Pais Fundadores Financeiros: o primeiro banco nacional americano - book excerpt

A batalha entre Alexander Hamilton, uma espécie de desenvolvimentista avant la lettre, e os agraristas republicanos reunidos em torno de Jefferson, não se limitou à lei autorizando a criação de um banco nacional, mas se estendia à questão das tarifas alfandegárias e todos os demais mecanismos favorecendo o protecionismo e o apoio à indústria nacional, uma questão que permanece viva, presente e problemático até hoje (basta verificar as posições de Trump a esse respeito).
A questão do banco também se manteve viva, até hoje, ainda que mais uma batalha tenha sido travada em torno da criação do Federal Reserve, um empreendimento que tem pouco mais de cem anos (1913).
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Today's encore selection -- from Financial Founding Fathers: The Men Who Made America Rich by Robert E. Wright and David J. Cowen. When America's Founding Fathers signed the Constitution in 1787, many believed that the new government was only authorized to do the functions specifically enumerated in that document. After all, those enumerated powers were already a bold leap forward from the Articles of Confederation. However, other signers felt that the government should be entitled to do things far beyond the enumerated powers, things "necessary and proper" to carry out its enumerated responsibilities. The difference between those two views formed an immediate rift between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson that echoes to this day -- and first exploded in the battle over a bill to create the first Bank of the United States, an institution nowhere mentioned in the Constitution:

"Banks were then highly controversial, but Alexander Hamilton was at the apex of his brilliance, guiding his Bank bill through Congress, ably aided by Congressman Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, a nationalist of the most fervent type. Although the Bank bill passed the Senate on January 20, 1791, congressman and Federalist Papers co-author James Madison tried to defeat it in the House. On February 8, the diminutive Madison and his allies lost a roll call that counted 39 in favor of the Bank and only 20 opposed. The political fighting had been particularly nasty, causing one senator to state in his diary that 'some gentlemen would have been ashamed to have their speeches of this day reflected in the newspapers of tomorrow.' The attack by the mostly southern opponents to the Bank was a landmark in American history, marking as it did the birth of the agrarian or Jeffersonian wing of the Republican Party. While this stand was the agrarian Re­publicans' first, it was certainly not their last; they would not rest in their attempt to destroy the creative work of Hamilton and his funding system.

 
First Bank of the United States 1792

"Although it had passed both houses of Congress, the Bank bill was anything but a done deal. To become law, President George Washington would have to sign it, and do so before February 26, the time limit imposed by the Constitu­tion. While Hamilton's ties to the president were many and deep, forged as they were during the crises and dangers of the Revolutionary War, Virginia's agrar­ian Republicans, led by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, Attorney General Edmund Randolph, and Madison, also had strong ties with Washington. All four gentlemen shared Virginian roots and bore the stain of slaveholding, though some more thoroughly than others. ... Most importantly, their opposition was not so much political as ideological; they vehe­mently opposed the Bank as unconstitutional and potentially dangerous to republican government. Jefferson and Randolph pressed the president to veto the Bank bill, and Madison's vain attempt to galvanize opposition to the Bank in Congress made it obvious where he stood.

"Washington had a decision to make. Dare he veto a bill of such importance passed by both houses of Congress and eagerly submitted by his closest eco­nomic advisor? Dare he sign the measure and face the accusation that he had passed a law that was, according to many prominent Virginians, impolitic, poor policy, and, perhaps most damning, clearly unconstitutional? Washington showed Hamilton the arguments against the Bank set forth by Randolph and Jefferson and gave him a week to respond. In essence, he placed in Hamilton's hands the power to save his creation.


Alexander Hamilton by William J. Weaver

"It was the sixth day, February 22, and Washington's deadline loomed. ... Hamilton [worked furiously through that night to prepare a rebuttal].

"Many observers, however, demurred or remained unconvinced of the neces­sity of a national bank. Hamilton believed that the long-term viability of his new funding system depended on passage of the law. The pressure to produce a flaw­less retort weighed heavily on him, and he rose to the challenge. In the first clear articulation of the broad or loose interpretation of the Constitution, Hamilton argued that the Bank, though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, was clearly constitutional because 'every power vested in a Government is in its na­ture sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ all means req­uisite and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power.'

"Hamilton had turned the tables on his opposition. Where Jefferson, Madi­son, and Randolph argued that the federal government had no power to incor­porate a bank because it was not explicitly allowed to do so in the Constitution, Hamilton retorted that the government enjoyed all powers necessary to its func­tioning that were not explicitly forbidden. Hamilton's logic was unanswerable. From that day forth the doctrine of 'implied powers' increasingly dominated legal interpretation of the Constitution. Hamilton had gained not one but two victories, the establishment of the Bank and the widespread acceptance of the doctrine of implied powers.

