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Mostrando postagens com marcador Obama. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Obama. Mostrar todas as postagens

terça-feira, 25 de maio de 2021

Revisitando a negociação nuclear Brasil-Turquia com o Irã - Rubens Barbosa (OESP)

 REVISITANDO A NEGOCIAÇÃO BRASIL-TURQUIA COM O IRÃ.

 

Rubens Barbosa

O Estado de S. Paulo, 25/05/2021


Espera-se para esta semana, a conclusão dos entendimentos entre os Estados Unidos e o Irã a fim de definir as condições para a volta do governo Biden ao acordo nuclear, abandonado por Trump e, por isso, desconsiderado por Teerã. 

 

Por seu interesse e oportunidade, transcrevo a descrição que o ex-embaixador da França nos EUA, Gerard Araud, fez dos entendimentos sobre esse importante acordo. No livro Passeport Diplomatique (Grasset,2019), Araud, na época diretor político do Quai D’Orsay e negociador francês nas tratativas com o Irã, comenta as negociações encetadas pelo Brasil e Turquia com o Irã, segundo a visão dos países que negociaram com o governo iraniano.

 

A iniciativa brasileira e turca de levar adiante a negociação, na interpretação de Lula e de seu ministro do exterior, resultou de pedido formulado por carta do presidente Obama, na qual ressaltava que os EUA apoiavam a proposta do ex-diretor geral da Agência Internacional de Energia Atômica no sentido de que o Irã transferisse 1.200 quilos de seu urânio de baixo enriquecimento para fora do país (Turquia). O presidente dos EUA lembra que havia pedido cautela a Lula nas negociações com o Irã, por não acreditar na boa fé do governo de Teerã, e instara o Brasil a insistir junto ao Irã a aceitar o oferecimento do governo de Washington de o país manter seu urânio na Turquia como caução, enquanto o combustível nuclear estava sendo produzido. Esse foi o encorajamento contido na carta de Obama. O acordo negociado pelo Brasil e Turquia com o Irã previa o envio por parte do Irã à Turquia de 1.200 quilos de seu urânio levemente enriquecido (a 3,5%) para uma troca, em um prazo máximo de um ano, por 120 quilos de combustível altamente enriquecido (20%), necessário para o reator experimental de Teerã. O acordo, que reconhecia ainda o direito do Irã de utilizar para fins pacíficos a tecnologia nuclear e o enriquecimento de urânio, segundo Celso Amorim, foi rejeitado pela secretaria de Estado Hillary Clinton, menos de 24 horas depois da sua assinatura.

 

Segundo Araud, no meio de uma difícil negociação que se estendia por mais de seis anos, “o Brasil e a Turquia, sem conhecer todos os detalhes desses entendimentos, decidiram interferir no processo, com base em uma interpretação da carta de Obama que reafirmava o objetivo que o grupo 5+1 (EUA, França, Reino Unido, Rússia e China) estava perseguindo (transferência do uranio para fora do país), sem entrar nos detalhes, como era de se esperar nesse tipo de correspondência”. “Os negociadores brasileiros e turcos, que desconheciam o histórico das longas negociações com o Irã, decidiram começar uma negociação paralela com base na carta de Obama a Lula e assinaram com os iranianos – que sabiam precisamente o que estava por detrás das palavras – um texto desequilibrado, que todos, inclusive a Rússia e a China, tiveram de rejeitar”. “No primeiro parágrafo do acordo, ficava reconhecido o direito do Irã de enriquecimento do urânio, que não estava em negociação com os EUA. Isso representava, de um lado, o descumprimento de cinco resoluções do Conselho de Segurança da ONU que solicitavam que o Irã suspendesse as atividades nessa área, e de outro, uma relevante inovação em termos de não proliferação, pois nunca o enriquecimento do urânio para programa nuclear foi considerado um direito, contrariamente ao direito no tocante ao uso pacífico da energia nuclear”. “O Brasil e a Turquia caíram em uma armadilha”. A bem da verdade, comenta Araud, “a carta de Obama era ao mesmo tempomuito pouco precisa e contribuiu para deixá-los perdidos em um labirinto, no qual os próprios negociadores do grupo estavam sem saída há seis anos”. “Brasil e Turquia se abstiveram na votação da Resolução do conselho de segurança que impôs sanções contra o Irã”. Araud conclui que, “além de desequilibrado, o acordo incorporou reivindicações do Irã que não haviam sido aceitas pelo grupo 5+1, como o direito ao enriquecimento do urânio para o programa nuclear, o que contrariava cinco resoluções da ONU, prevendo apenas sua utilização para fins pacíficos”.

