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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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domingo, 15 de novembro de 2009

1511) Banqueiros financiando Estados falidos: uma velha história...

Desde tempos recuados, banqueiros privados vem financiando príncipes e reis irresponsáveis, pois estes querem fazer guerra, manter amantes ou ter outros gastos extravagantes e, obviamente, não têm dinheiro para tanto.
No problem. Chame o seu banqueiro. Mas a operação pode sair muito cara.
Como relembram Haldane e Alessandri (do Bank of England) os juros podem subir para até 100%, como fizeram os banqueiros italianos com o rei francês Charles VIII (que aliás estava empreendendo aventuras italianas).
Bem, depois os Estados começaram a financiar banqueiros falidos, e isso muda a história...
Enfim, um passeio em 800 anos de financiamento privado a Estados, e do financiamento público a banqueiros privados, com um foco especial na recente crise financeira.
Transcrevo apenas o início do paper, depois remeto ao link do pdf.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Banking on the state
Paper by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, and Mr Piergiorgio Alessandri, based on a presentation delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago twelfth annual International Banking Conference on “The International Financial Crisis: Have the Rules of Finance Changed?”, Chicago, 25 September 2009.

* * *

1. Introduction
Historically, the link between the state and the banking system has been umbilical. Starting with the first Italian banking houses in the 13th century, banks were financiers of the sovereign. Sovereign need was often greatest following war. The Bank of England was established at the end of the 17th century for just this purpose, financing the war debts of William III.
From the earliest times, the relationship between banks and the state was often rocky. Sovereign default on loans was an everyday hazard for the banks, especially among states vanquished in war. Indeed, through the ages sovereign default has been the single biggest cause of banking collapse.1 It led to the downfall of many of the founding Italian banks, including the Medici of Florence.
As awareness of sovereign risk grew, banks began to charge higher loan rates to the sovereign than to commercial entities. In the 15th century, Charles VIII of France paid up to 100% on war loans to Italian banks, which were at the same time charging Italian merchants 5-10%.2 The Bank of England’s first loan to government carried an interest rate of 8% – double the rate at which the Bank discounted trade bills.
For the past two centuries, the tables have progressively turned. The state has instead become the last-resort financier of the banks. As with the state, banks’ needs have typically been greatest at times of financial crisis. And like the state, last-resort financing has not always been repaid in full and on time. The Great Depression marked a regime-shift in state support to the banking system. The credit crisis of the past two years may well mark another.
Table 1 provides a snap-shot of the scale of intervention to support the banks in the UK, US (...)

Leia o resto em:
Andrew G Haldane: Banking on the state (11.11.2009) - PDF, 180699 bytes
Paper by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, and Mr Piergiorgio Alessandri, based on a presentation delivered at the Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago twelfth annual Intern. Banking Conf., Chicago, 25 September 2009.

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