Civil-Military Relations - Samuel Huntington (NRRBs)

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Should We Worry About Trump’s Fawning Admiration of the Military?

By Gary J. Bass

The New York Review of Books, June 29, 2018

In his short time in office, President Trump has surrounded himself with senior military officers and expressed unquestioning admiration for the armed forces, even going so far as to propose a military parade on Veterans Day— something more typical of Beijing or Moscow. Should we be worried?

The best answer can be found in a book by Samuel Huntington that came out more than six decades ago. When most people think of Huntington, they remember his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,” or perhaps his hostility to Latino immigration in his latter years, but they would be far better off reading “The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.” First published in 1957, it is by far the most influential book on the subject — and itself a source of no small controversy.

Ambitious and deftly written, “The Soldier and the State” is an argument for civilian mastery over a professional military. For Huntington, modern military officers were like doctors or lawyers, with a specific professional expertise: managing violence. Whether in the United States or even the Soviet Union, their proper ethic was realistic, conservative and prudent, more wary of going to war than their reckless or crusading civilian masters.

Crucially, a suitably professionalized military stands aloof from politics. It should avoid the disastrous examples of Germany’s domineering general staff in World War I or Japan’s bellicose generals in World War II, whose political dominance brought confusion, fanaticism and ruin. Instead, Huntington believed that maximizing the professionalism of the armed forces would render them “politically sterile and neutral.” There would be no need to fear military domination or coups, because the officer corps would shun politics.

Cuba Almost Became a Nuclear Power in 1962 - Foreign Policy

Cuba Almost Became a Nuclear Power in 1962

The scariest moment in history was even scarier than we thought.

BY SVETLANA SAVRANSKAYA | Foreign Policy, October 10, 2012

Cuba would have become the first nuclear power in Latin America 50 years ago, if not for the dynamics captured in this remarkable verbatim transcript -- published here for the first time -- of Fidel Castro's excruciating meeting with Soviet deputy prime minister Anastas Mikoyan, on November 22, 1962. The document comes from the personal archive of his son, the late Sergo Mikoyan, which was donated to theNational Security Archive and which appears for the first time in English this month in the new book, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis.

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Long after the world thought the Cuban Missile Crisis had ended, with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's withdrawal of his medium-range nuclear missiles announced on October 28 -- and two days after President John F. Kennedy announced the lifting of the quarantine around Cuba -- the secret crisis still simmered. Unknown to the Americans, the Soviets had brought some 100 tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba -- 80 nuclear-armed front cruise missiles (FKRs), 12 nuclear warheads for dual-use Luna short-range rockets, and 6 nuclear bombs for IL-28 bombers. Even with the pullout of the strategic missiles, the tacticals would stay, and Soviet documentation reveals the intention of training the Cubans to use them.

But Fidel Castro was livid. Khrushchev had not consulted or even informed Castro about any deals with the Americans -- Fidel heard about the missile withdrawal from the radio. The Cuban leader refused to go along with any onsite inspections in Cuba, and raised further demands. The Soviets had their own Cuban crisis: They had to take back what the Americans called the "offensive weapons," get the U.S. to confirm its non-invasion pledge, and most importantly, keep Cuba as an ally. At the Soviet Presidium, everyone agreed only one man could achieve such a resolution: Anastas Mikoyan.

Mikoyan arrived in Cuba on November 2, 1962, and over 20 days of often-bitter conversations with Cuban leaders -- culminating in this tense meeting -- Mikoyan began to appreciate the danger tactical nuclear weapons posed if they were left on the island, especially in Cuban hands. On one day, Castro would refuse to see Mikoyan; on another, Fidel would order his anti-aircraft crews to shoot at the American surveillance planes.

The final straw apparently came on November 20, when Castro sent instructions to Cuba's representative at the United Nations, Carlos Lechuga, to mention "we have tactical nuclear weapons, which we should keep" -- partly as leverage in negotiations over inspections, also to establish the fact that the weapons were in Cuban possession. Extremely worried, Mikoyan cabled the Soviet Presidium that he now planned to inform the Cuban leader that all tactical nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from Cuba. Mikoyan had to break this unpleasant news to his hosts, and he had to do it in such a way that they would remain Soviet allies.