Os comentários do ex-embaixador francês em Washington qualificam as reiteradas manifestações de Lula e de Amorim de que o Brasil se engajou na negociação com o Irã em decorrência de um pedido formal de Obama. Uma leitura atenta da carta do presidente dos EUA mostra que o governo americano apenas instou o Brasil e a Turquia a convencer Teerã a transferir o urânio de baixo teor para fora do país, nos termos da proposta a AEIA. 

 

Depois desse episódio que envolveu o Brasil diretamente, as negociações prosseguiram por quase uma década e foram concluídas em 2019. O Irã assumiu a obrigação de suspender por 15 anos seu programa nuclear com a redução do total de centrífugas e de seu estoque de urânio. Com a saída dos EUA, Washington voltou a impor sanções políticas e econômicas. A plena reativação do acordo sobre o programa nuclear de Teerã passa pelo cumprimento pelo Irã das restrições ao processamento do urânio e pela suspensão das sanções americanas.

 

Rubens Barbosa, presidente do IRICE e membro da Academia Paulista de Letras.

quinta-feira, 12 de setembro de 2013

O Big Stick de Theodore Roosevelt e o porrete verbal de quem mais precisa dele...

Aspereza e suavidade
O presidente americano Theodore Roosevelt dizia que se deve falar macio e ter um porrete nas mãos. A presidente Dilma Rousseff, neste caso da espionagem brasileira, fala duro mas age com gentileza. Ao que tudo indica, irá aos Estados Unidos no dia 23, conforme previsto. Dilma tem interesse na visita (e Obama, sem dúvida, também). Há algumas propostas de cooperação a analisar.

E, quando fica bom para os dois lados, a tendência é que logo se acertem.

(da coluna do jornalista Carlos Brickmann, 11/09/2013)

quarta-feira, 11 de setembro de 2013

Obama, o Nobel da Paz que ainda nao justificou o premio...

Duro ser Superman hoje em dia. Melhor ficar em casa, de chinelo, comendo pipoca na frente da TV.
O problema é que sempre tem alguém que vem cobrar a inatividade e a passividade do SuperCop. E se o policial fizer algo, também vão reclamar...
 Paulo Roberto de Almeida 
World's Policeman


 Bennett
September 09, 2013

domingo, 16 de janeiro de 2011

BRIC with a S: expanding global influence -

BRIC Becomes BRICS: Changes on the Geopolitical Chessboard
by Jack A. Smith
Dissident Voice, Saturday, January 15th, 2011

The world’s four main emerging economic powers, known by the acronym BRIC — standing for Brazil, Russia, India and China — now refer to themselves as BRICS.

The capital “S” in BRICS stands for South Africa, which formally joined the four on December 24, bringing Africa into this important organization of rising global powers from Asia, Latin America and Europe. President Jacob Zuma is expected to attend the BRICS April meeting in Beijing as a full member.

This is a development of geopolitical significance, and it has doubtless intensified frustrations in Washington. The U.S. has been concerned about the growing economic and political strength of the BRIC countries for several years. In 2008, for instance, the National Intelligence Council produced a document titled “Global Trends 2025″ that predicted:

The whole international system — as constructed following WW II — will be revolutionized. Not only will new players — Brazil, Russia, India and China — have a seat at the international high table, they will bring new stakes and rules of the game.

More recently, the U.S. edition of the conservative British weekly The Economist noted in its January 1 issue that “America’s influence has dwindled everywhere with the financial crisis and the rise of emerging powers.”

The U.S. is still the dominating global hegemon, but a swiftly changing world situation is taking place as Washington’s economic and political influence is declining, even as it remains the unmatched military superpower.

America suffers from low growth, extreme indebtedness, imperial overreach, and virtual political paralysis at home while spending a trillion dollars a year on wars of choice, maintaining the Pentagon military machine, and on various other “national security” projects.

The BRICS countries, by their very existence, their rapid economic growth and degree of independence from Washington, are contributing to the transformation of today’s unipolar world order — still led exclusively by the United States — into a multipolar system where several countries and blocs will share global leadership. This is a major aim of BRICS, which recognizes it’s a rocky, long road ahead because those who cling to empire are very difficult to dislodge before they swiftly disintegrate.

Looking down that road the next few decades, it is imperative to contemplate two potentially game-changing events that will heavily impact global politics, and the future of world leadership.

