Grand Designs: Does China have a ‘Grand Strategy’?
Publication
By
Angela Stanzel, Nadège Rolland, Jabin Jacob, Melanie Hart
INTRODUCTION
Do China’s leaders have a strategy for
the long-term direction of their country? For a while now Chinese
thinkers have been discussing this very question, even speaking about
the parameters of an all-encompassing “grand strategy” (大战略 da zhanlue) for China.
As early as 2011, one of China’s leading
thinkers, Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at
Peking University, wrote that any country’s grand strategy must, at the
very least, answer what the nation’s core interests are, what external
forces pose a threat, and how the leadership can safeguard its
interests.
[1]
Wang, however, also noted that: “Whether China has any such strategy
today is open to debate” and that “(…) the Chinese government has yet to
disclose any document that comprehensively expounds the country’s
strategic goals and the ways to achieve them.”
[2]
The discussion has evolved since then, and
as of today the Chinese debate on what a “grand strategy” should look
like has produced policy directives, statements, and theories but so far
no authoritative formula has been communicated from the very top. This
is what makes the ongoing discussion so interesting.
Chinese scholars largely agree that China
needs a grand strategy that binds its strategic interests in the
economy, domestic politics and its foreign policy. Debates within China
largely revolve around the essential questions Wang Jisi posed in 2011.
How should China’s future economic, foreign policy, and military
strategies be framed in a more general sense, and how might that serve
to also protect the nation’s interests and security from external
threats? Not surprisingly, the question comes up repeatedly, including
questions about what role the US, as China’s most important partner −
and threat − might play in China’s “grand strategy”.
Cai Tuo, a scholar from the China
University of Political Science and Law, recalls in an article on
China’s grand strategy that this topic became subject to an intensive
debate among Chinese intellectuals around 2005, six years before Wang
Jisi raised it.
[3]
Among other writings he points to the Peking University’s annual Review
of China’s International Strategy as one of the most influential
sources of contributions to this debate.
[4]
In recent years, in particular since
Chinese president Xi Jinping came into power in 2013, China has
undergone many internal changes, as has the international landscape.
Therefore one might expect an even more intensive debate among Chinese
scholars on the future of Chinese strategy. Surprisingly, though, the
topic of grand strategy is surpassed by reams of academic literature
about the economic and political aspects of China’s “New Silk Road
(resp. Belt and Road) Initiative” (BRI). BRI also includes a maritime
component, which links it to China’s maritime strategy.
This China Analysis edition deals offers
insights into Chinese debates on the strategies behind the BRI and in
the maritime sphere; on how China’s global standing might have changed,
and what role the United States plays today in the Chinese imagination,
especially with Donald Trump as president.
Shaping the debate: China’s low profile and peaceful rise
Discussions concerning China’s strategy
evolved with Deng Xiaoping initiating the reform and opening-up period
in China at the end of the 1970s. Deng saw the need for China, as a
developing country, to focus on economic development and domestic
priorities and therefore to open up towards foreign relations as well as
within multilateral institutions. Therefore, Deng advocated for China
to keep a low profile in international affairs (韬光养晦 tao guang yang hui). This proved the basis for other strategic concepts that were developed after for a long time.
Chinese leaders saw the need to put in
place a “grand strategy” during the mid-1990s, according to Avery
Goldstein, Professor of Political Science at the University of
Pennsylvania and Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute
in Philadelphia.
[5]
According to his view, Chinese leaders saw the need for a wider-ranging
strategic concept due to changes in the international environment, the
post-Cold War world order, and the West’s sanctions against Beijing
following the Tiananmen Square massacre. China’s own domestic
development following its reform and the opening-up process also
motivated the need for a broader strategy. In Goldstein’s view, China
aimed for a grand strategy with the broad aim “to facilitate China's
rise by reducing the likelihood its growing capabilities will alarm
others or provoke them to oppose China”.
[6]
During this phase China also introduced a
new concept of security, which was first articulated in 1997 and seen as
“one of the most important developments in Chinese security thinking in
the post–Cold War era”, according to Chu Shulong
[7],
director of the Institute of International Strategic and Development
Studies at Tsinghua University and a member of the CSCAP China National
Committee. Chu argues that China advocated a new security concept “in
order to undermine the American military presence in Asia and the
U.S.-Japan security alliance (…) because China’s new security concept
does stand against the ‘old thinking’ represented by military blocs.” In
Chu’s view it also “reflects China’s search for a (…) regional security
arrangement for the Asia-Pacific region for the future.”
[8]
As a result, China endorsed
multilateralism and focused on improving relations with neighbouring
countries. This development has been visible in China’s diplomatic
efforts, for instance to improve ties with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries or to establish the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001. The fact that China also took a
central role in the Six Party Talks in the early 2000s to tackle the
North Korean nuclear weapons issue might have had other objectives, but
it fit well into the overall pattern of a stronger China engaging its
neighbours.
China’s improving regional relations, its
increasing participation in multilateral forums, and its integration
into world economic fora, accelerated by its accession to the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, has offered a opportunity for Beijing
that by was seen by some thinkers as possessing strategic value. Party
General Secretary Jiang Zemin in 2002 said: “The first two decades of
the 21st century are a period of important strategic opportunities”,
which China should seize.
[9]
China did indeed seize many opportunities to further develop its
economic ties around the world and continued to rise, economically,
politically, and militarily.
To counter international concerns about
China’s rise, in 2003, under the leadership of Chinese president Hu
Jintao, Beijing articulated a concept known as “China’s peaceful rise”
(中国和平崛起 zhongguo heping jueqi). It stressed Beijing’s wish to
develop in a peaceful international environment. Hu Jintao later (2004)
toned down this term even further and henceforth Beijing would only
speak of “China’s peaceful development”, instead of “rise”.
