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Mostrando postagens com marcador Nicholas Burns. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Nicholas Burns. Mostrar todas as postagens

segunda-feira, 4 de julho de 2022

A guerra na Ucrânia é a “maior ameaça à ordem mundial”: Nicholas Burns, em Beijing - Simone McCarthy (CNN)

 Diplomatas russos e americanos se enfrentam no fórum de Pequim


Embaixador dos EUA afirmou que guerra na Ucrânia é a "maior ameaça à ordem mundial"

Simone McCarthy, da CNN
04/07/2022 às 08:34 | Atualizado 04/07/2022 às 08:35

A guerra na Ucrânia é a “maior ameaça à ordem mundial”, disse o embaixador dos EUA, Nicholas Burns, em um fórum em Pequim nesta segunda-feira (4) – um evento raro que viu Burns sentado em um painel ao lado de seu colega russo para um debate diplomático.

“O fato de que a Rússia cruzou a fronteira com uma força armada, sem provocação, e começou esta guerra com tanto sofrimento humano, tantos civis inocentes mortos na Ucrânia – isso é uma violação direta da carta das Nações Unidas, é uma violação direta do que a Federação Russa assinou quando se tornou um estado membro”, disse Burns na discussão, que foi organizada pela prestigiosa Universidade Tsinghua de Pequim e pelo Fórum Mundial da Paz.

O embaixador russo na China, Andrey Denisov, revidou: “Discordo totalmente e posso me opor a cada frase dessa intervenção”, disse ele.

Denisov então fez uma “cortesia diplomática” para desejar a Burns e outros americanos um feliz 4 de julho, antes de acusar a Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (Otan) de provocar a ação da Rússia com “cinco ondas de expansão”.

Denisov pintou a atual ordem mundial como estando à beira de um abismo devido à “sabotagem” das Nações Unidas.

Rara demonstração de debate diplomático: o evento, que também incluiu a embaixadora do Reino Unido na China Caroline Wilson e o embaixador francês Laurent Bili, foi um raro debate diplomático após a invasão russa, que as democracias ocidentais condenaram firmemente.

“A principal responsável pela guerra é a Rússia”, disse Wilson. “A Otan é uma aliança puramente defensiva que agiu com extraordinária contenção em relação à Rússia.”

Também foi notável que tais condenações da guerra na Ucrânia estavam sendo expressas na China. O Partido Comunista Chinês não condenou a guerra nem mesmo a classificou como uma invasão. Enquanto isso, a mídia estatal da China apresentou uma versão cuidadosamente censurada da guerra para seus cidadãos e repetiu os pontos de discussão do Kremlin sobre a Otan.

https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/internacional/diplomatas-russos-e-americanos-se-enfrentam-no-forum-de-pequim/

sexta-feira, 20 de novembro de 2020

A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century - Nicholas Burns, Marc Grossman, Marcie Ries - Belfer Center (Harvard)

 REPORT - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century

Download the full report:

https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-diplomatic-service-21st-century


Executive Summary

The United States Foreign Service is confronting one of the most profound crises in its long and proud history. At a time of pandemic, recession, and mounting global challenges, our nation’s career diplomats find themselves without the support, funding, training, and leadership they need to represent the American people effectively overseas and in Washington, D.C. 

We argue in this report that the United States needs a strong and high performing Foreign Service to defend our country and advance its interests in the 21st century. That is why President-elect Biden and Congress should launch a major bipartisan initiative to revive, reform, and reimagine the Foreign Service. 

Many of the most serious challenges the United States will face in 2021 and beyond will require our diplomats to take the lead. These include the return of great power competition, leading a global response to the pandemic and its consequences, supporting American companies overseas during a devastating recession, mounting a major effort on climate change, negotiating an end to the Afghan and Iraq wars, and helping American citizens in every corner of the world who need the support of their government. Morale in the State Department, however, is at an all-time low and efforts to promote greater racial and ethnic diversity have failed just when the country needs women and men of all backgrounds as our primary link to nearly every country in the world. There are challenges to be met inside the Foreign Service, including an honest self-assessment of the Service’s internal culture.

Just as the United States succeeded in renewing both the military and intelligence agencies in recent decades, we must now do the same for our diplomats and diplomacy.

Under the auspices of the nonpartisan American Diplomacy Project at the Harvard Kennedy School, we met during the past year in 40 workshops and meetings with more than 200 people. They included serving State Department Officers, retired Foreign Service members, foreign diplomats, business leaders, and senior U.S. military officers, including two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as two former CIA Directors and retired intelligence officials. 

