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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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Mostrando postagens com marcador Belfer Center. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Belfer Center. Mostrar todas as postagens

quinta-feira, 3 de dezembro de 2020

A paranoia anti-China dos melhores acadêmicos americanos: criam uma nova guerra por si próprios - Graham Allison e Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Ao mesmo tempo em que assisto a um webinar da Carnegie Institution sobre: 

 Ending the United States' Forever Wars

 (link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jx8pW0yL7s), 

recebo mais uma das cartas do maior especialista americano em "decision making", Graham Allison, do Belfer Center da Harvard University, autor do famoso The Essence of Decision (sobre a crise dos mísseis soviéticos em Cuba em 1962, que foi superada brilhantemente por Kennedy, mais racional do que Kruschev), trazendo mais uma vez as elaborações paranóicas sobre a China como adversária.

Inacreditável como os universitários, os melhores, os maiores, supostamente os mais brilhantes, se deixaram contaminar pela paranoia – que eu sempre considerei normal – dos militares do Pentágonos. Não é possível que eles estejam considerando a China como uma adversária, ao mesmo título que foi a suprema "encarnação do mal", a União Soviética dos tempos da Guerra Fria (e mesmo antes). Não é que eles não reconhecem que a China seja diferente da URSS, mas é que eles interpretam o mundo, e a China, EXCLUSIVAMENTE DO PONTO DE VISTA AMERICANO, numa demonstração de miopia inacreditável para uma grande potência que não é dirigida por nenhum líder psicopata como Stalin ou Hitler – OK, tem o idiota do Trump, mas ele é so um grande idiota, capaz de desmantelar um monte de coisas, mas incapaz de conceber qualquer coisa para colocar no lugar –, mas por presidentes que são assessorados pelas melhores cabeças que um país democrático pode oferecer.

O que realmente me tem surpreendido de maneira frustrante é como esses intelectuais podem ser cegos pela hubris, pela arrogância do poder, como revelado por esta frase da carta abaixo: 

"Recognition that China is not just a twin of Russia and thus another “great power competitor” but a genuine Thucydidean rival whose meteoric rise threatens to upend the American-led international order".

Ou seja, o que vale é a ordem internacional liderada pelos EUA, que eles acham a melhor possível. Não há dúvida de que uma ordem internacional aberta e democrática, livre e flexível às mais diversas variedades culturais e intelectuais, é muito melhor do que um mundo autocrático, dominado pela censura e pelo poder irrestrito do Estado.

Mas quem disse que a China quer e pretende moldar o mundo à sua imagem e semelhança? Os americanos estão ignorando a história milenar da China, com todas as suas magníficas manifestações culturais e artísticas, com todos os progressos científicos e tecnológicos, a extraordinária vitalidade, energia e inventividade do seu povo?

Será que eles acham que o comunismo – do governo, não do povo – é o ponto final da história de uma nação estraordinária, é a realização evolutiva última dessa cultura extraordinária? Será que eles pensam que meros 70 anos de dominação autocrática do Partido Comunista vão dominar a história, a vida e o futuro da China por toda a eternidade? Como eles podem ser tão míopes, e achar que a China quer destruir os EUA e o mundo "dominado" ou liderado pelos EUA?

Parece que sim: eles ainda estão vivendo no mundo da Guerra Fria geopolítica, como revelado ainda por esta pequena frase de Graham Allison: 

"Realism about the inescapable fact that the U.S. and China live on a small globe where each one faces existential threats neither can defeat by itself (including climate MAD as well as nuclear MAD)."

Esse "small globe", eles o tomam como seu, ou devendo ficar eternamente sob sua liderança exclusiva. Essa história de "Thucydidean rival" é uma loucura completa, mas o pior é que essa cegueira pode realmente levar os americanos a tratar a China como um rival, o que é pior coisa que poderá ocorrer no século XXI, talvez condenado a viver sob a sombra de uma catástrofe nuclear, um novo Armageddon, como já ocorreu na segunda metade do século XX (o primeiro foi uma repetição da Guerra de Trinta Anos, do século XVII). Temos que escapar dessa loucura, mas parece que vai ser difícil com os "acadêmicos" americanos.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 3 de dezembro de 2020

============

From Belfer Center, December 2, 2020: 

President-elect Biden recognizes that the impact of the rise of China on the U.S. and the international order will pose the defining international challenge for his first term—and as far beyond that as any eye can see. Because his national security team includes many familiar faces from the Obama Administration, some in the press have suggested that it will be the third term of the Obama Administration. But that misses the extent to which the world has changed, the U.S. has changed, and most importantly, in the new administration Biden will be the decider.

