Se puder confortar... (Dalai Lama interview with Economist)

Unrest in Tibet

The views of a Marxist demon

The Economist, Mar 7th 2013, 10:29 by J.M. and A.R. | DHARAMSALA, INDIA

THE Dalai Lama jokes, in his broken English, that these days, “demon peacefully sleeping”. He playfully puts his hands up by his head to make horns with his fingers; a mocking reference to the word he says Chinese officials have used to describe him. But since the leader of Tibetan Buddhism officially retired from politics in August 2011, he has kept up a hectic schedule; touring foreign countries and giving Buddhist teachings around India where he lives. And although he insists now that he has given up holding regular meetings with officials from Tibet’s government-in-exile, he remains a figure of crucial political importance to his troubled homeland (see our story in this week's issue).
“This life…now service at least in the field of Tibetan struggle, now already end,” he told The Economist in a reception room at his residence in the town of Dharamsala in the Himalayan foothills. This would be a disappointment to many of the Tibetans who queue up to see him. At the age of 77, and in hearty spirits, the Dalai Lama gives the impression of being as keenly interested in, and painfully aware of, conditions in Tibet as he ever was. He insists that he is now—and will be for the rest of his life—engaged in promoting “human values”, “religious harmony” and a dialogue between Buddhism and modern science. But the wave of self-immolations in Tibet, mainly in the two years since he announced his retirement (see our post on Analects, February 15th), has kept him at the centre stage of Tibetan politics.
The Dalai Lama denies that he has encouraged these “drastic acts” (107 of them, resulting in 88 deaths, according to Tibetan exiles). But to China’s anger, he has not condemned them and has publicly said prayers for the victims. In Tibet, he explains, “the majority of the people have a lot of resentment”. He dismisses China’s assertions that the self-immolators have often set fire to themselves for non-political reasons (see, for example, this description by Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency, of how alcoholism and family strife appeared to have led to one such suicide). “These self-burned people, not drunk, not family problem”, he says. “I met some Tibetans. I think many of them, either their parents or grandparents were killed, or arrested and died in prisons, or gulags. So you see the resentment not just recently happened. No.” Chinese leaders, he says, fail to understand this.
The Dalai Lama blames the self-immolations on increasingly tight religious and cultural controls in Tibet. In some areas local officials from China’s ethnic-Han majority have made it more difficult for Tibetans to learn their own language in school, he says. He describes the self-immolations as a “very sensitive political matter”. But he says that his retirement and what he alleges is China’s tendency to “manipulate” his words, have encouraged him to “remain completely silent”. Lobsang Sangay, the government-in-exile’s prime minister who took over the Dalai Lama’s political duties, is blunter. “The message from inside, when someone does self-immolation, is that the number one concern is the return of the Dalai Lama. They want to die, not live as political prisoners under China,” he told The Economist. (Mr Sangay, an American-educated former academic, insists that “political responsibility is with me”, but says he does have “personal” meetings with the Dalai Lama, who offers his experience.)
A growing sense in Tibet that the Dalai Lama is highly unlikely ever to return to his homeland may well be one of the reasons for the spate of immolations. If he dies in exile, the Dalai Lama has said he will likely be reincarnated in the “free world” (see, for example, this interview in 2009 with CNN). This implies that Tibetans will have little chance of seeing the next Dalai Lama in Tibet either, unless huge political change occurs there. The Dalai Lama scoffs at attempts by the Chinese government in recent years to claim a role in the approval of reincarnations (an obvious attempt, say exiles, to lay the groundwork for rejecting the legitimacy of any Dalai Lama chosen outside China and for installing one whom the Chinese authorities believe they can control). “I jokingly said, firstly Chinese communists must accept theory of reincarnation, then second the Communist Party should recognise Chairman Mao Zedong’s reincarnation, then Deng Xiaoping’s reincarnation, then logically show an interest in Dalai Lama’s reincarnation”, says the Dalai Lama with a laugh. With an equal measure of mirth (apparently aimed at showing his own ability to accommodate the party’s faith), he says: “As far as social-economic theory is concerned, I am still a Marxist, not capitalist. That’s not secret.”
The Buddhist leader says he remains committed to a statement he made in September 2011 (see here for the full text) that he will consult other lamas and lay Tibetans about the reincarnation issue when he is “around ninety”. If people feel then the institution of the Dalai Lama is no longer relevant, then it will be abolished, “no problem”, he said, noting that the pope had recently broken with 600-year-old Catholic tradition by resigning. “I think best thing is like pope sort of system”, he says. But the Dalai Lama also says that he regards Tibetans inside Tibet as his “boss”. Given the reverence widely held in Tibet for the institution, it would seem unlikely that there would be calls for it to end. “Morally speaking, I cannot say you should do this, you should not do this,” he says.
The Dalai Lama says he does see some “positive things” in China. He describes meeting a Tibetan monk recently who told him about how “hundreds” of Han Chinese sought his blessings as he toured around China. He speaks of growing demands for political reform among Chinese, including Wen Jiabao, who will step down as prime minister in a few days (though as we reported in 2010, scepticism about Mr Wen’s ability or determination to change anything has long abounded). “Voice of change, of freedom, democracy, rule of law, now these voice[s] are growing year by year”, he says. “Overall picture: this is change, becoming more realistic.” And as China changes, he says, the Tibetan issue will be solved “easily”. If only Tibetans were as optimistic.