We sought the advice of senior Trump administration officials, members of the Biden transition team, former National Security Advisors and Secretaries of State, as well as members of Congress and their staffs from both parties.

In addition, we met more than 800 Americans in virtual conferences with think tanks, the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, and with World Affairs Councils in one national meeting and with chapters in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas; Peoria, Illinois; Nashville, Tennessee; Cleveland, Ohio; and Boston, Massachusetts. 

In every meeting, we listened to, and benefited from, the advice of concerned citizens who agree it is time to elevate diplomacy as a major national priority. To accomplish this, we must reimagine the Foreign Service for the current generation and those to come. 

Finally, we hope to honor with this call to action the women and men of the Service who work each day to promote and protect our great nation in difficult and dangerous places around the world. They deserve our full support. The time has come to help them rebuild the U.S. Foreign Service and Department of State.

10 Actions to Reimagine American Diplomacy and Reinvent the Foreign Service

Around the world, the face of the United States is embodied in the women and men of the U.S. Foreign Service. To ensure that we have the most robust and effective diplomatic corps in the world, we recommend these 10 actions:

1. President-elect Biden and Congress should define a new mission and mandate for the Foreign Service, and launch an urgent nonpartisan initiative to reform, rebuild, and reimagine the diplomatic corps.

  • Together, the President and Congress should restore the State Department's lead role in executing the nation's foreign policy and reaffirm the role of American Ambassadors overseas as the President's personal representatives.
  • They should strengthen budgetary support for the Foreign
    Service so that it is the strongest and most able diplomatic corps in the world.

2. Congress should pass a new Foreign Service Act to reshape the Service for the decades ahead and set the highest standards for diplomatic readiness, expertise, and leadership.

  • There have been only three such acts in the previous 100 years and the most recent was 40 years ago. A new act would establish a new strategic mandate and mission for a strengthened Foreign Service and guidelines for many of the actions proposed below. A new act, based upon what is best about the 1980 act, is essential to catalyze the transformational change that is needed.
  • Just as past Presidents and Congress undertook successful initiatives to renew the armed forces after Vietnam and the intelligence agencies after 9/11 and the Iraq War, a new act could serve as the foundation for a true 21st century Foreign Service.

3. Challenge the Foreign Service to transform its internal culture by incentivizing greater innovation, smart risk taking, individual accountability, inclusive management, and visionary leadership.

  • Establish institutional service requirements for promotion to include participation in recruiting, service on promotion panels, teaching assignments at the Foreign Service Institute,
    and mentoring.
  • Instill an ethos of stewardship of the profession of diplomacy by creating a Seniors Panel of all diplomats with the rank of Career Ambassador charged with promoting resilience, readiness, and inclusion for the diplomatic service.

4. Direct a relentless focus on diversity as a first-order strategic priority. Diversity is an essential element of producing high performance. America’s diplomats should be representative of the American people, their values, and their aspirations.

The next Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State must lead this effort. They should:

  • Take personal responsibility to achieve this goal.
  • Appoint a Chief Diversity Officer and be transparent about progress.
  • Seek legislation to establish and fund a large-scale diplomatic ROTC program for under-represented college students seeking a career in the Foreign and Civil Services.
  • Eliminate structural and procedural bias within recruitment, entry, assignment, and promotion processes.
  • Enforce accountability for diversity, inclusion, and mentoring by
    all managers.
  • Make promotions from junior to mid-level to senior ranks dependent on success in helping to create a more diverse
    Foreign Service.

5. Strengthen the professionalization of our diplomats through a vastly expanded career-long program of education and training that focuses on mastery of substantive foreign policy issues, diplomatic expertise, and leadership.

  • Seek congressional authorization and funding for a 15 percent increase in Foreign Service personnel levels to create a training float like that maintained by the U.S. military. We recommend an increase of 2,000 positions over three years to meet this goal.

6. Initiate a wholesale overhaul of the personnel system to make it more modern, flexible, transparent, and strategically oriented to future challenges and workforce needs.