Others, particularly in China, have speculated that in relations with China, this could be a second term of the Trump Administration. That misses what are sure to be even starker differences between what we’ve seen in the past four years and the incoming Biden Administration’s approach to foreign policy in general, and China in particular.

In my recent interview with the Global Times (China’s major English-language mouthpiece of the People’s Daily), I summarize differences that should become visible from day one between Biden and Trump’s China policy under 5 Rs: Restoration of normal foreign policy practices (e.g., an end to idiosyncratic, personalized government by tweet); Reversal of Trump's harmful initiatives (rejoining the Paris Accord, the WHO, etc.); Review of Trump’s “159 accomplishments” in dealing with China asking about each how it impacts American national interests (e.g., tariffs that harmed the U.S. more than China); Recognition that China is not just a twin of Russia and thus another “great power competitor” but a genuine Thucydidean rival whose meteoric rise threatens to upend the American-led international order; and Realism about the inescapable fact that the U.S. and China live on a small globe where each one faces existential threats neither can defeat by itself (including climate MAD as well as nuclear MAD).

If you have reactions, I’ll be interested.

Best regards.

Graham Allison
Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Follow me on Twitter

 Read the Interview »

sexta-feira, 20 de novembro de 2020

A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century - Nicholas Burns, Marc Grossman, Marcie Ries - Belfer Center (Harvard)

 REPORT - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century

Download the full report:

https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-diplomatic-service-21st-century


Executive Summary

The United States Foreign Service is confronting one of the most profound crises in its long and proud history. At a time of pandemic, recession, and mounting global challenges, our nation’s career diplomats find themselves without the support, funding, training, and leadership they need to represent the American people effectively overseas and in Washington, D.C. 

We argue in this report that the United States needs a strong and high performing Foreign Service to defend our country and advance its interests in the 21st century. That is why President-elect Biden and Congress should launch a major bipartisan initiative to revive, reform, and reimagine the Foreign Service. 

Many of the most serious challenges the United States will face in 2021 and beyond will require our diplomats to take the lead. These include the return of great power competition, leading a global response to the pandemic and its consequences, supporting American companies overseas during a devastating recession, mounting a major effort on climate change, negotiating an end to the Afghan and Iraq wars, and helping American citizens in every corner of the world who need the support of their government. Morale in the State Department, however, is at an all-time low and efforts to promote greater racial and ethnic diversity have failed just when the country needs women and men of all backgrounds as our primary link to nearly every country in the world. There are challenges to be met inside the Foreign Service, including an honest self-assessment of the Service’s internal culture.

Just as the United States succeeded in renewing both the military and intelligence agencies in recent decades, we must now do the same for our diplomats and diplomacy.

Under the auspices of the nonpartisan American Diplomacy Project at the Harvard Kennedy School, we met during the past year in 40 workshops and meetings with more than 200 people. They included serving State Department Officers, retired Foreign Service members, foreign diplomats, business leaders, and senior U.S. military officers, including two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as two former CIA Directors and retired intelligence officials. 

We sought the advice of senior Trump administration officials, members of the Biden transition team, former National Security Advisors and Secretaries of State, as well as members of Congress and their staffs from both parties.

In addition, we met more than 800 Americans in virtual conferences with think tanks, the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, and with World Affairs Councils in one national meeting and with chapters in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas; Peoria, Illinois; Nashville, Tennessee; Cleveland, Ohio; and Boston, Massachusetts. 

In every meeting, we listened to, and benefited from, the advice of concerned citizens who agree it is time to elevate diplomacy as a major national priority. To accomplish this, we must reimagine the Foreign Service for the current generation and those to come. 

Finally, we hope to honor with this call to action the women and men of the Service who work each day to promote and protect our great nation in difficult and dangerous places around the world. They deserve our full support. The time has come to help them rebuild the U.S. Foreign Service and Department of State.

10 Actions to Reimagine American Diplomacy and Reinvent the Foreign Service

Around the world, the face of the United States is embodied in the women and men of the U.S. Foreign Service. To ensure that we have the most robust and effective diplomatic corps in the world, we recommend these 10 actions:

1. President-elect Biden and Congress should define a new mission and mandate for the Foreign Service, and launch an urgent nonpartisan initiative to reform, rebuild, and reimagine the diplomatic corps.

  • Together, the President and Congress should restore the State Department's lead role in executing the nation's foreign policy and reaffirm the role of American Ambassadors overseas as the President's personal representatives.
  • They should strengthen budgetary support for the Foreign
    Service so that it is the strongest and most able diplomatic corps in the world.

