O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

sábado, 13 de outubro de 2012

Liberdade na Estrada: palestras previstas


BRASIL PAÍS DO FUTURO:
ATÉ QUANDO?

De 17 de outubro a 08 de novembro



Desde 2009, o Liberdade na Estrada tem levado a mensagem da liberdade para estudantes e acadêmicos Brasil afora, expondo conceitos e abordando problemas brasileiros sob a perspectiva liberal. Ao longo das 3 edições realizadas, mais de 2.500 estudantes em 14 das maiores cidades do Brasil participarem das palestras e debates do Liberdade na Estrada.
Em 2012, passaremos por 13 universidades de Sul, Sudeste, Nordeste e Distrito Federal. Tendo por base o tema “Brasil, país do futuro: até quando?”, levaremos um time de intelectuais e acadêmicos de destaque no contexto brasileiro e internacional que abordará os principais desafios que se colocam ao futuro do Brasil, sob seus aspectos econômicos, políticos, culturais e sociais.
Ver a programação no link: http://www.liberdadenaestrada.com.br/
  • Brasília

    • 8/11 (quinta-feira), às 19h
      UnB

    Palestrantes

    • Adolfo Sachsida
      Adolfo Sachsida
    • Paulo Roberto de Almeida
      Paulo Roberto de
      Almeida
  • BRASIL PAÍS DO FUTURO:
    ATÉ QUANDO?

    De 17 de outubro a 08 de novembro

  • Desde 2009, o Liberdade na Estrada tem levado a mensagem da liberdade para estudantes e acadêmicos Brasil afora, expondo conceitos e abordando problemas brasileiros sob a perspectiva liberal. Ao longo das 3 edições realizadas, mais de 2.500 estudantes em 14 das maiores cidades do Brasil participarem das palestras e debates do Liberdade na Estrada.
    Em 2012, passaremos por 13 universidades de Sul, Sudeste, Nordeste e Distrito Federal. Tendo por base o tema “Brasil, país do futuro: até quando?”, levaremos um time de intelectuais e acadêmicos de destaque no contexto brasileiro e internacional que abordará os principais desafios que se colocam ao futuro do Brasil, sob seus aspectos econômicos, políticos, culturais e sociais.
    • Realização

      Ordem Livre Atlas Network
    • Apoio nacional

      Estudantes Pela Liberdade
    • Patrocínio

      Smith Family Foundation
    • Adolfo Sachsida
    • Adriano Gianturco
    • Adrualdo Catão
    • André Ramos
    • Diogo Costa
    • Fabio Barbieri
    • Fabio Ostermann
    • Fernando Ulrich
    • Gabriel Benarrós
    • Helio Beltrão
    • José Pio Martins
    • Leandro Narloch
    • Paulo Roberto de Almeida
    • Rodrigo Constantino
    • Ronald Hillbrecht
    • Ronald Hillbrecht

      Ronald Hillbrecht
      Mestre em Economia pela USP e Ph.D. pela University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Professor Associado da FCE/UFRGS e do PPGE/UFRGS. Membro fundador do IDERS (Instituto de Direito e Economia do RS) e ex-Coordenador do Mestrado Profissionalizante em Economia do PPGE/UFRGS.

Historia: Italia declara guerra a Alemanha (13/10/1943)

Das páginas do New York Times, This Day [13 de outubro de 1943) in History:


