O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

sábado, 8 de fevereiro de 2020

José Guilherme Merquior: um ensaio sobre sua obra política - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Estou terminando um longo ensaio sobre o colega diplomata, mas sobretudo um grande intelectual, talvez o maior que tenha integrado a carreira diplomática, que ainda precisa ser revisto e normalizado para fins de publicação.
Eis o esquema e a bibliografia, limitada à parte de ciência política, excluindo portanto toda a parte de crítica literária.

José Guilherme Merquior: o esgrimista liberal

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

A caracterização de Merquior como “esgrimista liberal” foi atribuída pelo grande intelectual mexicano Enrique Krauze ao embaixador brasileiro pouco depois de seu precoce falecimento, em janeiro de 1991. José Mario Pereira, o editor da Topbooks que, à exceção do “último”, sobre o Liberalismo antigo e moderno, publicou os derradeiros livros do intelectual, diplomata e acadêmico (nessa ordem), transcreveu um trecho da homenagem do historiador mexicano no comovente ensaio que Pereira preparou sobre o “fenômeno Merquior” para a coletânea organizada por Alberto da Costa e Silva: O Itamaraty na Cultura Brasileira (Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco, 2001; pp. 360-378).
(...)

[Seções:]

Uma produção intelectual extraordinariamente rica, diversificada, densa

Merquior diplomata: o sistema internacional e a Europa ocidental

A legitimidade intelectual de Merquior, diplomata

Rousseau e Weber na trama da legitimidade

A natureza do processo

O argumento liberal: o liberalismo moderno é um social-liberalismo

Reflexões sobre os liberalismos contemporâneos

O marxismo ocidental: um debate para encerrar o ciclo dos irracionalismos

Entre o marxismo e o liberalismo, a Revolução Francesa repensada

O liberalismo, antigo e moderno: a “Suma” de José Guilherme Merquior

A trajetória intelectual de José Guilherme Merquior: o triunfo da razão

(...)

[Final:]

Teria Merquior sido um grande chanceler para o Brasil? Provavelmente sim, mas creio que o Itamaraty seria muito pequeno, e muito burocrático, para ele. No cargo, poderia ter reformado rituais e comportamentos do estamento diplomático, num sentido iluminista, liberal e liberista; mas ainda assim, isso seria pouco para o seu espírito libertário. O que ele teria feito, certamente, seria iluminar com a sua notável inteligência os métodos e os objetivos de trabalho, colocando a razão, e o sentido da História, acima de quaisquer outras conveniências conjunturais, o que provavelmente teria provocado resistências burocráticas, corporativas e de grupos de interesse econômico. Seria tolerante com os pecados menores de uma burocracia tradicional como o Itamaraty, mas teria deixado uma marca indelével na instituição. Para repetir sua tese na London School, inauguraria um período de “burocracia carismática” na velha Casa de Rio Branco, o que talvez a tivesse transformado para sempre, inaugurando novos padrões de inteligência. Vários colegas, dotados do mesmo espírito, mas hoje cingidos pelas regras sacrossantas da hierarquia e da disciplina, partilhariam e apoiariam tais intenções. Teria sido divertido...

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 3577: 7 de fevereiro 2020

Referências bibliográficas:

Obras de José Guilherme Merquior consultadas para este ensaio:

“O discurso como orador da turma do Instituto Rio Branco de 1963”, in: Lafer, Celso et alii. José Guilherme Merquior, Diplomata. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 1993, pp. 39-45.

“O sistema internacional e a Europa Ocidental” (Bonn, janeiro-fevereiro de 1973). [Brasília:] Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1973 (separata).

O estruturalismo dos pobres e outras questões. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 1975.

A Estética de Lévi-Strauss. Brasília: Editora da UnB, 1975.

L’Esthétique de Lévi-Strauss. Paris: PUF, 1977.

De Anchieta a Euclides: breve história da literatura brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1977.

O problema da legitimidade em Política Internacional: tese apresentada no I Curso de Altos Estudos do Instituto Rio Branco (1978); in: Lafer, Celso et alii. José Guilherme Merquior, Diplomata. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 1993, pp. 48-80.

Rousseau and Weber: two studies in the theory of legitimacy. Londres: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980.

O fantasma romântico e outros ensaios. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1980.

As Ideias e as Formas. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1981.

A natureza do processo. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1982.

O argumento liberal. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1983.

“Discurso de posse na Academia Brasileira de Letras” (11/03/1983); disponível no link: http://www.academia.org.br/academicos/jose-guilherme-merquior/discurso-de-posse.

Michel Foucault ou o niilismo da cátedra. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1985.

Crítica, 1964-1989: ensaios sobre arte e literatura. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1990.

Western Marxism. Londres: Paladin, 1986; 1991.