2. Congress should pass a new Foreign Service Act to reshape the Service for the decades ahead and set the highest standards for diplomatic readiness, expertise, and leadership.

  • There have been only three such acts in the previous 100 years and the most recent was 40 years ago. A new act would establish a new strategic mandate and mission for a strengthened Foreign Service and guidelines for many of the actions proposed below. A new act, based upon what is best about the 1980 act, is essential to catalyze the transformational change that is needed.
  • Just as past Presidents and Congress undertook successful initiatives to renew the armed forces after Vietnam and the intelligence agencies after 9/11 and the Iraq War, a new act could serve as the foundation for a true 21st century Foreign Service.

3. Challenge the Foreign Service to transform its internal culture by incentivizing greater innovation, smart risk taking, individual accountability, inclusive management, and visionary leadership.

  • Establish institutional service requirements for promotion to include participation in recruiting, service on promotion panels, teaching assignments at the Foreign Service Institute,
    and mentoring.
  • Instill an ethos of stewardship of the profession of diplomacy by creating a Seniors Panel of all diplomats with the rank of Career Ambassador charged with promoting resilience, readiness, and inclusion for the diplomatic service.

4. Direct a relentless focus on diversity as a first-order strategic priority. Diversity is an essential element of producing high performance. America’s diplomats should be representative of the American people, their values, and their aspirations.

The next Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State must lead this effort. They should:

  • Take personal responsibility to achieve this goal.
  • Appoint a Chief Diversity Officer and be transparent about progress.
  • Seek legislation to establish and fund a large-scale diplomatic ROTC program for under-represented college students seeking a career in the Foreign and Civil Services.
  • Eliminate structural and procedural bias within recruitment, entry, assignment, and promotion processes.
  • Enforce accountability for diversity, inclusion, and mentoring by
    all managers.
  • Make promotions from junior to mid-level to senior ranks dependent on success in helping to create a more diverse
    Foreign Service.

5. Strengthen the professionalization of our diplomats through a vastly expanded career-long program of education and training that focuses on mastery of substantive foreign policy issues, diplomatic expertise, and leadership.

  • Seek congressional authorization and funding for a 15 percent increase in Foreign Service personnel levels to create a training float like that maintained by the U.S. military. We recommend an increase of 2,000 positions over three years to meet this goal.

6. Initiate a wholesale overhaul of the personnel system to make it more modern, flexible, transparent, and strategically oriented to future challenges and workforce needs.

  • Make multifunctional competence in political, economic, public diplomacy, consular, and management skills the standard for professional success and promotion by eliminating the individual “cones,” which separate Officers into job categories.
  • After the 15 percent increase in positions is achieved, launch a four-year commitment to increase the size of the Foreign Service by another 1,400-1,800 positions to fill current and projected staffing gaps.
  • Reduce the size of the massive embassies created to support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and other large overseas outposts.
  • Prioritize development of regional and linguistic expertise through mandatory multiple tours using languages studied.
  • Instill more flexibility in personnel policies to address the needs of a globally deployed workforce and their family members.

7. Create a defined mid-level entry program so that the Foreign Service can recruit and employ Americans with critical or unique skills in areas such as technology, science, business, and engineering. This program must have rigorous, transparent, nonpolitical entry and retention requirements, including worldwide availability. It can also be a vehicle to expand the diversity of the Foreign Service and provide for the return of some who left the Service in recent years.

8. Seek legislative authorization and funding for a Diplomatic Reserve Corps, like the military, with annual training requirements and activation commitments. This will create a surge capacity in the event of a national emergency or international crisis and open opportunities for citizens with special skills to support American diplomacy.

  • Reservists would provide a positive connection between their communities and the Foreign Service.

9. Create a stronger and more nonpartisan Foreign Service by expanding the number of ambassadorial and senior Washington assignments for career professionals. The Department of State has more Senate-confirmed political appointee positions than any other Executive Branch agency.1 Currently, there is not a single serving career official in the 23 Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary positions, which is unprecedented in the modern history of the State Department.2

  • The next administration should seek by 2025 to:
    • Appoint career professionals to 90 percent of all ambassadorial positions.
    • Appoint a career professional to the position of Under Secretary for Political Affairs and one of the other four Under Secretaries of State.
    • Appoint career professionals to 75 percent of all Assistant Secretary of State positions.
    • Mandate these guidelines in legislation to promote a strengthened and more nonpartisan Foreign Service.
  • This would bring the Foreign Service into symmetry with the small number of political appointee positions in the senior ranks of the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

10. Rename the Foreign Service of the United States as the “United States Diplomatic Service” to signal transformation and to reinforce the vital role our diplomats perform in service to our nation. A name that begins with the term “foreign” and ends with “United States” is the reverse of how we should view America’s diplomats.