BIGGEST PACIFIC AIR FLEET BOMBS RABAUL; WRECKS 177 PLANES, 123 SHIPS IN SURPRISE; BADOGLIO, DECLARING WAR, RALLIES ITALY



REICH'S ACTS CITED
Italian Marshal Lists German Attacks as Cause of War
URGES PEOPLE TO FIGHT
He Tells Eisenhower That 'All Ties' With 'Dreadful Past' Are Broken--Backs Democracy
By MILTON BRACKER
By Wireless to The New York Times
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Churchill Rebuke to 'Politicians' Is Believed Aimed at U.S. Group
Algiers, Oct. 13--Italy declared war on Nazi Germany, her former Axis partner, at 3 P.M. today, Greenwich time [11 A.M. in New York].
Acting on orders of King Victor Emmanuel as transmitted by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the Italian Ambassador in Madrid notified the German Ambassador there that:
"In the face of repeated and intensified acts of war committed against Italians by the armed forces of Germany, from 1500 hours Greenwich time on the thirteenth day of October Italy considers herself in a state of war with Germany."
Thus the defeated nation led into war by Benito Mussolini re-entered it against its former ally through a curt diplomatic exchange in the capital of the country in which they had first collaborated on a military basis seven years ago.
Asks People to Avenge Ferocity
Excoriating the nation that now occupies Italy's own "Eternal City" as well as the entire industrial north, Marshal Badoglio in a proclamation to the Italian people exhorted them all to avenge the inhuman ferocity of the German Army at Naples and in other areas.
And in a five-sentence note to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mussolini's successor as head of the Italian Government told the Allied Commander in Chief that all ties with the "dreadful past" were broken and that his government would be proud "to march with you to inevitable victory." He asked General Eisenhower to communicate the decision to Britain, the United States, Russia and the other United Nations with which in his proclamation he said Italy would now march forward "shoulder to shoulder" to the end.
His Government, the septuagenarian marshal asserted in his proclamation to the Italian people, will soon be completed, and to guarantee its functioning as a truly democratic administration the representatives of "every political party" will be asked to participate. Moreover, the man with whom the Allies negotiated the armistice of Sept. 3 pledged that the present arrangement would in no way impair the "untrammeled right of the people of Italy to choose their own form of democratic government when peace is restored."
There could be no such peace, Marshal Badoglio said in the proclamation, so long as a single German remained on Italian soil. He reiterated in a statement to the press issued at his headquarters in Italy that his Government had no intention of interfering with the right of the Italian people to a free choice of the government they desire "for the not less important tasks of peace and reconstruction."
Cites Ouster of Mussolini
Marshal Badoglio cited the fact that the decree dissolving the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations--which accompanied the ousting of Mussolini in July--had effectually indicated the Government's intention. It was therein provided that elections would be held four months after the end of hostilities.
"What was said then is reaffirmed now," Marshal Badoglio said. "The present Government has clearly defined the task of leading the country until peace has been won. With that its mandate will cease."
The New York Times' exclusive story on the declaration this morning took the edge off the surprise of the announcement here this afternoon, but even without that the news would not have been so much of a surprise here as the news of the armistice thirty-five days ago.
It had been known for weeks--and this correspondent among others had said--that negotiations between the Allies and Marshal Badoglio were continuing with a view to formalizing Italy's war role from now on.
A major consideration was public opinion--just how the Allies intend to cope with the obvious criticism that is sure to arise in many quarters. There will be cries of "Darlanism" and much blinking in puzzlement among many Americans and Britons who have not yet forgotten the fact that our troops were shooting at and being shot at by Italians until very recently.
But as of the moment that the decision was formalized, with the Italian Ambassador at Madrid actually handing the document of notification to the German Ambassador there, it can be assumed that Washington and London had pretty well resolved the problem. This is about the way the two governments and their military High Command are understood to feel about it.
Question of Italian Army
The Italian Army as such cannot be regarded in its present state as an important striking force because of its great losses of man and equipment, but primarily because the all-important will to fight had been observed as very low for a long time preceding the armistice. At the same time Italian hatred of the Germans unquestionably grew as the fighting spirit waned, and episodes between German and Italian soldiers and civilians before and after the armistice have shown pretty clearly a complete and incontrovertible end of all sympathy between the former Axis partners.
Therefore, it seemed reasonable to take advantage of the Italians' willingness, even eagerness, to pin their hopes of a better role in the peace settlement to the status of co-belligerency now. As co-belligerents, which the Italians now become by virtue of the documents published today, even though the Allies have not said so in so many words, the Italians will be able to help the Allies in a great many ways, even if not as fellow- soldiers in the front lines.
