos países observados.
Informações consideradas mais relevantes, como a de mobilização militar, deveriam ser repassadas para o governo brasileiro assim que fossem obtidas. Já se sabia que os diplomatas brasileiros, por instrução do governo militar, monitoravam as atividades de integrantes de grupos de esquerda no exterior durante a ditadura.
(Com Estadão Conteúdo)

Politica economica para ETs e outros seres bizarros - Rolf Kuntz

Os seres bizarros, na verdade, são os próprios formuladores (???) e executores (!!!) dessa coisa que pretende se passar por política econômica.
Começa pelo fato de se apropriarem de fenômenos naturais como se fosse de sua feitura. Por exemplo: como a inflação do mês foi só 0,03%, o pessoal bizarro começa festejar e a dançar, proclamando gloriosamente: "Viram, viram?" Como aqueles índios que fazem dança da chuva, acreditando realmente ter tal poder.
Quanto ao ufódromo, mencionado ao final da matéria, ele na verdade já existe, sob a forma de um museu para o ET de Varginha no qual o governo federal já colocou 1 milhão e hoje está abandonado inacabado, como aliás já postado aqui.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Falta saber se o ET de Varginha crê no governo

Rolf Kuntz
O Estado de S.Paulo,10/08/2013

É quase uma crueldade pedir à presidente Dilma Rousseff a substituição do ministro da Fazenda, Guido Mantega. Sem ser almas irmãs, são pelo menos espíritos complementares. Ambos atribuem a alta da inflação nos primeiros meses deste ano à quebra da safra americana. Nenhuma relação com a demanda, disse recentemente o ministro. A presidente reafirmou a tese da seca nos Estados Unidos na quarta-feira, ao comentar triunfalmente o resultado de julho, uma alta de apenas 0,03% do Índice de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo (IPCA). Onde encontrar um parceiro tão adequado para esse dueto?
Talvez no Ministério da Educação, mas essa hipótese tem sido negada no Palácio do Planalto. Outra possibilidade seria chamar o ET de Varginha, merecedor do "maior respeito", segundo a presidente. Mas seria preciso saber, em primeiro lugar, se ele acredita na existência do governo instalado em Brasília ou se o considera mais uma alucinação coletiva ou produto da crendice popular. Mas todos esses detalhes, neste momento, são pouco importantes. Quarta-feira, esta é a grande notícia, foi um dia glorioso para a presidente e para Mantega.
A inflação, disseram os dois, está e sempre esteve sob controle, sem prejudicar a economia. O ministro, no entanto, foi mais cauteloso e admitiu aumentos de preços mais acelerados nos próximos meses - "como em todos os anos", segundo ele. Com a mesma prudência, evitou previsões mais detalhadas. Quando lhe perguntaram se a taxa acumulada no fim do ano será menor que a do ano passado, quase tirou o time de campo. "Não sei, provavelmente sim", foi a resposta registrada pela Agência Estado.
Sem a seca americana e com boa oferta de alimentos no Brasil, fica difícil entender essa hesitação. Talvez ele tenha lido, num momento de folga, as projeções de mercado mantidas no site do Banco Central (BC). Na sexta-feira de manhã o BC ainda registrava a estimativa para o mês de julho: 0,01%, um número pouco melhor que o divulgado oficialmente pelo Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). Os números projetados para os meses seguintes crescem de forma quase contínua: 0,26% em agosto, 0,43% em setembro, 0,55% em outubro, 0,55% em novembro e 0,67% em dezembro.
Para o ano a série indica uma alta acumulada de 5,72%, bem pouco inferior à do ano passado, 5,84%. Talvez se possa falar em convergência para a meta, de 4,5%, mas o avanço é lento e, nesse ritmo, o percurso dificilmente será concluído nos 12 meses seguintes.
Mas o governo parece continuar satisfeito com acumulados anuais abaixo de 6,5%. Sua meta efetiva é qualquer ponto na faixa de 4,5% a 6,5%, um detalhe traído mais de uma vez pelo próprio ministro em suas declarações. Politicamente é este o ponto mais importante: a inflação estará "bastante sob controle", segundo a linguagem presidencial, enquanto as taxas de 12 meses ficarem nessa área. O "compromisso com a estabilidade", mencionado mais uma vez pela presidente na quarta-feira, tem como referência esse limite.
É um compromisso frouxo, próprio de quem pouco se incomoda com a alta persistente dos preços. Em dez anos, uma inflação anual média de 4,5% resulta numa taxa acumulada de 55,3%. Uma inflação de 2,5%, mais próxima das metas adotadas nos países desenvolvidos e em vários emergentes, produziria uma alta de preços de 28% no mesmo período. Uma das consequências seria um considerável desajuste cambial no País com taxa mais elevada.
O ministro Mantega falou muitas vezes em guerra cambial, nos últimos cinco anos. A presidente Dilma Rousseff acusou os governos dos países desenvolvidos de criarem um tsunami monetário e com isso afetarem o câmbio e o poder de competição dos emergentes. Ambos seriam muito mais realistas, e mais eficientes na política econômica, se dessem mais atenção à diferença entre as taxas de inflação no Brasil e em outros países.
Mas isso parece muito improvável. As pressões inflacionárias, segundo o governo, vêm de fora, juntamente com a crise causadora, também segundo a versão do Planalto, da estagnação brasileira. Além disso, a meta de 4,5% foi estendida até 2015, com a margem de tolerância de 2 pontos para mais ou para menos (na prática, para mais). Um resultado anual de 6,4% continuará sendo alardeado como prova do compromisso com a estabilidade.
Tudo isso combina perfeitamente com o desleixo fiscal. Como os truques de maquiagem estão cada vez mais evidentes, o governo tem desistido, com jeito de criança flagrada em molecagem, de alguns expedientes escandalosos, como a antecipação de recebíveis da Itaipu Binacional. É cada vez mais difícil encontrar meios para entregar no fim do ano um superávit primário de 2,3% do produto interno bruto, já bem menor que a meta inicial de 3,1%. Enquanto isso, continua a política fiscal expansionista apontada mais de uma vez pelo pessoal do BC nas avaliações dos fatores inflacionários.
Sem melhora na gestão das finanças públicas - nem corte de gastos, nem aumento da eficiência no uso do dinheiro -, mantém-se uma das causas principais do desarranjo dos preços. As possíveis pressões derivadas do aumento do dólar apenas complicarão um quadro já bastante ruim.
A tarefa de frear a inflação continuará entregue aos formuladores da política monetária. Nenhum diretor do BC entenderá a taxa de 0,03% de julho, explicável basicamente pela redução política das tarifas de transportes e pelo recuo temporário dos preços dos alimentos, como um sinal de vitória. Muito mais fácil será declarar respeito ao ET de Varginha e abrir licitação para um ufódromo. Uma nova estatal poderá cuidar do assunto. Em cinco anos as obras estarão incompletas, talvez nem começadas, mas o orçamento terá aumentado barbaramente.