1. The rate of petroleum extraction will soon reach the beginning of terminal decline, known as peak oil. This means more than half the world’s petroleum reserves will have been depleted, leading inevitably to much higher oil prices and severe shortages. Under prevailing global conditions, this will greatly exacerbate tensions between major oil consuming countries leading to wars for energy resources

One resource war already has taken place — the Bush Administration’s bungled invasion of Iraq, which possesses the world’s fourth largest reserves of petroleum and tenth largest of natural gas. Since the U.S. with less than 5% of world population absorbs nearly 30% of the planet’s crude oil, who’s Washington’s next target — Iran? Behind the U.S.-Israeli smokescreen of alleged Iranian aggression and supposed nefarious nuclear ambitions, reposes the world’s third-largest proven oil reserves and second-largest natural gas reserves.

In 2009, the U.S.,with a population of 300 million, consumed 18.7 million barrels of oil a day, the world’s highest percentage. The second highest — the European Union with a population of 500 million — consumed 13.7 barrels a day. China with a population of 1.4 billion people was third, consuming 8.2 million barrels. BRICS, incidentally, includes the country with the world’s first largest natural gas reserves, Russia (which is also eighth in petroleum reserves).

2. Equally dangerous, and perhaps much more so, is the probability of disastrous climate change in the next few decades, the initial effects of which have already arrived and are causing havoc with weather patterns. This situation will get much worse since the industrialized world, following slothful U.S. leadership, has done hardly anything to reduce its use of coal, oil and natural gas fossil fuels that are mainly responsible for climate change.

Another climate question is whether the capitalist system itself is capable of taking the steps necessary to dramatically reduce dependence on greenhouse gas emissions as the socialists maintain. Eventually, under far better global leadership, some serious action must be taken, but the damage done until that point may not be rectified for centuries, if not longer. The question of better global leadership depends to a large degree on the outcome of the unipolar-multipolar debate.

Returning to the immediate problem, Washington not only opposes BRICS’ preference for multipolarity, but is disgruntled by some of its political views. For instance, the group does not share America’s antagonism toward Iran — President Barack Obama’s whipping boy of the moment. BRICS also lacks enthusiasm for America’s wars in Central Asia and the Middle East and maintains friendly relations with the oppressed Palestinians. The five nation emerging group further leans toward replacing the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency with a basket of currencies not preferential to any one country, as is the present system toward the U.S., or perhaps even a non-national global reserve legal tender.

For a small group —though it is symbolic of a large trend in world affairs — BRICS will have considerable clout this year as members of the UN Security Council occupying five of 15 seats — temporarily for Brazil (until the end of 2011), India and South Africa (ending after 2012), and permanently of course for China and Russia.

BRICS as an organization had a most unusual birthing. The group was brought into the world, so to speak, without the knowledge of its members. The event took place in 2001 when an economist with the investment powerhouse Goldman Sachs created the BRIC acronym and identified the four countries together as a lucrative investment opportunity for the company’s clients based on the enormity of their combined Gross Domestic Products and the probability of increasing growth.

Neither Brazil, Russia, India nor China played a role in this process, but they took note of their enhanced status as the BRICs and recognized that they shared many similarities in outlook as well as significant differences in their types of government and economic specialties.

The main similarity was that they were emerging societies with growing economies and influence, and they viewed Washington’s unilateral world leadership as a temporary condition brought about by accident two decades earlier due to the implosion of the Soviet Union and most of the socialist world. They all seek a broader, more equitable world leadership arrangement within which they and others will play a role.

At the initiative of Russia’s then-President Vladimir Putin in 2006, BRIC began what became regular meetings at the ministerial level that evolved a couple of years later into what is, in effect, a political organization. There are some differences and rivalries within its ranks that have been kept within bounds, such as between China and India (which is also close to the U.S.), and to a lesser extent between Russia and China. Brazil and South Africa are everyone’s friends.

All five BRICS states — three of whom possess nuclear arsenals — maintain essentially cordial relations with the U.S. and try to avoid antagonizing the world superpower.

Dispite productive working relations between the U.S. and Russia, Moscow justly perceives Washington to be an implicit threat that seeks to neutralize — if it cannot dominate — it’s now reviving former Cold War opponent. The Russian leadership seems to view the U.S. as a strategically declining imperialist power, perhaps all the more dangerous for its predicament.

The Chinese government, while standing up for its rights when challenged by the U.S., is especially cautious because America’s military power at this point is overwhelmingly superior to its own in all respects. It’s trying to catch up in terms of defense, but it will take many years.