O Marxismo Ocidental. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1986; São Paulo: É Realizações, 2018.

“El otro Occidente: um poco de filosofia de la história desde Latinoamerica”, Cuadernos Americanos Nueva Epoca, n. 13, enero-febrero 1989.

“O repensamento da Revolução”, in: Furet, François; Ozouf, Mona (orgs.). Dicionário Crítico da Revolução Francesa. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1989, pp. xvii-lvii.

“Brésil: cent ans de bilan historique”, Cahiers du Brésil Contemporain, n. 16, pp. 5-22; link: http://www.revues.msh-paris.fr/vernumpub/1-Merquior%20-%20Souza.pdf.

Liberalism old and new. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991.

O Liberalismo, antigo e moderno. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1991; tradução do original em inglês de Henrique de Araújo Mesquita.

Algumas reflexões sobre os liberalismos contemporâneos (1986). Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Liberal do Rio de Janeiro, 1991, 27 p.

Outras obras:

Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. Révolutions bourgeoises et modernisation capitaliste: Démocratie et autoritarisme au Brésil. Sarrebruck: Éditions Universitaires Européennes, 2015.

_______ . Marxismo e socialismo no Brasil e no mundo: trajetória de duas parábolas da era contemporânea. Brasília: Edição de Autor, 2019.

Azambuja, Marcos Castrioto. “Merquior: dois momentos e duas dimensões”, in: Lafer, Celso et alii. José Guilherme Merquior, Diplomata. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 1993, pp. 21-24.

Campos, Roberto. “Merquior, o liberista”, prefácio a O Liberalismo, antigo e moderno. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1991, pp. 1-14.

Costa e Silva, Alberto da (org.): O Itamaraty na Cultura Brasileira. Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco, 2001.

Fonseca Jr., Gelson. “Introdução ao texto O problema da legitimidade em Política Internacional”, in: Lafer, Celso et alii. José Guilherme Merquior, Diplomata. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 1993, pp. 31-38.

Franco, Afonso Arinos de Melo. O índio brasileiro e a Revolução Francesa: as origens brasileiras da teoria da bondade natural. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora, 1937.

Furet, François; Ozouf, Mona (orgs.). Dicionário Crítico da Revolução Francesa. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1989; Prefácio de José Guilherme Merquior; tradução de Henrique Mesquita.

Gellner, Ernest; Cansino, César (orgs.). Liberalism in modern times: essays in honour of José G. Merquior. Londres: Oxford University Press, 1996.

______ . Liberalismo, fin de siglo. Almeria: Editorial Universidad de Almeria, 1998.

Lafer, Celso. “José Guilherme Merquior: O problema da legitimidade em Política Internacional”, in: Lafer, Celso et alii. José Guilherme Merquior, Diplomata. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 1993, pp. 9-14.

Pereira, José Mario. “O fenômeno Merquior” in: Alberto da Costa e Silva (org.): O Itamaraty na Cultura Brasileira. Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco, 2001, pp. 360-378.

Ricupero, Rubens. “A diplomacia da inteligência”, in: Lafer et alii, José Guilherme Merquior, diplomata. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 1993, pp. 15-20.

Seixas Corrêa, Luiz Felipe de. “José Guilherme Merquior: um depoimento pessoal”, in: Lafer, Celso et alii. José Guilherme Merquior, Diplomata. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 1993, pp. 25-30.

Universidade de Brasília, Encontros Internacionais da UnB, Brasília, Editora da UnB, 1980.

Livros e capítulos PRAlmeida nas bibliotecas do Itamaraty

O Itamaraty possui três bibliotecas: a do MRE, estritamente, também chamada Azeredo da Silveira, a do Instituto Rio Branco, para os estudantes que labutam em campus próprio, e a primeira, original, velhusca e aparentemente estagnada, a do Itamaraty do Rio de Janeiro, no velho Palácio.
Consultando o catálogo unificado, encontrei esses resultados, mas dos quais seria preciso retirar várias dissertações do período em que o IRBr mantinha o seu curso de Mestrado em Diplomacia, do qual fui professor orientador e quase coordenador.

Information Unit

Biblioteca Azeredo da Silveira(117)

Biblioteca Histórica do Itamaraty Rio(7)

Instituto Rio Branco(44)

Type of work

Publication date

O afundamento do Department of State por Trump - Robbie Gramer (Foreign Policy)

Existem várias maneiras de destruir um serviço diplomático de qualidade: a designação de representantes sem qualificações, com base unicamente nas contribuições feitas para a campanha presidencial é uma delas, e a mais estarrecedora, para uma grande potência, que precisa dispor de informações fiáveis, que só diplomatas experimentados podem prover.

At Embassies Abroad, Trump Envoys Are Quietly Pushing Out Career Diplomats

“There’s zero support or pushback from the department for the career people,” said one former U.S. official.