"Washington signed the bill on February 25. The centerpiece of Hamilton's creation was in place. The creator had once again triumphed. However, the 'tri­umvirate' of Madison, Randolph, and Jefferson was horrified that their fellow Virginian had signed the bill. As one pamphleteer noted, 'the great Washington burst from the trammels which had been prepared for him, shook off the bias on which the triumvirate had placed their main dependence, and to the great mor­tification of their party, fixed his signature on the bill.' The agrarian trio would not soon forget."

Financial Founding Fathers: The Men Who Made America Rich
Author: Robert E. Wright and David J. Cowen
Publisher: University Of Chicago Press
Copyright 2006 by Robert E. Wright and David J. Cowen
Pages 11-13

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Rise and demise of Bretton Woods system - Michael Bordo

Um resumo de um paper importante, de um dos maiores especialistas no sistema de Bretton Woods.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

The Operation and Demise of the Bretton Woods System; 1958 to 1971 
For your information, especially if you want to understand some important historical issues related to our international monetary system, here is a good paper by Michael Bordo (NBER Working Paper No. 23189), The Operation and Demise of the Bretton Woods System; 1958 to 1971.
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23189?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw
 
This chapter revisits the history of the origins, operation and demise of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System. The Bretton Woods system was created by the !944 Articles of Agreement to design a new international monetary order for the post war at a global conference organized by the US Treasury at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods ,New Hampshire at the height of World War II. The Articles represented a compromise between the American plan of Harry Dexter White and the British plan of John Maynard Keynes. The compromise created an adjustable peg system based on the US dollar convertible into gold at $35 per ounce along with capital controls. It was designed to combine the advantages of fixed exchange rates of the pre World War I gold standard with some flexibility to handle large real shocks. The compromise gave members both exchange rate stability and the independence for their monetary authorities to maintain full employment.
It took over a decade for the fully current account convertible system to get started. The system only lasted for 12 years from 1959 to 1971 but it did deliver remarkable economic performance. The BWS evolved into a gold dollar standard which depended on the US monetary authorities following sound low inflation policies. As the System evolved it faced the same severe fundamental problems as in the interwar gold exchange standard of: adjustment, confidence and liquidity. The adjustment problem meant that member countries with balance of payments deficits, in the face of nominal rigidities, ran the gauntlet between currency crises and recessions. Surplus countries had to sterilize dollar inflows to prevent inflation.
The U.S. as center country faced the Triffin dilemma. With the growth of trade and income member countries held more and more dollars instead of scarce gold as reserves generated by a growing US balance of payments deficit. As outstanding dollar liabilities grew relative to the US monetary gold stock confidence in the dollar would wane raising the likelihood of a run on Fort Knox.This led to the possibility that the US would follow tight financial policies to reduce the deficit thereby starving the rest of the world of needed liquidity leading to global deflation and depression as occurred in the 1930s. Enormous efforts by the US, the G10 and international institutions were devoted to solving this problem.
As it turned out, after 1965 the key problem facing the global economy was inflation, not deflation, reflecting expansionary Federal Reserve policies to finance the Vietnam war and the Great Inflation. US inflation was exported through the balance of payments to the surplus countries of Europe and Japan leading them in 1971 to begin converting their outstanding dollar holdings into gold. In reaction President Richard Nixon closed the US gold window ending the BWS.

A carne é fraca e a politicagem é forte - Carlos Brickmann

OS DELÍRIOS DA CARNE

Coluna Carlos Brickmann

______________________

(Edição dos jornais de Quarta-feira, 22 de março de 2017)

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O problema não é a carne. O problema não é o tamanho das malfeitorias, nem o prejuízo às exportações. O problema é o Governo; o Governo que politiza a fiscalização de alimentos, que deveria ser estritamente técnica, rígida, intolerante, preocupada com a saúde da população, absolutamente desconhecedora das conveniências de partidos.

Boa parte do Ministério da Agricultura está loteada, aparelhada para servir a interesses partidários. Nos Estados onde houve mais problemas com a Operação Carne Fraca, o PMDB (ala Temer) e o PP, do ministro Ricardo Barros, comandam a Superintendência do Ministério da Agricultura do Paraná. Em Goiás, o poder é exercido pelo PTB, na pessoa do deputado Jovair Arantes. Quem cuida da qualidade da carne?