The Chinese Communist Party and government are primarily focused, as they have been for decades, on the creation of a modern, advanced, educated and 70% urban society of some 1.4 billion people. The national plan is to achieve this goal by 2030, based on economic growth (China is now the world’s second largest economy, heading toward first within 15-35 years), political stability at home (which will soon require substantial social reforms to facilitate), and a foreign policy of nonintervention and friendship between nations.

The Beijing leadership is evidently uncertain whether the U.S. decline is temporary or long term and does not officially comment on such matters in line with its foreign policy perspective.

Just before the start of 3-day talks in Beijing regarding U.S.-China military relations, Defense Secretary Robert Gates told the New York Times January 8 that the Obama Administration was so concerned about Beijing’s “military buildup in the Pacific” that the Pentagon was now increasing spending on such weapons as an advanced “long range nuclear-capable bomber aircraft,” among other measures.

Responding to Gates’ comment two days later at a joint press conference, Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Liang Guanglie said the U.S. “was overreacting” to an effort to modernize. “We can by no means call ourselves an advanced military force,” Liang said. “The gap between us and that of advanced countries is at least two to three decades.” This cannot be honestly disputed

The newspaper also paraphrased Gates as saying during his visit that “if Chinese leaders considered the United States a declining power… they were wrong.” He was then directly quoted: “My general line for those both at home and around the world who think the U.S. is in decline is that history’s dustbins are filled with countries that underestimated the resilience of the United States.” Last August, it should be noted, two-thirds of the America people queried told an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll they think the U.S. is in a state of decline.

While Gates dwells upon Beijing’s “buildup,” the U.S. virtually encircles China with military bases, submarines, fleets at sea, spy satellites, long-range nuclear and conventional missiles, offensive weapons many years in advance of Chinese defenses, overwhelming airpower, plus alliances with Japan and South Korea in Beijing’s vulnerable northeast, Taiwan, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and India. The U.S. spends over 10 times more on the military than China. It operates up to 1,000 large and small military bases around the world, while China has no foreign bases.

The Obama Administration is presently fishing in the troubled waters of the South China Sea, intervening in territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries, including Vietnam, much to Beijing’s chagrin.

It is precisely this kind of “leadership” that BRICS and a number of emerging nations want to change.

The addition of South Africa was a deft political move that further enhances BRICS’ power and status. The new member possesses Africa’s largest economy, but as number 31 in global GDP economies it is far behind its new partners, nearly by 20-1 in China’s case. It’s also behind such other emerging countries as Turkey, Mexico, and South Korea, for example — but African credentials are important geopolitically, giving BRICS a four-continent breadth, influence and trade opportunities. China is South Africa’s largest trading partner, and India wants to increase commercial ties to Africa.

Johannesburg sought BRIC membership over the last year, and as early as August the process of admission was underway, but now as a member it must take serious steps to substantially hasten its economic development to keep pace with other BRICS members. This will not be easy, but it is assumed the partners will help out.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson declared: “We believe that South Africa’s accession will promote the development of BRICS and enhance cooperation between emerging economies.” Russia’s Foreign Ministry statement said South Africa “will not only increase the total economic weight of our association but also will help build up opportunities for mutually beneficial practical cooperation within BRICS.”

Brazil’s Foreign Ministry, in addition to the conventional welcoming, interjected a sharp political note into this economic club by suggesting that “on the international level” BRICS would work “to reform the financial system and increase democratization of global governance.” The reference was to Washington’s dominant authority over global finance and its unipolar leadership. This is bound to further irritate Washington.

India, like South Africa a former British colony and now a swiftly developing country, cannot conceivably oppose Johannesburg’s admission for obvious reasons, but has so far remained publicly silent since the December 24 announcement. India’s unexpected quietude is of interest because last August Indian High Commissioner Virendra Gupta commented that “India of course remains extremely supportive of South Africa joining BRIC.” The Indian foreign office is too sophisticated to have forgotten the expected routine welcoming.

Maintaining good ties with Washington, which is disturbed by South Africa’s membership, is one of New Delhi’s main considerations. The United States has been courting India for some time, offering various rewards — from help with its nuclear program (and silence about its violation of the nonproliferation treaty) to supporting India’s quest for a future Security Council seat (which China opposes and Russia supports). The purpose is to attract India more deeply into Washington’s orbit, undercutting Beijing’s increasing global influence, and perhaps setting the two against each other.

Global Trends 2025 even envisioned possible “great power rivalries and increasing energy insecurity” between India and China that may lead to a serious confrontation “though great power war is averted.” In the process, “United States power is greatly enhanced. ”

Regardless of BRICS and other emerging economies, President Obama’s principal foreign policy objective since assuming office has been to reassert American global leadership after the Bush Administration’s neoconservative imperialist wars and unilateralism weakened Washington’s alliances and compromised its hegemony. This is what Obama was elected to do — not, by rank-and-file Democrats cocooned in “change we can believe in,” but by the representatives of great wealth, great corporations and great financial power.