Robbie Gramer

Foreign Policy, February 5, 2020, 3:19 PM

Foreign Policy illustration/Getty Images

Lana Marks is a successful fashion designer and member of U.S. President Donald Trump’s private Mar-a-Lago club in Florida. Though she has no prior diplomatic experience, Marks is also Trump’s ambassador to South Africa, and last month she forced out her second in command, the veteran career foreign service officer David Young.

Multiple current and former officials familiar say issues at the embassy arose over disputed accounts of the ambassador pushing for her son to take on an elevated role with the embassy. A senior embassy official, speaking on condition of anonymity, vehemently denies these claims, calling them “totally inaccurate” and saying Young’s departure was a separate issue.

To some current officials, Young’s case illustrated a growing trend in the Trump administration. Already, several of Trump’s political allies-turned-ambassadors—he has appointed a higher percentage than most previous presidents—have sacked their deputies amid a culture of mistrust between politically appointed and career State Department officials.

Marks has also faced other criticism within the State Department over how she manages the embassy in Pretoria, although management problems at the embassy predate her arrival.

Several officials say concerns were raised over the conflicting accounts of whether her son would have a role at the embassy. The senior embassy official said the ambassador did not try to get her son a senior embassy job, but rather wanted to make him “chief of staff” of her household, under her personal employ. The idea, the official said, initially came at the suggestion of another senior State Department official, but then later the State Department reversed that suggestion.

Marks deleted a tweet on Nov. 8, 2019, referring to her son, Martin Marks, as her “chief of staff” on Twitter. She did so at the State Department’s request, the embassy official said.

The official stressed that the ambassador is committed to complying with all State Department rules and regulations.

Other U.S. Embassy staff have been pushed out or left their post early, including officials who worked on foreign aid and health programs in a country that is a major recipient of U.S. funds to tackle HIV and AIDS, according to several State Department officials familiar with the matter. Some officials attribute this to the ambassador, but the senior embassy official said the ambassador is working to fix them and that she “inherited” problems at the embassy that were “long-standing and had been brushed under the rug.”

An internal State Department watchdog report released last month on the U.S. diplomatic mission in South Africa detailed allegations of employees experiencing bullying and mismanagement, months before Marks assumed her role as ambassador.

Last month, the State Department dispatched several senior officials to South Africa to help manage tensions at the embassy, two officials said, including Deputy Undersecretary of Management William Todd and Geeta Pasi, the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs.

It’s not the first time the State Department has had to respond to allegations of mismanagement at embassies abroad, nor is it unique to the current administration. But Trump’s politically appointed ambassadors are sacking their deputy chiefs of mission—an embassy’s second-in-command post held by foreign service officers—in unusually high numbers, officials say.

Former U.S. diplomat Nicholas Burns testifies before the Senate.

Pompeo’s Silence Creates a ‘Crisis of Morale’ at State Department

“The rank and file are very disturbed by the inability, the refusal, of the secretary of state to defend his own people,” says former diplomat Nicholas Burns.

Trump's EU ambassador Gordon Sondland testifies in the impeachment inquiry.

U.S. Diplomacy’s ‘Gordon Problem’ Goes Way Beyond Gordon Sondland

With the ambassador’s headline-making testimony, the Ukraine impeachment inquiry shed unprecedented light on the difference between political appointees and career diplomats.

Trump's ambassador to the EU Gordon Sondland prepares to testify in the impeachment inquiry.

Plugging the Donor-to-Ambassador Pipeline

Trump gives more ambassadorships to donors and fat cats than most presidents. A House bill seeks to stop that practice for all presidents going forward.

This story draws on interviews from over a dozen current and former U.S. officials and other people familiar with the matters in question. The State Department did not respond to five requests for comment for this story. The U.S. Embassy official who spoke to Foreign Policy said the State Department did not properly notify Marks in advance of the multiple requests for comment.

After publication, Marks issued the following statement to Foreign Policy: “David Young, my former DCM, is a wonderful man and a tremendously capable diplomat. I was and am personally very fond of him. Our management styles were quite different, and with his experience and ambition, I felt it far more appropriate for him to be in a chargé [d’affaires] position, which I arranged for him and was told was imminent. I only wish him the very best in the future.”

The State Department did not respond to a request for comment on Young’s next posting.

Along with South Africa, Trump’s envoys in Canada, France, Iceland, Romania, and the United Kingdom have all removed their deputy chiefs of mission, some ambassadors doing so just shortly before or after arriving at their new posts.