Quem cuida da qualidade da carne são os próprios produtores e exportadores, que sabem o custo da negligência na redução das vendas internacionais. Já Temer oferece churrasco a representantes dos países exportadores - e mantém a mesma política de loteamento do Governo que levou à questão da carne, sem notar que é esse o seu problema. Narra o bem informado Radar on-line (http://veja.abril.com.br/blog/radar-on-line) que Temer sinalizou à bancada do PMDB mineiro na Câmara que lhe dará a próxima vaga no Ministério. Diante dos governos que temos, a qualidade dos alimentos que consumimos e exportamos é até boa demais.

 

Os dados da briga

 

As principais críticas à Operação Carne Fraca envolvem números. Foram dois anos de investigações e mais de mil policiais federais para autuar 21 dos 4.837 frigoríficos nacionais, dos quais foi preciso interditar três, responsáveis por menos de 2% da produção brasileira de carnes; dos 11.300 funcionários do Ministério da Agricultura, 33 foram afastados. E os 21 frigoríficos colocados sob fiscalização especial exportaram, em 2016, US$ 120 milhões. No total, 0,89% das exportações brasileiros de carne.

 

Os fatos da vida

 

Mas o fato é que havia politicagem, que houve servidores que facilitaram aos infratores o que não deveriam facilitar, que foram encontradas coisas erradas - talvez não as que, no calor da notícia, levaram fontes e jornalistas a divulgar que vitamina C dava câncer. Pode ter havido exagero, mas tinha coisa errada. O estrago está feito. Como assinalou o jornalista gaúcho Fernando Albrecht (http://fernandoalbrecht.blog.br/), "o povo sempre acredita na acusação, mas nunca na defesa". E com motivos.

 

Quem paga a conta

 

Imaginemos que haja apenas um bife estragado em toda a imensa produção nacional. Uma porcentagem desprezível, sem dúvida. Mas, para quem comeu esse bife e passou mal, de que adianta saber que todo o restante da carne produzida no país estava em excelentes condições? E os importadores, por via das dúvidas, por que comprarão do Brasil e não da Argentina, do Uruguai ou da Austrália?A propósito, uma bela explicação em perguntas e respostas sobre a Operação Carne Fraca e os problemas causados por carne em más condições está em http://wp.me/p6GVg3-36c.

Stefan Zweig e o Brasil: nota à imprensa

A Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG), o Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais (IPRI) e o Instituto Rio-Branco (IRBr) promovem nesta data, 21 de março, no auditório Embaixador João Augusto de Araújo Castro, debate sobre a obra do escritor austríaco Stefan Zweig (1881-1942) e sua estada no Brasil.

O debate começará às 15h. A entrada é franca. Terá a participação do ex-ministro Celso Lafer, professor emérito da Universidade de São Paulo; de Kristina Michahelles, jornalista, tradutora e diretora da Casa de Stefan Zweig em Petrópolis; e do historiador Israel Beloch, que coordenou a edição do Dicionário Histórico-Biográfico Brasileiro, editado pela Fundação Getúlio Vargas.

Jornalista na juventude, Stefan Zweig tornou-se, a partir da década de 1920, um dos escritores mais famosos e vendidos em todo o mundo. Em 1936, visitou o Brasil pela primeira vez, sendo homenageado pelo Governo brasileiro. Pronunciou, no Rio de Janeiro, a palestra “A Unidade Espiritual do Mundo”, em que repudiava a visão xenófoba e intolerante à época dominante na sua própria patria e na Alemanha. Com a ascensão do nazismo, exilou-se, a partir de 1934, na Inglaterra, visitando novamente o Brasil, ainda que rapidamente, em 1940, quando recolhe elementos para escrever, em 1941, “Brasil, País do Futuro”, obra em que enaltecia a diversidade presente na formação do povo brasileiro. Depois de breve estada em Nova York, mudou-se para o Brasil no segundo semestre de 1941, mas decidiu-se pelo suicídio em fevereiro de 1942, em Petrópolis, onde tinha instalado residência, profundamente deprimido com o avanço do nazismo na Europa. Ali terminou suas memórias, “O Mundo de Ontem”, na qual descreve o ambiente de liberdade e segurança desfrutado na Europa antes da Grande Guerra. Em sua carta de despedida, reafirmou seu amor pelo Brasil, cuja diversidade e tolerância eram, para ele, motivo de admiração diante de uma Europa que se autodestruía com a Segunda Guerra Mundial.

Depois do debate, o Professor Celso Lafer e o Doutor Israel Beloch autografarão o livro universal (em cinco línguas) editado por este último a partir da conferência de Stefan Zweig no Brasil, sobre “A Unidade Espiritual do Mundo”, que será lançado na ocasião, e que conta com estudo de Lafer sobre o pacificismo de Zweig.

O auditório do Instituto Rio-Branco fica no SAFS Quadra 05, lotes 2 e 3. Tem capacidade para 117 pessoas.