Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (RIA Novosti/Eduard Pesov)
The UN Security Council has no right to support a revolution or foreign intervention in Syria, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned. Any plan to withdraw government troops while fighting continues is untenable, and naïve at best, he added.
The demand for President Bashar al-Assad to resign as a precondition to resolving the Syrian crisis is a completely unrealistic approach, Lavrov said during a public appearance at the Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs.
“There are different attitudes towards the Syrian regime. But while fighting in the streets continues, it is absolutely unrealistic to say that the only way out is for one side to unilaterally capitulate. It is not a matter of ideology, we don’t support any political figures in Syria. We just reason from what is realistic,” Lavrov said to the students of the diplomatic university.
Harking back to the summit in Geneva in June, Lavrov noted that despite differing opinions on the conflict, all the participating countries agreed to work for a “free, stable, independent and democratic”Syria. However, “our western partners and some nations in the region are almost openly pushing for outside intervention,” said Lavrov.
“Outside intervention should be positive. Every international player should push for both sides of the Syrian conflict to cease violence,” stressed Lavrov. “Saying that the government should be the first to pull out its troops from towns and then the opposition is not a viable plan.”
The Russian foreign minister added that those foreign players who insist on inciting the opposition forces “are not working in the interests of the Syrian people. They are motivated by their own geopolitical interests.”
Lavrov cited the fact the Security Council dismissed a vote on the Geneva accord as evidence that a number of countries were not working for the Syrian people.
Ecuador, Assange’s rights must be respected
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange’s rights as a political refugee must be respected, Lavrov said, adding that under international law, it would be illegal for UK police to storm the Ecuadorian embassy.
“As long as he is inside Ecuadorian territory, I think no one will try any rash actions, and the rights of the refugee [Assange] must be respected. No one can challenge the judicial process. But when the Ecuadorian embassy is threatened with being stormed, just like the Winter Palace was, I think it’s a little outside the rule of law,” Lavrov said in his talk to the students, alluding to the Bolshevik storming of the Winter Palace during Russia's 1917 revolution.
WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has been holed up inside the Ecuadorian embassy in London since June. The whistleblower is currently in the center of an international stalemate insofar as Ecuador has granted him asylum but the UK has pledged to arrest him if he sets foot outside the building.
Assange estimates that he could potentially get out of the Ecuadorian embassy in a year’s time if Sweden drops the extradition order against him. The 41-year-old Australian is wanted for questioning over charges of sexual assault and rape in Sweden.
Assange has said that if Sweden drops the extradition order against him he could potentially leave the embassy in a year’s time. The 41-year-old Australian is wanted for questioning over charges of sexual assault and rape in Sweden.
Commenting on the WikLeaks whistleblowing scandal that precipitated Assange’s asylum request, Lavrov said that the information in the WikiLeaks cables “brought to light how governments relate to their partners, and what they think of them.” The document dump hadn’t harmed or threatened the safety of any particular government, he said.
“It was curious,” Lavrov said. “But nothing more. Many of our impressions were simply confirmed.”
5 comentários:
O posicionamento do Brasil é muito interessante em certos casos. Aparentemente, seria um posicionamento fundamentado nos melhores princípios. Porém, lendo melhor, é um posicionamento sem posição contra aqueles que considere aliados.
Por exemplo, no caso do programa nuclear iraniano. O ex-presidente, discursando, há tempos,despedindo-se de Angela Merkel, na Alemanha, quando esta criticou o programa nuclear iraniano, disse, resumidamente, que "ninguém que possuísse arsenais nucleares teria moral para cobrar que o Irão não tivesse a bomba". Aparentemente correto, só que foi um popular "pula baú".
Para ser verdadeiro o que ele quis dizer, teria de sê-lo fortalecendo o caráter pacifista do Brasil, signatário do acordo de não proliferação e sujeito a inspeções regulares da AIEA.
Mas, ao contrário, ele atacou os que detinham arsenais nucleares, sem deixar claro que gostaria de ver todos sem armas nucleares. Deixou claro um aspecto pueril: como as potências ocidentais detinham poderio nuclear, por que não permitiam que outros países, fora do Ocidente, ou na periferia do Ocidente, também pudessem tê-los?
Pueril e absurdo raciocínio, para um País que, há mais de cem anos não entra em guerra com seus vizinhos.
Agora, em relação à Síria, a tergiversação é a mesma. Se a Síria pode reprimir violentamente, pelo fato dos oposicionistas também usarem de violência, como explicar como chegamos à mudança de ditadura para democracia em 1985? Por que não dar como exemplo a forma como o Brasil realizou a sua transição, ao invés de perfilar-se, por mal disfarçada omissão ou apoio ou meia verdade, em favor do governo sírio?
"In war, truth is the first casualty."