sábado, 10 de agosto de 2013

Copa do Mundo 2014: Brasil sagrado campeao em 2013 (em gastos com estadios...)

Em dobro07/08/2013 | 13h30

Custo de estádios no Brasil ultrapassa o das Copas da África e Alemanha juntos

Dinheiro gasto nos estádios brasileiros daria para pagar as duas últimas competições

Custo de estádios no Brasil ultrapassa o das Copas da África e Alemanha juntos Lauro Alves/Agencia RBS
Estádio Mané Garrincha, que sediou a abertura da Copa das Confederações, foi o mais caroFoto: Lauro Alves / Agencia RBS
Mesmo com a conclusão de seis dos 12 estádios da Copa, o gasto com as obras continuam crescendo. A última revisão do valor alcançou os R$ 8 bilhões — número 285% superior ao previsto em outubro de 2007, quando o Brasil foi anunciado como sede do Mundial do próximo ano e o preço das reformas e construções era de R$ 2,8 bilhões.
Com o novo valor, o Brasil aumentou a diferença nos gastos em relação às Copas de 2006 e 2010 — agora, os estádios brasileiros custam duas vezes mais. Na África do Sul, o custo total das dez arenas foi de R$ 3,27 bilhões. Na Alemanha, 12 estádios saíram por R$ 3,6 bilhões.
Os custos aumentaram recentemente na Arena da Amazônia, na Arena da Baixada, no Maracanã e no Mané Garrincha. As revisões foram responsáveis por um acréscimo de quase R$ 1 bilhão. Em abril deste ano, antes dos reajustes, a Matriz de Responsabilidades apontava gastos na ordem de R$ 7,031 bilhões.
O aumento da conta ocorre até mesmo nos estádios já concluídos, como o Maracanã e o Mané Garrincha. No Rio, o governo afirmou que o aumento de R$ 59,7 milhões, divulgado na semana passada, está ligado ao "reajuste de preços e atualização monetária". Em maio, o custo do estádio já havia sofrido um acréscimo de R$ 277 milhões, ultrapassando a marca de R$ 1 bilhão.
Em Brasília, o mesmo cenário. No contrato assinado em 2010, o Mané Garrincha estava orçado em R$ 696 milhões. No entanto, 19 aditivos foram responsáveis por um acréscimo de R$ 337 milhões. Além disso, o custo da cobertura, dos assentos, do gramado e do placar eletrônico elevou a conta em mais R$ 193,1 milhões. Hoje, o estádio tem preço fixado em R$ 1,43 bilhão.
Nos dois casos, o valor triplicou. Em 2009, a previsão era que a reforma do Maracanã custasse R$ 400 milhões. A construção do novo Mané Garrincha sairia por R$ 520 milhões.
Duas obras em andamento também tiveram os valores reajustados. Em Curitiba, o aumento de R$ 46 milhões ocoerreu por conta do retardamento de um ano no cronograma. A Arena da Baixada está orçada, agora, em R$ 265 milhões. A Arena da Amazônia, por sua vez, passou de R$ 550 milhões para R$ 605 milhões.
Confira o custo de cada estádio:
Arena Corinthians: R$ 855 milhões
Arena da Baixada: R$ 265 milhões
Arena da Amazônia: R$ 605 milhões
Arena das Dunas: R$ 350 milhões
Arena Pantanal: R$ 519,4 milhões
Arena Pernambuco: R$ 529,5 milhões
Beira-Rio: R$ 330 milhões
Castelão: R$ 623 milhões
Fonte Nova: R$ 591,7 milhões
Mané Garrincha: R$ 1,43 bilhão
Maracanã: R$ 1,19 bilhão
Mineirão: R$ 695 milhões

Uma revolucao no ensino superior dos EUA: Ben Nelson e o seu Projeto Minerva - The Wall Street Journal

