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Mostrando postagens com marcador Gertrude Himmelfarb. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Gertrude Himmelfarb. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 3 de janeiro de 2020

Gertrude Himmelfarb: The Last Victorian Sage - Myron Magnet (City Journal)

The Last Victorian Sage

Gertrude Himmelfarb, 1922–2019

The City Journal, January 3, 2020

Gertrude Himmelfarb, our foremost historian of ideas and one of the nation’s greatest historians of any stamp, died Monday at 97. Though a Washingtonian for the last decades of her long and productive life, the Brooklyn-born Himmelfarb was among the last of a storied band of New York Jewish intellectuals—the “Family,” they called themselves—who joined scholarly erudition to wide-ranging social, political, cultural, and ethical concerns far transcending the merely academic. They wrote for an educated general audience eager for the acuity with which they brought the wisdom and experience of the past to bear on the problems of present-day life. Through much reflection and debate, they’d mostly thought their way through the Trotskyist political correctness that prevailed in their student days to arrive at a liberal Americanism that, in time, metamorphosed into their own brand of conservativism. Now, with wonks and pundits, pedants and ideologues, taking their places, and with the “educated general reader” going extinct, today’s intellectuals seem shallow and dull by contrast.
Acerbic in her impatience with foolishness, Himmelfarb particularly scorned the Marxoid view that people’s beliefs and ideals have no independent reality but are just reflections of the material conditions around them. She rejected social-policy theories that give short shrift to cultural life, ignoring what goes on in people’s minds and hearts as a mere reflection of the real reality—the economic reality that should be the focus of our attention. According to this viewpoint, what people think can’t possibly alter the large forces that shape their lives. What determines individual behavior is the environment, not the content of the mind and spirit of the individual—as in, for example, the belief that crime springs from a lack of opportunity. She wasn’t much more sympathetic to social-policy thinkers who consider individuals the authors of their own actions and fates only to the extent that they choose rationally among various economic incentives—a welfare check versus a minimum-wage job, say. To her, this was just another way of saying that individuals merely respond mechanically to the environment: they don’t shape it.
As she saw it, beliefs shape behavior and transform the environment, rather than only vice-versa. The ideals that a culture transmits to its citizens affect whether they will be victims or masters of circumstance. In the introduction to her 1986 book, Marriage and Morals Among the Victorians, she remarked that the essays in that volume had what she called an almost obsessively unifying theme—the theme of the moral imagination, in the phrase of Lionel Trilling and, before him, Edmund Burke—a phrase that she also used as the title of a 2006 collection of essays. This theme unifies all her extraordinary works, beginning with her first book, on Lord Acton, subtitled “A Study in Conscience and Politics,” and including her magisterial Poverty and Compassion, subtitled “The Moral Imagination of the Late Victorians.” Far larger than everyday propriety, the moral imagination refers, as Himmelfarb puts it, to “the morality that dignifies and civilizes human beings, removing us from our natural brutish state.” It is the specifically human faculty that converts a mere featherless biped, as the Victorian sage Thomas Carlyle liked to say, into a creature of intelligence and a man.
Central to Himmelfarb’s thought was the relation between the moral imagination and poverty—the moral imagination of the larger society and of the poor themselves. Nowhere does she explicate this theme more profoundly than in The De-moralization of Society, published in 1995. How was it, she asks, that over the course of the nineteenth century, all of Britain’s key indicators of social pathology markedly improved? The illegitimacy rate, 7 percent in 1845, plunged below 4 percent by century’s end. Between 1857 and 1901, the crime rate fell by half, so that even while the population soared from 19 million to 33 million, the absolute number of serious crimes decreased. The prostitutes and drunks common at midcentury had become so scarce by 1900 that they no longer seemed a pressing social ill.
All this happened amid urbanization and industrialization that some theorists held should have produced social disintegration, not social improvement. But a much stronger force swept all before it: Victorian culture in general, and Victorian morality in particular, with its emphasis on virtue, respectability, work, self-help, sobriety, cleanliness, and family. The great Victorian achievement, as Himmelfarb saw it, was a “moral reformation” that allowed Britain “to attain a degree of civility and humaneness that was the envy of the rest of the world.”
It was a deeply self-conscious reformation, sparked by such value-laden institutions as Sunday schools and the temperance movement, by the “cult of respectability” and allegiance to duty even when belief in God and immortality began to falter, by the factory acts and great sanitation projects by which the propertied classes set out to improve the lives of the poor. It was a profoundly democratic reformation, too, Himmelfarb explains. “In attributing to everyone the same virtues—potentially at least, if not in actuality—[the Victorians] assumed a common human nature and thus a moral (although not a political or an economic) equality.” Just look at how the idea of a gentleman changed over the nineteenth century from a class term to a mainly moral term, so that such virtues as “integrity, honesty, generosity, courage, graciousness, politeness, [or] consideration for others” could distinguish a middle-class Victorian—even sometimes a laborer—as a gentleman.