Ambassadors have full authority to remove their deputy chief of mission, even without cause, given how important the relationship between an ambassador and his or her deputy is to ensuring the smooth management of an embassy. But the high rate at which it’s happening now reflects how wide the gulf can be between politically appointed ambassadors and the diplomatic corps—an issue laid bare by Trump’s impeachment trial that dragged the State Department into Congressional impeachment investigations. Behind the scenes, some officials fear it is hampering embassies’ abilities to carry out their missions.

“We are deeply concerned by the number of removals of deputy chiefs of mission overseas, which are happening at way above the normal pace,” said Eric Rubin, a senior foreign service officer currently serving as president of the American Foreign Service Association, the union that represents U.S. diplomats. “It’s generally very rare for a DCM to be removed by the ambassador. It does happen. Sometimes it happens for a good cause. But it’s rare. And it is now becoming an epidemic.”

“It’s created a lot of turmoil in a lot of embassies even … if it’s hard to quantify,” said another senior U.S. diplomat.

In several cases where deputy chiefs of mission were forced out early, including the U.S. Embassy in France led by Ambassador Jamie McCourt, Trump’s ambassadors have cycled through two or three deputy chiefs during their tenure. The embassies where deputy chiefs are being sacked are all led by deep-pocketed Republican political donors whom Trump tapped to be ambassadors, despite some having no prior diplomatic or government experience.

The senior U.S. Embassy official in South Africa said Marks is “currently working with a very capable and excellent team of foreign service officers and a great DCM.”

Marks, who was born in South Africa, founded a highly successful luxury handbag company bearing her name. She has served on Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Women’s Leadership Board and as a lecturer at Georgetown University’s Women’s Leadership Initiative, according to her official biography on the U.S. Embassy in South Africa’s website. She is also one of at least eight members of Trump’s private Mar-a-Lago club in Florida to be offered senior administration positions, according to a 2019 investigation by USA Today. She has been in South Africa for several months, after the ambassador post sat empty for three years.

Marks said she “hit the ground running” after arriving in Pretoria in an interview last month with the Daily Maverick, regularly working 6 a.m. to 2 a.m. to make up for lost time, with a goal of boosting trade ties between the two countries and trying to help South Africa become one of the United States’ top 20 trade partners globally. “I have the right people on board. … It’s a lot of work to make this happen. It’s tripling trade. But I have the support of the people I need,” she said in the interview.

She saw her lack of government experience as an asset. “I come from the private sector. I’m not a civil servant by background. That’s why President Trump put me in this position, because I’m a person who wants results,” she said in the interview.

U.S. embassies traditionally employ some diplomats’ family members, primarily in administrative posts and particularly in smaller embassies in developing countries that are short-staffed. But it is against State Department regulations for a diplomat to be in a role that would manage or oversee a family member, officials said. Consequently, U.S. ambassadors’ family members can’t take jobs at the embassy, since the ambassador oversees all personnel.

One official who spoke to Foreign Policy conceded that the clear State Department guidelines barring nepotism aren’t reflected elsewhere in the administration: The president’s own son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and daughter Ivanka Trump have senior roles at the White House. (The Department of Justice ruled in 2017 that Kushner having a role in his father-in-law’s administration does not violate federal anti-nepotism laws.)

Marks’s son, Martin, is a writer with degrees from Johns Hopkins University and New York University who has written in the past for outlets including New Yorker and Vanity Fair. The senior embassy official who spoke to Foreign Policysaid he “helped behind the scenes with all aspects of communications” during her vetting process before she was confirmed by the Senate. He “conducted training sessions on domestic and foreign policy” for Marks “and assisted with hearing preparation, and helped draft her opening statement, all with the full knowledge of the State Department.”

Both Democratic and Republican administrations have carried out the practice of tapping campaign donors for ambassador posts, which has sometimes—though not always—sowed mismanagement and morale issues at U.S. embassies abroad. (Indeed, several Obama administration donors-turned-ambassadors were quietly sacked over allegations of mismanagement.) The United States is one of the only countries in the world with a practice of giving ambassador posts to high-end political donors. Some of those ambassadors receive high marks and plaudits from foreign service officers, and some foreign countries prefer such U.S. ambassadors, in instances where they have closer ties to the White House or president’s inner circles.

Ambassadors require a presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. Traditionally, two-thirds of ambassador posts are held by career diplomats, while one-third are held by political appointees. Under Trump, the ratio of ambassador posts held by political appointees has increased—42 percent of Trump’s ambassador appointees are political, and 58 percent are career, according to data from the American Foreign Service Association—though that number constantly shifts as ambassadors cycle in and out of posts.

In past administrations, career officials including deputy chiefs of mission felt they had the support of the State Department if their ambassador was causing issues. That’s not the case now, said Lewis Lukens, a former longtime career diplomat. “There’s zero support or pushback from the department for the career people,” he said.

Lukens told GQ that he was forced out of his job as deputy chief in London in 2018 by Trump’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Woody Johnson, after mentioning former President Barack Obama in speeches he gave to British students.