Ben Nelson: The Man Who Would Overthrow Harvard
San Francisco
'If you think as we do," says Ben Nelson, "Harvard's the world's most valuable brand." He doesn't mean only in higher education. "Our goal is to displace Harvard. We're perfectly happy for Harvard to be the world's second most valuable brand."
Listening to Mr. Nelson at his spare offices in San Francisco's Mid-Market, a couple of adjectives come to mind. Generous (to Harvard) isn't one. Nor immodest. Here's a big talker with bold ideas. Crazy, too, in that Silicon Valley take-a-flier way.
Mr. Nelson founded and runs the Minerva Project. The school touts itself as the first elite—make that "e-lite"—American university to open in 100 years. Or it will be when the first class enters in 2015. Mr. Nelson, who previously led the online photo-sharing company Snapfish, wants to topple and transcend the American academy's economic and educational model.
And why not? Higher education's product-delivery system—a professor droning to a limited number of students in a room—dates back a thousand years. The industry's physical plant (dorms, classrooms, gyms) often a century or more. Its most expensive employees, tenured faculty, can't be fired. The price of its product (tuition) and operating costs have outpaced inflation by multiples.
In similar circumstances, Wal-Mart took out America's small retail chains. Amazon crushed Borders. And Harvard will have to make way for . . . Minerva? "There is no better case to do something that I can think of in the history of the world," says Mr. Nelson.
Ken Fallin
Some people regarded as serious folks have bought the pitch, superlatives and all. Larry Summers, the former Harvard president, agreed to be the chairman of Minerva's advisory board. Former Sen. Bob Kerrey, who led the New School in New York from 2001-10, heads the fundraising arm. Stephen Kosslyn, previously dean of social sciences at Harvard, is Minerva's founding academic dean. Benchmark, a venture-capital firm that financed eBay and Twitter, last year made its largest-ever seed investment, $25 million, in Minerva.
Mr. Nelson calls Minerva a "reimagined university." Sure, there will be majors and semesters. Admission requirements will be "extraordinarily high," he says, as at the Ivies. Students will live together and attend classes. And one day, an alumni network will grease job and social opportunities.
But Minerva will have no hallowed halls, manicured lawns or campus. No fraternities or sports teams. Students will spend their first year in San Francisco, living together in a residence hall. If they need to borrow books, says Mr. Nelson, the city has a great public library. Who needs a student center with all of the coffee shops around?
Each of the next six semesters students will move, in cohorts of about 150, from one city to another. Residences and high-tech classrooms will be set up in the likes of São Paulo, London or Singapore— details to come. Professors get flexible, short-term contracts, but no tenure. Minerva is for-profit.
The business buzzword here is the "unbundling" of higher education, or disaggregation. Since the founding of Oxford in the 12th century, universities, as the word implies, have tried to offer everything in one package and one place. In the world of the Web and Google, physical barriers are disappearing.
Mr. Nelson wants to bring this technological disruption to the top end of the educational food chain, and at first look Minerva's sticker price stands out. Freed of the costs of athletics, the band and other pricey campus amenities, a degree will cost less than half the average top-end private education, which is now over $50,000 a year with room and board.
His larger conceit, inspired or outlandish, is to junk centuries of tradition and press the reset button on the university experience. Mr. Nelson offers a fully-formed educational philosophy with a practiced salesman's confidence. At Minerva, introductory courses are out. For Econ or Psych 101, buy some books or sign up for one of the MOOCs—as in massive open online course—on the Web.
"Too much of undergrad education is the dissemination of basic information that at that level of student you should expect them to know," he says. "We just feel we don't have any moral standing to charge you thousands of dollars for learning what you can learn for free." Legacy universities move students to their degrees through packed, required lecture classes, which Mr. Nelson calls their "profit pools." And yes, he adds, all schools are about raking in money, even if most don't pay taxes by claiming "not-for-profit" status.
In the Nelson dream curriculum, all incoming students take the same four yearlong courses. His common core won't make students read the Great Books. "We want to teach you how to think," Mr. Nelson says. A course on "multimodal communications" works on practical writing and debating skills. A "formal systems class" goes over "everything from logic to advanced stats, Big Data, to formal reasoning, to behavioral econ."
Over the next three years, Minervaites take small, discussion-heavy seminars via video from their various locations. Classes will be taped and used to critique not only how students handle the subjects, but also how they apply the reasoning and communication skills taught freshman year.
The idea for Minerva grew out of Mr. Nelson's undergraduate experience. As a freshman at Penn's Wharton School, he took a course on the history of the university. "I realized that what the universities are supposed to be is not what they are," he says. "That the concept of universities taking great raw material and teaching how it can have positive impact in the world is gone."
Undergraduates come in, take some random classes, settle on a major and "oh yeah, you're going to pick up critical thinking in the process by accident." By his senior year, Mr. Nelson was pushing for curriculum changes as chairman of a student committee on undergraduate education. As a 21-year-old, he designed Penn's still popular program of preceptorials, which are small, short-term and noncredit seminars offered "for the sake of learning."
A Wharton bachelor's degree in economics took him to consulting at Dean & Company in Washington, D.C. "My first six months, what did the consulting firm teach me? They didn't teach me the basics of how they do business. They taught me how to think. I didn't know how to check my work. I didn't think about order of magnitude. I didn't have habits of mind that a liberal arts education was supposed to have given me. And not only did I not have it, none of my other colleagues had it—people who had graduated from Princeton and Harvard and Yale."
After joining Snapfish in 1999 and leaving as CEO a little over a decade later, Mr. Nelson, who is 38 and married with a daughter, wrote and shopped around his business plan for Minerva. He says he considered partnering with existing institutions, but decided to build a 21st-century school from scratch to offer the "ideal education."
Ideas like his are not in short supply. The catch? No one has found a way to make a steady profit on an ed-tech startup.
Going back to the Internet bubble of the late 1990s, many have tried. With $120 million from Michael Milken and Larry Ellison and a board of big names, UNext launched in 1997 as a Web-based graduate university. It failed. Fathom, a for-profit online-learning venture founded by Columbia University in 2000, closed three years and several million in losses later.
In the current surge of investment in new educational companies, Minerva has no direct competitor but plenty of company. Udacity and Coursera, two prominent startups, are looking to monetize the proliferation of MOOCs. UniversityNow offers cheap, practical courses online and at brick-and-mortar locations in the Bay Area. And so on.
Education accounts for 8.7% of the U.S. economy, but less than 1% of all venture capital transactions in 1995-2011 and only 0.3% of total public market capitalization, as of 2011, according to Global Silicon Valley Advisors. The group predicts the market for postsecondary "eLearning" and for-profit universities will grow by double digits annually over the next five years.
Mr. Nelson's vision will be beside the point if Minerva fails to attract paying students. He makes a straightforward business case. Harvard and other top schools take only a small share of qualified applicants, and for 30 years have refused to meet growing demand. A new global middle class—some 1.5 billion people—desperately wants an elite American education. "The existing model doesn't work," he says. "The market was begging for a solution."
Audacious ideas are easy to pick apart, and Mr. Nelson's are no exception. He repeats "elite" to describe a startup without a single student. Reputations are usually earned over time. Many prospective students dream of Harvard for the brand. Even at around $20,000 a year—no bargain for middle-class Chinese 18-year-olds—Minerva won't soon have the Harvard cachet.
Any education startup must also brave a regulatory swamp. By opting out of government-backed student-loan programs, Minerva won't have to abide by many of the federal rules for so-called Title IV (of the relevant 1965 law) schools. Americans won't have an edge in admissions and Minerva expects most students will come from abroad.
But Mr. Nelson wants to be part of the club whose price of entry is accreditation. A cartel sanctioned by Congress places a high barrier to entry for newcomers, stifling educational innovation. Startups face a long slog to get accredited. So last month Minerva chose to partner with the Keck Graduate Institute, or KGI, a small school founded in 1997 that is part of the Claremont consortium of colleges near Los Angeles. Minerva degrees will now have, pending the regulatory OK, an accreditor's seal of approval.
With this move, Mr. Nelson eased one headache and raised some questions. KGI offers only graduate degrees in life sciences, an unusual fit for an undergraduate startup. KGI isn't a recognizable international name for Minerva to market. Yet Mr. Nelson says the schools are "completely complementary" and the deal represents "zero change in our mission."
Among the other marketing challenges: Won't Minerva undergrads miss out on lifelong bonding built in classrooms, dorms and next to the keg? Traveling across the world, Mr. Nelson says, will bring people even closer together. Campus activities? Imagine a college newspaper with 25 foreign bureaus, he shoots back, or the cultural attractions of the world's great cities. "If you want to be an intercollegiate fencer, do not come to Minerva. Bad idea," he says. "There are a lot of traditional experiences that a traditional university will provide you that we will not."
Effusive on every other topic, Mr. Nelson turns vague when I bring up Minerva's finances. Skeptical investors have seen this movie before. Mr. Nelson doesn't even hint at projected profit or a growth timetable. He says the school has to become roughly the size of an Ivy League university, enrolling around 10,000 students, to break even. "Making your profit, your substantial revenue, based on 18-year-olds is not the mover," he says. "It's what you do with them. It's how you build the brand."
If the bulk of revenues won't come from undergrads, then where? "We'll see," he says. Perhaps executive education, or licensing classroom content or technology, or putting on conferences. "Our enterprise value will not be derived nearly as much from our 'E' as much as P/E," he says, as in the price/earnings ratio. "It isn't about maximizing profits. It's all about how the brand unlocks the future potential earnings." Harvard, a multibillion-dollar operation, is a business more than an academic model.
Whether or not Mr. Nelson and Minerva shake up American higher education, someone will.
Mr. Kaminski is a member of the Journal's editorial board.