Key to the reformation was the family. To the Victorians, the family home was “a sacred place”; family and home together, says Himmelfarb, “constituted something like a civic religion.” The foundation of the social order, families were universally recognized as the great schools of citizenship and civilization. If Victorian families didn’t grant women the freedom we moderns demand, married women’s lives were much more fulfilled than jeering critics, from Lytton Strachey onward, have contended. Even as Victorian family values embodied the comfortable middle-class ethic, they were democratized to include working-class families as well: far from feeling victims of class and patriarchal oppression, working-class wives overwhelmingly reported themselves satisfied and fulfilled by their lot.
The reformation succeeded so well also because it extended below the working class, to the poorest of the poor. Victorian welfare policy, embodied in the 1834 Poor Law, rested on a single moral proposition: that the conditions of life on relief for the able-bodied poor should be “less eligible”—less attractive—than those of the meanest wage earner’s life The goal: to make welfare less appealing than work and to honor effort by making sure that its rewards always surpassed the wages of idleness.
The result was the system of workhouses Dickens excoriated in Oliver Twist: welfare came at the cost of giving up your liberty and bearing a stigma. However harsh, the system worked: welfare expenditure, £8 million in 1817, remained at that figure in 1871—though the population had doubled. As Himmelfarb judges: “[S]tigmas are the corollaries of values. If work, independence, responsibility, respectability are valued, then their converse must be devalued, seen as disreputable.“ Accordingly, hand-in-hand with harshness toward the “undeserving” poor went benevolent philanthropy toward the “deserving” poor, ranging from organized efforts to educate them and improve their working and living conditions to individual acts of charity to help them through hard times.
To Himmelfarb, poverty is as much a matter of the mind and spirit as of the pocket. Perhaps today’s prevalence of illegitimacy, welfare dependency, crime, school failure, drug use, and the like among the intergenerational poor has much to do with our culture’s push to remove the stigma from these things at the same time that it has devalued middle-class—Victorian—virtues and traditional family life, not just for the poor but for us all. To cure it, social policymakers will need to take a larger view of human freedom than the shrunken one that has left society so demoralized, in both senses of the word.
Himmelfarb and her husband, Irving Kristol—she was Bea Kristol in private life—were beloved friends and precious mentors to me. When they still lived in New York, one of the great treats of my wife’s and my life was their periodic invitation to Sunday lunch, where we might meet a congressman or an ambassador (Bibi Netanyahu, as it happened), and where Bea taught me how to make horseradish sauce. Even before I met her, an essay of Bea’s on Burke in her 1968 Victorian Minds had helped nudge me down the road to conservatism. As for the civic religion of family, nothing demonstrated to me the truth of our mutual friend Daniel Bell’s judgment that the Kristols’ marriage was the happiest of their generation as much as a disagreement they once had at our dinner table—a long and intense dispute about whether President Ronald Reagan should visit a military cemetery in Bitburg, Germany, to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe and to show that our former enemies were now our ever-closer friends and allies in the Cold War. Trouble was, as the White House learned after accepting the invitation, Waffen–SS officers were buried in that graveyard, so the president’s wreath would appear to honor among the very worst of Nazi murderers.
Irving, who had advised Reagan to go, contended that the visit was pure realpolitik, and that canceling the ceremony now, instead of demonstrating that bygones were bygones, would inflame mutual hostility. Bea maintained that morality was morality: that the Holocaust was pure evil and could not in any way be papered over, much less honored. The two went at this for half an hour, my wife and I egging Bea on. Our other guests uttered scarcely a word, one couple out of fascination, the other out of fear of saying the wrong thing. But it wasfascinating, because, in all this time, Irving, though clearly getting the worst of the discussion, never lost his characteristic unruffled, benevolent sweetness, and Bea—with her delicate bones, sharp features, energetic animation, and keen, all-observant eye, resembling some rare, small, royal falcon—never argued but only debated, though with every so often a characteristic, “Oh, Irving!” A model and an inspiration.
I remember Irving speaking at his 60th birthday party of his thankfulness for all that America had bestowed on him. “I never imagined I’d have a color TV set,” he said, “or a washing machine.”
“Oh, Irving!” said Bea. “We don’t have a washing machine. It’s a dishwasher.”
They were both truly thankful for all that America had given them. When they resided in New York, Bea’s mother lived with them for a time. She would stand for hours at their big window looking north over Central Park, puzzling out what to make of all the joggers. Perhaps with memories of the Russian pogroms her family had fled in her childhood, she would say to herself: “I don’t understand. What are they running from?” That was the beauty of America, Bea and Irving knew. They didn’t have to run away from anything.