1 Partnership for Public Service. Political Appointee Tracker, last modified November 9, 2020, https://ourpublicservice.org/political-appointee-tracker/.
2 There are 4 other positions that hold the rank of Assistant Secretary: the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Coordinator for International Information Programs, and the Director of the Foreign Service Institute. Currently only the Director General of the Foreign Service and the Director of the Foreign Service institute are Career Foreign Service.

For more information on this publication: Belfer Communications Office
For Academic Citation: Burns, Nicholas, Marc Grossman and Marcie Ries. “A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, November 2020.

The Authors

Nicholas Burns

terça-feira, 19 de maio de 2020

National Digital Currencies: The Future of Money? - Belfer Center (Harvard University)

National Digital Currencies: The Future of Money?

Tomorrow’s money will live in your smartphone, not your wallet.
Spurred by the potential to modernize domestic payments systems or to take a leading role in updating the global payments infrastructure, nations around the globe are exploring whether to issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC), the digital form of a country’s fiat currency.
China, for example, began piloting a national digital currency last month. The European Central Bank has convened a working group of major economies to coordinate digital currency research and development. The U.S. Federal Reserve said it was in the early stages of researching the digital dollar. 
But what are the risks and rewards of this shift? And how might it impact the decades-long dominance of the U.S. dollar?
new project from the Belfer Center’s Economic Diplomacy Initiativeand the Atlantic Council’s Global Business and Economics Center will track the rise of digital currencies around the globe. A color-coded map provides a snapshot of where countries stand – research, development, pilot, and launched – in deploying a CBDC, along with an overview of national efforts.
“Digital currencies could substantially reshuffle traditional instruments of economic diplomacy,” said Aditi Kumar, Executive Director of the Belfer Center. “Through this project, we’ll closely monitor digital currency developments and how countries position themselves in the evolving global economic environment.”
This financial innovation carries significant legal, economic, and operational risks. National digital currencies could give governments the capability to surveil users – good for tracking criminals, but a concern for the privacy of ordinary citizens. Business models for banks and payments platforms would need to change if people are using government-provided digital cash. And central banks would need to ramp up their operational capabilities to manage a digital currency.
“Central banks are not only regulators, as we have seen in the past months, they can drive economic growth and innovation,” said Josh Lipsky, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Global Economics program and a fellow at the Belfer Center’s Economic Diplomacy Initiative. “That spirit of innovation needs to come into play with CBDCs. The evolution of money is happening and it’s important for central banks to help lead the transformation.”

View the Project »

sexta-feira, 17 de janeiro de 2020

A paranoia intelectual anti-China apresentou respostas acadêmicas: Belfer Center

Uma das coisas que mais me chocou nos últimos dois anos foi o crescimento da paranoia anti-China mesmo nos meios mais esclarecidos dos EUA, supostamente o establishment acadêmico das grandes universidades. 
O Belfer Center da Harvard até organizou uma espécie de concurso para que os candidatos respondessem com trabalhos propondo as melhores estratégias para que os EUA respondessem ao "desafio da China", o me parece de uma loucura completa.
Enfim, os resultados foram apresentados e figuram em outra postagem neste blog: 
China challenge to the US: Belfer Center prized papers
Paulo Roberto de Almeida


Graham Allison <GTA@belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu> 
China Challenge Contest Win
Belfer Center, January 16, 2020

Since sending Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? to the publisher three years ago, I have been searching for ways to escape the dangerous dynamic that could lead Washington and Beijing to stumble into a catastrophic conflict neither side wants. At this point, I’ve identified nine potential “avenues of escape”—none yet so compelling that I’m ready to fully embrace it. About one thing, however, I am certain: there is no monopoly of strategic wisdom on this issue in Washington or in Beijing—or especially Cambridge!
So the research team suggested that we invite whomever had a good idea to contribute it. To do this, the Belfer Center created a contest. Using an assignment I give my students at Harvard Kennedy School challenging them to craft a grand strategy to meet the China challenge, we invited answers. (For details about the contest, click here). We received dozens of valuable submissions from across the world.
The winner of the competition was Robin Nataf, and we awarded three honorable mentions to Kazumi Hoshino-MacDonaldPatrick Kolesiak, and Jessica Robyn Jordan.
Each of their strategic options memos offer clues policymakers in Washington may find useful. I invite you to read the winning submissions here.
Graham Allison
Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Follow me on Twitter

sexta-feira, 28 de junho de 2013

A revolucao energetica nos EUA - Leonardo Maugeri (Harvard Belfer Center)