A version of this article appeared August 10, 2013, on page A11 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: The Man Who Would Overthrow Harvard.

Clausewitz no Afeganistao: o buraco sempre fica mais embaixo... - John Thornhill meets Emile Simpson (Financial Times)

Lunch with the FT: Emile Simpson

Over Dorset crab and Picpoul, the former soldier hailed as a Clausewitz for our times talks to John Thornhill about military strategy, Afghanistan and ‘armed politics’
Emile Simpson©Patrick Morgan
When the veteran military historian Professor Michael Howard raves about a book by a little-known, 30-year-old ex-Gurkha officer and declares it to be comparable to Clausewitz, it is surely worth snapping to attention. And after reading War From the Ground Up, I am all the more intrigued to meet its author, Emile Simpson. Drawing on his experience of fighting in Afghanistan, Simpson has written an engrossing account of the 12-year conflict that challenges the way we think about war and suggests how we might better fight the next one. “War From the Ground Up is a work of such importance that it should be compulsory reading at every level in the military,” Howard concluded in his Times Literary Supplement review.
Sitting in the Drapers Arms on a gloriously sunny day in north London, Simpson looks every inch the military man, from his regulation haircut to his civilian uniform of brown sports jacket and green tie. As he rises to greet me, the tall, athletic Simpson exudes an air of orderliness. His voice, modulated by his schooling in Cambridge and the parade grounds of Sandhurst, is one notch too loud, as is often the way with army officers.
We decide to move to the garden of the Islington gastropub, which he says is one of his favourite watering holes. It is eerily deserted on a Friday lunchtime. As we settle at a shady table, I ask Simpson whether he is from a military family and what first drew him to the army. He explains that his parents are both Cambridge academics who were somewhat surprised by his choice of career. “My interest in things military was part through history and [part] a spirit of adventure,” he says, in the slightly elliptical manner he deploys when talking about himself.
On a gap year spent teaching in Nepal, he was drawn to the local culture and traditions of the Gurkha regiment. After studying history at Jesus College, Oxford, where he was tutored and inspired by Niall Ferguson, he went to Sandhurst, where he was commissioned as an officer in the Royal Gurkha Rifles. In his six and a half years in the army, Simpson served three tours in southern Afghanistan, first as a platoon commander in charge of 30 men in Kandahar in 2007, then as a military intelligence officer helping to fight the counterinsurgency in Helmand province in 2010, and, finally, working at headquarters of the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) under the US commander General John R Allen in 2011. Like Carl von Clausewitz, whose service in the Prussian army during the Napoleonic wars shaped his classic book On War , Simpson’s writings are informed by deep personal experience as well as a fascination with military theory.
Before we can plunge too deeply into Afghanistan, the waitress arrives to take our order from the surprisingly ambitious menu. Simpson goes for steak tartare and Dorset crab. I opt for the smoked mackerel and am also tempted by the crab. We order two glasses of Picpoul.
Simpson says that what intrigued him as a frontline officer was how much his experience on the ground diverged from what he had been taught about war and the way politicians talked about the conflict. Clausewitz still largely defines how most people understand war: it is primarily seen as an interstate activity that is polarised, decisive and finite. One side wins, declares victory and imposes its terms – and narrative – upon the loser. The other side accepts defeat, licks its wounds and works out how to fight smarter next time.