This overall strategic direction prompted
heated debate among Chinese scholars. Cai Tuo underlines the idea of
basing a true grand strategy on China’s peaceful rise, but also stresses
the need to thoroughly assess and debate the goals, methods, and
consequences of a rising China. Men Honghua advocates a grand strategy
based on an assessment of the country’s national interests and
strengths, and also stresses that a grand strategy should make use of
China’s international environment as well as its national strategic
resources (国家战略资源
guojia zhanlue ziyuan), which are political,
economic, military and ideological in nature, and all of which should be
employed to pursue China’s main interest: to protect its national
interests, security, and values.
[10]
In the aftermath of the global financial
crisis, when China had recovered from the shocks in its markets and the
downturn of Chinese exports, the Chinese government saw the need to
bolster the country’s economic and social stability. Hu Jintao reflected
on China’s national needs in 2009 and broadly defined the country’s
core interests to centre on economic and social development, sovereignty
(i.e. the Communist Party’s political stability), and security (meaning
territorial and national integrity). No doubt Hu wanted to leave his
mark as a leader able to clearly articulate China’s core interests.
However, despite Hu Jintao’s efforts to
outline those interests in simple terms, the debate continued. Wang Jisi
remarked “defining China’s core interests according to the three prongs
of sovereignty, security, and development, which are sometimes in
tension with each other, means it is almost impossible to devise a
straightforward organizing principle.”
[11]
He noted “a variety of views among Chinese political elites”, which
“complicates efforts to devise any such grand strategy based on a
political consensus.”
[12]
In his study, Wang found “four changes in
China’s strategic thinking”, which “may suggest the foundations for a
new grand strategy.”
[13]
These “changes” include a more comprehensive understanding of security
and transnational problems (such as terrorism or piracy), a more
multilateral and issue-oriented Chinese diplomacy (such as on energy
security or nuclear non-proliferation), a greater focus on social issues
arising because of China’s economic development, and greater attention
to the “cultural soft power of the nation” (China’s international
image).
[14]
Since Xi Jinping came to power, Wang’s
“changes” seem to have informed China’s new strategic thinking and
practice. China today engages more in counter-terrorism efforts
(nationally as well as internationally) as well as within multilateral
institutions (it established another one of its own); it makes efforts
to advance its economy further, and it tries to improve China’s image
abroad. Meanwhile, Beijing’s foreign policy is more assertive than it
ever used to be, implying that the times of keeping a low profile seem
to be over.
Early on, after taking power, Xi Jinping
described China’s ambition as the “China Dream” to “resurrect” Chinese
ancient power. This ambition stands in contrast to China’s past claims
that it wishes to pursue a course of “peaceful development”. This
ambition, however, does not yet mean that China has formulated its
“grand strategy” or even an all-encompassing foreign policy strategy.
Shi Yinghong pointed this out in an ECFR piece in 2015, stating that
China is just “beginning to come up with a grand strategy in its foreign
relations”.
[15]
In an article in late 2016, Shi also
criticises China for promoting a separate economic strategy and military
strategy, which “may eventually run the risk of creating strategic
overdraft” (战略透支
zhanlue touzhi), simply put, China might end up having too many strategies to be strategic.
[16]
In his view, China’s new strategic military concepts, its improved
military capabilities, its competition with the US and Japan, and its
assertive maritime policies, have damaged Beijing's soft power reach and
increased the risk of a conflict springing up with the US or Japan.
Shi believes China needs to “first develop
our own strength and capability” instead of engaging in massive and
costly economic projects, such as its BRI scheme or the establishment of
the AIIB.”
[17]
Both militarily and economically, China should be more cautious, Shi
urges. Although, he says, the “emerging disorganization in the Western
world (…) could be a strategic opportunity for China”. But in order to
profit from it, Beijing first needs to define its interests more
narrowly and slow down its pace, otherwise “we might not be able to make
use of the opportunities brought by the decline and disorganization in
the West.”
[18]
Many strategies or one grand strategy?
China has yet to formulate a true “grand
strategy” and the question is whether it wants to do so at all, or
whether it wants to develop more and more concrete individual
strategies, such as the indigenisation of its economy, the modernisation
of its army, and the build-up of its blue-water navy, just to name a
few. Many strategies do not equal one grand strategy but, taken
together, they can reveal the broad strategic direction in which China
is heading.
What has remained unchanged in China’s
strategies is that its calculations are closely tied to the US presence
in the region and globally. The Chinese government’s view on the US
gives us an idea of China’s aspirations. Xi Jinping in particular has
been promoting a “new type of great power relationship”, in which he
sees China and the US in a “G2 world”. Xi also proposed a “Chinese
solution”, in October 2016, to imply that China might have better
solutions to regional or global problems than the US, or indeed any
other country. The BRI and the establishment of the AIIB are already
“solutions” China offers to improve global infrastructure and
transportation. China’s ambition to be a global power must therefore be
seen in the context of its US policies.
In this edition of China Analysis authors
grapple with questions in the Chinese intellectual community about
China’s place in the global order and the key parts of its strategy: the
BRI and its maritime security.
Nadège Rolland, senior fellow at The
National Bureau of Asian Research, explains why China’s BRI is something
akin to a “grand strategy” and how it reflects on China’s overall
long-term interests: “the achievement of China’s unimpeded rise”.
Rolland introduces several Chinese authors that underline the strategic
purpose of China’s BRI scheme – to help China’s geopolitical and
economic rise. In the context of BRI, Chinese leaders have mobilised
‘hard power’ resources as well as ‘soft power’ assets, according to
Rolland, and she further reflects on the debate in China on how BRI is
reshaping China’s foreign policy and diplomacy.