Although nothing has been said officially as to exactly how the Italians will be employed in the rest of the war, it is almost universally believed that a lingering feeling between them and their recent enemies would militate against their efficiently joining in the actual battlefront.
At the same time, there is obviously an enormous amount of behind-the-lines work, particularly in their own country, where the Italians can be of enormous use. In all matters of supply, in furnishing guards over military property, as a collective liaison agency between advancing Allies and the liberated Italian people, there is no doubt that the Italians can contribute a major service to the Allied cause.
Italy's Position in War
This can be understood better when viewed negatively. If the Allies had turned down Italy's plea to be accepted as a co-belligerent, she would naturally have remained a defeated enemy. As such much Allied military strength would have had to be diverted to administering her disbanded army and her liberated but not militarily controlled territory.
As this correspondent wrote several times, the new status of Italy means a new and minimized role for the Allied Military Government, but at the same time it means giving the Italians more faith in those who defeated them, pride in having a share in the cleansing of their own territory of the hated Germans, and an opportunity actually to play an important role in ultimate victory.
Another highly important consideration behind the decision of the Allies to permit the Italian declaration was the probable effect on the populations of the occupied parts of Italy. Even with the status as it was up to this afternoon, the Allies had reason to be hopeful that the great laboring populations of Milan, Turin and Genoa would turn against the Germans in the same way the French and other European victims of Hitler had turned against the occupying forces.
Now, it may be argued, many persons north of the present Allied front will see in the advancing forces not only foreign armies considerably less odious than those they are driving out but Italian forces themselves. And no matter how limited is the extent to which the Italian troops are employed, that will nevertheless be true to some degree.
The question of who will figure in marshal Badoglio's completed government has been bruited about ever since the armistice. So far the only names released as officially connected with the Italian marshal are those of his military, naval and air aides who accompanied him on the visit to General Eisenhower Sept. 29. These also included Count Aquarone, Minister of Finance.
But it is uniformly agreed that outsiders will have to be brought in and, of course, Count Carlo Sforza's name has cropped up most often. He is now en route here.
But Count Sforza has said he will not actually be part of the Badoglio Government, although he will lend his influence and aid to the general project of kicking the Germans out. As Marshal Badoglio has said, the single objective is to free the country of Germans, and on that basis, it ought to be possible to unite many Italian leaders who otherwise are separated by vast political differences. Another hitch is that so many potential candidates are in German hands.
Attitude of the French
The attitude of the French Committee of National Liberation here remains generally calm, although there is still no love between the French and the Italians as the simple fact of newsreels showing Italians proves. But with Rene Massigli to direct its foreign relations and both Gen. Charles de Gaulle and Henri-Honore Giraud thoroughly aware of the primary military nature of the new arrangement, it is very unlikely that the French will make a formal protest.
At the time of the armistice they were most piqued, not by the armistice of course, but by the fact that it had been negotiated without their participation.
The establishment of the Politico-Military Commission, with France sharing membership with Russia, the United States and Britain, has helped to bring the committee into the swiftly enlarging Mediterranean picture and will undoubtedly help to alleviate any sting that the recognition of Italy as a co-belligerent might otherwise have provoked.
A member of the Committee of National Liberation said tonight that the Italian matter would undoubtedly be discussed at a regular meeting tomorrow morning, but he doubted that any formal comment would be issued. It was this man's opinion that many persons in France, particularly southeastern France, would be interested in the development. He said it was obvious from the background of French-Italian relations since 1938 that acceptance of the Italians as co-belligerents could hardly be seriously stomached by these French.
Many will never forget the circumstances of the Italian declaration of war against France. But the French spokesman also was sure the committee had come too far since those days to be seriously piqued by what is plainly a military step. Moreover, he cited a guarantee in the Allied leader's declaration that nothing growing out of the new status of Italy would be permitted to constitute inconsistence with the armistice terms. Beyond that he thought the French were prepared to await eventualities.
There may be a problem in Corsica, where 80,000 Italians have retained an army, which the patriots who figured in the liberation there would very much like to take over, as well as all of its transport.