“When I was being told I had to leave seven months early, the answer from the department was, ‘Look, the ambassador is a friend of the president’s, he’s a friend of Trump’s, and there’s nothing we can do,’” Lukens told Foreign Policy. “I imagine that some of these other people are facing that same situation.”

Several other current State Department officials who spoke to Foreign Policy on condition of anonymity concurred. “The level of mistrust of the career service by incoming political appointees is extraordinarily high on average,” said one.

“There is this implicit assumption that the career people can’t be trusted, which is both very corrosive to our institution, but also very unfair and inaccurate. The signal that sends to the career staff is really, really harmful,” said another.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo came to Foggy Bottom in 2018 vowing to restore the State Department’s “swagger” following the rocky tenure of Trump’s first secretary of state, Rex Tillerson. He took steps to improve morale, lifting an unpopular hiring freeze instituted under Tillerson and taking time to meet with U.S. Embassy staff and their families during his trips abroad. In department-wide emails he sends from his travels abroad, dubbed “Miles with Mike,” Pompeo regularly praises the hard work and dedication of his employees.

But Democratic lawmakers and former senior diplomats have criticized Pompeo over his handling of events surrounding Trump’s impeachment. The impeachment hearing thrust career State Department officials into the spotlight through public hearings on the president’s purported efforts to pressure Ukraine into investigating a political rival. (Trump was acquitted of all charges on mostly partisan lines on Wednesday.) Notably, Pompeo has not offered public support for former Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch, a career foreign service officer forced out of her job following a smear campaign by associates of the president.

Pompeo has dismissed those criticisms. “I’ve defended every single person on this team. I’ve done what’s right for every single person on this team,” he said when pressed on Yovanovitch during an interview with NPR last month that ended in an angry confrontation with the interviewer.

U.S. embassies abroad aren’t immune to the tensions in Washington involving Trump. The president decried “deep state bureaucrats” during the Democratic-led impeachment investigation when State Department officials were subpoenaed to testify before Congress as fact witnesses.

Deputy chiefs of mission serve an important role overseeing the day-to-day management of an embassy, handling almost nonstop contact with foreign counterparts in the host country and, depending on the size of the embassy, overseeing dozens or even hundreds of personnel. They take on an elevated importance during transitions between administrations, when new ambassadors might not arrive for months, or even years, as the confirmation process for them stalls back in Washington amid behind-the-scenes political negotiations between Congress and the White House.

“The DCM essentially bridges the gap between the old ambassador and the new one,” explained one State Department official. “The DCM is responsible for preparing the embassy for the new ambassador and providing continuity and leadership and helping ensure the ambassador is successful at launch.”

An unusually high number of ambassador posts have sat empty under Trump, leaving deputy chiefs to lead the embassy for years on end. Since Pompeo came into office, that trend has declined as more ambassador nominations move through the White House and Republican-controlled Senate.

The ambassadors’ relationships with their deputy chiefs of mission is key, but it can be difficult to manage with a high-powered political donor-turned-ambassador stepping into an embassy for the first time, said Lukens. “What you want ideally is for the ambassador and DCM to complement one another’s skills,” he said.

“It’s a bit more complicated when the ambassador is a political appointee who doesn’t really bring any [diplomatic] skills or background to the job. In those cases the DCM is really responsible for running and managing the embassy.”

Update, Feb. 6, 2020: This story was updated to include additional comments, including a statement from Ambassador Lana Marks. It was also updated to include information from a State Department inspector general’s report on the embassy.

Robbie Gramer is a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy.

Twitter: @RobbieGramer

Itamaraty: la chasse aux sorcières à nouveau - Bruno Meyerfeld (Le Monde)

Je reçois, à nouveau, d'un correspondant à Paris, l'article de Bruno Meyerfeld déjà transcrit ici. Celui-ci est une copie d'abonné, puisqu'on voit les links disponibles.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

« C’est un climat de chasse aux sorcières » : dans le Brésil de Bolsonaro, le grand blues des diplomates

Par Bruno Meyerfeld

Le Monde, Publié le 04 février 2020 à 10h28 - Mis à jour le 04 février 2020 à 13h13

Réservé à nos abonnés

Enquête - Depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, le président d’extrême droite fait tout pour imposer sa vision du monde à cette administration influente. Quelques membres de l’« Itamaraty » témoignent de ce qu’ils voient comme la « destruction » en cours de leur ministère.