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LUNCH WITH THE FT

But the Afghanistan conflict, which has lasted longer than the two world wars combined, does not neatly conform to this pattern. Who is the enemy? How do you know when you have won? What would victory even look like? At times, when Simpson was fighting in Helmand at the height of the counterinsurgency, the battle lines were fairly clear. “We were fighting the Taliban pretty much every day. There were a lot of casualties – both ways. The battle group as a whole [of 1,000] had about 110 wounded and 28 dead, both British and Afghans,” he says.
At other times, it became near-impossible to distinguish between enemies and friends. The conflict appeared kaleidoscopic, indecisive and seemingly infinite. In his book, which interweaves military theory with personal anecdote, Simpson cites the example of one local commander who was notionally on the side of the Afghan government in Kabul but “rented” out some of his forces to the local Taliban because they had agreed to pay for them. In such situations, trying to divide the population between “them” and “us” was not only dangerous but counter-productive. “There were not two sides. Everyone was on their own side,” he says.
What frustrated Simpson was that abstract doctrinal concepts kept obstructing sensible operational judgments. “The metrics of success were based on red and blue and geographical control of an area – blue being our own forces and red the enemy,” he says. By 2010 his unit had developed its own alternative metrics “identifying different constituencies in the area you were operating in, be they violently or politically hostile to you, sympathetic or undecided.
“From that understanding, you could use both military means and non-military means, working with our civilian counterparts, to deliver a narrative, or a political story, if you like – just like a politician might deliver a narrative during an election. You give each constituency what it wants while going on the offensive against the opposition’s narrative.”
Simpson is as passionate in talking about army doctrine as he is dispassionate in talking about his own personal experiences. But he uses a very different vocabulary from the normal terms of military discourse – “persuasion”, “opponents” and “strategic audiences” in place of “force”, “enemies” and “targets” – and draws inspiration from sources as varied as Aristotle’s teachings on rhetoric and medieval theologians. As he expounds his theory of “armed politics” with eloquence, I am struck by his more than fleeting resemblance to a young David Cameron.
Our starters arrive and Simpson laughs at my mackerel, an upturned tail of a fish pointing up to the cloudless sky. He tucks into his steak tartare and launches into an explanation of how the relationship between soldiers and politicians must change if we want to fight 21st-century conflicts more effectively.
Simpson says that the accepted model for civil-military relations remains Samuel P Huntington’s classic book The Soldier and The State, first published in 1957. That book’s main reference point was the showdown between President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean war when the over-mighty general threatened to unleash nuclear war on China. Huntington argued that generals should never again be allowed to have that level of strategic authority, and that policy guidelines should be set by the president. There was also the longstanding constitutional argument that soldiers should not interfere in setting policy because that was the preserve of elected politicians. While that policy may have made sense during the cold war, it does not convince Simpson today. “What I am saying now is that the constitutional argument still makes sense but the strategic argument doesn’t. What you have now is the politicisation of military action down to a tactical level.”
As Simpson puts it, strategy is always “the dialogue between desire and possibility”. Politicians may desire an outcome but their strategy has to be tempered by the operational realities on the ground. In conflicts such as Afghanistan, those frontline soldiers responsible for implementing armed politics on the ground must have more say in shaping and presenting that strategic narrative. “Huntington’s one-way flow simply does not make sense if you want a nuanced political approach down to the tactical level,” he says.
The crabs arrive accompanied by an array of crushing and gouging instruments that would not have disgraced a medieval dungeon. And, however splendid the crab looks and tastes, I quickly realise it was the daftest main course I could have ordered. Extracting meat from a crustacean’s extremities is not compatible with taking shorthand notes. While we’ve been talking, the pub garden has slowly filled up with fashionable young mothers and prams. The badlands of Afghanistan could not seem further away. I ask him what he thinks will happen when Nato forces pull out next year.
As he rips a claw off his crab, Simpson says he doesn’t foresee a dramatic collapse of the Kabul regime. The government’s endemic corruption poses a bigger threat to its survival than the Taliban does, he argues. When Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 they left behind a reasonably stable regime that was still able to defeat the Mujahideen when they massed for a conventional battle at Jalalabad later that year. It was the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 that doomed the Najibullah regime by cutting off its funding. The regime in Kabul today may not be very democratic or effective, he says, but it is unlikely to be overthrown by force.
“The Taliban can take dusty villages but for them to present an existential threat to the state means they have to knock out the Afghan army backed by US air power. They did not do it with the Russians. They will not do it today. If the state fails, it will be because it implodes as a result of corruption,” he says. As fragments of dismembered crab are cleared away from the table (and my notebook), Simpson orders a lemon tart and I plump for a poached pear. I am keen to prolong the conversation and explore one of the other big ideas of his book: the fact that social media has had a transformational effect on war.
Unsurprisingly, we return to Clausewitz, who is still taught in military academies today. Simpson rejects any suggestion that his work is comparable. “That would be incredibly immodest and inappropriate,” he says. “But my book is an interpretation of Clausewitz in the modern day ... [On War] is characterised by dialectics, between theory and experience, between history and the present day, between intuition and doctrine ... It is very much located in reality, but not consumed by it. I very much identified with that experience.”
As a young soldier in the Prussian army, Clausewitz fought at a time when the whole conception of conflict was being revolutionised. In the late 18th century, war was not unlimited: the great powers would try to defeat the enemy on the battlefield to gain an advantage but they rarely knocked out other states. Following the French Revolution, Napoleon was able to mobilise millions of soldiers and overthrow other regimes. “The whole state was at risk. It was a fundamentally different concept,” Simpson says.
He argues that a similarly decisive change in conflict is taking place today. Thanks to videos taken on smartphones and the universality of social media, the “strategic audiences” in any war are global. As we are seeing in Syria, images of conflict can be flashed around the world in a heartbeat. “Can we get back to a situation where there is a clear divide between military and political activity? I don’t think we can. Any war is going to be contaminated by contact with audiences around the world who have an interest in that conflict,” he says.
That has two big consequences. First, there needs to be a fusion of military and political activity at the operational level. But, second, conflicts have to be dealt with on their own terms and compartmentalised to prevent their proliferation, as the French have successfully done in Mali. “How you can box in a conflict will be the number one strategic question that will govern the next few decades,” he says.
In Simpson’s view, one of the biggest mistakes the US has made has been to talk about a “global war on terror”, a phrase he describes as silly because it raises expectations that can never be met. “If you elevate this to a global concept, to the level of grand strategy, that is profoundly dangerous,” he says. “If you want stability in the world you have to have clear strategic boundaries that seek to compartmentalise conflicts, and not aggregate them. The reason is that if you don’t box in your conflicts with clear strategic boundaries, chronological, conceptual, geographical, legal, then you experience a proliferation of violence.”
Simpson finished his last tour of Afghanistan just before Christmas 2011 and left the army shortly afterwards because it “was mainly incompatible with personal life, my girlfriend and my family”. He also had broader frustrations with the career structure in the army. “If you are a reformist and want to reform the army then you have to bide your time, as you do in any organisation. Just being in a bureaucracy in general was quite frustrating,” he says.
Simpson has switched careers and is now studying international law, a field in which he hopes he can combine both theory and practice. But he will not be wholly lost to the field of military doctrine as he is already working on another book about the concept of the enemy. His spirit of adventure is sated by trekking trips in Nepal and cycling tours in Oman.
Since his book’s publication in 2012, Simpson has been invited to speak to several military audiences in the US, where the debate still rages about how best to conduct counterinsurgency campaigns. It has received a cooler response from Britain’s top brass, despite Professor Howard’s endorsement, but Simpson says the army is slowly becoming more receptive to fresh thinking because of its recent setbacks in Basra and Helmand.
“Thirty years ago, if you could drink a bottle of whisky in the evening and run 10 miles in the morning and had a big moustache, then you were a good bloke and didn’t need to read anything. But today the army is much more open to reading. The army has got less afraid of intellectualism since things went wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan,” he says. “We do need to rethink our profession.”
John Thornhill is the FT’s deputy editor
-------------------------------------------
Drapers Arms
44 Barnsbury Street, London
2 glasses Picpoul £11.50
1 steak tartare £7.50
1 smoked mackerel £6.50
2 Dorset crab £27.00
1 chips £3.50
1 potatoes £3.50
1 lemon tart £6.50
1 poached pear £6.50
Total £72.50
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Paraguai, a Alianca do Pacifico e o Mercosul - Rogério Mendelski