Capitalistas sao oportunistas: como os chineses, por exemplo

An Ambivalent China Affirms the Charisma of the Dalai Lama

By ANDREW JACOBS

Published: February 18, 2012

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HONG’AI, China — Despite the absence of road signs or promotional Web sites, a dozen or so people each day manage to find their way to this sleepy hamlet that sits in the fold of a dusky mountain in northwestern Qinghai Province.

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They congratulate themselves for having found the place — and for evading the police — but then come face to face with Gonpo Tashi, a squat, no-nonsense barley farmer who guards the entrance to the house where his uncle, the 14th Dalai Lama, was born 76 years ago.

If the traveler speaks Tibetan, Mr. Tashi, 65, will peer warily out into the road before swinging open the heavy wooden doors and allowing entry to the modest home where China’s most reviled and revered spiritual leader spent the first three years of his life.

If the visitor is Han Chinese, the country’s dominant ethnic group, the gatekeeper might grumble vaguely about “the rules” but then relent.

But if the supplicant bears patently Western features, Mr. Tashi can be relied upon to throw up his hands with dramatic effect and shoo the interloper back toward the vehicle that made the hourlong drive from the provincial capital. “Leave, leave now,” he will shout. “If they come, you will be in trouble.”

“They” refers to the local public security personnel who occasionally block the road to Hong’Ai or stand outside the Dalai Lama’s ancestral home, especially when there is trouble brewing somewhere on the expansive plateau where most of China’s 5.4 million ethnic Tibetans live.

That this state-financed shrine to the Dalai Lama exists at all highlights Beijing’s complex and contradictory attitude toward a man it frequently describes as a terrorist, a separatist and “a wolf in monk’s robes.” Since relations between the exiled Tibetan leader and the Chinese government took a nose dive in the mid-1990s, even possession of the Dalai Lama’s picture is considered a crime.

The government’s official line is that the Dalai Lama is agitating for an independent Tibet, even as he insists that he is seeking only meaningful autonomy. In recent months, the government has sought to blame him for the self-immolations of about two dozen Tibetans, a ghastly act of protest against Chinese rule that he has condemned.

Hong’Ai, or Taktser as it is known in Tibetan, has long been on the receiving end of that official ambivalence. In the mid-1980s, when talks were proceeding reasonably well, the government rebuilt the Dalai Lama’s birthplace, which had been destroyed during the antireligious fervor of the Cultural Revolution.

In 2010, the local Communist Party poured 2.6 million renminbi, or about $410,000, into Hong’Ai, upgrading the town’s 54 residences, including the Dalai Lama’s homestead, with the aim of turning the place into a lucrative tourist attraction. The improvements included tall, white-tile gates for every home and a colorfully painted but imposing wall in front of the Dalai Lama’s home that prevents visitors from peering inside.

In an article about the town in 2010, the official Xinhua news agency boasted that the improvements to each house had cost more than 10 times as much as the average villager’s annual income. “Everyone was enthusiastic,” a township official was quoted as saying about the renovations.

Mr. Tashi, the caretaker, made out particularly well, having received a modern toilet to replace an arrangement that involved two planks over a trench. “Maybe when I am too old to squat, the flush toilet will be useful,” Xinhua reported him as saying.