Jabin Jacob, a fellow at the Institute of
Chinese Studies in Delhi, outlines China’s thinking on maritime
strategy, which, in his view, includes the BRI as well. He refers to the
2015 White Paper, which confirms that China’s leaders are committed to
“the idea of China as a maritime great power.” Jacob believes that
capabilities, actions, and narratives, are all important components of
the project and are reflected in China’s maritime grand strategy. He
describes how these three components play out in the debate within
China, such as in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, or on the
relationship with its neighbours, such as Japan. Jacob further reflects
on how Chinese scholars view the US both as an adversary and as a model
in China’s maritime strategy.
Melanie Hart, a senior fellow and director
of China Policy at American Progress, offers insights into Chinese
debates on where China believes it stands in the global order in light
of Donald Trump becoming the new US president. She outlines competing
views in China and points out that all scholars want to “see the
US-China relationship as the center of global power”. Chinese scholars,
she notes, assume that the shifting global order, and the decline of the
West (reinforced by Trump’s polices) works in China’s favour. But there
is disagreement among Chinese scholars on the question of China’s
position vis-à-vis the US and whether China is ready to partner with the
US in a G2 world. Hart, however, also points out that the “American
decline” rhetoric might fade if China meets severe economic or security
challenges.
Our authors have offered an insight into
current thinking on some of China’s most important strategic approaches
today. Their insights show that the concept of a grand strategy is still
very fluid in China and continues to develop. While it might be too
simple to say that China will phrase its grand strategy according to
whatever the US is doing, the apparent decline of the US under Trump has
triggered a renewed debate on China’s standing as a global power.
Whether this is the beginning of a renewed
thinking on a grand conceptual strategy for China remains to be seen.
Possibly the long-awaited Party Congress in October will indicate
whether China has indeed departed from its peaceful rise and will launch
a high profile and ambitious grand strategy.
The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Grand Strategy?
Nadège Rolland
A grand strategy reflects the vision that a
state has for itself and for its desired position in the international
system. It is meant to shape the international environment in a way that
benefits the state’s long-term strategic objectives. It is a top-down
approach, assumed to be sustained over a long period of time, and it
seeks to mobilise and integrate all the available domestic resources and
instruments of national power (not just military but also diplomatic,
economic, financial, intellectual, cultural and political),
[19] in order to shape the international environment in ways that reflect the values of the state and serve its national interests.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
launched by Xi Jinping in late 2013, perfectly matches this description.
It is a long-term endeavour (supposed to come to fruition in 2049 for
the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China),
which combines all the elements of China’s power and uses all its
available advantages in order to produce a favourable outcome. China’s
economic actors, financial resources, state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
diplomats, security experts, intellectuals, and media are all called to
join the effort under the leadership’s helm. In other words, BRI is a
grand strategy, coordinating and giving direction to a large array of
national resources to achieve a political objective, which Xi Jinping
has defined as the “China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the nation”
(中华民族伟大复兴 zhonghua minzu weida fuxing): the achievement of China’s unimpeded rise.
Hard and soft power mobilised by the top
The BRI did not materialise out of the
mind of Xi Jinping fully formed. Yet, as Fu Mengzi and Xu Gang note, it
clearly bears the marks of a top-level design.
[20]
Xi Jinping’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime Silk
Road”, proposed during his state visits to Kazakhstan and to Indonesia
in September and October 2013, gave the green light to the project. From
then on, the entire Chinese administration has been mobilised and
organised to flesh out and implement the leader’s grand vision. The 3rd
Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party’s Central Committee adopted
the decision to move forward with the project in November 2013. In March
2015, the National Development and Reform Commission, the ministry of
foreign affairs and the ministry of commerce jointly issued a roadmap
under the form of a “Vision and Actions” document
(推动共建丝绸之路经济带和21世纪海上丝绸之路的愿景与行动
tuidong gong jian sichou zhi lu jingji dai he 21 shiji haishang sichou zhi lu de yuanjing yu xingdong),
[21]
calling for all the central government ministries (education, science
and technology, agriculture, water, etc.), as well as entities such as
the People’s Bank of China and the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of China (SASAC), and the relevant organs at
the provincial level, to introduce specific measures to promote and
serve BRI. According to Fu Mengzi and Xu Gang the creation of a Leading
Working Group for Belt and Road Construction, a top-level coordination
mechanism led by vice premier Zhang Gaoli and four other high-profile
co-chairs, “highlights the significant degree of attention given by the
central leadership.”
China has invested large amounts of its
financial resources in Belt and Road countries, offering loans up to
$110 billion for more than 600 projects.
[22] In 2016 alone, 61 countries signed industrial cooperation agreements with China.
[23]
Created to help fund BRI projects, the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) has become the world’s second largest multilateral
development agency, surpassing the Asian Development Bank in its number
of members.
[24]
With BRI’s great potential also come
growing challenges. In the face of increasing risks to its overseas
investments, it will be difficult for China to stick to its
non-interference principle and to “maintain China’s expanding overseas
interests through peaceful diplomatic means in a complex and
ever-changing situation”.
[25]
As Chinese overseas assets expand, security forces have been instructed
to think about possible options in case a contingency plan is needed:
all the relevant departments “are currently actively studying
responses”, which include possible army “support for the protection of
overseas interests, the use of foreign security forces to strengthen
intelligence research and analysis, the establishment of security
operations systems, etc.”
[26]
Experts from the China Institutes of Contemporary International
Relations (CICIR) further recommend, “deepening China’s security
cooperation with foreign governments” and “adding a specific security
cooperation clause to bilateral trade and investment agreements”.
[27]
In addition to China’s ‘hard power’
resources, the leadership is also mobilising its ‘soft power’ assets. In
order to tell “positive Chinese stories” about BRI, the relevant
propaganda entities have been instructed to “strengthen international
communication and public opinion guidance”.