  • Make multifunctional competence in political, economic, public diplomacy, consular, and management skills the standard for professional success and promotion by eliminating the individual “cones,” which separate Officers into job categories.
  • After the 15 percent increase in positions is achieved, launch a four-year commitment to increase the size of the Foreign Service by another 1,400-1,800 positions to fill current and projected staffing gaps.
  • Reduce the size of the massive embassies created to support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and other large overseas outposts.
  • Prioritize development of regional and linguistic expertise through mandatory multiple tours using languages studied.
  • Instill more flexibility in personnel policies to address the needs of a globally deployed workforce and their family members.

7. Create a defined mid-level entry program so that the Foreign Service can recruit and employ Americans with critical or unique skills in areas such as technology, science, business, and engineering. This program must have rigorous, transparent, nonpolitical entry and retention requirements, including worldwide availability. It can also be a vehicle to expand the diversity of the Foreign Service and provide for the return of some who left the Service in recent years.

8. Seek legislative authorization and funding for a Diplomatic Reserve Corps, like the military, with annual training requirements and activation commitments. This will create a surge capacity in the event of a national emergency or international crisis and open opportunities for citizens with special skills to support American diplomacy.

  • Reservists would provide a positive connection between their communities and the Foreign Service.

9. Create a stronger and more nonpartisan Foreign Service by expanding the number of ambassadorial and senior Washington assignments for career professionals. The Department of State has more Senate-confirmed political appointee positions than any other Executive Branch agency.1 Currently, there is not a single serving career official in the 23 Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary positions, which is unprecedented in the modern history of the State Department.2

  • The next administration should seek by 2025 to:
    • Appoint career professionals to 90 percent of all ambassadorial positions.
    • Appoint a career professional to the position of Under Secretary for Political Affairs and one of the other four Under Secretaries of State.
    • Appoint career professionals to 75 percent of all Assistant Secretary of State positions.
    • Mandate these guidelines in legislation to promote a strengthened and more nonpartisan Foreign Service.
  • This would bring the Foreign Service into symmetry with the small number of political appointee positions in the senior ranks of the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

10. Rename the Foreign Service of the United States as the “United States Diplomatic Service” to signal transformation and to reinforce the vital role our diplomats perform in service to our nation. A name that begins with the term “foreign” and ends with “United States” is the reverse of how we should view America’s diplomats.


1 Partnership for Public Service. Political Appointee Tracker, last modified November 9, 2020, https://ourpublicservice.org/political-appointee-tracker/.
2 There are 4 other positions that hold the rank of Assistant Secretary: the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Coordinator for International Information Programs, and the Director of the Foreign Service Institute. Currently only the Director General of the Foreign Service and the Director of the Foreign Service institute are Career Foreign Service.

For more information on this publication: Belfer Communications Office
For Academic Citation: Burns, Nicholas, Marc Grossman and Marcie Ries. “A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, November 2020.

The Authors

Nicholas Burns

quarta-feira, 25 de março de 2020

A introversão do império sob Trump - Nicholas Burns (Foreign Affairs)

How to Lead in a Time of Pandemic

What U.S. Foreign Policy Should Be Doing—But Isn’t—to Rally the World to Action

The world has never before confronted a crisis quite like COVID-19, one that has simultaneously tested both the limits of public health systems everywhere and the ability of countries to work together on a shared challenge. But it is in just such moments of crisis that, under all prior U.S. presidents since World War II, the institutions of U.S. foreign policy mobilize for leadership. They call nations to action. They set the agenda for what needs to be done. They chart a path beyond the point of crisis.
Unfortunately, President Donald Trump has spent the last three years demeaning and degrading these very institutions and denigrating the kind of U.S. leadership and global collective action they promote—which is one reason for the world’s inadequate response to the coronavirus pandemic thus far. To date, world leaders have done alarmingly little together to blunt the crisis. The United Nations Security Council is silent. The World Health Organization (WHO) offers a useful global clearinghouse but lacks a global megaphone to lead. European Union nations have defaulted to national solutions and closed borders to their neighbors for the first time in generations. China hid the crisis from the world in its critical early days. And Trump has been especially disengaged. Beyond individual phone calls with world leaders, he has made just one attempt to organize countries to band together—a single conference call with European, Canadian, and Japanese leaders in the G-7 forum he currently chairs.  
Depending on how long it lasts, COVID-19’s impact could match that of a world war, in terms of the number of people it affects, the changes to daily life it brings on every continent, and its human toll. And the impact on business, trade, and markets could result in the most devastating global economic crisis since the Great Depression.
Such worst-case scenarios will be hard to avoid without American leadership. National leaders, including Trump, have understandably focused first on addressing the threat to their own citizens. But the pandemic must be fought simultaneously at the global level, with the full support of powerful countries—those that have a capacity to organize, set priorities, and unite disparate and often conflicting national efforts. For all the changes to the geopolitical landscape in recent years, one basic reality has not changed: such global action is impossible if the world’s strongest country, the United States, is either absent or acting alone.