Other official news accounts were slightly disparaging, calling him a “big shot” and pointing out that his family owns a car paid for with a handsome government salary augmented by visitor donations. Two of his three children, one article said, are Communist Party members.

That same account said that Mr. Tashi had visited his uncle twice in the 1990s in India and that he yearned for his return. “I miss him very much,” he said.

According to official figures, a majority of the town’s 274 residents are Han, and even those who describe themselves as Tibetan cannot speak their ancestral tongue. In his 1990autobiography, “Freedom in Exile,” the Dalai Lama said his family spoke no Tibetan, only a dialect of Mandarin. It was only when he and his family moved to Lhasa — after high-ranking lamas identified him as the reincarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama — that he learned the language.

In his book he described his hometown in bleak terms, recounting the crop failures and the harsh winters. His last visit was in 1955, four years before he fled to India during a failed uprising against Chinese rule.

Those who make it past Mr. Tashi’s temperamental door policy report that there are a few utilitarian rooms surrounding a courtyard, its center anchored by a pole draped in multicolored Tibetan prayer flags. Just as eye-catching is the late model Volkswagen, covered by plastic drop cloth, that sits in one corner. One room contains a bed, another a yellow throne and a Buddhist shrine.

Most of the two-story house is off limits to visitors, and the only nod to the Dalai Lama is a small painting of him on the ceiling. Photographs are forbidden.

Those villagers willing to speak to foreign visitors were proud of their connection to a man who, under different circumstances, might have been the most powerful religious figure in the land. A 46-year-old woman who gave her name as Chobai and described herself as a distant cousin said she had once traveled overland to India to visit him.

“We are all waiting for him to come back one day,” she said with a smile.

Another woman a few doors down offered a tour of her home and the shrine that includes two photographs of the Dalai Lama, a distant relative.

After a trio of Dutch tourists pounded on the front gate and refused to retreat, Mr. Tashi’s 45-year-old nephew stepped outside and watched with a mixture of curiosity and annoyance.

When the police failed to materialize, he seemed to relax as one of the tourists, Lisanne de Wit, described a recent visit to Dharamsala, India, where the Dalai Lama lives. Ms. de Wit, a 19-year-old theology student, then made one last plea for entry, describing how she had endured a weeklong bus ride from Sichuan Province to reach this corner of Qinghai.

The nephew shrugged and offered a sympathetic smile. “The order has come from above,” he said before shutting the door. “And there’s nothing you or I can do about it.”

Mia Li contributed research.

A version of this article appeared in print on February 19, 2012, on pageA14 of the New York edition with the headline: An Ambivalent China Affirms the Charisma Of the Dalai Lama

BRIC with a S: expanding global influence -

BRIC Becomes BRICS: Changes on the Geopolitical Chessboard
by Jack A. Smith
Dissident Voice, Saturday, January 15th, 2011

The world’s four main emerging economic powers, known by the acronym BRIC — standing for Brazil, Russia, India and China — now refer to themselves as BRICS.

The capital “S” in BRICS stands for South Africa, which formally joined the four on December 24, bringing Africa into this important organization of rising global powers from Asia, Latin America and Europe. President Jacob Zuma is expected to attend the BRICS April meeting in Beijing as a full member.

This is a development of geopolitical significance, and it has doubtless intensified frustrations in Washington. The U.S. has been concerned about the growing economic and political strength of the BRIC countries for several years. In 2008, for instance, the National Intelligence Council produced a document titled “Global Trends 2025″ that predicted:

The whole international system — as constructed following WW II — will be revolutionized. Not only will new players — Brazil, Russia, India and China — have a seat at the international high table, they will bring new stakes and rules of the game.

More recently, the U.S. edition of the conservative British weekly The Economist noted in its January 1 issue that “America’s influence has dwindled everywhere with the financial crisis and the rise of emerging powers.”

The U.S. is still the dominating global hegemon, but a swiftly changing world situation is taking place as Washington’s economic and political influence is declining, even as it remains the unmatched military superpower.

America suffers from low growth, extreme indebtedness, imperial overreach, and virtual political paralysis at home while spending a trillion dollars a year on wars of choice, maintaining the Pentagon military machine, and on various other “national security” projects.

The BRICS countries, by their very existence, their rapid economic growth and degree of independence from Washington, are contributing to the transformation of today’s unipolar world order — still led exclusively by the United States — into a multipolar system where several countries and blocs will share global leadership. This is a major aim of BRICS, which recognizes it’s a rocky, long road ahead because those who cling to empire are very difficult to dislodge before they swiftly disintegrate.