L’homme nous ouvre la porte, et reçoit tout sourire. Puis il la referme et s’écroule sur une chaise, accablé. « Beaucoup de gens ici sont en dépression. Moi, pour l’instant, je tiens le coup sans médicaments, murmure, les larmes aux yeux ce diplomate haut placé du ministère des affaires étrangères brésilien. Avant, j’allais tous les jours au travail plein d’adrénaline, passionné. Aujourd’hui, j’y vais seulement par obligation. J’ai même pensé à tout quitter. C’est d’une tristesse infinie… »

De lui, nous ne révélerons ni le nom ni la fonction. « Depuis que l’extrême droite de Jair Bolsonaro est au pouvoir, quiconque développe une pensée critique est puni, lâche-t-il. C’est un climat de chasse aux sorcières. » Une demi-douzaine d’autres diplomates ont tout de même accepté de témoigner auprès du Monde, le plus souvent anonymement, sur ce qu’ils considèrent être la « destruction » en cours de leur ministère. Et, avec elle, celle de l’image du Brésil dans le monde.

Avant tout, il convient de rappeler l’importance dans ce pays du ministère des affaires étrangères, surnommé l’« Itamaraty », ce palais des « pierres libres » en langue indienne tupi. Un « temple » de béton conçu par l’architecte Oscar Niemeyer et inauguré en 1970 sur l’axe monumental de Brasilia. Orné d’un jardin aquatique et ceinturé de hautes colonnes, il compte de prestigieux salons et un escalier d’exception, en forme d’hélice, s’élevant vers les étages sans poutre ni rambarde, comme par magie.

Le culte de l’Itamaraty

Mais la puissance de l’Itamaraty n’est seulement une affaire d’architecture. Avec 222 représentations à l’étranger (ambassades et consulats), le pays dispose du huitième service diplomatique de la planète. Mieux que l’Italie, l’Espagne ou le Royaume-Uni. « Peu de pays doivent autant à la diplomatie », écrivit l’ambassadeur et historien Rubens Ricupero (A Diplomacia na Construçao do Brasil, 2016, non traduit). Selon lui, l’institution aurait même forgé, au fil du temps, une « certaine idée du Brésil » : celle d’un géant « heureux (…), en paix (…), confiant dans le droit et les solutions négociées (…), force constructive de modération et d’équilibre ».

L’ambassadeur brésilien se doit d’être charmant, bien mis, cultivé et expert en tout

Le pays voue donc un culte à ses diplomates. Et son Dieu se nomme José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, baron de Rio Branco, ministre des relations extérieures de 1902 à sa mort, en 1912, qui donna sa pleine mesure à l’Itamaraty. Cet homme raffiné, moustache taillée à l’anglaise, sécurisa les frontières, signa des traités de paix avec une dizaine de pays voisins, agrandit pacifiquement le territoire de 190 000 km² et légitima la jeune république aux yeux du monde. Lors de son décès, survenu en plein carnaval, on alla jusqu’à repousser les festivités de quelques semaines.

Depuis, à l’image du « baron », l’ambassadeur brésilien se doit d’être charmant, bien mis, cultivé et expert en tout (« Des clones de Philippe II d’Espagne, altiers, barbus, cultivés, sourcilleux et méprisants », s’amuse un diplomate européen). Formés à l’Institut Rio Branco, à Brasilia, les fonctionnaires sont recrutés lors d’un concours considéré comme le plus difficile de la république : 6 400 candidats pour 20 places en 2019. Les « itamaratistes », au minimum trilingues, maîtrisent aussi bien les textes antiques que le droit international et sont souvent « prêtés » aux autres ministères, aux exécutifs locaux, voire aux entreprises publiques. « Nous sommes le “deep state” », résume un ambassadeur. Autrement dit, les vrais maîtres du jeu brésilien.

« Persécutions idéologiques »

Dans ces conditions, il n’est pas étonnant que l’Itamaraty soit devenu la cible de Jair Bolsonaro, modeste capitaine de réserve, qui vomit cette « aristocratie » aussi orgueilleuse que lettrée. Pour ne rien arranger, l’Itamaraty est perçu par le pouvoir comme un nid de gauchistes, « l’un des ministères où l’idéologie marxiste est la plus enracinée », selon les mots d’Eduardo Bolsonaro, influent fils du président. Dès lors, une purge s’imposait, doublée d’une saignée.