Cuba Almost Became a Nuclear Power in 1962 - Foreign Policy


Cuba Almost Became a Nuclear Power in 1962

The scariest moment in history was even scarier than we thought.

BY SVETLANA SAVRANSKAYA | Foreign Policy, October 10, 2012

Cuba would have become the first nuclear power in Latin America 50 years ago, if not for the dynamics captured in this remarkable verbatim transcript -- published here for the first time -- of Fidel Castro's excruciating meeting with Soviet deputy prime minister Anastas Mikoyan, on November 22, 1962. The document comes from the personal archive of his son, the late Sergo Mikoyan, which was donated to theNational Security Archive and which appears for the first time in English this month in the new book, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis.
Long after the world thought the Cuban Missile Crisis had ended, with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's withdrawal of his medium-range nuclear missiles announced on October 28 -- and two days after President John F. Kennedy announced the lifting of the quarantine around Cuba -- the secret crisis still simmered. Unknown to the Americans, the Soviets had brought some 100 tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba -- 80 nuclear-armed front cruise missiles (FKRs), 12 nuclear warheads for dual-use Luna short-range rockets, and 6 nuclear bombs for IL-28 bombers. Even with the pullout of the strategic missiles, the tacticals would stay, and Soviet documentation reveals the intention of training the Cubans to use them.
But Fidel Castro was livid. Khrushchev had not consulted or even informed Castro about any deals with the Americans -- Fidel heard about the missile withdrawal from the radio. The Cuban leader refused to go along with any onsite inspections in Cuba, and raised further demands. The Soviets had their own Cuban crisis: They had to take back what the Americans called the "offensive weapons," get the U.S. to confirm its non-invasion pledge, and most importantly, keep Cuba as an ally. At the Soviet Presidium, everyone agreed only one man could achieve such a resolution: Anastas Mikoyan.
Mikoyan arrived in Cuba on November 2, 1962, and over 20 days of often-bitter conversations with Cuban leaders -- culminating in this tense meeting -- Mikoyan began to appreciate the danger tactical nuclear weapons posed if they were left on the island, especially in Cuban hands. On one day, Castro would refuse to see Mikoyan; on another, Fidel would order his anti-aircraft crews to shoot at the American surveillance planes.
The final straw apparently came on November 20, when Castro sent instructions to Cuba's representative at the United Nations, Carlos Lechuga, to mention "we have tactical nuclear weapons, which we should keep" -- partly as leverage in negotiations over inspections, also to establish the fact that the weapons were in Cuban possession. Extremely worried, Mikoyan cabled the Soviet Presidium that he now planned to inform the Cuban leader that all tactical nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from Cuba. Mikoyan had to break this unpleasant news to his hosts, and he had to do it in such a way that they would remain Soviet allies.
This four-hour conversation on November 22 provided the final blow to the Cuban revolutionaries, now that the Soviet Union was removing all the weapons for which Cuba had to suffer so much. Castro opened the conversation saying that he was in a bad mood because Kennedy stated in his speech that all nuclear weapons were removed from Cuba, but surely the tacticals were still on the island. Mikoyan confirmed that "the Soviet government has not given any promises regarding the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons. The Americans do not even have any information that they are in Cuba." But the Soviet government itself, said Mikoyan, not under U.S. pressure, has now decided to take them back.
Castro's mood only got worse. Now the tacticals were coming out. Already the Soviets had given in to American pressure on the IL-28 bombers (technically the bombers could reach Florida so they qualified as "offensive" and they were nuclear capable). Mikoyan tried to persuade Castro that "as far as Il-28s are concerned, you know yourself that they are outdated. Presently, it is best to use them as a target plane." Castro retorts: "And why did you send them to us then?"
Castro was very emotional and at times rough with Mikoyan -- he criticized the Soviet military for failing to camouflage the missiles, for not using their anti-aircraft launchers to shoot down U.S. U-2 spy planes, essentially allowing them to photograph the sites. He went back to the initial offer of missiles and stated that the Cubans did not want the missiles, they only accepted the weapons as part of "fulfilling their duty to the socialist camp." The Cubans were ready to die in a nuclear war and were hoping that the Soviet Union would be also willing "to do the same for us." But the Soviets did not treat the Cubans as a partner, they caved in under U.S. pressure, and did not even consult the Cubans about the withdrawal. Castro expressed the humiliation the Cubans felt: "What do you think we are? A zero on the left, a dirty rag. We tried to help the Soviet Union to get out of a difficult situation."
In desperation, Castro almost begged Mikoyan to leave the tactical warheads in Cuba, especially because the Americans were not aware of them and they were not part of the agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Castro claimed that the situation now was even worse than it was before the crisis -- Cuba was defenseless, and the U.S. non-invasion assurances did not mean much for the Cubans. But Mikoyan rejected Castro's pleas and cited a (nonexistent) Soviet law proscribing the transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. Castro had a suggestion: "So you have a law that prohibits transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to other countries? It's a pity. And when are you going to repeal that law?" Mikoyan was non-committal: "We will see. It is our right [to do so]."
This ended Cuba's hope to become a Latin American nuclear power.
Ironically, if the Cubans were a little more pliant, and a little less independent, if they were more willing to be Soviet pawns, they would have kept the tactical nuclear weapons on the island. But they showed themselves to be much more than just a parking lot for the Soviet missiles. Cuba was a major independent variable of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Mikoyan treated his Cuban hosts with great empathy and respect, while being highly critical of his own political and military leadership. He admired the genuine character of the Cuban revolution, he saw its appeal for Latin America. But he also saw the danger of the situation spiraling out of control probably better than other leaders in this tense triangle, and thus brought about the final resolution of the crisis.
The following transcript was prepared by a Soviet note-taker, with the Soviet ambassador to Cuba, Alexandr Alexeyev, translating for Mikoyan.
Mikoyan Castro Memcon 11 22 62.PDF