Looking down that road the next few decades, it is imperative to contemplate two potentially game-changing events that will heavily impact global politics, and the future of world leadership.

1. The rate of petroleum extraction will soon reach the beginning of terminal decline, known as peak oil. This means more than half the world’s petroleum reserves will have been depleted, leading inevitably to much higher oil prices and severe shortages. Under prevailing global conditions, this will greatly exacerbate tensions between major oil consuming countries leading to wars for energy resources

One resource war already has taken place — the Bush Administration’s bungled invasion of Iraq, which possesses the world’s fourth largest reserves of petroleum and tenth largest of natural gas. Since the U.S. with less than 5% of world population absorbs nearly 30% of the planet’s crude oil, who’s Washington’s next target — Iran? Behind the U.S.-Israeli smokescreen of alleged Iranian aggression and supposed nefarious nuclear ambitions, reposes the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves and second-largest natural gas reserves.

In 2009, the U.S.,with a population of 300 million, consumed 18.7 million barrels of oil a day, the world’s highest percentage. The second highest — the European Union with a population of 500 million — consumed 13.7 barrels a day. China with a population of 1.4 billion people was third, consuming 8.2 million barrels. BRICS, incidentally, includes the country with the world’s first largest natural gas reserves, Russia (which is also eighth in petroleum reserves).

2. Equally dangerous, and perhaps much more so, is the probability of disastrous climate change in the next few decades, the initial effects of which have already arrived and are causing havoc with weather patterns. This situation will get much worse since the industrialized world, following slothful U.S. leadership, has done hardly anything to reduce its use of coal, oil and natural gas fossil fuels that are mainly responsible for climate change.

Another climate question is whether the capitalist system itself is capable of taking the steps necessary to dramatically reduce dependence on greenhouse gas emissions as the socialists maintain. Eventually, under far better global leadership, some serious action must be taken, but the damage done until that point may not be rectified for centuries, if not longer. The question of better global leadership depends to a large degree on the outcome of the unipolar-multipolar debate.

Returning to the immediate problem, Washington not only opposes BRICS’ preference for multipolarity, but is disgruntled by some of its political views. For instance, the group does not share America’s antagonism toward Iran — President Barack Obama’s whipping boy of the moment. BRICS also lacks enthusiasm for America’s wars in Central Asia and the Middle East and maintains friendly relations with the oppressed Palestinians. The five nation emerging group further leans toward replacing the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency with a basket of currencies not preferential to any one country, as is the present system toward the U.S., or perhaps even a non-national global reserve legal tender.

For a small group —though it is symbolic of a large trend in world affairs — BRICS will have considerable clout this year as members of the UN Security Council occupying five of 15 seats — temporarily for Brazil (until the end of 2011), India and South Africa (ending after 2012), and permanently of course for China and Russia.

BRICS as an organization had a most unusual birthing. The group was brought into the world, so to speak, without the knowledge of its members. The event took place in 2001 when an economist with the investment powerhouse Goldman Sachs created the BRIC acronym and identified the four countries together as a lucrative investment opportunity for the company’s clients based on the enormity of their combined Gross Domestic Products and the probability of increasing growth.

Neither Brazil, Russia, India nor China played a role in this process, but they took note of their enhanced status as the BRICs and recognized that they shared many similarities in outlook as well as significant differences in their types of government and economic specialties.

The main similarity was that they were emerging societies with growing economies and influence, and they viewed Washington’s unilateral world leadership as a temporary condition brought about by accident two decades earlier due to the implosion of the Soviet Union and most of the socialist world. They all seek a broader, more equitable world leadership arrangement within which they and others will play a role.

At the initiative of Russia’s then-President Vladimir Putin in 2006, BRIC began what became regular meetings at the ministerial level that evolved a couple of years later into what is, in effect, a political organization. There are some differences and rivalries within its ranks that have been kept within bounds, such as between China and India (which is also close to the U.S.), and to a lesser extent between Russia and China. Brazil and South Africa are everyone’s friends.

All five BRICS states — three of whom possess nuclear arsenals — maintain essentially cordial relations with the U.S. and try to avoid antagonizing the world superpower.