Myron Magnet, a National Humanities Medal laureate, is the author of Dickens and the Social Order  and Clarence Thomas and the Lost Constitution.

domingo, 5 de junho de 2016

Lord Acton and the Idea of Liberty - Gertrude Himmelfarb (Acton Institute)

Lord Acton and the Idea of Liberty



The opening words of Lord Acton’s first lecture on the History of Freedom in 1877 set the theme: “Liberty, next to religion, has been the motive of good deeds and the common pretext of crime, from the sowing of the seed at Athens, 2,460 years ago, until the ripened harvest was gathered by men of our race.” In the course of time, constitutions were perverted, charters became obsolete, parliaments abdicated and peoples erred, but the idea of liberty survived. That idea is “the unity, the only unity, of the history of the world, and the one principle of a philosophy of history.”
Whatever institutions or forms of government have been devised through the ages, the idea of liberty has remained constant: the right of each man to consult his conscience without reference to authorities or majorities, custom or opinion. The security of conscience enjoyed by the individual has its parallel in the security of minorities within the State; in both cases liberty is the safeguard of religion.
In the history of antiquity, Acton found confirmation of two of his favorite theories, that liberty is ancient and despotism modern, and that the history of liberty is in large measure the history of religion. The government of the Israelites, the first demonstration of political liberty, was a voluntary federation of self-governing tribes and families. When monarchy was finally instituted, it was only after much resistance, and the prophets kept alive the idea of equality before the law and the subservience of all before God. Acton wrote: “Thus the example of the Hebrew nation laid down the parallel lines on which all freedom has been won – the doctrine of national tradition and the doctrine of the higher law; the principle that a constitution grows from a root, by process of development, and not of essential change; and the principle that all political authorities must be tested and reformed according to a code which was not made by man.”
The first of the many disasters to befall liberty occurred when Babylonia conquered Judah and freedom under divine authority made way for absolutism under human authorities. From the degradation of tyranny, inequality and oppression, the world was rescued by the most gifted of ancient cities, Athens. Solon inaugurated a revolution in philosophy and politics when he introduced the idea of popular election, “the idea that a man ought to have a voice in selecting those to whose rectitude and wisdom he is compelled to trust his fortune, his family and his life.” Government by consent replaced government by force, and those who ruled were made responsible to those who obeyed. It was then discovered that political power, once concentrated in the interest of good order, could be distributed at no risk to order and at great gain to liberty.
This process of democratization was hastened by Pericles. With popular religion disintegrating, morality liberating itself from mythology, and a growing skepticism of moral authority, the people became the effective arbiters of good and evil. In consideration of this, Pericles installed them in the seat of power. All the props that artificially bolstered up property and wealth were destroyed, and it was a duty as well as a right for Athenians to participate in public affairs. Government became a matter of persuasion and rhetoric the instrument of popular rule, so that the “ascendancy of the mind” was established together with the ascendancy of the people.
In the zeal for the popular interest, however, there was no provision for the unpopular, and the minority soon found itself at the mercy of the majority. The people, now sovereign, felt themselves bound by no rules of right or wrong, no criteria except expediency, no force outside of themselves. They conducted wars in the marketplace and lost them, exploited their dependencies, plundered the rich, and crowned their guilt with the martyrdom of Socrates. The experiment of Athens taught that democracy, the rule of the most numerous and most powerful class, was an evil of the same nature as monarchical absolutism and required restraints of the same sort: institutions to protect it against itself and a permanent source of law to prevent arbitrary revolutions of opinion.
Men learned for the first time what later history was to confirm again and again. Acton:
It is bad to be oppressed by a minority, but it is worse to be oppressed by a majority. For there is a reserve of latent power in the masses which, if it is called into play, the minority can seldom resist. But from the absolute will of an entire people there is no appeal, no redemption, no refuge but treason.