This four-hour conversation on November 22 provided the final blow to the Cuban revolutionaries, now that the Soviet Union was removing all the weapons for which Cuba had to suffer so much. Castro opened the conversation saying that he was in a bad mood because Kennedy stated in his speech that all nuclear weapons were removed from Cuba, but surely the tacticals were still on the island. Mikoyan confirmed that "the Soviet government has not given any promises regarding the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons. The Americans do not even have any information that they are in Cuba." But the Soviet government itself, said Mikoyan, not under U.S. pressure, has now decided to take them back.

Castro's mood only got worse. Now the tacticals were coming out. Already the Soviets had given in to American pressure on the IL-28 bombers (technically the bombers could reach Florida so they qualified as "offensive" and they were nuclear capable). Mikoyan tried to persuade Castro that "as far as Il-28s are concerned, you know yourself that they are outdated. Presently, it is best to use them as a target plane." Castro retorts: "And why did you send them to us then?"

Castro was very emotional and at times rough with Mikoyan -- he criticized the Soviet military for failing to camouflage the missiles, for not using their anti-aircraft launchers to shoot down U.S. U-2 spy planes, essentially allowing them to photograph the sites. He went back to the initial offer of missiles and stated that the Cubans did not want the missiles, they only accepted the weapons as part of "fulfilling their duty to the socialist camp." The Cubans were ready to die in a nuclear war and were hoping that the Soviet Union would be also willing "to do the same for us." But the Soviets did not treat the Cubans as a partner, they caved in under U.S. pressure, and did not even consult the Cubans about the withdrawal. Castro expressed the humiliation the Cubans felt: "What do you think we are? A zero on the left, a dirty rag. We tried to help the Soviet Union to get out of a difficult situation."

In desperation, Castro almost begged Mikoyan to leave the tactical warheads in Cuba, especially because the Americans were not aware of them and they were not part of the agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Castro claimed that the situation now was even worse than it was before the crisis -- Cuba was defenseless, and the U.S. non-invasion assurances did not mean much for the Cubans. But Mikoyan rejected Castro's pleas and cited a (nonexistent) Soviet law proscribing the transfer of nuclear weapons to third countries. Castro had a suggestion: "So you have a law that prohibits transfer of tactical nuclear weapons to other countries? It's a pity. And when are you going to repeal that law?" Mikoyan was non-committal: "We will see. It is our right [to do so]."

This ended Cuba's hope to become a Latin American nuclear power.

Ironically, if the Cubans were a little more pliant, and a little less independent, if they were more willing to be Soviet pawns, they would have kept the tactical nuclear weapons on the island. But they showed themselves to be much more than just a parking lot for the Soviet missiles. Cuba was a major independent variable of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Mikoyan treated his Cuban hosts with great empathy and respect, while being highly critical of his own political and military leadership. He admired the genuine character of the Cuban revolution, he saw its appeal for Latin America. But he also saw the danger of the situation spiraling out of control probably better than other leaders in this tense triangle, and thus brought about the final resolution of the crisis.

The following transcript was prepared by a Soviet note-taker, with the Soviet ambassador to Cuba, Alexandr Alexeyev, translating for Mikoyan.

Mikoyan Castro Memcon 11 22 62.PDF

Svetlana Savranskaya is director of Russia programs at the National Security Archive, George Washington University. Her new book, with the late Sergo Mikoyan, is The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November (Stanford CA/Washington DC: Stanford University Press/Wilson Center Press, 2012).