Dispite productive working relations between the U.S. and Russia, Moscow justly perceives Washington to be an implicit threat that seeks to neutralize — if it cannot dominate — it’s now reviving former Cold War opponent. The Russian leadership seems to view the U.S. as a strategically declining imperialist power, perhaps all the more dangerous for its predicament.

The Chinese government, while standing up for its rights when challenged by the U.S., is especially cautious because America’s military power at this point is overwhelmingly superior to its own in all respects. It’s trying to catch up in terms of defense, but it will take many years.

The Chinese Communist Party and government are primarily focused, as they have been for decades, on the creation of a modern, advanced, educated and 70% urban society of some 1.4 billion people. The national plan is to achieve this goal by 2030, based on economic growth (China is now the world’s second largest economy, heading toward first within 15-35 years), political stability at home (which will soon require substantial social reforms to facilitate), and a foreign policy of nonintervention and friendship between nations.

The Beijing leadership is evidently uncertain whether the U.S. decline is temporary or long term and does not officially comment on such matters in line with its foreign policy perspective.

Just before the start of 3-day talks in Beijing regarding U.S.-China military relations, Defense Secretary Robert Gates told the New York Times January 8 that the Obama Administration was so concerned about Beijing’s “military buildup in the Pacific” that the Pentagon was now increasing spending on such weapons as an advanced “long range nuclear-capable bomber aircraft,” among other measures.

Responding to Gates’ comment two days later at a joint press conference, Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Liang Guanglie said the U.S. “was overreacting” to an effort to modernize. “We can by no means call ourselves an advanced military force,” Liang said. “The gap between us and that of advanced countries is at least two to three decades.” This cannot be honestly disputed

The newspaper also paraphrased Gates as saying during his visit that “if Chinese leaders considered the United States a declining power… they were wrong.” He was then directly quoted: “My general line for those both at home and around the world who think the U.S. is in decline is that history’s dustbins are filled with countries that underestimated the resilience of the United States.” Last August, it should be noted, two-thirds of the America people queried told an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll they think the U.S. is in a state of decline.

While Gates dwells upon Beijing’s “buildup,” the U.S. virtually encircles China with military bases, submarines, fleets at sea, spy satellites, long-range nuclear and conventional missiles, offensive weapons many years in advance of Chinese defenses, overwhelming airpower, plus alliances with Japan and South Korea in Beijing’s vulnerable northeast, Taiwan, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and India. The U.S. spends over 10 times more on the military than China. It operates up to 1,000 large and small military bases around the world, while China has no foreign bases.

The Obama Administration is presently fishing in the troubled waters of the South China Sea, intervening in territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries, including Vietnam, much to Beijing’s chagrin.

It is precisely this kind of “leadership” that BRICS and a number of emerging nations want to change.

The addition of South Africa was a deft political move that further enhances BRICS’ power and status. The new member possesses Africa’s largest economy, but as number 31 in global GDP economies it is far behind its new partners, nearly by 20-1 in China’s case. It’s also behind such other emerging countries as Turkey, Mexico, and South Korea, for example — but African credentials are important geopolitically, giving BRICS a four-continent breadth, influence and trade opportunities. China is South Africa’s largest trading partner, and India wants to increase commercial ties to Africa.

Johannesburg sought BRIC membership over the last year, and as early as August the process of admission was underway, but now as a member it must take serious steps to substantially hasten its economic development to keep pace with other BRICS members. This will not be easy, but it is assumed the partners will help out.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson declared: “We believe that South Africa’s accession will promote the development of BRICS and enhance cooperation between emerging economies.” Russia’s Foreign Ministry statement said South Africa “will not only increase the total economic weight of our association but also will help build up opportunities for mutually beneficial practical cooperation within BRICS.”

Brazil’s Foreign Ministry, in addition to the conventional welcoming, interjected a sharp political note into this economic club by suggesting that “on the international level” BRICS would work “to reform the financial system and increase democratization of global governance.” The reference was to Washington’s dominant authority over global finance and its unipolar leadership. This is bound to further irritate Washington.

India, like South Africa a former British colony and now a swiftly developing country, cannot conceivably oppose Johannesburg’s admission for obvious reasons, but has so far remained publicly silent since the December 24 announcement. India’s unexpected quietude is of interest because last August Indian High Commissioner Virendra Gupta commented that “India of course remains extremely supportive of South Africa joining BRIC.” The Indian foreign office is too sophisticated to have forgotten the expected routine welcoming.