The Roman Republic experienced the same problems as Greece. Aristocratic governments alternated with democratic ones, until Caesar, supported by an army flushed with victories and a populace seduced by his generosity, converted the republic into a monarchy. In spite of the fact that the empire was an “ill-disguised and odious despotism,” it made an important contribution to liberty. As Frederick the Great, though a despot, could promote the freedom of religion and speech, and the Bonapartes, though tyrants, could win the love of the people, so the Roman Empire aroused genuine loyalty because it satisfied deep needs.
The poor fared better than they had under the Republic and the rich better than under the Triumvirate, the provinces acquired citizenship, slavery was mitigated, religious toleration was instituted, a primitive law of nations was devised, and the law of property was perfected. But what was given to liberty with one hand was taken away with the other when the people, by a voluntary act of delegation, transferred its sovereignty to the emperor and supported his tyranny because they thought of it as their own.
In terms of institutions and legislation, Greece and Rome had an imperfect conception of freedom. They knew how to manipulate power, but not how to achieve liberty. “The vice of the classic State was that it was both Church and State in one. Morality was undistinguished from religion and politics from morals; and in religion, morality, and politics there was only one legislator and one authority,” Acton wrote. The citizen was subject to the State as the slave was to his master, and nothing was deemed sacred apart from the public welfare.
But where their institutions failed, their philosophy succeeded. At a time when their governments were most absolute, their theories called for a mixed constitution. They saw that any single principle of government standing alone, whether monarchy, aristocracy or democracy, was apt to be carried to excess, and that only in a distribution and balance of powers was liberty secure. All the philosophers of antiquity displayed the same theoretical boldness and practical timidity.  Socrates urged men to submit all questions to the judgment of reason and conscience, and to ignore the verdict of authority, majority or custom. Yet he would not sanction resistance. “He emancipated men for thought, but not for action” and he fell victim to the old superstition of the State.
Plato taught the supremacy of a divine law “written in the mind of God” and Aristotle applied it, in the form of the doctrine of a mixed constitution, to practical government. But neither Plato nor Aristotle dared to conceive of liberty as justice rather than as expediency. Plato “perverted” the divine law when he limited it to the citizens of Greece, refusing it to the slave and the stranger. Aristotle perverted it by putting good government higher than liberty. They did not see that liberty was not a means to a higher political end but was itself the highest end, that “it is not for the sake of a good public administration that it is required, but for security in the pursuit of the highest objects of civil society and of private life.”
The Stoics pushed the theory of liberty one step forward with the doctrine of a law of Nature that was superior to the law of nations and the will of the people. “The great question,” they taught, “is to discover, not what governments prescribe, but what they ought to prescribe; for no prescription is valid against the conscience of mankind.” And the conscience of mankind knows no distinctions between Greek and barbarian, rich and poor, slave and master. Men are equal in rights as in duties, and human legislation can neither detract from the one nor add to the other. Thus the Stoics “redeemed democracy from the narrowness, the want of principle and of sympathy, which are its reproach among the Greeks.” Augustine testified to their wisdom when he remarked, after quoting Seneca, “What more could a Christian say than this Pagan has said?”
The Christian had, indeed, little more to say. There was hardly a truth in politics or ethics that had not already been enunciated before the new dispensation was revealed. It was left for Christianity, however, to animate the old truths, to make real the metaphysical barrier which philosophy had erected in the way of absolutism. The only thing Socrates could do in the way of a protest against tyranny was to die for his convictions. The Stoics could only advise the wise man to hold aloof from politics and keep faith with the unwritten law in his heart. But when Christ said, “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s,” he gave to the State a legitimacy it had never before enjoyed, and set bounds to it that it had never yet acknowledged. And he not only delivered the precept but he also forged the instruments to execute it. To limit the power of the State ceased to be the hope of patient, ineffectual philosophers and became the perpetual charge of a universal Church.

This article was excerpted from Gertrude Himmelfarb’s Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics. The book, originally published in 1952, is available in a new 2015 edition from the Acton Book Shop.
Source: http://www.acton.org/pub/commentary/2015/11/10/lord-acton-idea-liberty

Grato ao amigo Paulo Kramer pela remessa deste artigo.