The Obama Administration’s first National Security Strategy report, released in May 2010, makes it clear that “Our national security strategy is… focused on renewing American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century.” In discussing world economies, which correlate to global leadership in Washington’s view, President Obama declared in his State of the Union Speech last year that “I do not accept second place for the United States of America.”

As part of this policy the U.S. seeks to forestall the development of a genuine multipolar system by making limited concessions to the emerging nations that will that leave Washington in charge for many years.

Washington’s latest scheme, introduced a year and a half ago by Secretary of State Clinton, is the so-called, “multi-partner,” not “multipolar,” world — suggesting the Obama Administration’s intention is to serve as “senior” partner of a global leadership “coalition of the willing,” as it were, that will in effect strengthen Washington’s singular role.

“We will lead,” Clinton told the Council on Foreign Relations, “by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multipolar world and toward a multi-partner world. Now, we know this approach is not a panacea. We will remain clear-eyed about our purpose. Not everybody in the world wishes us well or shares our values and interests. And some will actively seek to undermine our efforts. In those cases, our partnerships can become power coalitions to constrain or deter those negative actions.”

The U.S. also gives verbal support to an eventual expansion of the Security Council, and has cooperated in extending the powers of emerging countries within the Group of 20 leading industrialized economies, in the World Bank and IMF. In addition the State Department seeks one-to-one arrangements advantageous to certain countries to keep them well within the U.S. sphere of influence.

Washington intends to function as the principal world power for as long as it can. After all it is still an enormously wealthy, militarized state with powerful and obedient industrialized allies including the European Union countries (and NATO), the UK-Australia-Canada-New Zealand nexus, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and others.

However, the ongoing global diversification of economic and political resources toward the emerging countries appears to be leading inevitably to multipolarity. To quote “Global Trends 2025″ once again:

The unprecedented transfer of wealth roughly from West to East now under way will continue for the foreseeable future…. Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050. China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading military power.

Actually China became the second largest global economy last August, 15 years before 2025.

Under such conditions, how many newly empowered emerging countries will remain content simply to play follow-the-leader behind a faltering and militarist Uncle Sam?

The time of decision about the architecture of future world leadership draws nearer. At some point in 10 or 20 years a reluctant Washington may have to settle for a prominent position in a multipolar world construct.

But, of course, there remains another possibility.

Given the volatile global situation — peak oil, climate change, continued U.S. imperial wars, grave poverty that will increase as world population grows from 6.8 billion today to over 9 billion in 2050, and many emerging countries seeking a rightful share of world leadership — the Unites States may resort in time to global military aggression to sustain its dominant status, possibly even World War III.

Considering the U.S. political system’s decades-long move toward the right, the enormity of the Pentagon’s arsenal, the militarism in our society, and the ability of Washington and the corporate mass media to collaborate in “selling” wars to a misinformed public, this cannot be ruled out.

It is impossible to predict how all this will turn out. What is known is that the American people still have the power to make their own history. This is not so much a question of voting — for whom, in this case? — but of taking action to galvanize the masses of people to oppose the political structure’s penchant for wars and global domination, for inexcusable foot-dragging on climate change and indifference to gross economic inequality.

Jack A. Smith is editor of the Activist Newsletter and a former editor of the Guardian (US) radical newsweekly. He may be reached at: jacdon@earthlink.net. Read other articles by Jack.

terça-feira, 29 de junho de 2010

A irrelevancia do G20 - Walter Russell Mead

Pointless G-20 Summit Unfolds In Toronto
Walter Russell Mead
The American Interest, June 25th, 2010

The first task for anybody these days who wants to follow world news in an intelligent way is to figure out what to ignore. All over the world, commissions are meeting, legislatures debating, leaders are making speeches, demonstrators are marching, sabers are rattling and so on. Nobody can follow it all or make sense of it all. So, from the standpoint of the generalist or the engaged citizen the question is how to achieve ‘intelligent ignorance’: how to figure out what you don’t need to follow so that you can focus like a laser on what really counts.