Maintaining good ties with Washington, which is disturbed by South Africa’s membership, is one of New Delhi’s main considerations. The United States has been courting India for some time, offering various rewards — from help with its nuclear program (and silence about its violation of the nonproliferation treaty) to supporting India’s quest for a future Security Council seat (which China opposes and Russia supports). The purpose is to attract India more deeply into Washington’s orbit, undercutting Beijing’s increasing global influence, and perhaps setting the two against each other.

Global Trends 2025 even envisioned possible “great power rivalries and increasing energy insecurity” between India and China that may lead to a serious confrontation “though great power war is averted.” In the process, “United States power is greatly enhanced. ”

Regardless of BRICS and other emerging economies, President Obama’s principal foreign policy objective since assuming office has been to reassert American global leadership after the Bush Administration’s neoconservative imperialist wars and unilateralism weakened Washington’s alliances and compromised its hegemony. This is what Obama was elected to do — not, by rank-and-file Democrats cocooned in “change we can believe in,” but by the representatives of great wealth, great corporations and great financial power.

The Obama Administration’s first National Security Strategy report, released in May 2010, makes it clear that “Our national security strategy is… focused on renewing American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century.” In discussing world economies, which correlate to global leadership in Washington’s view, President Obama declared in his State of the Union Speech last year that “I do not accept second place for the United States of America.”

As part of this policy the U.S. seeks to forestall the development of a genuine multipolar system by making limited concessions to the emerging nations that will that leave Washington in charge for many years.

Washington’s latest scheme, introduced a year and a half ago by Secretary of State Clinton, is the so-called, “multi-partner,” not “multipolar,” world — suggesting the Obama Administration’s intention is to serve as “senior” partner of a global leadership “coalition of the willing,” as it were, that will in effect strengthen Washington’s singular role.

“We will lead,” Clinton told the Council on Foreign Relations, “by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multipolar world and toward a multi-partner world. Now, we know this approach is not a panacea. We will remain clear-eyed about our purpose. Not everybody in the world wishes us well or shares our values and interests. And some will actively seek to undermine our efforts. In those cases, our partnerships can become power coalitions to constrain or deter those negative actions.”

The U.S. also gives verbal support to an eventual expansion of the Security Council, and has cooperated in extending the powers of emerging countries within the Group of 20 leading industrialized economies, in the World Bank and IMF. In addition the State Department seeks one-to-one arrangements advantageous to certain countries to keep them well within the U.S. sphere of influence.

Washington intends to function as the principal world power for as long as it can. After all it is still an enormously wealthy, militarized state with powerful and obedient industrialized allies including the European Union countries (and NATO), the UK-Australia-Canada-New Zealand nexus, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and others.

However, the ongoing global diversification of economic and political resources toward the emerging countries appears to be leading inevitably to multipolarity. To quote “Global Trends 2025″ once again:

The unprecedented transfer of wealth roughly from West to East now under way will continue for the foreseeable future…. Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050. China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading military power.

Actually China became the second largest global economy last August, 15 years before 2025.

Under such conditions, how many newly empowered emerging countries will remain content simply to play follow-the-leader behind a faltering and militarist Uncle Sam?

The time of decision about the architecture of future world leadership draws nearer. At some point in 10 or 20 years a reluctant Washington may have to settle for a prominent position in a multipolar world construct.

But, of course, there remains another possibility.

Given the volatile global situation — peak oil, climate change, continued U.S. imperial wars, grave poverty that will increase as world population grows from 6.8 billion today to over 9 billion in 2050, and many emerging countries seeking a rightful share of world leadership — the Unites States may resort in time to global military aggression to sustain its dominant status, possibly even World War III.

Considering the U.S. political system’s decades-long move toward the right, the enormity of the Pentagon’s arsenal, the militarism in our society, and the ability of Washington and the corporate mass media to collaborate in “selling” wars to a misinformed public, this cannot be ruled out.

It is impossible to predict how all this will turn out. What is known is that the American people still have the power to make their own history. This is not so much a question of voting — for whom, in this case? — but of taking action to galvanize the masses of people to oppose the political structure’s penchant for wars and global domination, for inexcusable foot-dragging on climate change and indifference to gross economic inequality.

Jack A. Smith is editor of the Activist Newsletter and a former editor of the Guardian (US) radical newsweekly. He may be reached at: jacdon@earthlink.net. Read other articles by Jack.