O VELHO PARAGUAI DE GUERRA
Postado por Rogério Mendelski em 28 de julho de 2013

O Paraguai deu uma banana das grandes para o Mercosul e hoje é integrante da Aliança do Pacífico, um novo bloco econômico formado pelo Chile, Peru, Colômbia e México e que já controla quase 50% do comércio exterior da América Latina, movimentando em apenas um ano de existência 556 bilhões de dólares em exportações e 551 bilhões de dólares em importações.

O ingresso do Paraguai na AP não foi fácil por que o Brasil tentou prejudicá-lo, não satisfeito com a suspensão daquele país do Mercosul, depois que Fernando Lugo foi cassado pelo Congresso paraguaio. Diplomatas do Paraguai e da Colômbia informaram ao diário ABC Color, de Assunção, que o Brasil quis impedir a entrada dos nossos vizinhos alegando as “cláusulas democráticas” do Mercosul como se este bloco tivesse alguma influência sobe a AP.

As tais “cláusulas democráticas” foram motivo de discretas chacotas entre a diplomacia dos países que saudaram o Paraguai pela decisão tomada. “Os membros da Aliança do Pacífico estão muito contentes e agradecidos pela disposição do Paraguai em fazer parte desse foro”, disse o chanceler mexicano José Antonio Meade.

Mas o que é mesmo esse bloco econômico que com um ano de funcionamento tem 210 milhões de habitantes e representa um terço do PIB da América Latina e se coloca como a oitava economia do planeta?
A resposta é bem simples: Chile, Peru, Colômbia e México – e agora o Paraguai – se uniram em torno de objetivos democráticos e capitalistas na definição do presidente chileno Sebastián Piñera: “O compromisso da Aliança é o de compartilhar valores comuns como a democracia, o respeito aos direitos humanos, a liberdade econômica privada, o direito à propriedade produtiva, intelectual e empresarial, assim como a economia de mercado e a liberdade de expressão”.