THE CRISIS LAST TIME

Compare the extraordinary inactivity in the face of the coronavirus pandemic with the global financial crisis of 2008–9. Governments led by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and U.S. Presidents George W. Bush and then Barack Obama employed the G-20 to unite the world’s most powerful economies to work together on a global solution. Both Bush and Obama understood that the United States, with all its power and immense credibility, had to lead if the world was going to prevent the Great Recession from becoming a Great Depression.
Throughout its history, the United States has been fortunate to have visionary, charismatic leadership at times of great crisis: George Washington during the Revolution, Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Great Depression and World War II. Trump, unfortunately, has not proved himself to be anywhere close to such a leader. His character drives him to divide rather than to unite at home. His “America first” foreign policy instincts drive him to act alone in the world rather than in concert with others. He seems incapable of imagining that the United States might be made stronger and more effective by confronting a crisis in lockstep with its allies and partners.
Since the start of the coronavirus crisis, those tendencies have defined the international aspects of Trump’s response. In his daily press conferences, he rarely mentions concrete work being done in tandem with other governments. He has initiated no significant international action. And he has dramatically weakened many of the federal agencies that would normally lead the global response to such a crisis: the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Security Council Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense (which he very unwisely disbanded in 2018). It was not a slip of the tongue last week when Trump referred publicly to the “Deep State Department.” Is it any wonder that the institutions of government he routinely derides, and has starved for funds and leadership, would prove so catastrophically unprepared?
Any other recent American president would have confronted the crisis much more urgently from the start. The priority would have been the home front, of course. But both Obama and Bush, like many presidents before them, would have also understood the need for an all-out global effort, led by the United States and its allies, to confront the threat together.

NOT TOO LATE

The Trump administration has lost valuable time since December, but it is not too late to assemble an international coalition to begin to limit COVID-19’s ruthlessly efficient global contagion. What might such an effort look like? The administration should join with other global leaders to launch at least three high-level international efforts to tackle the most difficult challenges posed by the pandemic—one made up of top leaders, one made up of economic policymakers, and one made up of U.S. and Chinese officials.
The first should be a G-20 leaders steering group to focus on the health and economic challenges ahead. Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, to start, should begin meetings via teleconference to discuss how to blunt both the health and economic impacts. This leadership group should meet weekly if necessary to assess progress and resolve the inevitable disputes and misunderstandings of such a massive global undertaking. They should appoint and empower trusted senior cabinet-level officials to meet daily to identify the roadblocks in the international response; to resolve practical problems impeding relief efforts; and to partner on long-term plans that can ultimately bring the crisis to an end. Trump can create this group at a first meeting this week. There is no time to waste.
The agenda of this steering group will need to be broad and ambitious. The most urgent issue is to agree that national public health officials must exchange quickly and effectively accurate data on the number of people affected and tested and the mortality rate in countries around the world. This alone would be of inestimable help to the experts seeking to understand and model the impact of the virus and thus predict its arc going forward. There will need to be agreement on the central clearing-house for this exchange of information, whether that is the WHO or another body that can work more efficiently.
These leaders must also push countries with greater capacity to agree on a joint effort to transfer material assistance, training, and know-how to countries with weaker public health systems. As the pandemic will likely persist for most of 2020, it will be critical for countries that have largely recovered to extend help to those in greatest need. That is unlikely to happen without top-down pressure from leaders such as Trump and Xi.
It is also not too early for leaders to assign a group of eminent global public health experts to determine what has gone right so far, what needs to be urgently fixed, which international institutions are failing, and what (if any) new ones may need to be created. Leaders need to demand that governments be better prepared, individually and collectively, for the next crisis. (This is an especially acute weakness of the United States, of course, whose level of preparedness and early response has been among the weakest of any major nation.) The G-20 should also work to coordinate the many research universities and private companies working on a vaccine. Governments are not in most cases well suited to carrying out research themselves, but they can cut through regulatory red tape, provide seed funding, and, most important, agree on an equitable means of distribution once the vaccine is available.
National governments have also struggled with how to help the hundreds of thousands of people stranded in foreign countries, with borders slammed shut with surprising speed in every part of the world. Embassies and consulates now need help to protect their citizens caught in the no man’s lands of the pandemic. The G-20 countries are in the best position to help organize special flights and humanitarian convoys. One has to go back 80 years, to the start of World War II, to find a time when so many people have been left helpless outside their countries’ borders.
This high-level steering group would also allow leaders to communicate more effectively in advance of national decisions that will inevitably affect other countries. When Trump, for example, announced that he intended to stop travel by Europeans to the United States, he did so without any significant consultation with the European Union, whose leadership was understandably furious as a result. (That one act may for years color the way European governments and citizens view the United States.)
Most important, in place of such dissension, world leaders should deliver a united message of resolve to fight the pandemic together and to plan for our ultimate deliverance from it. Even a simple public message of solidarity would help—particularly from Trump, who has reached out precious few times to convey American sympathy to those suffering abroad. The world needs hope, and these leaders can provide at least a measure of it.