[28]
CICIR experts advise that films, documentaries, and exhibitions more
widely display the positive impact of BRI projects on local economies
and societies.
Overall, BRI coordinates “both domestic
development and international economic cooperation”, Fu Mengzi and Xu
Gang write, in order to serve a great “strategic ambition.” They believe
that this “substantial” and “clear plan” is meant to “forcefully shape
China’s geopolitical and economic path to further achieve its rise” and
to help China “consolidate its status as a global economic power and
lead a new phase of globalization”.
Shaping China’s external environment
The mobilisation of China’s domestic
resources under BRI’s umbrella is intended to shape China’s external
environment. For Chen Gang, an expert at the Institute of East Asian
Studies of the National University of Singapore, BRI has “altered”
China’s “long-standing principle of keeping a low profile” and reflects
Beijing’s newfound “political ambition to seek global great power status
and its long-term plan of reshaping the global economic structure”
[29]:
as Chinese SOEs venture out and create new industrial capacity abroad,
the domestic industry needs to be “successfully upgraded” to form a
“complementary supply chain”, as Li Ziguo, an expert at the Eurasia
Institute of the China Institute of International Studies, describes it,
in which China will be at the top.
BRI also indicates marked changes in how
China sees its environment. As he looks around China’s periphery, Liu
Jun, a researcher at the Institute of International Studies of Yunnan
University, describes a problematic maritime flank that contrasts with a
consolidated and stable western landmass.
[30]
Russia is perceived to be a solid political, economic, and military
friend for China, and the two strategic partners “can defend one another
in times of European and American strategic squeeze” (战略挤压
zhanlüe ji ya).
“Fruitful cooperation” with Central Asia on security issues has been
achieved thanks to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On China’s
western flank, only India is seen as a potential concern as “it has been
impossible to get rid of the issue of mutual trust because India sees
China as a powerful international competitor”. By contrast, Liu
describes a problematic eastern theatre with multiple hotspots (Japan,
Taiwan, and North Korea), especially the South China Sea where the “US,
Japan, Australia and others” have “seized the opportunity” of China’s
island reclamation to “intervene militarily.” Maritime access is
crucially important: “as a country with no ocean, it is impossible for
China to rise, or even to grow into a global power”.
[31]
The implementation of BRI is also
reshaping China’s diplomatic conduct. Li Ziguo believes, this
“diplomatic transformation” marks the opening of a “new era” with a more
proactive China, which has “put forward a series of positions on
international relations and global governance.” What he means is that
from ‘rule taker’, China will now become ‘rule maker’:
“After the 1840 Opium War, China became a profound victim of
globalization, then evolved into a detached spectator, and now has grown
into an active participant.” Li Ziguo writes that having in the past
“accepted and learned” the international rules, it will now “participate
in the development of rules.” He further states that these new rules
will “break the Western moral advantage” and focus on “development
rights” instead of “good and bad” political systems. Meaning that
instead of playing along with the rules and platforms provided by others
(World Bank, IMF) China will now provide its own public goods.
Epitomising an approach informed by “Chinese wisdom,” the AIIB is
“clearly different from Western-led financial institutions” as loans are
offered without political conditions, Li Ziguo notes.
Thanks to BRI, “China’s circle of friends is expanding”
[32]: “More than 100 countries and international organizations have expressed their support.”
[33]
Most Belt and Road countries are economically less developed than
China. Chen Gang points out that they are “not just limited to the
Eurasian continent, but will eventually cover all the ‘middle zone’ and
‘third world’ put forward by Mao” in his ‘Three Worlds Theory’ (“三个世界”理论
san ge shijie lilun).
[34]
Chen Gang sees BRI as a continuation of China’s historical ties with
third world countries and as the opening of a “new era of China’s Third
World strategy.” As such, the US and other Western countries are
concerned that BRI will bring about “the erosion of their global
influence and overseas interests”: “Mao’s Third World strategy mostly
used to seek China’s increased political influence; the Belt and Road
strategy not only seeks to expand political and diplomatic influence but
has also a clear economic expansion appeal”. In essence, Mao’s idea was
to exert restraint on Soviet hegemony by consolidating cooperation
among Third World countries − an international relations parallel to the
Maoist revolutionary strategy of using the countryside to encircle the
urban strongholds. Chen Gang concludes by saying that “the international
game around BRI has just begun” but falls short of taking the next step
and explicitly enunciating what follows from his historic parallel: as a
result of China’s increased cooperation with the developing world
through BRI, the current American hegemon will be encircled, restrained
and marginalised.
Does China have a Maritime Grand Strategy?
Jabin Jacob
To what extent does China have a clear
‘maritime strategy’? If such a thing exists, it is probably best
outlined in China’s defence white paper, which was released in 2015. It
declared that, “[t]he traditional mentality that land outweighs sea must
be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the
seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests”.
[35]
China’s defence white papers are seldom heavy on detail, and are often
less a declaration of future intent than a confirmation of what has been
already under way for some time. The 2015 white paper, however, not
only confirms what China’s leaders have been thinking for a while, it
also commits them more strongly to the idea of China as a maritime great
power.
The defence white paper also reflects all
three elements that define a strategy: capabilities, actions, and
narratives, i.e., what China can do, what it actually does, and what
rationale it proffers for its capabilities and actions.
Chinese capabilities, actions, and narratives
Capabilities are the easiest to measure
for both the Chinese as well as outside observers, but these alone do
not constitute strategy. It is noteworthy that the Chinese may seek
capabilities because of the advantage this can bring them in terms of
‘the optics’. Take for example, China’s grand programme of building
multiple aircraft carriers. It does this even as it claims that its
missiles and submarines can counter American aircraft carriers. But the
prestige that comes from owning aircraft carriers too is important for
Beijing.
