O que segue abaixo são minhas respostas, eminentemente pessoais, a questões colocadas cinco meses atrás (em julho de 2009) por uma jornalista russa a propósito da questão da Ossétia do Sul. Suponho que não tenham apreciado minha sinceridade -- e, portanto, a condenação do "imperialismo" russo -- pois não fui mais contatado para responder questões do mesmo jornal (ou revista). Em todo caso, não costumo acomodar respostas para agradar perguntadores, e respondo exatamente aquilo que penso. Quem não gostar não precisa ler, ou divulgar...
The question of Ossetia and Russian intervention: a personal Brazilian view
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brazilian professor of International Political Economy at University Center of Brasilia (Uniceub) (responding in his personal capacity).
Answers to questions submitted by Yulia Netesova, European Bureau Chief of the Russian Journal.
1) Who in your opinion started the war in Ossetia in 2008?
PRA: There are many answers to this question. The precise one does not depend solely on how one can define “war” – or hostilities, from another point of view – but on how we should consider – and I stress that point – the already conflicting situation and the bellicose state prevailing before the opening of military maneuvers and the actual arms firing after that. One of the alternate answers could be to attribute all responsibilities on the shoulders of Georgian president, who tried to recover full sovereignty over a region of his country that did not respond to his command. Indeed, he seems to carry the main responsibility for the launching of the military operations by the feeble Georgian Army. But we cannot ignore the previous situation of open defiance of this national sovereignty by Ossetian leaders and their Russian allies. In this sense, another alternate answer could also be that Russia, in fact, was acting deliberately to provoke the conflict. So, even if Georgian president bears responsibility for ‘starting’ the actual conflict, both sides could be blamed for the opening of the inevitable war in that region. They objectively share the blame.
2) Taking into account that Russia and the West have opposite points of views about it, do you think that there is a need for new understanding of such terms as "aggressor" and "aggression"?
PRA: In the context of United Nations legal texts – foundational Chart and some Protocols – and in the framework of a formal understanding of those acts by legal fora – the International Law Commission, for instance – those terms are mainly applied in situations implying inter-state relations, that is, acts engaging two (or more) States having full sovereign rights over certain territories. In this sense, aggression clearly implies an unlawful act of a military or likewise nature, against norms and rules of international law, first of all the UN Charter and pertinent covenants.
I do not think that we – or in any case, a competent legal body – should redefine those concepts, but one can read them in connection with other legal terms, like non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, or non-interference. Nevertheless, one also has to bear in mind concrete situations of unrestrained acts of repression against civilians and other unarmed people, which could arise the difficult question of humanitarian intervention (there is not yet a formalized corpus of doctrine and practice concerning humanitarian intervention). But even taking that into account, it is also clear that the Russian response to Georgian military initiatives in Ossetia did not have only humanitarian concerns as its main motivation: there was also a sense of imperial affirmation that is inseparable of Russian geopolitics since Peter the Great.
3) How should these terms be interpreted from now on?
PRA: As regards inter-state relations, there should be no reinterpretation at all, at least if one has to fully respect the Westphalian principles that are at the core of the current international political system, that is, the UN Charter and the most important protocols and conventions dealing with armed conflicts, since the Hague Peace conferences and other multilateral instruments. But if there could be a new understanding, arising from a conceptual evolution of international law, of a different kind of aggression, say of an intra-State nature against civilian populations pertaining to the recognized sovereignty of the same State, then, perhaps, those concepts should be reinterpreted in a sense more respectful of the rights of individuals than of the rights of the said State.
I consider this to be a needed progress of the international law, that is, a clear advancement over the sovereign rights of the State, going instead to favor citizens’ rights, but I’m also skeptical that such an evolution – which should be acquired peacefully and in a consensual manner among most of member States of the UNO system – is really possible or feasible. We are still living in a Westphalian world, that is, one of Nation-States, and any retreat from that legal universe is not only controversial, in doctrinal terms, and difficult in the actual practice of the Nation-States (which will be part of the political scenario for the foreseeable future).