« Araujo a voulu s’entourer de gens sans expérience, qui lui doivent tout et ne peuvent pas le contredire », assure un agent du ministère

En un an, cinq ambassades ont été fermées dans les Caraïbes, et deux ou trois autres devraient l’être sous peu en Afrique. Le nombre de « secrétariats » – équivalent des directions générales du Quai d’Orsay en France – a été ramené de neuf à sept, et l’ensemble de ses chefs remerciés, remplacés par des diplomates moins capés et de grades inférieurs. « Le nouveau ministre Ernesto Araujo a voulu s’entourer de personnes de confiance, se justifie-t-on à la direction de l’Itamaraty. C’est naturel, dans le monde entier c’est comme ça ! » Faux, rétorquent plusieurs agents du ministère sollicités par Le Monde. « Démettre tous les chefs d’un coup, c’est inédit, assure l’un d’eux. Araujo a voulu s’entourer de gens sans expérience, qui lui doivent tout et ne peuvent pas le contredire. »

« La maison est devenue silencieuse »

« Tous les ministres des affaires étrangères de Dilma ont été envoyés dans des ambassades de second plan », constate une source, citant Luiz Alberto Figueiredo (au Qatar), Mauro Vieira (en Croatie) et Antonio Patriota (en Egypte). Pour certains, c’est une punition. Pour d’autres, un choix. « Je n’allais pas représenter à l’étranger ce gouvernement de clowns ! J’ai préféré me mettre en retrait », confie ainsi un diplomate, marqué à gauche, ayant accepté une fonction subalterne à l’étranger.

A Brasilia, les ex-chefs de services, « recasés à des postes inférieurs ou laissés sans charge précise, viennent au ministère pour prendre un café, s’asseoir sur une chaise, regarder les murs. C’est très humiliant », explique-t-on. Parmi ces fonctionnaires désœuvrés, Paulo Roberto de Almeida est l’un des rares à témoigner à visage découvert. Ancien directeur de l’Institut de recherche des relations internationales (IPRI), il fut débarqué en mars 2019 pour des posts critiques du ministre publiés sur son blog. Depuis, cet homme de 70 ans a été « relégué » aux archives du ministère. « Mais on ne m’a attribué aucune fonction précise… donc je m’occupe comme je peux : je passe mon temps à la bibliothèque, je lis, j’écris des livres… », dit-il.

Dans l’intervalle, M. de Almeida – pourtant marqué à droite – dit avoir perdu sa « gratification », un complément de salaire pour les chefs de service : « Mon revenu a baissé d’un quart, passant de 26 000 [5 490 euros] à 21 000 reais [4 430 euros] », précise-t-il, dénonçant un climat « de persécution, d’intimidation, doublé de vengeance personnelle ». « Plus personne n’ose se parler librement, les couloirs sont vides. Les gens s’enferment dans leur bureau. La maison est devenue silencieuse. »

Trump, « sauveur de l’âme de l’Occident »

A l’Itamaraty, dans l’un des salons orné de tableaux de maître et de tapisseries, trônait jusqu’à il y a peu le buste d’un monsieur austère, au crâne dégarni et à la fine moustache : San Tiago Dantas, ministre des affaires étrangères au début des années 1960. A l’époque, il fut le chantre d’une politique extérieure indépendante, proche des pays en développement et critique à l’égard des Etats-Unis. D’après la presse, sa statue aurait été discrètement retirée.

Car sur le fond aussi, l’offensive idéologique est lancée, menée par le ministre Ernesto Araujo. Climatosceptique assumé, complotiste notoire, ce diplomate un brin farfelu, capable, dans un même discours, de citer Proust et une réplique de télénovela, prône l’édification d’un axe mondial « chrétien-conservateur », mené par l’Américain Donald Trump, « sauveur de l’âme de l’Occident ». Conséquence : à l’Itamaraty, un nouveau secrétariat à la « souveraineté nationale et à la citoyenneté »a été créé, quand celui dédié à l’environnement a disparu.

Auparavant moteur de l’intégration régionale, le Brésil a annoncé début 2020 son retrait de la Communauté d’Etats latino-américains et caraïbes (Celac). Jadis leader dans les négociations climatiques, il a participé à plein au désastre de la COP25 de Madrid. Autrefois très investi dans les droits de l’homme à l’ONU, il y bloque aujourd’hui nombre de discussions sur les migrations, le genre ou le droit à l’avortement.

« On arrête les conneries ! »

« La nouvelle diplomatie brésilienne, c’est la fin du Forum de Sao Paulo [organisation rassemblant les partis de gauche sud-américains ] et du désalignement automatique sur les Etats-Unis », se réjouit Luis Fernando Serra, nommé en 2019 ambassadeur du Brésil à Paris. Ce diplomate madré, un temps pressenti pour diriger l’Itamaraty bolsonariste, évoque un simple « rééquilibrage » : « A présent, avec Jair Bolsonaro, nous avons une diplomatie pragmatique et ouverte. Nous ne sommes pas soumis aux Etats-Unis et on ne renonce pas à l’Europe : c’est d’ailleurs sous Bolsonaro qu’a été signé l’accord commercial entre l’Union européenne et le Mercosur. L’un n’exclut pas l’autre. »

« Bolsonaro remet en cause l’insertion du Brésil dans le monde et les fondamentaux de notre diplomatie », décrypte Hussein Kalout

Pour les experts, le parti pris est pourtant évident : « Depuis un an, l’alignement sur Washington est total et inconditionnel », estime Hussein Kalout, professeur de relations internationales à l’université Harvard, citant le vote récent de Brasilia contre la levée de l’embargo américain sur Cuba ou le soutien de Jair Bolsonaro à l’assassinat du général iranien Soleimani. « Bolsonaro remet en cause l’insertion du Brésil dans le monde et les fondamentaux de notre diplomatie, fondée sur le multilatéralisme, la résolution pacifique des conflits et le respect de la souveraineté nationale. C’est sans précédent », décrypte M. Kalout.