Um Austriaco na China: Zhang Weiying

OPINION - THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW
Zhang Weiying: China's Anti-Keynesian Insurgent 



The Wall Street Journal, October 12, 2012

Zhang Weiying's warnings that stimulus spending would lead to malinvestment were once ignored. Now official ministries invite the follower of Hayek to speak.

China's Anti-Keynesian Insurgent

Zhang Weiying's warnings that stimulus spending would lead to malinvestment were once ignored. Now official ministries invite the follower of Hayek to speak.


Beijing
It's a rare afternoon in the Chinese capital when smog hasn't blocked the skies, and one of China's most famous economists is in a sanguine mood. The economy is in trouble as the Communist Party heads for a once-in-a-decade transfer of power while prosecuting its former golden boy, Bo Xilai, on criminal charges. Worried investors want signs that Beijing remains committed to growth—and the sign they'd most like to see is a big Keynesian stimulus.
Zhang Weiying would say that they're wrong to panic. The economic slowdown, he calmly says over tea, is actually good news that "makes the government think we need to change"—toward reform and away from priming the pump. We aren't all Keynesians now in China, he insists.
Three years ago, Keynesianism was official policy. The 2008 financial crisis had Beijing gloating over the failure of the free-market "Washington Consensus" and touting the "China Model" of government intervention. Keynesianism fit the statist zeitgeist and Beijing then suffered an export slump, so the government allocated $3.5 trillion—or about 50% of gross domestic product—in bank loans and direct spending.
Mr. Zhang's academic colleagues were all praise for the "China Model," but in 2009 he was giving speeches entitled "Bury Keynesianism." Then a top administrator at Peking University, where he now teaches economics, he argued that since the financial crisis was caused by easy money, it couldn't be solved by the same. "The current economy is like a drug addict, and the prescription from the doctor is morphine, so the final result will be much worse," he said.
Zina Saunders
He invoked the ideas of the late Nobel laureate Friedrich Hayek and the Austrian School of Economics to argue that if the economy weren't allowed to adjust on its own, China's minor bust would be followed by a bigger one. He also advocated doing away with existing distortions such as the monopolies enjoyed in many industries by state-owned enterprises.
Those were the days when China was fast becoming the world's second-largest economy (growth in one 2010 quarter crossed 11% on an annual basis), so the establishment was in no mood to listen. "When I criticized the central government's stimulus policy, many senior officials were not happy," Mr. Zhang says. It might not have helped that at last year's World Economic Forum in China he called the government's powerful National Development and Reform Commission "a bunch of smart people doing something really stupid."