4) To which extent Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhasia altered the traditional Russian course to maintain the stability of the already existing borders on the post Soviet space?
PRA: From a foreign point of view, it seems that Russia acted much more on territorial and geopolitical motivations than on legal grounds. Imperial nostalgia – besides legitimate concerns with Russian people in those regions – is still a driving force in Russian current diplomacy and in his muscled actions at the immediate borders. The implosion of Soviet Union and the chaotic constitution of independent states at the periphery, in 1991-2, represented a significant diminution of Russia’s power and territory; nationalistic feelings and some sense of dispossession are inevitable in those circumstances. In this context it is understandable that Russia will act decisively trying to recover some sense of the honneur perdu. In doing this, Russia concurs to the instability and political tension in the – and possibly to the rearmament of the – entire region, and not only South Ossetia, Abkhasia, Georgia and other neighboring countries. History puts Russia on the expanding side of other comparable great nation-states, and from that vision arises an image of an imperial Russia that is inherently aggressive and domination-prone.
5) Did this move create a legal precedent that might be repeated in the future?
PRA: Certainly. It establishes a pattern of interference and intromission in other States’ internal affairs that could be followed by other States in similar or comparable circumstances. The whole system of UN principles regarding non-intervention and non-interference could be jeopardized. But, of course, there is also an inevitable tension with another principle, that of self-determination. In any case, those difficult questions should be peacefully discussed at a legal multilateral level, preferably UN Security Council or International Law Commission, eventually going to the International Court of Justice. Imposing a solution by faits-accomplis and military demonstrations is the worst non-solution for such difficult situations.
6) Which long-term solutions would you propose for the South Ossetia and Abkhazia problems?
PRA: There are no simple solutions for similar cases, especially in Eastern Europe, where a mosaic of peoples, communities and entangling sovereignties are mixed together in the same spaces. Every solution could represent a loss for some of those people, either in patrimonial and economic rights or in political and civic expressions of self-determination, not to mention language, religious and customs peculiarities, such as education or even judicial systems.
In any case, tentative approaches could imply a common commitment to the exclusive resource to peaceful means, the isolation and containment of extremist and violent people or political movements, and the establishment of legitimate representation of the concerned population to solve the problem peacefully. One possible way out is to appeal to an independent or neutral organization, which should act on the basis of a clear mandate, accepted by all parties. The Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, based in Vienna, could be such a facilitator in this concrete case. Of course, much depends on civil and military leaders of the parties concerned, and their responsible behavior and due restraint.
Unhappily, History only shows that we cannot be too much optimistic in Europe in general, and some regions in particular. Since Middle Ages up to the modern Balkans and, precisely, in the Black and Caspian seas regions, historical records are much more on the side of the violent than in the pacific means for the resolution of conflicts. Peaceful solutions are rather the exception than the rule for territorial claims, peoples’ rights, religious or ethnic affairs, or leadership disputes.
In this particular case, there could be no lasting solution at the local level, if not some sort of guarantee by a big and external power. Those guarantors could be the OSCE or the EU, for one side, and Russia for the other. It seems, though, that Russia is not part of the solution but a part of the problem. So, more than 50% of the solution remains in the Russian side: let’s see if Russian leaders can act responsibly.
7) Would you agree that after the war in South Ossetia the President Medvedev's initiative to create a system of Euroatlantic security became more topical?
PRA: South Ossetia has nothing to do with Euroatlantic security; it should be, theoretically at least, an exclusively European concern. Of course, the NATO entanglement in that region complicates the whole matter, because it brings also the U.S. to the forefront of the crisis. But Russia should understand that if some people and countries seek the umbrella of NATO, it is because they are not comfortable with, and in fact feel threatened by the Russian shadow over them. That’s History: Russia menaced, invaded, occupied, submitted and still threatens most of its neighbors. Even if that is not a fact, that is a plausible perception. Notwithstanding its own record of foreign invasion – by Swedish, Napoleonic or German invaders – Russia is, objectively, the main insecurity factor in Central and Eastern Europe and for most of central Asia, going down to Persia and Afghanistan, since at least the 18th century.