* Aeschylus
Greek tragic dramatist (525 BC - 456 BC)
Caro Dr. P.R.A.,
Primeiramente gostariamos de ratificar de que existem sim "valores universais"; direitos naturais ou não; reconhecidos por todos os povos e nações; como a proteção à vida humana e os princípios da autodeterminação e não-intervenção! Não obstante, não acreditarmos que "valores ocidentais" sejam "universiais"; ao melhor estilo "one fits all"!
Não queremos fazer aqui o papel de "advogado do diabo"; não nutrimos simpatias por regimes como o de al-Assad; mas é fato que na região (Oriente Médio, Oriente Próximo,...whatsoever...!) pululam regimes tão execráveis quanto o alawita; e no entanto o Ocidente, convenientemente, não usa a mesma "régua" para medí-los! Coisas da "Realpolitik" (...e os que têm poder para pô-la em prática; o faz!).
Não tenhamos ilusões quanto ao embate entre as forças do governo sírio e os ditos "rebeldes"; trata-se do clássico modelo de "proxy war"! Miram em Damasco; mas o alvo é Terão!
Quanto aos vetos de Rússia e China no CS; tenhamos em mente que a Síria não é a Líbia,"ipsis litteris", e Bashar al-Assad não é Muammar al-Gaddafi! Desculpe-nos valermo-nos desta expressão chula, mas,"...o buraco é mais em baixo!".
Após o consenso, entre os cinco membros permanentes do CS, para aprovação da resolução 1973 (S/RES/1973), de 26 de março de 2011, a qual permitiu fechar o espaço aéreo líbio (NO FLY ZONES); e impedir que os aviões líbios atingissem as cidades tomadas pelos "rebeldes"; sob à égide do princípio de intervenção humanitária("Responsibility to Protect"); autorizando os membros da ONU:"...to take all necessary measures,...to protect civilians..."; fora interpretada de forma "extensiva" por alguns membros do CS; o que culminou com a intervenção decisiva da OTAN em favor dos "rebeldes"; servindo de aríete para derrubar Muammar al-Gaddafi; indo além do que fora autorizado pelo CS; contariando a "letra" e o "espírito" da resolução e da carta da ONU.
Como resultado - China e Rússia -, tornaram-se recalcitrantes quanto à aprovar qualquer resolução no âmbito do CS que possa permitir que o mesmo ocorra com a Síria.
(continua)
(continuação do psot anteririor)
Para melhor entender o intricado tabuleiro dos ineresses envolvidos, valemo-nos da análise da situação feita pela STRATFOR no artigo "Consequences of the Fall of the Syrian Regime" (July 24, 2012):
(...)
"The Russian and Chinese Strategy
The geopolitical picture is somewhat clearer than the internal political picture. Whatever else happens, it is unlikely that al Assad will be able to return to unchallenged rule. The United States, France and other European countries have opposed his regime. Russia, China and Iran have supported it, each for different reasons. The Russians opposed the West's calls to intervene, which were grounded on human rights concerns, fearing that the proposed intervention was simply a subterfuge to extend Western power and that it would be used against them. The Chinese also supported the Syrians, in part for these same reasons. Both Moscow and Beijing hoped to avoid legitimizing Western pressure based on human rights considerations -- something they had each faced at one time or another. In addition, Russia and China wanted the United States in particular focused on the Middle East rather than on them. They would not have minded a military intervention that would have bogged down the United States, but the United States declined to give that to them.
"But the Russian and Chinese game was subtler than that. It focused on Iran. As we have argued, if the al Assad regime were to survive and were to be isolated from the West, it would be primarily dependent on Iran, its main patron. Iran had supplied trainers, special operations troops, supplies and money to sustain the regime. For Iran, the events in Syria represented a tremendous opportunity. Iran already held a powerful position in Iraq, not quite dominating it but heavily influencing it. If the al Assad regime survived and had Iranian support to thank for its survival, Syria would become even more dependent on Iran than was Iraq. This would shore up the Iranian position in Iraq, but more important, it would have created an Iranian sphere of influence stretching from western Afghanistan to Lebanon, where Hezbollah is an Iranian ally.
"The Russians and Chinese clearly understood that if this had happened, the United States would have had an intense interest in undermining the Iranian sphere of influence -- and would have had to devote massive resources to doing so. Russia and China benefitted greatly in the post-9/11 world, when the United States was obsessed with the Islamic world and had little interest or resources to devote to China and Russia. With the end of the Afghanistan war looming, this respite seemed likely to end. Underwriting Iranian hegemony over a region that would inevitably draw the United States' attention was a low-cost, high-return strategy.
"The Chinese primarily provided political cover, keeping the Russians from having to operate alone diplomatically. They devoted no resources to the Syrian conflict but did continue to oppose sanctions against Iran and provided trade opportunities for Iran. The Russians made a much larger commitment, providing material and political support to the al Assad regime.