PREVENTING A GREAT DEPRESSION

With major economies grinding to a halt, Trump and other leaders should also take personal oversight of a second high-level group, this one made up of finance ministers and central bank presidents from G-20 countries and others. In the face of the most serious economic crisis in nearly a century, their focus should be to more closely align fiscal and monetary policies to limit the severity of a likely global recession.
U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell and his central bank colleagues in Canada, Europe, and Japan set a good example earlier this month in coordinating a first tranche of common measures to stimulate the global economy. But these countries cannot hope to steer effective global action without officials from Brazil, China, India, and other rising powers at the same table.
There are also some immediate problems that need fixing. One is to lower tariff barriers on the medical products and parts that will be essential to a more successful health response. This won’t be easy at a time of economic distress when the temptation of national governments will be to protect their own markets, but the costs of failing to do so will be enormous. Another is to evaluate the sanctions currently in place on governments such as Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela and to lift any that are impeding vital humanitarian aid, at least temporarily. Citizens of these countries, who are as vulnerable as anyone to the coronavirus, should not pay with their lives for the sins of their governments. Just as important, uncontrolled outbreaks will threaten new waves of infections beyond their borders.

WHEN TWO TIGERS UNITE

Finally, the Trump administration needs to establish much more frequent communication between Washington and Beijing—between Trump and Xi themselves, between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his counterpart, and between Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin and his counterparts. As the two major global powers, the United States and China must do more to mitigate the worst aspects of the crisis and to provide public leadership. The low point of this crisis politically has been the failure of Washington and Beijing to set aside broader tensions and combine forces to combat the pandemic.
If anything, distrust and hostility between the United States and China have gotten worse. During the last few weeks, they have fought a running war of words over who is ultimately responsible for the pandemic. Chinese officials set a low bar by claiming—falsely and outrageously—that the U.S. military planted the virus in Wuhan to weaken China. But Trump has not helped by referring to COVID-19 as the “Chinese virus.”
For the sake of both their own citizens and the rest of the world, Washington and Beijing must stop the blame game and start working together on solutions. If China and the United States can’t communicate and cooperate effectively, it will be next to impossible to avoid further tensions—dividing a world that, now more than ever, should be united for common action. But there is also much at stake for the two superpowers’ reputation and credibility. While China is rightly praised for its rigorous social-distancing campaign and recent humanitarian aid to the European Union and others, it continues to come under intense (and deserved) criticism for initially suppressing information about the epidemic and, even now, for not sharing complete data on infections. Trump, meanwhile, is not even trying to lead globally. That image—of a United States that was not there to help during the most serious crisis in most people’s lifetimes—could do irreparable damage to how the rest of the world views the country going forward.
A global crisis of this magnitude carries a final, and potentially deadly, risk. If countries turn against one another, competing for scarce resources and failing to communicate responsibly, it is not unthinkable that conflict and war could result.