China’s naval activity is supported by its
narratives – both military and civilian. On the military side, there
is, of course, the great emphasis on humanitarian and disaster relief,
including anti-piracy operations. However, significant infrastructure
development in the form of China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI,
一带一路) plays an extremely important role in the projection of Chinese
maritime power. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR,
21世纪海上丝绸之路) component of the BRI upgrades the physical infrastructure of
many Asian and African countries. Of course, this presents an
opportunity for China as a global supplier of public goods and of a
benign regional and global power. Nevertheless, the lack of economic
rationale as well as of transparency in many projects under BRI raises
several suspicions both in host countries and elsewhere.
The massive China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), financed by Beijing, is currently under way as part of
the BRI linking western China with the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. The
CPEC is unique for connecting both the overland as well as the maritime
route (the belt and the road). It is almost certain that the economic
costs of the projects are beyond Pakistan’s capacity to pay or what the
CPEC itself might produce in terms of returns.
[36]
The apparent lack of sound economic rationale or outcomes for the CPEC
raises the possibility of Pakistan being unable to make good on its
repayments. China might then use this to convert strategic real estate,
such as the Gwadar port in the Pakistani province of Balochistan, to
security-related objectives. Indian analysts in particular believe
Gwadar will in due course become a staging area for China’s maritime
assets and personnel along the lines of Djibouti in the Horn of Africa.
Such prognoses and suspicion of Chinese
narratives are also natural in a situation where China’s actions speak
differently from its words. In the South China Sea in particular, these
actions result in a permanently wary, even if not actively hostile,
immediate neighbourhood. In this case, China appears to have arrived at
the conclusion that size and capability matter and that none of the
south-east Asian nations are ever going to be able to match or contend
with China for long even if they wanted to, and that the US itself is
less than fully committed to its allies.
The situation is not quite the same where a
more significant naval power like Japan is concerned. Here, China might
keep Japan engaged in maritime confrontation below a certain threshold;
the PLA Navy is, therefore, careful not to get involved directly
allowing instead its coast guard and fishing vessels carry out the
intrusions into Japanese territorial waters.
[37]
China also appears to operate under the view that Japan’s ‘peace
constitution’, its anti-war public and the lack of US interest in
getting involved on behalf of its allies, allows China to keep provoking
without fear of a major reaction.
The narrative of visceral enmity that the
Chinese state has developed over the years against their neighbour might
even aid such brinksmanship. Even any losses that the Chinese may
encounter might provide opportunities to raise the threshold of
provocative and aggressive behaviour with Japan still higher.
China in the Indian Ocean
Chinese analysts have begun to say that the Indian Ocean is part of China’s “grand national maritime strategy”.
[38]
To some extent, statements such as these reveal what the Chinese
government is thinking or the kind of ideas on maritime issues that are
being discussed in elite Chinese circles. Cao Xiaogang, who studies the
Chinese military, for instance, claims that China’s “South China Sea
strategy” (南海战略) helps complicate the United States’ maritime strategy
by introducing an obstacle between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
[39] This hints at one of the many ways in which the Indian Ocean is important to China.
But in the Indian Ocean, Chinese actions
and strategies are substantially different from those in the East China
Sea or the South China Sea. This is the area where China’s limited naval
capabilities are most in evidence. China, therefore, prefers to
highlight in its narrative non-traditional security threats such as
piracy as the primary case for Chinese naval activity in the Indian
Ocean region.
[40]
However, China is also using anti-piracy
operations to allow PLA Navy ships to spend considerable time in the
Indian Ocean including port calls at many of India’s neighbours and
military exercises with the Pakistani navy. The presence of Chinese
submarines in Indian Ocean waters certainly does not convey any benign
intent.
[41]
What is interesting, in fact, is how the Chinese have justified the
presence of submarines in the Indian Ocean. They are not shy of counting
the matter of prestige as an important consideration but they have also
put forward such implausible reasons as anti-piracy, counter-terrorism
and humanitarian and disaster relief.
[42]
America as the model
China closely follows what the US is doing
in the maritime domain, especially in their neighbourhood, not just
with a view to opposing these actions but also to learn from and ape
these actions, perhaps because China believes that what the US does is
what great powers do.
Highlighting the apparent failures or lack
of logic or legitimacy of US actions is also a necessary objective of
China’s narrative. Doing so is aimed at making China’s own actions and
narratives look good in comparison. One of these failures, for instance,
is the US inability to get its allies as well as other countries to
conduct joint operations in the South China Sea, as Su Xiaohui, a
researcher at the Institute for International Strategic Studies at the
China Institute for International Studies, points out.
[43]
Japan, Australia, and India all turned down the offer, and the
Philippines too soon suspended joint operations after Rodrigo Duterte
came to power as president. Hu Bo, a researcher from the Maritime
Institute at Peking University, meanwhile, argues that the Americans are
politicising the situation in the South China Sea and using their media
as tools in a propaganda war against China and thus increasing the risk
of confrontation.
[44]
Su Xiaohui offers some insight into
Chinese elite thinking, stating that if the US could not effectively
challenge China on the South China Sea issue, the credibility of its
alliance system would be affected.
[45]
Such views both encourage as well as possibly reflect China will to
continue provocations and assertiveness in the South China Sea.
Alongside this, there is a strong hint of a threat to the US when some
Chinese authors highlight China’s weaponry of submarines and anti-ship
missiles. Chinese analysts like Su appear to believe that talk of war
bothers the Americans more than it does the Chinese themselves.
[46]
Conclusion
China’s 2015 defence white paper lays the
beginnings of a maritime strategy for China, but the process of defining
the strategy – balancing capabilities, actions, and narratives in the
East and South China Seas as well as the Indian Ocean – is ongoing.