"It seems the Russians began calculating the end for the regime some time ago. Russia continued to deliver ammunition and other supplies to Syria but pulled back on a delivery of helicopters. Several attempts to deliver the helicopters "failed" when British insurers of the ship pulled coverage. That was the reason the Russians gave for not delivering the helicopters, but obviously the Russians could have insured the ship themselves. They were backing off from supporting al Assad, their intelligence indicating trouble in Damascus. In the last few days the Russians have moved to the point where they had their ambassador to France suggest that the time had come for al Assad to leave -- then, of course, he denied having made the statement.
(continua)
(continuação do post anterior)
"A Strategic Blow to Iran
As the Russians withdraw support, Iran is now left extremely exposed. There had been a sense of inevitability in Iran's rise in the region, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula. The decline of al Assad's regime is a strategic blow to the Iranians in two ways. First, the wide-reaching sphere of influence they were creating clearly won't happen now. Second, Iran will rapidly move from being an ascendant power to a power on the defensive.
"The place where this will become most apparent is in Iraq. For Iran, Iraq represents a fundamental national security interest. Having fought a bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s, the Iranians have an overriding interest in assuring that Iraq remains at least neutral and preferably pro-Iranian. While Iran was ascendant, Iraqi politicians felt that they had to be accommodating. However, in the same way that Syrian generals had to recalculate their positions, Iraqi politicians have to do the same. With sanctions -- whatever their effectiveness -- being imposed on Iran, and with Iran's position in Syria unraveling, the psychology in Iraq might change.
"This is particularly the case because of intensifying Turkish interest in Iraq. In recent days the Turks have announced plans for pipelines in Iraq to oil fields in the south and in the north. Turkish economic activity is intensifying. Turkey is the only regional power that can challenge Iran militarily. It uses that power against the Kurds in Iraq. But more to the point, if a country builds a pipeline, it must ensure access to it, either politically or militarily. Turkey does not want to militarily involve itself in Iraq, but it does want political influence to guarantee its interests. Thus, just as the Iranians are in retreat, the Turks have an interest in, if not supplanting them, certainly supplementing them.
"The pressure on Iran is now intense, and it will be interesting to see the political consequences. There was consensus on the Syrian strategy, but with failure of the strategy, that consensus dissolves. This will have an impact inside of Iran, possibly even more than the sanctions. Governments have trouble managing reversals."
(...)
Não haverá uma resolução do conflito, em curto prazo, que se arrasta já por quase dois anos,com centenas de milhares de refugiados e mortos, em grande parte população civil, sobretudo quando governos ocidentais "exigem" a renúncia de al-Assad; prolongando o sofrimento do povo sírio; quando deveriam os membros do CS e potências regionais, que têm poder de influenciar às partes envolvidas no conflito, sentar à mesa e negociar uma trégua; e posteriormente um "modus vivendi" satisfatório para todos.
Vale!
(continuação do post anterior, parte final)
"A Strategic Blow to Iran
As the Russians withdraw support, Iran is now left extremely exposed. There had been a sense of inevitability in Iran's rise in the region, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula. The decline of al Assad's regime is a strategic blow to the Iranians in two ways. First, the wide-reaching sphere of influence they were creating clearly won't happen now. Second, Iran will rapidly move from being an ascendant power to a power on the defensive.
"The place where this will become most apparent is in Iraq. For Iran, Iraq represents a fundamental national security interest. Having fought a bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s, the Iranians have an overriding interest in assuring that Iraq remains at least neutral and preferably pro-Iranian. While Iran was ascendant, Iraqi politicians felt that they had to be accommodating. However, in the same way that Syrian generals had to recalculate their positions, Iraqi politicians have to do the same. With sanctions -- whatever their effectiveness -- being imposed on Iran, and with Iran's position in Syria unraveling, the psychology in Iraq might change.
"This is particularly the case because of intensifying Turkish interest in Iraq. In recent days the Turks have announced plans for pipelines in Iraq to oil fields in the south and in the north. Turkish economic activity is intensifying. Turkey is the only regional power that can challenge Iran militarily. It uses that power against the Kurds in Iraq. But more to the point, if a country builds a pipeline, it must ensure access to it, either politically or militarily. Turkey does not want to militarily involve itself in Iraq, but it does want political influence to guarantee its interests. Thus, just as the Iranians are in retreat, the Turks have an interest in, if not supplanting them, certainly supplementing them.
"The pressure on Iran is now intense, and it will be interesting to see the political consequences. There was consensus on the Syrian strategy, but with failure of the strategy, that consensus dissolves. This will have an impact inside of Iran, possibly even more than the sanctions. Governments have trouble managing reversals."
(...)
Não haverá uma resolução do conflito, em curto prazo, que se arrasta já por quase dois anos,com centenas de milhares de refugiados e mortos, em grande parte população civil, sobretudo quando governos ocidentais "exigem" a renúncia de al-Assad; prolongando o sofrimento do povo sírio; quando deveriam os membros do CS e potências regionais, que têm poder de influenciar às partes envolvidas no conflito, sentar à mesa e negociar uma trégua; e posteriormente um "modus vivendi" satisfatório para todos.
Vale!
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