Ultimately, Beijing's stimulus fed a false investment boom that stoked asset bubbles—then the morphine wore off while the government tightened. Officials claim the economy grew at 7.6% year-on-year between April and June this year. Skeptics think the real number is closer to 4%. (One London research house says 1%.) Meanwhile, industries dominated or favored by the state, such as steel or solar power, are idling from overcapacity. Countless sheets of copper are reportedly stacked in warehouses, blocking doorways and exemplifying Hayek's notion of "malinvestment."
In other words, the stimulus was a poster child for Mr. Zhang's Austrian theories. And the sheer size of the failure suddenly has people paying attention. "The Keynesian policy didn't deliver what it promised," he says, so "more and more people realize that . . . when the government makes investment [in] something that's useless, recession will come."
Chinese officials no longer treat Mr. Zhang as a pariah. He reports that Ministry of Agriculture officials tell him they enjoy reading his articles. Other ministries and local governments, including in Henan and Liaoning provinces, invite him to speak. He says that when he recently wrote an article praising the late Austrian economist Murray Rothbard, the Communist Party secretary of Shanghai—a fairly high-level apparatchik—told him he liked it.
Could Austrian sympathies be percolating right to the top of Chinese officialdom? Last month, Premier Wen Jiabao called the stimulus a "scientific response" to the crisis and tried to refute the charge that the country "paid an undue price" for it. He sounded like someone forced to defend against internal challengers who had been reading Hayek—or Zhang Weiying.
Mr. Zhang didn't identify with the Austrian school until 2008, when he presented a paper at an economics conference in Chicago and someone told him he sounded like a Hayek acolyte. He says he'd always thought this way.
The 52-year-old was born in rural Shaanxi province in north-central China. In a country where party officials and tiger mothers compete to brainwash youth, he escaped both.
"Rural areas were not so polluted by [party] ideology," he says. "My parents were illiterate," he adds, and once he began his education, they couldn't understand the ideas he brought home from school. "That means they never interfered."
Mr. Zhang has been charting his own way since he was a graduate student in economics in Shaanxi. He wrote a newspaper article in 1983 arguing that money wasn't evil. For that crime, critics from the still-powerful anticapitalist camp tore into him. There was a danger he wouldn't be able to graduate with a degree, but "thankfully, China's political climate changed in a very short time."

In the mid-1980s, under party leader Deng Xiaoping, officials were moving to liberalize the economy. Yet they were sometimes clueless. After decades of a planned economy, says Mr. Zhang, "the price [of everything] was distorted" and the government's solution was to "set up a price research center with a big computer . . . and adjust prices according to this calculation." Of course, "they couldn't get any results."
This gave Mr. Zhang his first break. In his graduate thesis, he considered the possibility of having one price system remain government-controlled and leaving another to the market, with industries moving slowly from the first track to the second. He impressed policy makers with the idea at a 1984 conference, and they adopted it, giving Mr. Zhang a job with the State Commission for Reforming the Economic System. The stint turned him off from policy-making. Bureaucrats rarely "rock the boat," he says. "Making policy is a political process . . . a compromise."

Looking for a world where he didn't have to compromise, he went to Oxford, where he studied for an economics doctorate. On returning to China in 1994, he co-founded the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University, the country's oldest modern institution of higher learning.

Mr. Zhang says he prefers the academic marketplace of ideas rather than policies, but he stands out there too. Unlike the Chinese tribe of reformer-economists who see themselves as technocrats chipping away at statism, Mr. Zhang thinks in stark moral terms. In a speech this year, he invoked Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to argue that there is such a thing as natural law and that the right to property is "passed prior to sovereignty."
The flip side of this freedom to pursue success is being able to stomach failure, which is where Mr. Zhang's affinity for Hayek ties in. Austrians frown even on central banks trying to manipulate demand because, as Mr. Zhang tells it, "when you make a mistake, you must take responsibility."
"If you suffer today, it's a small suffering. But if you don't have that suffering today," tomorrow "you'll have a big suffering." Letting people know that truth, he says, "is what an economist or scholar should do."
Leaders should do this too, and he talks excitedly about the late 1990s, when the Asian economic crisis spurred the party to privatize state companies, even if it left 20 million unemployed. The crisis had brought Indonesia and others to their knees, says Mr. Zhang, and China's leaders understood at the time that "the lesson was not to have crony capitalism" and a bloated public sector.
Back then, the intellectual tide was going in Mr. Zhang's direction. State-controlled CCTV proclaimed him "Economist of the Year" in 2002, and he remembers that at Peking University "the whole culture was reform-oriented too." He was appointed assistant president of the university that year and later dean of the Guanghua School of Management, where he pushed reform.
The reforms proved successful, but the reformer was crucified. The old guard in the faculty lounges revolted, while accusations impugning Mr. Zhang's loyalty and questioning his credentials swirled over the Internet. He was forced out of his Guanghua post in 2010.

Much of the trouble stemmed from internal campus politics, but he also says that the broader "environment changed." China's universities are a product of a planned economy, so "if the whole country [was] in the good process of reform, people like me won't be treated like that."
What happened? China's leadership team of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, in place since 2002, reversed reforms. Rising inequality was the original excuse for favoring the public sector and, one suspects, high growth soon convinced policy makers to continue on that path. The new mantra in Beijing was "guo jin, min tui"—the state advances, the private sector retreats.