While China seems to be following the
tried-and-tested methods of other rising powers and great navies of the
past, and especially of the US, there should be no doubt that the
Chinese will seek to distinguish themselves from other powers in their
maritime strategy as they seek to do in all other domains.
Thus, while show of military muscle is as
important a consideration for China’s party-state as for other
countries, the MSR is a unique and equally important part of any Chinese
maritime strategy. While the MSR offers connectivity and other economic
opportunities to host countries, it might also be viewed as the velvet
glove hiding the iron fist of China’s military intentions – something
that many powers before China have seldom bothered to mask. This could
in itself be part of a strategy with ‘Chinese characteristics’.
Analysing China’s position in the global system
Melanie Hart
Many Chinese observers view the United
Kingdom’s Brexit vote and the election in the United States of Donald
Trump as evidence that the Western-led liberal order is entering a new
phase of retrenchment that will provide more space for China to expand
its own global presence. But exactly what that means for the current
world order and China’s position within it is the subject of intense
debate in China.
Chinese scholars are studying the
international system to see if anything has actually changed at a
systemic level. There are three competing views in China about the state
of the global order today. Some Chinese scholars argue that the
international system is still unipolar and dominated by the US; others
believe the system is now bipolar, with China serving as a critical
check against the US; while the third group believes the system is now
multipolar, with major powers balancing each other out.
One common thread is that all analysts see
the US-China relationship at the apex of global power, and think that
China is steadily absorbing more of that power from the US. Chinese
scholars generally assume that the global community welcomes China’s
rise and that it is restructuring and reforming the global order to make
it more representative of a broader array of interests, particularly
developing-nation interests. Indeed, Chinese analysts routinely call
for a more peaceful and fair global order without providing clear
definitions of what that should look like. President Trump’s “America
first” rhetoric and the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from
the Transpacific Partnership and Paris climate accord are adding more
fuel to claims that the US is in retreat.
Defining the International Configuration
Chinese scholars use the term “international configuration” (国际格局
guoji geju)
to describe the balance of power among nations and the international
system that emerges from that balance at a given point in time.
[47]
This term gained prominence in China during the cold war era to
describe the US-USSR bipolar global power structure. In a recent review
of Chinese academic debates on this topic, Professor Zhou Fangyin from
the Guangdong University of Foreign Studies Research Institute for
International Studies states that the Chinese concept of “international
configuration” encompasses the entire structure and composition of
international relations, including the distribution of power, global
governance system, distribution of benefits among powers, and
macro-level trends such as globalisation and the digital information
revolution.
[48]
Chinese scholars classify international configurations in terms of “poles” and “power centres”.
[49]
They use concrete metrics, such as gross domestic product, population,
production capacity, and military capability, to assess relative power
and only consider a nation to be a true “pole” if its power extends
globally. The number of poles determines whether the system is unipolar,
bipolar, or multipolar. The structure of other power centres around the
poles and the overall distribution of power determines how the system
functions.
In Chinese, “international configuration”
is a more specific term than “global order”. According to Cui Liru,
senior advisor to the China Institutes for Contemporary International
Relations, global order is “a concept with the most indistinct meaning”
which “people often use according to their own needs and understanding”.
[50]
Unipolar, Bipolar, or Multipolar
In the late 1980s internal weakness caused
the Soviet Union to implode, turning a previously bipolar system into a
unipolar one with the US at the centre. But starting in the 1990s,
globalisation and the digital revolution contributed to China’s rise,
bringing a series of power redistribution shocks to the unipolar system.
By the late 2000s, US global leadership and the unipolar power
structure had begun to fray as China’s economy ballooned.
[51]
From a Chinese perspective, the 2008 global financial crisis—which the
United States instigated and China weathered more easily than the
Western developed nations—demonstrated that China’s power was rising,
U.S. power was declining, and the U.S.-led unipolar order was on its way
out.
Chinese scholars generally agree that the
latest wave of nationalist populist politics in the US and Europe
indicates that the pace of change is accelerating. However, they
disagree on the question of whether the change that has occurred thus
far adds up to a shift in the underlying global structure. Some scholars
argue that China is now a major “pole” operating at the same level as
the US, but others do not believe China has reached that level yet or
see a more a multipolar order emerging. Three recent articles lay out
the reasoning behind these conflicting views.
Tsinghua University experts Yan Yilong and Cui Jing use the work of Marx to argue that we still live in a bipolar world.
[52]
In 1853, Karl Marx used Hegel’s law of the contact of extremes to
describe interactions between Europe and China. In Marx’s view, European
colonialism triggered a liberation movement in China that could
potentially loop back around and trigger a revolution in Europe. Yan and
Cui argue that, once again, the non-Western world is rising up, just as
Marx described in 1853. The difference is that this time China is much
stronger, and it is leading the non-Western world to rise up
collectively to balance against the unipolar global system. According to
Yan and Cui, China’s rise is as significant as the industrial
revolution, and they believe China now stands shoulder-to-shoulder with
the US in a bipolar system.
Their view of this bipolar system
represents a departure from the cold war playbook of confrontation.
Instead, the authors argue that the US and China share many common
interests, and today’s most pressing problems, such as climate change,
are global in nature and impossible for either nation to solve on its
own. Instead of the old cold war system, they describe a new type of
bipolarity in which the two poles compete but also cooperate, engage in
joint global leadership on common problems, and serve to check and
balance one another. In their view, China’s rise has broken apart the
US-led “hegemonic order” (霸道秩序
badao zhixu) to produce a more
democratic order where more interests are represented, more nations can
reap benefits, and there is “more respect for individual nations’
independence and self-determination.”
[53]
They argue that this new type of bipolar order offers greater
opportunity for multilateral global governance mechanisms that bring in a
broader array of competing viewpoints.
Cui Liru argues that China operates in a multipolar international configuration.