Simple facts should be stated clearly: if central and European peoples, countries or States could feel secure with Russia at their side, they would not seek NATO or other security arrangements. If President Medvedev sincerely wants to build a new security scheme, he could start to invite OSCE, EU and, perhaps, NATO representatives to discuss the revitalization of the arrangements already done at the end of the Soviet era, and commit himself to fully respect them. As regards the new problems arisen by the dissolution of the Soviet empire, he could start to propose a permanent conference, with all concerned parties and European Union and OSCE observers, to discuss all matters in the agenda, in the same manner as big peace conferences were held in the past. There is no perfect guarantee that all matters could be settled easily, but he could not be accused of not trying. After solving, or trying to, the remaining questions in the region, he can pursue his idea of an Euroatlantic security scheme. But, being realistically, that would surely be a new wrap to an old body. As OSCE and NATO are still alive and kicking, Russia should try to live with those realities…
8) How would you explain the paradox that European countries agreed to discuss it exactly after the events of the August 2008?
PRA: It’s simply a matter or urgency: political leaders, if they do not have the qualities of Statesmen – and that is the case of most European leaders, currently –, just act under the pressure of events, or when there is no escape alternative. For many reasons, all humanly explained, complicated matters are always postponed, until they present themselves in the forefront of the agenda. Georgia’s military takeover of Ossetia and Russia’s brutal response prompted them to some activity; besides, Monsieur Sarkozy, as the incumbent president of the EU, was looking for some opportunity to shine again his diplomatic credentials.
9) If Obama continues to prove his commitment to the idea of restarting the relations with Russia, might this cause a cleavage between the USA and ex-Soviet countries that have an anti-Russian stance?
PRA: Perhaps, that it is not certain. Mr. Obama is acting very cautiously with anyone, friend or foe. He has, first, to restore American prestige, after a disastrous Bush presidency, condemned precisely by its arrogant unilateralism and imperial behavior. But, one also should consider the need of Russia to reassert itself in a world that prizes much more soft than hard power. The problem of ex-Soviet countries that have an anti-Russian stance is, first and foremost, a Russian problem, not an American concern, which is not part of the equation (at least originally).
To have any ‘restarting’ of Russian-American relations, both countries should first establish a common agenda at the bilateral and multilateral level, and only after take specific problems in the neighborhood. Conversely, there should no case of Russia being involved with Latin American neighbors that have an anti-American stance: besides the irrelevant case of Cuba, if Russia starts a special relationship with the so-called Bolivarian States – among them, Venezuela in the first place – it would be just to annoy the U.S. and to seek some commercial dealings, in special in arms.
Of course, the U.S., as an imperial State, always will have an eye for any new opportunity to aggrandize its world coverage, but that is mostly done for the best interests of its multinational companies and its business community. American imperialism is first of all a matter of free trade and open investments opportunities. Of course, the U.S. will always seek to have strategic preeminence over any other power, but this is imperial hubris, only conceivable when that power has also economic preeminence. If Russia wants a good relationship with America (and with any other country in the world) it simply has to have as its main purpose to attain the maximum prosperity affordable, which is the result of productivity gains, not of military efforts.
10) Is there a chance that American policy of strengthening the relations with Georgia and Ukraine will zero the small progress in the US-Russian relationship that has been achieved by Obama and Medvedev?
PRA: Perhaps, but that is small politics, or ‘lesser’ geopolitics. Georgia and Ukraine are two small or middle powers, not capable of disrupting world peace or contributing in a relevant manner to world prosperity and security. What Russia has to accomplish, with the U.S., EU, China, India and other relevant actors, is to seek common solutions to common problems: economic growth and development, peace and security through non-proliferation and arms reduction (whenever possible), joint endeavors combating or minimizing the nefarious effects of rogue States, climate change, organized crime and drug trafficking, piracy and terrorism, peace in the Middle East and development in Africa and elsewhere. Georgia and Ukraine are small issues, compared with the huge agenda both countries have to confront.