When the financial crisis struck Beijing jumped at the chance to advance the state even further. The poor economic result is now front and center, but Mr. Zhang says the past decade has also seen dramatic social problems that help alter the climate of opinion. The Chinese people have watched bureaucrats distribute resources to state companies and their friends, and popular perceptions of corruption and inequality have grown. Far from a crisis of markets, he says, Beijing is facing a crisis of state.
That is why Mr. Zhang is hopeful for reforms. He proposes restarting privatization, which he says is easier to do now because "some of these companies are listed on exchanges." Overhauling the financial system is next, since state companies use the banks as ATMs and deprive entrepreneurs of formal loans.
Can we expect such a liberalization right after the new crop of leaders is anointed in mid-November? He says that Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang, a contender for the top decision-making body, is a "real reformer." But otherwise he admits that Chinese politics is a black box.

Is there a possibility that Beijing will turn to another stimulus to goose GDP? "Certainly things could go worse. But there could also be good opportunity," he says. What he does know is that people's way of thinking has changed. It's just that the "impact is implicit, not explicit" in China's nondemocracy.
Mr. Zhang is optimistic because he thinks 30 years of openness have altered expectations. "We have a lot of trust in" markets today, which is why the last decade's anti-market turn has exasperated people. Mass protests against land grabs and other government bullying now number 180,000 a year, according to government data compiled at Beijing's Tsinghua University. These protests are hard for the party to ignore—and powerfully make the moral case for free markets.
"We human beings always seek happiness," says Mr. Zhang. "Now there are two ways. You make yourself happy by making other people unhappy—I call that the logic of robbery. The other way, you make yourself happy by making other people happy—that's the logic of the market. Which way do you prefer?"

Mr. Bhattacharya is an editorial page writer for The Wall Street Journal Asia.
A version of this article appeared October 13, 2012, on page A11 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: China's Anti-Keynesian Insurgent.

Trapalhadas petroliferas do governo - revista Piaui

Quando o governo passado iniciou sua trajetória errática, uma coisa o caracterizava na área energética: combustíveis renováveis, sobretudo etanol e biodiesel.
No meio do caminho, o governo tropeçou um imenso manancial de petróleo, o do pré-sal, e endoidou completamente. Ou melhor, ele já era doido, só ficou maluco de pedra, e não fez mais nada de correto, ou só burradas, para não dizer que fez c..... sobre c....., o que é respeitável record, mesmo para quem fez tanto mal para as instituições e a própria economia brasileira, aprofundando o estatismo, o intervencionismo, a carga fiscal, a corrupção, a mentira, a desfaçatez e outros vícios mais.
Tudo, tudo o que o Brasil não precisava era de uma batalha rentista, de políticos oportunistas e burocratas deformados, em torno desses milhares, milhões, bilhões, de m3 de petróleo, aliás escondidos a mais de 7 mil metros de profundidade, com um custo considerável de extração e desafios tecnológicos de monta.
Se tivéssemos continuado no regime anterior, as empresas privadas já teriam começado a exploração de várias áreas.
O governo Lula só representou atraso, em todas as áreas, especialmente no petróleo.
Leiam a matéria abaixo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


Consuelo Dieguez
Revista Piauí, Setembro de 2012

No começo de agosto de 2008, durante uma cerimônia no estado do Pará, o então presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva celebrou a descoberta das reservas de petróleo na camada do pré-sal. "Deus não nos deu isso para que a gente continue fazendo burrice. Deus deu um sinal. Mais uma chance para o Brasil", disse a uma plateia entusiasmada. E prosseguiu, como vinha fazendo em todos os seus discursos: "É preciso que a gente aproveite esse momento e tente discutir como vamos utilizar esse petróleo, quem vai explorar esse petróleo." A descoberta foi alardeada como um dos maiores feitos do seu governo e incorporada à campanha da candidata Dilma Rousseff. Passado o período de excitação e das falas exaltadas, o petróleo do pré-sal continua praticamente intocado no fundo do mar, a 7 mil metros da superfície. Não se definiu ainda o que fazer com tamanha riqueza.

A camada de sal tem 800 quilômetros de comprimento por 200 de largura, e estende-se, no fundo do oceano Atlântico, do Espírito Santo até Santa Catarina. A Petrobras encontrou petróleo sob o sal em meados de 2007, durante a exploração do campo de Tupi (depois rebatizado de Lula), na bacia de Santos, a 286 quilômetros da costa do Rio de Janeiro. Testes subsequentes confirmaram a existência, só nesse campo, de 5 a 8 bilhões de barris de óleo.