[54]
In his view, 2008 marked the turning point from a unipolar to a
multipolar system. That year, China’s success hosting the Olympic games
was a soft power success that demonstrated its peaceful rise, while the
global financial crisis demonstrated the risks and failings of a
unipolar system dominated by the US. In his view, the shift from a
unipolar to a multipolar system reflects America’s decline. Indeed, he
argues that the centre weakened to the point that it was “unable to
easily exercise hegemonic authority like it did in the post-Cold War
era”.
[55] According to Cui, in the new post-2008 multipolar system, the US no longer has “unconditional leadership authority” (绝对的主导权
juedui de zhudao quan).
[56]
The structure today is more balanced, with “different power centers
competing and cooperating at different levels according to their own
superiority and characteristics”.
[57]
Power is more diffuse, and that brings benefits as well as challenges
for China. Professor Cui thinks the US and China have a critical role in
the new multipolar global order. As the largest developed nation and
largest developing nation, the US and China have a unique capability to
practice joint leadership.
Arguments that China still lives in a
unipolar world are becoming increasingly hard to find, but Xiao Huanrong
and Qi Ji, both experts at the Institute of International Relations at
the Communication University of China, support this view.
[58]
They still portray the US as an aging, stumbling nation reaching the
limits of its hegemonic power and bumping up against new limitations
both internal and external. However, unlike Cui Liru, they argue that
the structure is still unipolar because China still cannot compete with
the US in terms of its military capability and the number of bases it
has across the world. In their view, although China is steadily rising,
only a big shock will rock the US off the top spot and usher in a truly
bipolar or multipolar system.
Although they still believe in the idea of
a unipolar system, they see profound change in the way it operates:
problems are increasingly global, power is increasingly dispersed, and
the US is no longer able to fulfill global needs unilaterally. They
argue that China’s national interests are best served by focusing on its
own development within the current unilateral system rather than
pushing for systemic change.
Assessing the Trump presidency
Most Chinese scholars interpret the Trump
presidency as evidence that the decline of the West is accelerating, US
hegemony is crumbling, and China is gaining in relative power. Yan and
Cui actually expect US-China competition to intensify under Trump. In
their view, compared to his predecessors, Trump is more willing to break
international rules and norms that previously kept US-China competition
within a predictable lane.
[59]
Yet, they argue that, although the US still enjoys an overall military
edge, it cannot address critical national security threats in Northeast
Asia without Chinese assistance, and it is increasingly dependent on
Chinese trade and investment to keep its domestic economy running.
Consequently, they do not expect the Trump administration to truly
operationalise his “America first” policy. They expect that any attempt
to do this will backfire and boost global demand for Chinese leadership
and push the global community toward China’s concept of the global
order, which they view as more peaceful and egalitarian.
Zhang Tengjun, a researcher from the
America Institute of the China Institute of International Studies,
recently echoed this view, stating that if China remains focused on its
own internal development and peaceful rise, “the international community
will naturally place high hopes on China, and some will even go so far
as to raise the possibility of China taking over the global leadership
role from the United States.”
[60] Zhang calls for China to remain level headed and avoid jumping into that role too quickly.
From an American perspective, Chinese
scholars are making a wide array of assumptions, some of which appear to
be constructed on shaky ground: that the broader global community
welcomes and will continue to welcome Chinese leadership across a wide
array of issues; that a China-centric system would be more
representative than a US-centric system; that China’s capabilities will
continue to grow and the nation will not become bogged down in its own
domestic economic or political crises. Those assumptions will need to be
tested in a systematic way in order to determine whether this new trend
in Chinese ‘international configuration’ analysis truly reflects
fundamental shifts in the international system or is another wave of
wishful thinking that will fade the next time China faces major
challenges.
[3] Cai Tuo (蔡拓), "About China's grand strategy" (“中国大战略刍议”), "International Observations" 2006 (载《国际观察》2006年第2期).
[5]
Avery Goldstein, “Rising to the challenge - China’s Grand Strategy and
International Security”, Studies in Asian Security Series, Stanford
University Press, Stanford, 2005.
[10] Cai Tuo (蔡拓), "About China's grand strategy" (“中国大战略刍议”), "International Observations" 2006 (载《国际观察》2006年第2期).
[19]
For a discussion of China’s national power, see Nadège Rolland,
“China’s National Power: A Colossus with Iron or Clay Feet?” in Ashley
J. Tellis (Ed.)
Foundations of National Power in the Asia Pacific, Strategic Asia 2015-16 (The National Bureau of Asian Research: Seattle, 2015), pp. 23-56.
[20] Fu Mengzi, Xu Gang, “Belt and Road: Progress, Challenges and Responses” (“一带一路”：进展、挑战与应对,
“yidaiyilu”: jinzhan, tiaozhan yu yingdui),
Guoji wenti yanjiu, Vol.3, 2017, available at
http://www.cicir.ac.cn/chinese/News_8198.html (hereafter, Fu Mengzi, Xu
Gang, “Belt and Road: Progress, Challenges and Responses”).
[21]
“Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”, National Development and Reform
Commission, 28 March 2015, available at
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html
[22] Fu Mengzi, Xu Gang, “Belt and Road: Progress, Challenges and Responses”
[23] Li Ziguo, “Belt and Road: New Era, New Challenges, New Responsibilities” (“一带一路”：新时代、新挑战、新任务,
“yidai yilu”: xin shidai, xin tiaozhan, xin renwu),
Guoyanyuan,
31 May 2017, available at
http://www.ciis.org.cn/chinese/2017-05/31/content_9502473.htm (hereafter
Li Ziguo, “Belt and Road: New Era, New Challenges, New
Responsibilities”).