Pensando bem, são valores ausentes em alguns paises do Mercosul e, por isso mesmo, o Paraguai não reclamou de sua saída do bloco que ajudou a fundar em 1991. E não quer voltar por que já disse que não senta na mesma mesa onde estiver a Venezuela. Este é o velho Paraguai de guerra cujo povo sabe muito bem o que é ditadura, democracia e farsas como a que Fernando Lugo tentou implantar no país.

AS TENTATIVAS

Em 2005, na Cúpula das Américas, em Mar del Plata (Argentina) os países que hoje integram a AP tentaram estabelecer tratados de livre comercio entre os paises da América Latina, mas Hugo Chavez influenciou os membros do Mercosul e apoiado por Nestor Kirchner a idéia não prosperou. Era o momento de alguns paises democráticos como o Chile, Colômbia e México começarem a pensar num novo bloco econômico.

BONS NEGÓCIOS

Os países integrantes da AP já eliminaram as tarifas de importação e exportação em 90 por cento de seus produtos para o incremento do livre comércio entre si. Quando negociam em bloco olham para a Ásia e buscam atrair investimentos que irão beneficia-los também em bloco.

APOIO DO SENADOR

O senador Álvaro Dias (PSDB-PR) saudou a posição do Paraguai. Diz ele: “Quando ocorreu o impeachment de Fernando Lugo e o Mercosul decidiu pelo seu afastamento, abrindo a porta para o ingresso da Venezuela, imaginou-se que o Paraguai teria poucas alternativas. Hoje, o Paraguai está na Aliança para o Pacífico e agora pode dar uma banana para aqueles que o expulsaram do Mercosul”.

ACORDOS ECONÔMICOS

O que para Hugo Chavez e Nestor Kirchner tinha cheiro de enxofre – acordos com os EUA – para a Aliança do Pacífico é puro perfume de progresso e bons negócios.
Quem estabelece acordos comerciais com os EUA precisa cumprir altos níveis de exigência e complexidade, mas depois de estabelecidos nada mais muda. Ao final das negociações, o país se torna apto para firmar qualquer acordo comercial no mundo. A opinião é do diplomata Rubens Ricupero, ex-embaixador do Brasil nos EUA e ex-secretário-geral da Conferência nas Nações Unidas sobre Comércio e Desenvolvimento.

FRACASSO

Enquanto o Mercosul patina e não sai do lugar desde 1991, a Aliança do Pacífico atrai investimentos e negocia com todos os países oferecendo vantagens aduaneiras e taxas atraentes.
No ano passado o Chile cresceu 5,5 % e recebeu 30 bilhões de dólares em investimentos externos. O México firmou 13 acordos comerciais na mesma linha, o Peru 12 e a Colômbia 11.

No Brasil, caminhões com gêneros perecíveis ficam dias parados em Uruguaiana esperando pela boa vontade da burocracia argentina. E vice-versa.

Crises financeiras: que tal revisar sua historia? - Book review

Crises financeiras sempre vão existir, pelo menos enquanto investidores e apostadores empurrarem os limites de risco de suas aplicações para ganhar sempre um pouco mais. Não depende só de banqueiros gananciosos, ou de autoridades reguladoras "liberais" ao extremo, pois os fatores estão incorporados ao "DNA financeiro" das pessoas: sempre tentar ganhar um pouco mais.
Nesse contexto, os banqueiros sempre são tentados a emprestar um pouco mais. Mas isso não ocorre só com os "especuladores de Wall Street". Na base da mais recente crise financeira americana não estavam apenas os derivativos financeiros criados pelos banqueiros privados de Wall Street, mas também as hipotecas imobiliárias garantidas em excesso do seu capital pelas seguradoras oficiais do governo americano, Fannie Mae e Freddy Mac, que empurraram como nunca os limites políticos dos empréstimos a pessoas que, normalmente, nunca teriam condições de receber aqueles créditos, pois apresentavam um risco potencial, muito grande, de inadimplência. Foram essas hipotecas subprime que foram transformadas em derivativos negociados no mercado com base na classificação AAA que receberam das agências de classificação de risco, já que as garantias eram dadas por agências governamentais, que não iriam falhar, certo? Pois falharam.
Assim são as coisas, mas é sempre bom aprender com os fracassos.
E quais foram os fracassos do sistema financeiro? Emprestar demais, ou seja, criar dinheiro, uma coisa que os governos estão sempre fazendo. Governos vão à falência? Aparentemente não, mas quando não podem mais emitir dinheiro, como os da Grécia e Portugal, para eles a festa acaba mais cedo...
Governos deveriam ter as mãos atadas na emissão de dinheiro, inclusive na garantia de empréstimos hipotecários para pessoas com alto potencial de risco.
Como está fazendo agora o governo brasileiro, por exemplo, não só com o programa Minha Casa, Minha Vida.
Vai dar em bolha e explodir, ou implodir?
Eu não sei, só sei que a conta vai ficar para nós, nossos filhos e netos.
Disso eu tenho plena certeza.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

----- EH.NET BOOK REVIEW ------
Title: History and Financial Crises: Lessons from the 20th Century
Published by EH.Net (August 2013)

Christopher Kobrak and Mira Wilkins, editors, 
History and Financial Crises: Lessons from the 20th Century.  
New York: Routledge, 2013. x + 138 pp. $140 (cloth), ISBN: 978-0-415-62297-4.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Jon Moen, Department of Economics, University of Mississippi.