The approaching G-20 summit in Toronto is an excellent subject to ignore — a classic pseudo-event that will be breathlessly and minutely covered by the ’serious’ press at which much will be said and little done. Over the last two weeks I myself have saved great swathes of time by skimming lightly across rather than delving deeply into such subjects as whether the United States and Germany will engage in a catfight over fiscal stimulus and whether China’s decision to loosen its control over its currency will reduce the pressure on China at the G-20. It is as close to certain as anything can be that nothing will take place at the G-20 that changes German or American fiscal plans or in any way shape or form affect China’s currency policy in any substantive way. There is no point whatever in covering these subjects, and just because journalists are stupid and lazy enough to write these pieces and editors are misguided enough to run them is no reason why you, dear reader, should waste your precious time reading them. Indeed, to the extent that you allow yourself to be deceived into the belief that what is happening in Toronto is an event rather than a pageant you will actually be degrading your ability to follow world affairs.

While the approaching G-20 summit, like previous G-20 and G-8 summits, is a pseudo-event as pointless as an American political convention, there is one useful purpose it can serve: it can help students of world affairs learn the difference between real events and fake ones, between (as Mark Twain said) a bolt of lightning and a lightning bug.

The first thing to observe is that the G-20 isn’t new. It is an expanded version of the old G-8 (which itself was the old G-7 plus Russia). These summit meetings of world leaders date back for a generation; they have always gotten lots of coverage in the serious press, and they have almost never meant anything or gotten anything done. World leaders like them because they provide a platform that lets presidents and prime ministers look like statesmen instead of politicians. Bureaucrats adore them because position papers must be written and revised and many obscure officials must rack up air miles preparing compromises and talking points for communiques and declarations. It doesn’t matter to the bureaucrats that the declarations have no binding force and that countries who sign onto them will generally go on and do exactly what they would have done had no declaration ever been made. Process! Paper! Junkets!

Now the one sure thing about vacuous talking shops is that increasing the number of participants decreases the importance of the meeting. If 7 or 8 leaders representing the world’s richest countries almost never agreed on anything important, how many important decisions will a group of 20 leaders from countries with even greater disparities in interest and outlook reach? If 7 or 8 leaders consistently produced empty communiques with few real world results, how much more vacuous and much less effective will the communiques produced by 20 world leaders be? There will be more empty posturing and vain grandstanding than before — and there will be less substance and less frank talk than ever.

Yet, in a striking demonstration of the idiocy and futility with which our world is governed, as the G-8 morphs into the G-20 and becomes ever less likely to produce any meaningful result, it is getting more coverage and not less.

There are several reasons for this. First, the word ‘news’ is derived from the word ‘new’, not from the word ’significant’. Even the sclerotic world of serious journalism and diplomatic convention was beginning to weary of the G-7/G-8 story. With every passing summit, the vapidity of these events became harder to ignore; we were reaching the shark-jumping moment when not even bureaucrats could pretend to care. But now we have new characters and new plot lines. There is almost no chance that the G-20 meetings will accomplish more than the G-7 meetings, but what does that have to do with anything? Evidently, not much.

Second, pandering is one of the activities that bring politicians, journalists and diplomats together, and the G-20 summit is a panderfest of historic proportions. Politicians pander to the prejudices and aspirations of their constituents. Right now that means ‘looking busy’ about the world economy, so the politicians welcome a summit that can showcase their tireless efforts to make voters rich or at least get them jobs. Diplomats also pander: the powerful countries always need to stroke the less powerful but not insignificant. This was one of the most successful features of the G-7: Canada and Italy stood on (apparently) equal footing with the US, Japan, Germany, Britain and France. Then we pandered to Russia, desperate for signs of great power status, by turning the G-7 into the G-8. And now, drumroll, with the expansion of the G-8 to the G-20 we can pander to the vanity (sorry, we can recognize the importance) of a whole new bunch of countries. Also, we can do something that matters some — bringing China and India into the club — without dropping Canada and Italy. Expanding the club avoids giving offense even if it makes the summits even less focused and useful than before for real policy purposes, but expanding the membership is the better choice if the chief function of the group is to flatter rather than to do.

Amazingly, this obvious and quite relevant fact has not been a major feature in the coverage of what much of the ’serious’ press continues to treat like a major development. Rather than hounding politicians for boondoggling, useless junkets, vanity grandstanding and general time wasting, the serious press has generally supported the summit process and enthusiastically for the most part hailed the ‘rise’ of the G-20.

This is partly because summits work well for the press. The serious press likes these summits for the same reasons that the Weather Channel likes hurricanes — the summits are recurring events that are easy to cover. What will Canada’s position be on bank reform at the G-20? What is the French view on Chinese currency reform? Sources don’t mind talking to journalists about subjects like this so the stories are easy to research and write; as long as editors are willing to publish this swill journalists will gladly go on writing it. From this perspective the increasing difficulty of pretending that G-7 summits still mattered after decades of irrelevance was a problem for journalists; the shift to the G-8 and now G-20 format keeps hope alive.