« De l’antidiplomatie ! »

« Moi, j’appelle ça de l’antidiplomatie ! », enrage Celso Amorim, 77 ans, ancien grand chef de la diplomatie de Lula. Pour cet « itamaratiste » raffiné, qui nous reçoit dans son appartement donnant sur la plage de Copacabana, rempli de livres en français et d’objets d’art, « la diplomatie, c’est résoudre les problèmes par la conversation. Aujourd’hui, on a un discours belliciste, guerrier même. Aussi loin que je me souvienne, même au temps de la dictature, je n’ai jamais éprouvé une telle honte de la politique extérieure de mon pays », s’attriste cette mémoire vivante du « palais » en regardant les vagues au loin.

A bolha da Bolsa trumpista? Vai estourar antes ou depois de novembro? - Thomas I. Palley (The Globalist)

A US Stock Market Boom is Not the Basis of Shared Prosperity

The U.S. addiction to stock price inflation is rooted in an illusion. It is promoted by Donald Trump, Wall Street, the Fed and mainstream economists.

By Thomas I. Palley

The Globalist, February 4, 2020

The United States is currently enjoying another stock market boom. If history is any guide, it may well end in a bust. In the meantime, the boom is having a politically toxic effect. Donald Trump uses it to make the case for his reelection in the fall.

But his argument, at a minimum, requires a big leap of faith. Trump’s assertion – that a stock market boom is the basis for shared prosperity – is just that, an assertion. It certainly hasn’t led to any broad-based prosperity. The beneficiaries are the happy few at the top of the U.S. economic pyramid.

Galbraith’s “bezzle”

Anyone who ever read John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Great Crash 1929, his 1954 classic, has run across Galbraith’s idea of the “bezzle.” In addition to Ponzi schemes, Galbraith’s bezzle also captures the dynamic of speculative bubbles.

Those bubbles are a form of fraud we collectively inflict on ourselves. Investors buy in believing they will be able to sell at a higher price, and their purchases drive up prices and attract new investors who hope to jump on the price appreciation band wagon.

The bubble continues until belief in ever higher prices is punctured, whereupon buyers evaporate and the bubble implodes. Once again, all feel richer along the way.

Today’s stock market increasingly has the smell and feel of another bezzle. That smell is metaphorically rather perfectly reflected in President Trump who has all the integrity of a con man.

Better yet, Trump’s business history, in addition to reliance on funding from suspect sources, is marked by serial bankruptcies.

The Fed as stock market booster

Trump has also managed to use the presidential bully pulpit to cajole the U.S. Federal Reserve into further inflating asset prices by enjoining it to lower interest rates.

In addition to directly impacting asset pricing, the Federal Reserve has given a green flag for speculative buying. In that process, it has strengthened beliefs that it stands ready to guarantee stock prices, via the so-called “Powell put.”

That put is an amplification of the prior “Bernanke put,” which was in turn an amplification of the “Greenspan put” which launched the Federal Reserve’s commitment to stock prices.

To be honest, it did not take much cajoling from Trump as the Federal Reserve has evidently learned little from the past 35 years of serial asset price bubbles.

Furthermore, the composition of its current Board of Governors leans strongly toward Wall Street. Moreover, all of the Fed’ Board members have a strong personal interest in higher U.S. stock market prices from which they each stand to gain.

Mainstream economists as stock market boosters

This already artful policy pyramid is further supported by the mainstream economics profession, many of whom are also beneficiaries of higher stock prices.

Mainstream economists have now embraced asset price inflation as the preferred tool for combating recession and sustaining economic expansions. And some are arguing for the Fed to purchase equities in the next recession.

Conclusion

The wheel has come full circle. Whereas in the post-War era economic policy aimed to provide a floor for labor, now it openly aims to provide a floor for capital.

The U.S. addiction to stock price inflation is politically and economically toxic. It is rooted in an illusion promoted by Wall Street, the Federal Reserve and mainstream economists.

The case they present to an all too gullible American public deliberately conflates stock market returns (for the few) with shared prosperity (for all).

The simple reality is a stock market boom is not the basis of shared prosperity. But don’t expect Mr. Trump ever to tell anyone that truth.

Diplomatizzando