A WAR WITH ONE SIDE                                         

When the world faced a very different crisis at the start of World War II, it was the confident and united leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill that created the alliance critical to ultimate victory and forged a vision in the Atlantic Charter for what would come in its wake. Leaders and commentators have compared the current struggle to war. What makes this crisis different, though, is that every country and all citizens are now on the same side.
To have a chance of prevailing, we need focused, determined, and effective leadership and genuine collaboration from Trump and other global leaders. They will largely determine whether the world can meet this existential test. In an age of nationalism and “America first,” the truth should be clear for all to see: nothing in human history has so clearly demonstrated how the fate of everyone—all 7.7 billion people—in our highly connected world is now linked.

sexta-feira, 23 de agosto de 2019

Paises balticos sob dominacao sovietica: paises que nunca aceitaram, EUA e Brasil

Permito-me esclarecer que a diplomacia brasileira, que reconhecia os países bálticos como independentes, no período de entre-guerras, jamais aceitou a soberania soviética sobre os três Estados. Quando ingressei no Itamaraty, e comecei a trabalhar na Divisão de Europa Oriental, surpreendi-me ao encontrar maços sobre cada um dos países nos arquivos da Divisão. Logo aprendi que nós nunca tínhamos aceitada a invasão soviética de 1940, e continuávamos mantendo maços sobre os três países, alimentados, em grande parte, pelos materiais produzidos pelas rádios e instituições de pesquisa americanas, financiadas pela CIA, Radio Free Europe e Radio Liberty.
Este artigo do ex-diplomata americano Nicholas Burns – que acaba de publicar um livro devastador sobre o afundamento da diplomacia americana nos tempos que correm – permite reconsiderar o caso dos países bálticos.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

From: Belfer Center, Harvard University
Dear Colleagues and Friends,
I enclose below my Atlantic article on the remarkable event that took place thirty years ago today when more than two million citizens of the Baltic republics of the U.S.S.R. engineered one of the most dramatic and successful mass protests in Soviet history.
Men, women and children linked hands in a continuous human chain over 400 miles long to protest the secret agreement that had been made on that date fifty years earlier between Hitler and Stalin to divide control of Eastern Europe between them in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. That odious backroom deal allowed Stalin to invade Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940, erase their national identities and incorporate them by terror and force into the Soviet Union for more than half a century.
Every president starting with Franklin Delano Roosevelt refused to recognize the incarceration of the Baltic countries in the Soviet empire. And four recent American presidents—George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama—all worked to right a historic wrong. Bush 41 helped to liberate the Baltics from Soviet rule. Clinton helped to negotiate the departure of Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia. Bush 43 led in bringing them into NATO. Obama protected them from further Russian aggression. 
It is a remarkable story of American commitment and long-term bipartisan strategy to help democracy be reborn in three countries on the northern rim of Europe. 
I conclude by arguing that President Donald Trump has failed to continue this long-term American effort to support democracies at risk in Europe. In fact, I fear our NATO allies cannot truly depend on the U.S. as long as he is in the Oval Office.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Nick Burns
Faculty Chair, Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship

The Lasting Lesson of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

For the first time in its history, NATO does not have a strong, principled American leader to guide it.