But the press is also in the pandering business. Many readers are less interested in understanding the world than in receiving confirmation that their existing understanding of the world is correct. For many of the people who read the serious press, the belief that the world is moving smoothly into a new era of North South cooperation along a path of institutional development and reform is an important part of their world view. They also want and perhaps need to believe that the world’s political and economic authorities know what to do about the economic issues we face and are laboring earnestly together to solve common problems. The G-20 story reinforces these important if delusional narratives in ways that both the producers and the consumers of serious journalism find deeply appealing.

Ultimately I suspect that the air will lead out of the G-20 bubble. The world press once covered the meetings and the votes of the UN General Assembly with great attention. I am old enough to remember when General Assembly votes got headline treatment in major US papers. In due course the pretense that those votes mattered in the real world became unsustainable and the headlines died away.

Pending that day, the best way to handle the flood of coverage about events like G-20 summits is to employ the vital news technique of strategic defocusing. Don’t turn a blind eye completely: scan the headlines and even read the occasional op-ed if the columnist is using an approaching summit as a news hook for an interesting essay (rather than bloviating at length about, say, whether Chancellor Merkel will have a public fight with President Obama over the fiscal policies of their two countries). Every now and then a man will actually bite a dog at one of these summits; you can’t ignore them completely but with very little investment of time you can monitor the news flow to see whether by some bizarre twist of fate a real fact somehow manifests itself amid the empty pomp.

For the upcoming weekend, this is good news. We can all spend more time outdoors and less time with the newspapers, TV talking heads and news magazines until this whole pointless roadshow leaves town.

© The American Interest LLC & Walter Russell Mead 2009-2010

quarta-feira, 14 de abril de 2010

2104) Obama e "o cara": fim de uma bela amizade?

Da coluna diária do jornalista gaúcho Políbio Braga:

Saiba por que Obama não acha mais que Lula é “O Cara”
15 de abril de 2010

As imagens e as notícias sobre a Cúpula de Segurança Nuclear mostram que resultaram esfriadas as relações entre Barak Obama e Lula.

. Obama, que já considerou Lula a verdadeira encarnação de “O Cara”, ignorou-o em Washington.

. O que ocorreu:

1) Obama caiu na real dentro do próprio contexto do papel que jogam os EUA, fazendo menos concessões a situações e figuras exóticas como Lula.

2) Lula tem criado embaraços para os americanos em função do apoio ou tolerância a notórios inimigos dos EUA.

. A hora da verdade chegou antes para Obama e muito tarde para Lula.

Políbio Braga

sexta-feira, 5 de março de 2010

1750) Obama Nuclear Policy

Obama's Nuclear Posture Review will set tone for U.S. weapons policy
By Mary Beth Sheridan and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, March 5, 2010; 1:30 PM

President Obama's top national security advisers within days will present him with an agonizing choice on how to guide U.S. nuclear weapons policy for the rest of his presidency.

Does he substantially advance his bold pledge to seek a world free of nuclear weapons by declaring that the "sole purpose" of the U.S. arsenal is to deter other nations from using them? Or does he embrace a more modest option, supported by some senior military officials, that deterrence is the "primary purpose"?

The difference may seem semantic, but such words, which will be contained in a document known as the Nuclear Posture Review, have deep meanings and could dramatically shift nuclear policy in the United States and around the world. The first option would scale back the arsenal's war-fighting role, potentially leading to a smaller U.S. stockpile and taking weapons off alert. The second option would be less of a change, holding out the nuclear threat but still permitting a reduction in weapons. The president was briefed on the document this week and requested additional intermediate options, officials say.

Senior administration officials have already indicated the review is likely to roll back some Bush policies, such as threatening the use of nuclear weapons to preempt or respond to chemical or biological attacks. The review will also point to new ways to cut the Pentagon's stockpile of roughly 5,000 active nuclear warheads, they say.

But, officials say, after lengthy debate, Obama's aides have rejected some of the boldest ideas on the table, such as forswearing the option to use nuclear arms first in a conflict, or dropping one leg of the "triad" of bombers, submarines and land-based missiles that carry the deadly weapons.

Obama's decision on the sensitive issue of U.S. "declaratory policy," U.S. officials and outside experts say, will help determine whether the document is regarded as a far-reaching shift from the Bush administration's version released in 2001. Lower-level officials trying to craft the language engaged in fierce discussions about how far and fast the administration could alter course without alarming allies.