This book is a collection of six papers that were originally published as a special issue of Business History (Volume 53, Issue 2, April 2011).  It includes a new summary chapter on the use of history in understanding modern financial crises.  Two themes tied the original collection together: the roles of globalization and regulation in financial crises.  Because of the five papers chosen, the collection focuses on the 1920s and 30s.  The papers cover the experiences of the German, Swedish, British, Canadian, and U.S. financial and banking sectors just before and during the Great Depression.  Individually, the five papers draw useful lessons from historical episodes of financial crises, and I enjoyed reading them.  Because they were subject to careful peer-review, I will not review them individually.  Instead, I will review the effectiveness of the collection as a whole.
The original introductory essay and the new concluding essay distract from the five papers; they do not clearly make a case for why I should read them as a collection.  The introductory essay by Christopher Kobrak and Mira Wilkins starts with an extended discussion on the definition of a financial crisis.  It acknowledges Charles Kindleberger’s (2011) self-confessed inability to define a crisis and notes attempts to define a crisis on the basis of sudden movements in interest rates or the money supply.  Yet it ends quite unsatisfyingly with “no absolute definition of either financial or economic crisis” (p. 5).  Later the essay apologizes for ultimately choosing a set of papers that are limited to the twentieth century, with an emphasis on the Great Depression (p. 10).  That is not bad, but the apology diminishes what the five essays do offer, as noted carefully in the next few pages.  One important point that the essay points out, however, is that not all crises covered in the special issue resulted in a collapse in demand and prices (p. 15).  Why crises do not inevitably lead to recessions or worse could be examined more.
The new, concluding essay by Christopher Kobrak is problematic.  As a stand-alone essay, I found it to be a potentially compelling survey of the relationship between financial and banking panics and the perils of making casual historical comparisons.  In particular, highlighting the relevance of the banking crises of the early 1930s rather than the spectacular stock market crash of 1929 helps in making historical comparisons with the crisis that started in 2008.  But then the essay veers off into topics that are again distracting, like musing on the loss of governmental discipline from the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement (p. 119).  This is odd, as the introductory essay indicates that the paper by Mark Billings and Forrest Capie emphasizes the benefits of flexible exchange rates.  The author then regrets not having an essay or more discussion of the Bank Panic of 1907, stating that it gets “little press in financial histories” (p. 120) and then proceeds to write several pages on the Panic.  I have found quite a bit about 1907 in financial histories by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963), Gary Gorton (2010), Richard Timberlake (1993), and Elmus Wicker (2000), just to name a few.  I may have contributed something myself.  The section on regulation (p. 123) starts out well, noting how historically regulation has always been trying to play catch-up to financial innovation.  But the subsequent discussion of the breakdown in Bretton Woods again doesn’t seem closely related to the papers of the special issue.  The discussion of “Good Financial Crises” argues that crises that were successfully averted rarely get examined.  Wicker clearly points out that the New York Clearing House successfully dealt with the Panic of 1873, and he refers to the reactions to the Panics of 1884 and 1890 as success stories from the point of view of the Clearing House.  I mention this because there is a lot of historical analysis of specific panics out there that could have been tied into this essay.
The conclusion to the essay left me a bit puzzled.  Certainly financial markets are much more complicated today than, say, in 1907.  But is this the result of an increasing lack of social responsibility on the part of financiers today?  We are asked to compare today’s leaders with those of 1907, who “stepped in to save a system from problems they themselves had created” (p. 131).  Whatever those problems were, I have a hard time imagining that saving his own skin was not first and foremost in J.P. Morgan’s mind, an incentive that just happened to be compatible with that of New York’s financial market in general.  Nevertheless, read the special issue or the book for the all of the essays.  Just do not expect to find a lot of lessons.
References:
Friedman, Milton, and Anna J. Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1963.
Gorton, Gary.  Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Kindleberger, Charles.  Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 6th edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
Timberlake, Richard.  Monetary Policy in the United States: An Intellectual and Institutional History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Wicker, Elmus.  Banking Panics of the Gilded Age.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
 
Jon Moen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Mississippi.  He has studied retirement in the United States in addition to his research on the Panic of 1907.  He is currently working on a project with Ellis Tallman of Oberlin College and the Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank on the effectiveness of the New York Clearing House in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
   
Copyright (c) 2013 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (August 2013). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview

Geographic Location: Europe, North America
Subject: Financial Markets, Financial Institutions, and Monetary History
Time: 20th Century: Pre WWII

Brics: um artigo antigo, mas ainda valido - Paulo R. Almeida

Encontrado, nesses meandros da internet, que tudo escondem e tudo descobrem: um artigo meu sobre os Brics, originais, ou seja, a quatro, publicado na revista Inteligência:

Rothschilds and Brazil: An Introduction to Sources in The Rothschild Archive - Caroline Shaw (LARR)

RESEARCH REPORTS AND NOTES
ROTHSCHILDS AND BRAZIL: An Introduction to Sources in The Rothschild Archive
Caroline Shaw
The Rothschild Archive, London
Latin American Research Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, February 2005
© 2005 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819

Abstract: N. M. Rothschild & Sons (NMR), the banking house which the Frankfurt-born Nathan Mayer Rothschild (1777–1836) began operating from New Court in London in 1809 and which is continued to this day by his descendants, has a long history of involvement in Brazil. Extensive documentation of this history is preserved in The Rothschild Archive in London, where material up to 1930 is available for consultation. The firm’s initial business with Brazil was in merchant banking activities and bullion dealing, but in 1855 it became the Brazilian government’s financial agent in London and went on to handle the government’s borrowing in the London capital markets and to be closely concerned with the country’s fiscal, commercial, and exchange rate policy. With the bank at the heart of the development of Brazilian public finance, The Rothschild Archive is an important resource for an understanding of this aspect of Brazilian economic and political history, as well as the history of British informal imperialism and emerging patterns of globalization.