Nossos aliados no Brics: sobre Siria e Assange-Equador

O ministro Lavrov sempre foi, é um dos melhores amigos dos amigos dos amigos, se é que vocês me entendem, todos companheiros unidos numa mesma causa, em prol da soberania, do respeito à lei, da não intervenção nos assuntos internos dos outros Estados e essas outras coisas antigas, mas ainda válidas. Sua fala, abaixo transcrita, é de um realismo impressionante, o que só testemunha em favor de sua coerência lúcida e de sua adequação aos princípios consagrados do direito internacional, sem falar da lógica e do interesse próprio.
Como é que o regime sírio vai deixar de massacrar seus opositores, se estes pretendem massacrar o regime sírio, a começar por Assad e seus asseclas? Seria pedir que eles cometessem suicídio certo?
Por isso que Brasil e Rússia estão certos, desse ponto de vista: enquanto todas as partes não cessarem suas hostilidades, é irrealista pedir que apenas uma das partes renuncie à violência. Lógico, pois não?
Portanto, Assad está plenamente certo em continuar a destruir tranquilamente seu país, bombardeando bairros e cidades inteiras, lançando ataques aéreos contra seus opositores, enfim, massacrando alegremente aqueles que não concordam em que ele seja o único presidente legítimo da Síria. Quem não concorda com isso, não pode dialogar com o governo, certo?
O problema desses ocidentais é que eles não respeitam os direitos legítimos dos Estados soberanos, e ficam perturbando o cenários com demandas ilegítimas e ilegais relativas a democracia, direitos humanos e essas coisas incômodas. O Brasil está certo em defender a soberania dos Estados, e impedir a derrubada de governos legítimos pela força. O governo está certo ao se alinhar com a Rússia e a China no veto a essas medidas propostas no CSNU pelos ocidentais de intervenção nos assuntos internos da Síria. Onde iríamos parar, se isso fosse autorizado?
Quanto ao Equador, acho que o ministro Lavrov está ligeiramente equivocado: o que os bolcheviques fizeram foi justamente invadir o Palácio de Inverno, contra a lei e o direito. O ministro Lavrov está condenando agora os bolcheviques? Que gracinha...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

UN Security Council has no authority to support revolution in Syria – Lavrov

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Published: 01 September, 2012, 10:51
Edited: 01 September, 2012, 17:03

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (RIA Novosti/Eduard Pesov)

The UN Security Council has no right to support a revolution or foreign intervention in Syria, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned. Any plan to withdraw government troops while fighting continues is untenable, and naïve at best, he added.

The demand for President Bashar al-Assad to resign as a precondition to resolving the Syrian crisis is a completely unrealistic approach, Lavrov said during a public appearance at the Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs.

“There are different attitudes towards the Syrian regime. But while fighting in the streets continues, it is absolutely unrealistic to say that the only way out is for one side to unilaterally capitulate. It is not a matter of ideology, we don’t support any political figures in Syria. We just reason from what is realistic,” Lavrov said to the students of the diplomatic university.

Harking back to the summit in Geneva in June, Lavrov noted that despite differing opinions on the conflict, all the participating countries agreed to work for a “free, stable, independent and democratic”Syria. However, “our western partners and some nations in the region are almost openly pushing for outside intervention,” said Lavrov.

“Outside intervention should be positive. Every international player should push for both sides of the Syrian conflict to cease violence,” stressed Lavrov. “Saying that the government should be the first to pull out its troops from towns and then the opposition is not a viable plan.”

The Russian foreign minister added that those foreign players who insist on inciting the opposition forces “are not working in the interests of the Syrian people. They are motivated by their own geopolitical interests.”

Lavrov cited the fact the Security Council dismissed a vote on the Geneva accord as evidence that a number of countries were not working for the Syrian people.

Ecuador, Assange’s rights must be respected

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange’s rights as a political refugee must be respected, Lavrov said, adding that under international law, it would be illegal for UK police to storm the Ecuadorian embassy.

“As long as he is inside Ecuadorian territory, I think no one will try any rash actions, and the rights of the refugee [Assange] must be respected. No one can challenge the judicial process. But when the Ecuadorian embassy is threatened with being stormed, just like the Winter Palace was, I think it’s a little outside the rule of law,” Lavrov said in his talk to the students, alluding to the Bolshevik storming of the Winter Palace during Russia's 1917 revolution.

WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has been holed up inside the Ecuadorian embassy in London since June. The whistleblower is currently in the center of an international stalemate insofar as Ecuador has granted him asylum but the UK has pledged to arrest him if he sets foot outside the building. 

Assange estimates that he could potentially get out of the Ecuadorian embassy in a year’s time if Sweden drops the extradition order against him. The 41-year-old Australian is wanted for questioning over charges of sexual assault and rape in Sweden.

Assange has said that if Sweden drops the extradition order against him he could potentially leave the embassy in a year’s time. The 41-year-old Australian is wanted for questioning over charges of sexual assault and rape in Sweden.

Commenting on the WikLeaks whistleblowing scandal that precipitated Assange’s asylum request, Lavrov said that the information in the WikiLeaks cables “brought to light how governments relate to their partners, and what they think of them.” The document dump hadn’t harmed or threatened the safety of any particular government, he said.

“It was curious,” Lavrov said. “But nothing more. Many of our impressions were simply confirmed.”