The Nuclear Posture Review is done at the start of each administration, and influences budgets, treaties and weapons deployments and retirements for five to 10 years. Expectations for this one have been raised because of Obama's pledge last year to "put an end to Cold War thinking" and move toward global disarmament -- a vision that helped win him a Nobel Peace Prize.

The review, more than a month overdue, reflects the tension in seeking to advance the president's sweeping agenda without unnerving allies who depend on the U.S. nuclear "umbrella." The Pentagon is also wary of losing options in a world with emerging nuclear threats from North Korea and Iran, officials say.

Until recently, Obama generally has not intervened in the Pentagon-led process, which also involves officials from the State Department, the Energy Department and other agencies. That has raised concerns among arms-control advocates that the final product will be a cautious bureaucratic compromise.

"This NPR will be sort of the bell toll," said Stephen Young of the Union of Concerned Scientists. "It will signal the direction. Will the president try to push that agenda?"

U.S. diplomats hope the final document will establish the Obama administration's credibility before a nuclear security summit in April and a crucial meeting in May on the fraying global nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That treaty is at the heart of Obama's strategy to combat the most urgent threat today: the spread of nuclear weapons to unstable states and to terrorists. The last such session in 2005 ended in failure, with many countries accusing the Bush administration of trying to scotch their nuclear programs while maintaining one of the world's most massive stockpiles.

"The United States can't go around and ask others to give up their nuclear weapons while we maintain a list of official purposes for our nuclear weapons" that necessitates a large arsenal, said Jan Lodal, a senior Defense Department official in the Clinton administration.

The review comes as the U.S. military's precision-guided, conventional weapons have gained such accuracy that they can handle many threats assigned to nuclear weapons in the past.

But U.S. allies are divided about Obama's vision. New governments in Germany and Japan have embraced it, but some nations are more skeptical. "A country like ours, with a very special experience with its own history, we are maybe more cautious than some other countries," said Petr Kolar, the Czech ambassador, referring to past Soviet domination.

Kolar said big policy changes -- like promising not to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis -- could embolden other nuclear-armed powers. "My personal perspective is . . . we shouldn't actually lose the instruments we so far have," he said. "What's the change that would be gained by that?"

Another European ambassador said the nuclear review broke ground in even contemplating such a pledge. But he said it was unlikely while NATO was engaged in a major study of its strategy, due out this fall.

Pentagon officials worry that allies like Japan or Turkey could decide to develop their own nuclear weapons if they believed U.S. protection wasn't assured. Skeptics -- both Democrats and Republicans -- also question whether pledges to limit the U.S. nuclear role would have the impact claimed by proponents , since foes probably wouldn't believe such assertions. "We're better off when we communicate that all options are on the table," said Thomas Mahnken, a senior Defense Department official in the Bush administration. "As a practical matter, they are."

More than two dozen Democrats, led by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (Calif.), chairwoman of the Intelligence Committee, have pressed Obama to adopt language saying the "sole" or "only" purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is deterrence. It would not prevent the U.S. government from using a weapon first but would de-emphasize that option in planning.

The Bush administration's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review pledged to reduce the Cold War role of nuclear weapons. But it discussed planning to build new types of "bunker-buster" warheads. It also proposed developing the U.S. nuclear stockpile based not on potential enemies' actual threat but their future capability to carry out nuclear, chemical or biological attacks.

As part of his "declaratory policy," Obama will have to consider whether to break with the Bush and Clinton administrations' studied ambiguity about whether the United States would use nuclear weapons to respond to chemical or biological attacks planned by non-nuclear countries.

The president is expected to adopt that change, but with an important caveat, officials said. The new policy would drop that threat only for countries in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thus not working on their own bomb.

The immediate effect of such a policy would be limited, since the potential aggressors that most concern the United States are nuclear powers or accused treaty violators like Iran. But the move could encourage other countries to stick to the rules of that pact, officials said.

"It would be a significant pulling back of the reach of the nuclear sword," said Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists.

One senior official said the review will "point to dramatic reductions in the stockpile" in coming years.

In particular, the review will push for beefing up America's deteriorating weapons complex and nuclear labs so that the Pentagon can be more certain of its weapons' effectiveness, officials said. That shift will allow the Defense Department to get rid of some of the roughly 2,000 nuclear warheads it keeps as backups, in addition to its nearly 3,000 deployed weapons, officials said. There are also more than 4,000 older, inactive warheads in the queue for dismantlement.

It is not yet clear whether such reductions would be part of a formal treaty with Russia, one official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.