"The Shale Oil Boom: A U.S. Phenomenon"

Study Forecasts Tripling of U.S. Shale Oil Output

June 2013
Author: Leonardo Maugeri, Roy Family Fellow, Geopolitics of Energy Project

Introduction
There are several issues in the current debate on the so-called U.S. tight and shale oil ... revolution that contribute to reinforce extreme and seemingly irreconcilable attitudes. One of the central questions revolves around the real potential of this revolution and can be formulated simply as follows: Is oil production from shale formations just a temporary bubble or is it an event capable of significantly altering the U.S.—and possibly global—energy outlook?
This study addresses such questions on the basis of a general analysis of more than 4,000 shale wells and a much more focused analysis of 2,000 of these wells along with the activities of about one hundred oil companies involved in shale oil exploitation. The main results of such analysis are multifaceted.
On one hand, the large resource size – and the ability of the industry to develop it through steady improvements in technology and cost – dwarf earlier forecasts, suggesting the possibility that the United States may become the largest global oil producer in just a few years. On the other hand, the unique characteristics of shale oil – the drilling intensity in particular – make it extremely vulnerable to both price drops and environmental opposition in new and populated areas.
Drilling intensity is a key point in order to understand the real evolution of shale oil (as well as shale gas) activity in the United States and its flexibility – e.g. the possibility to rapidly adapt to shifting circumstances.
Given the early state of knowledge and technology, the U.S. shale oil boom is mostly a function of bringing as many wells as possible on line, due to the dramatic decline in production that follows the early months of activity with each new well. For example, by December 2012 it took about 90 new producing wells per month just to maintain North Dakota’s Bakken-Three Forks (the largest shale oil play so far in the United States) oil production of 770,000 barrels per day.
Drilling intensity in U.S. shale oil plays skyrocketed from a few hundred wells brought online (e.g., becoming productive) before 2011 to more than 4,000 in 2012 – a figure that outpaces the total number of oil and gas wells (both conventional and unconventional) brought online in the same year in the rest of the world (except Canada).
In the short- to medium-term (3 to 5 years), the correlation between drilling intensity and shale oil production will shape the evolution of U.S. oil production more than any other factor. And because drilling intensity is largely a function of the oil price, a significant dip in oil price may trigger a rapid twist in the shale oil boom.
The central role played by drilling intensity in this early stage of shale oil and gas development has a crucial but almost unnoticed implication for the possibility of replicating the success of the American experience in other parts of the world. The United States concentrates in its territory 60 percent of the global availability of drilling rigs; moreover, 95 percent of U.S. drilling rigs can perform horizontal drilling that together with hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” is required to liberate shale resources.
Combined with a relatively low population density in several shale areas, this vast supply is a key factor that allows the United States to achieve a drilling intensity level that is impossible for other countries to achieve. No other country in the world has ever experienced even a fraction of the overall U.S. drilling intensity, a common feature of the U.S. oil and gas industry since its inception. In 2012, for example, the United States completed 45,468 oil and gas wells (and brought online 28,354 of them) as against 3,921 wells completed in the rest of the world, except Canada.1
The drilling-intense nature of the shale business is a factor that will make the expansion of the shale phenomenon in other parts of the world improbable – at least in this decade. But there are other factors that will make the global replication of a U.S. style shale boom difficult, including an absence of private mineral rights in most countries, as well as the absence of the U.S. independent companies whose guerilla-style operational mindset has proven essential to the exploitation of shale formations that (unlike conventional oil and gas fields) require companies to move on a micro-scale, on multiple micro-objectives, and flexibly leverage short-term opportunities.
Although highly difficult to replicate, the U.S. shale experience may have a dramatic impact on the hydrocarbon sector by gradually introducing hydraulic fracturing as a means to recover more oil from conventional, mature, and declining oilfields worldwide.

To view the Policy Brief (summary version), click here
To view the Media Advisory, click here
Download full discussion paper:

For more information about this publication please contact the Belfer Center Communications Office at 617-495-9858.
For Academic Citation:
Maugeri, Leonardo. "The Shale Oil Boom: A U.S. Phenomenon." Discussion Paper 2013-05, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2013.