[24] Fu Mengzi, Xu Gang, “Belt and Road: Progress, Challenges and Responses”
[25] Li Ziguo, “Belt and Road: New Era, New Challenges, New Responsibilities”
[26] Fu Mengzi, Xu Gang, “Belt and Road: Progress, Challenges and Responses”
[27] Fu Mengzi, Xu Gang, “Belt and Road: Progress, Challenges and Responses”
[28] Fu Mengzi, Xu Gang, “Belt and Road: Progress, Challenges and Responses”
[29] Chen Gang, “The Diplomatic Thought at the Source of China’s “Belt and Road” Strategy” (中国“一带一路”战略的外交思想根源,
zhongguo “yidaiyilu” zhanlüe de waijiao sixiang genyuan
), Lianhe zaobao, 25 May 2017, available at
http://beltandroad.zaobao.com/beltandroad/analysis/story20170525-764119
(hereafter Chen Gang, “The Diplomatic Thought at the Source of China’s
“Belt and Road” Strategy”).
[30] Liu Jun, “Characteristics of China’s Current Periphery Diplomacy” (当今中国周边外交的特点,
dangjin zhongguo zhoubian waijiao de tedian),
Lianhe zaobao,
4 March 2016, available at
http://www.chinaelections.com/article/106/241206.html (hereafter Liu
Jun, “Characteristics of China’s Current Periphery Diplomacy”).
[31] Liu Jun, “Characteristics of China’s Current Periphery Diplomacy”
[32] Fu Mengzi, Xu Gang, “Belt and Road: Progress, Challenges and Responses”
[33] Li Ziguo, “Belt and Road: New Era, New Challenges, New Responsibilities”
[34]
Note: in 1974, Mao Zedong described the world as divided in three
categories. The first world consisted of superpowers (US and USSR), the
second, of intermediate powers (Japan, Europe, Canada) and the third, of
exploited nations in Africa, Latin America and Asia, which constituted
the principal force against imperialism and hegemonism embodied by the
first world. China belonged to the third category. Mao’s thought was
described in a speech given by Deng Xiaoping to the UN in April 1974,
which can be found here:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/deng-xiaoping/1974/04/10.htm.
[36] For more see: Jabin T Jacob. “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Perspectives from India”,
China & World Economy, Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 86-100, 2017.
[37]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Trends in Chinese Government and
Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and
Japan's Response – Records of Intrusions of Chinese Government and Other
Vessels into Japan's Territorial Sea”, 4 October 2017, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html.
[38] Observed by the present author at a conference in Shanghai, November 2015.
[39]
Cao Xiaoguang (曹晓光), “In-depth: How can China’s South China Sea
strategy cause the US to face a life-and-death choice?” (深度：中国南海战略如何布局
可让美国面临生死存亡) [Shendu: Zhongguo Nanhai zhanlüe ruhe buju ke rang meiguo
mianlian shengsicunwang],
New Wave Military Blog (新浪军事微博), 23 October 2016, available at
http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2016-10-23/doc-ifxwztru6936723.shtml.
[40]
Jabin T Jacob, “Discerning China’s Evolving Strategy in the Indian
Ocean Region: An Indian Perspective” in David Brewster (ed.).
India and China at Sea: Sino-Indian Strategic Competition in the Maritime Domain. Oxford University Press
(forthcoming), 2017.
[42]
Jabin T Jacob, “Discerning China’s Evolving Strategy in the Indian
Ocean Region: An Indian Perspective” in David Brewster (ed.).
India and China at Sea: Sino-Indian Strategic Competition in the Maritime Domain. Oxford University Press
(forthcoming), 2017.
[44]
Hu Bo (胡波), “The hidden high risks of America’s South China Sea policy,
China should suitably enhance its level of resistance”
(美国南海政策潜藏高度风险，中国应适当提升对抗等级) [Meiguo Nanhai zhengce qiancang gaodu
fengxian, Zhongguo ying shidang tisheng duikang dengji], Institute of
Ocean Research, Peking University, 22 February 2016, available at
http://ocean.pku.edu.cn/subpage.asp?id=488.
[48] 把“格局”与“国际”组合在一起，它既可以指国际关系的总体结构、布局，也被用于说明国际关系的宏观态势。Zhou Fangyin, “Zhong guo xue zhe dui guo ji ge ju de ren shi ji zheng ming,”
Quarterly Journal of International Politics, 2017, Vol 2 Issue 2 (国际政治科学), 2017 年第２卷第２期（总第６期）, 第1-32页.
[49] Xiao Huanrong and Qi Ji, “The Basic Figures and Trends of Current International Configuration and China’s Orientation,”
Journal of Xuzhou Institute of Technology Social Sciences Edition, November 2016, Vol. 31, No. 6.
[50] Cui Liru, “The Evolution of the International Configuration.”
[51]
Ibid; Xiao Huanrong and Qi Ji, “The Basic Figures and Trends.”; Yan
Yilong and Cui Jing, “Shi lun ‘liang ji xiang lian’ de quan qiu xin zhi
xu,”
Xin Rui Xin Lun, 2017 Issue 1, p. 161-169
[52]
Yan Yilong and Cui Jing, “Shi lun ‘liang ji xiang lian’” XX EDITORIAL
NOTE: I’M USING THE ORIGINAL FULL ACADEMIC ARTICLE, WHICH IS LONGER AND
CITED CORRECTLY IN NOTE 5, NOT THE EXCERPT AT THE NEW LEGALIST WEBSITE
LISTED HERE XX
[54] Cui Liru, “The Evolution of the International Configuration.”
[55] Cui Liru, “The Evolution of the International Configuration.”
[56] Cui Liru, “The Evolution of the International Configuration.”
[58] Xiao Huanrong and Qi Ji, “The Basic Figures and Trends.”
[59] Yan Yilong and Cui Jing, “Shi lun ‘liang ji xiang lian.’”