11) Do you think that USA and other big actors should choose their "friends" and "enemies" on the Euroatlantic space?
PRA: The very notion of ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’ and even the geographical concept of an Euroatlantic space are old stuff, some kind of déjà vu agenda that should submerge under the rubbles of the old geopolitical world of the Cold War. This kind of geopolitical game is the last bad advice that the U.S. or Russia should take from old vintage Prince counselors. In an interdependent world there are no such things as enemies or friends: each and every country should look for opportunities to trade and invest, in a globalized and integrated market. The ‘best’ enemy of the U.S. is probably the Pentagon and its strategists, always looking for enemies around. Even powerful empires have paranoid behaviors. But, let’s have a look on Russia.
The worst enemies of Russia are not outside its frontiers, but are all “made-in Russia”: cesaristic or autocratic trends in the political sphere, the new centralization of economic power in the hands of the State, the corruption and the lack of real independence of some State agencies, the precarious situation of human rights and the killings of journalists and human rights activists, the demographic decline and the worsening of education, health and environment, and, perhaps not the least, the remilitarization of its foreign policy (not to mention the energy blackmail against Europe). If Russia has some concerns with near space, it could look at some of its neighbors, where some autocrats from the Soviet era still command the life and death of their citizens. Democracy, human rights and a market economy are surely the best means to enter the WTO, to join the OECD and start to enjoy the respect and confidence of neighbors and other countries alike.
12) Might this lead to new divisions and new conflicts that will pose a threat to Europe on the whole?
PRA: Europe is a geopolitical dwarf. It does not have the guts nor the will to develop its own strategic capability, having depended so much and for so long on the American nuclear power. But Russia is only a little more capable, in strategic terms, than UK and France together. It could confront them in a hypothetical conflict, but not in the field that matters: economic endurance. Despite its growth in the last few years, Russia has still a long way to go to perform satisfactorily in the productivity game. It has to overcome its dependence on commodities of the energy sector and start to explore other riches: the educational capabilities of its people to transform its enormous resources into valuable products and services.
In the world of the future there will be no more global conflicts or Napoleonic wars – that was the pattern until the Second World War, afterwards no more – but there will be plenty of small, asymmetric conflicts that should be tackled conjointly by the great powers, among them Russia, China, EU and the U.S., of course. The only threat to Europe is its aging population and the reluctance to accept more Third World immigrants, whom are needed to fill the gaps in man-power and pay for its generous social security schemes (that is a Russian problem too).
Focusing in old military conflicts and in political divisions in Europe is the best way to keep alive old ghosts of a geopolitical past, that should be buried, to give space to economic cooperation and integration. Russia seems still mired in its past, instead of looking ahead to receive American, European and Chinese capital, know-how and technology to improve its productive system.
13) The war in South Ossetia started just a couple of months after Dmitry Medvedev became president of Russia. In which way did it influence his political career and international political image?
PRA: It’s difficult to say, from a Brazilian standpoint. The overall impression that we, Westerners or Latin American people, have is that Vladimir Putin is still very much in the commands. So, Medvedev’s political image, at the beginning at least, was not the best possible one, ranging from being a puppet to just an interim president. Nevertheless, as time goes by, he seems to be asserting himself, and marking his own approach to Russian internal and external affairs. This is to be praised and welcomed. After all, a democratic Russia should be heading towards real decentralization, not to concentration of State powers. I’m convinced that a true market democracy in Russia, fully respecting human and citizens’ rights, engaged in internal reforms and sincerely cooperative with neighbors and multilateral organizations is the best outcome that we could have in the world scenario, but first of all for its own people.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasilia, July 23, 2009.
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