Esse volume correspondia a quase metade das reservas brasileiras conhecidas até então, de 14,4 bilhões de barris. Outras descobertas na mesma região ampliaram as estimativas para 20 bilhões de barris. A sísmica feita no local, uma espécie de ultrassonografia gigante do fundo do oceano, detectou que há um reservatório colossal e contínuo sob toda a camada do sal. Os geólogos da Petrobras deduziram que há grande probabilidade de se encontrarem imensas quantidades de óleo em toda a sua extensão.
A descoberta não provocou euforia apenas no governo. O mercado inteiro se alvoroçou: petroleiras, fornecedores de máquinas e equipamentos, trabalhadores do setor, analistas e políticos que viram a chance de multiplicar a arrecadação de seus estados e municípios com os royalties sobre as áreas exploradas. Os prognósticos eram os mais favoráveis. Comemorava-se a possibilidade de geração de milhares de empregos, deconstrução de plataformas e navios e de encomenda de grandes volumes de equipamentos à indústria nacional.

Um estudo elaborado à época pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro concluiu que, para atender os projetos de exploração e produção no pré-sal, os investimentos seriam de, no mínimo, 340 bilhões de dólares entre 2009 e 2025. A descoberta foi tão impactante que o Departamento de Energia americano chegou a prever que, em 2030, o Brasil seria o quarto maior produtor mundial, atrás apenas da Arábia Saudita, da Rússia e dos Estados Unidos. Esse clima de exaltação já não existe mais. Cedeu lugar a incertezas sobre a política do governo para o setor.

Sob a justificativa de que as reservas gigantes no pré-sal exigiam um tratamento distinto do que é dado a outras áreas, o governo decidiu fazer uma lei alterando o marco regulatório de 1997, que permitiu que outras empresas passassem a explorar e produzir petróleo no Brasil. Após meses de discussão, uma comissão interministerial mudou a forma de exploração do combustível. Os contratos para a região do pré-sal não seriam mais de concessão, como os vigentes até então, mas sim de partilha. Na concessão, as empresas participam de leilões e pagam um bônus pelos blocos arrematados. Todo o petróleo encontrado fica com as companhias, que transferem ao governo royalties e participações especiais sobre a produção. No contrato de partilha, metade do petróleo encontrado fica com a União, que divide os riscos de exploração e depois ressarce as empresas pelos investimentos feitos nas jazidas. As empresas continuam pagando royalties e participação especial sobre a produção.

A proposta da comissão interministerial foi enviada ao Congresso em agosto de 2009. Lá, virou alvo de disputas inflamadas entre políticos de estados produtores e não produtores de petróleo pelas receitas dos royalties. O novo marco regulatório demorou um ano e meio para ser aprovado. Lula sancionou a lei no final do seu governo, mas vetou toda a parte que tratava da distribuição dos royalties por ferir os contratos anteriores, feitos sob o regime de concessão. Coube à presidente Dilma, no começo de seu governo, enviar um novo projeto ao Congresso tratando especificamente dessa questão. A discussão se arrasta desde então na Câmara dos Deputados, retardando a exploração no pré-sal.

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Abatam todas as mulheres que sabem ler... (calma, nao sou eu)

Este poderia ser o grito de guerra dos talibãs, não é mesmo?
Talvez até preventivamente: "abatam todas as mulheres que pretender ir para a escola, que ousam aprender a ler, que pensam em sair da ditadura dos homens..."
Pronto, assim fica melhor.
Acredito que o Afeganistão, o Paquistão, junto com alguns redutos outros em países asiáticos e africanos (muçulmanos, por certo), são os lugares mais miseráveis do ponto de vista das mulheres.
Estou errado?
Estou sendo anti-islâmico?
Gostaria que me provassem o contrário.
Aceito qualquer evidência material, intelectual, espiritual, virtual, de que não é assim nesses lugares. 
Vou me penitenciar, e admito até dialogar com um talibã.
Mas, seria mesmo possível?
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


By DECLAN WALSH
The Pakistan police said they had made several arrests in the shooting of the teenage education activist Malala Yousafzai, but the Taliban said she would be targeted again.