Thirty years ago this week, on August 23, 1989, more than 2 million citizens of the Baltic republics of the U.S.S.R. engineered one of the most dramatic and successful mass protests in Soviet history. Men, women, and children linked hands in a continuous human chain more than 400 miles long that they called the “Baltic Way,” connecting the Estonian capital of Tallinn in the north with the Latvian capital of Riga in the center and the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius in the south.
Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov signs the German-Soviet nonaggression pact; Joachim von Ribbentrop and Josef Stalin stand behind him. Moscow, August 23. 1939.
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov signs the German-Soviet nonaggression pact; Joachim von Ribbentrop and Josef Stalin stand behind him, Moscow, August 23. 1939.
(U.S. National Archives & Records Administration)
They were protesting what was then the 50th anniversary of one of modern history’s most brutal and cynical backroom deals—the secret agreement made 80 years ago on August 23, 1939—by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin to divide Eastern Europe between them on the eve of the Second World War. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (named after Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop) divided Poland, giving Hitler a free path to go to war against it 10 days later and Stalin the green light to invade Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in May and June of 1940.
The three young Baltic states were stripped of their national identities and incorporated by terror and force into the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1940. Stalin’s secret police murdered many of the Baltic government, business, and cultural leaders. Thousands of others were sent to the Soviet Gulag prison system east of the Ural Mountains. Against their will, three independent nations were imprisoned as puppet republics of the Soviet Union for more than half a century until they liberated themselves in September 1991, just before the Soviet empire itself disintegrated.
By 2004, in a remarkable transformation, all three were admitted to NATO. They joined the European Union that same year. The story of how these three small countries on the northern rim of Europe made their way from prisoners in the Soviet Union to members of the two great institutions of the West has lessons for us at a time when President Donald Trump is abandoning the American leadership role in Europe that was so critical in bringing the Cold War to a peaceful and democratic end.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt refused in 1940 to recognize the takeover of the three countries by Stalin. He froze Baltic gold reserves and other financial assets to deny their use by the Soviets. Backed by President Dwight Eisenhower, Congress established in 1959 a Captive Nations Committee to illuminate the imposition of communist rule on formerly free nations, including the three Baltic states. Through the long decades of the Cold War, however, very few American officials would have given good odds that the trio would ever regain their independence from Moscow.
When I joined the National Security Council staff in 1990, I became its liaison to the three Baltic legations in Washington, D.C. It was impossible not to admire Estonian Ambassador Ernst Jaakson and Latvian Ambassador Anatol Dinbergs. Jaakson had arrived in the United States as a young diplomatic representative of Estonia in 1929 and stayed all through the lean and seemingly hopeless years of the Soviet occupation of his country to independence in 1991. Dinbergs came to the U.S. in 1937 and, like Jaakson, never left. They came to work every day for more than five decades to represent governments that had ceased to exist at the start of World War II. Along with Lithuanian Ambassador Stasys Lozoraitis, who represented Lithuania in Washington after 1987, they kept faith with their country and the dream that some far-off day in the future, the Baltic states might be reborn. There is simply nothing like it in modern diplomatic history.
The Balts are the real heroes of this story. They liberated themselves against great odds. They did, however, receive critical support from the U.S., Canada, and Europe in the waning months of the dying Soviet Union.   
Bush pushed the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the summer and autumn of 1991 to let the Baltic states go free, arguing against the use of force by Moscow. When Secretary of State James Baker later visited the three capitals, he pledged full support for their independence.
President George W. Bush pushed NATO leaders to admit the three Baltic countries into NATO in 2004. As Bush’s ambassador to NATO at the time, I believed the Baltic countries would be truly free only when they were inside the alliance, protected by its Article 5 mutual-defense guarantee.
Before the end of his presidency, Obama and NATO leaders deployed a battalion of NATO troops to each of the Baltic countries and Poland as a visible symbol of that commitment—that the independence of the states Russia had dominated in the past would be secure.
The Cold War ended peacefully in large part because of the constancy and determination of the U.S. and its NATO allies. Each American president had a shared sense of what was at stake and a common strategy to deploy U.S. military and diplomatic strength to defend freedom.  
Together, they held the line for five decades to help Europe resist communism, even when the odds seemed slim that it would ever be vanquished. John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan’s historic speeches at the Berlin Wall best symbolized that common will and commitment.  
When the wall finally fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union itself dissolved two years later, President George H. W. Bush proclaimed that a Europe “whole and free” had been reborn and a “democratic peace” had taken root across the continent. This decades-long U.S.-led campaign is surely one of the great foreign-policy achievements in our history. Every American should take pride in it.
President Trump, however, sees the world through a radically different lens than his predecessors did. He is dismantling, block by block, the foundations of our power that made America great from FDR’s time to Obama’s.
As antidemocratic populists contest power across Europe, Trump has effectively sided with such leaders in Hungary and Italy against true friends such as Germany’s Angela Merkel and France’s Emmanuel Macron. Just this week, Trump bullied the NATO ally Denmark and canceled a state visit to Copenhagen because its government had the temerity to refuse to sell Greenland to the U.S. The reaction among the usually stolid Danes has been anger and bewilderment that an American president would treat them with such disrespect.
And on the eve of this weekend’s G7 Summit, Trump is calling publicly for Russia to be reinstated in the group, even as it continues to occupy Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine.
The 20th century was the American century not just because the U.S. wielded enormous military and diplomatic power. The U.S. became the leading nation in the world because all of its presidents, until Trump, believed in helping Europe to become a united, democratic continent after centuries of war and division.
The lasting message of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is that evil triumphs when democracies fail to stand up to it. And the message of the Baltic Way protests is that America is at its greatest when it stands up for freedom where it is at risk. The Baltic governments that previous presidents worked so hard to defend must now be worried that, if Russia threatens, Trump will not heed those lessons.
As Americans reflect on the 2020 election and the prospect of Trump gaining another term in office, we must come to one simple conclusion: We simply can’t afford it. Two and a half years into his presidency, Trump has demonstrated beyond a shadow of doubt that America can’t be great in the world, and our allies can’t truly depend on him, while he remains in the Oval Office.