Diálogos da Brazil Conference, de Harvard a BH: respostas a questões - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

A conferência vai ser amanhã, dia 26, e o moderador, provavelmente o colega acadêmico e especialista em política externa brasileira Guilherme Casarões, formulará as perguntas que julgar pertinentes, sobretudo depois do G7 de Hiroshima. Mas como ele me havia enviado previamente uma série de questões que serão abordadas, preparei algumas notas para fixar algumas ideias, como sempre faço. Mas, também, como sempre faço, nunca leio o que escrevi, por isso resolvi já colocar de antemão meus comentários a algumas dessas questões, para informação dos distintos leitores deste meu modesto blog.

Diálogos da Brazil Conference, de Harvard a BH: respostas a questões

  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Respostas tentativas a questões colocadas pelo moderador, para o evento de 26/05/2023.

  

1) Pergunta introdutória: estamos em 2023, com um velho e novo governo e velhos e novos desafios políticos, econômicos e sociais. Que Brasil é esse e que mundo é esse em que o Brasil terá que navegar daqui para a frente?

 

PRA: O mundo mudou, para melhor – no plano dos progressos materiais, embora não para todos –, mas também para pior: com um acirramento da insegurança internacional, em virtude de um Estado nuclear transgressor da Carta da ONU e das normas mais elementares do Direito Internacional. O Brasil também mudou, para melhor – ao se livrar do pior governo conhecido desde que aqui chegou o primeiro governador-geral, D. Tomé de Souza, ou seja, desde 1549 –, mas também para uma situação incerta, ao se ter um novo governo que está olhando o Brasil com os olhos no retrovisor. 

A globalização se fragmentou, e alguns Estados revisionistas, por acaso não democráticos, começam a proclamar a necessidade de uma nova “ordem mundial”, algo que só ocorre ao cabo de grandes catástrofes. O pior é que os dirigentes brasileiros, e certamente o PT, parecem concordar com essa ideia insana.

 

2) Como já dissemos, os desafios do Brasil (em casa e no mundo) são enormes. Quais, na sua opinião, deveriam ser as prioridades deste novo governo - imediatas e no médio prazo do mandato - para garantir que o Brasil resgate seu caminho para o desenvolvimento?

 

PRA: Desenvolvimento se faz com investimentos. Investimentos se fazem a partir de um sólido ambiente de negócios, com um quadro transparente e claro das políticas governamentais, com certa definição de prioridades. O governo atual se elegeu muito mais como recusa do desgoverno bolsonarista do que por virtudes próprias, inclusive porque não apresentou, até agora, um plano claro de governo, além de alguns slogans atraentes. O principal desafio é a estabilidade econômica – ou seja, equilíbrio das contas públicas –, num ambiente de baixa inflação – o que ainda não é o caso – e de previsibilidade quanto aos rumos futuros, ou seja, prioridades bem estabelecidas. O segundo desafio, mais externo do que aparentemente interno, é o de contemplar as preocupações dos países democráticos avançados com a destruição da Amazônia e dos povos indígenas, e o Brasil ainda não provou que pode responder adequadamente a essas preocupações. O terceiro desafio é o de elevar os níveis medíocres da produtividade, principal fator da perda de competitividades externa da economia brasileira; esse desafio depende não exatamente de reformas educacionais, mas de uma verdadeira revolução nos padrões educacionais do Brasil, nas escolas públicas em especial. Uma quarta prioridade do Brasil deveria ser a integração na América do Sul, algo que dificilmente passará por uma coordenação continental, dado o nível de fragmentação da região: caberia ao Brasil fazer os primeiros gestos, de natureza puramente unilateral, ou seja, abrir voluntariamente seus mercados aos países vizinhos.

 

3) O governo Lula definiu algumas prioridades para sua agenda externa. Temas como meio ambiente, direitos humanos e comércio estão na pauta. Lula também busca resgatar a centralidade brasileira na América do Sul e na África, ao mesmo tempo em que se equilibra na disputa das grandes potências. Esse caminho faz sentido? Querer que o Brasil volte ao tabuleiro mundial é suficiente para garantir o desenvolvimento, ao menos no cenário externo?

 

            PRA: Todas essas são prioridades compreensíveis, mas elas deveriam ser, antes de mais nada, objeto de estudos técnicos da diplomacia profissional, não de falas improvisadas do presidente, que revela apenas a sua ignorância sobre temas básicos do sistema mundial, como sua megalomania de pretender opinar sobre quaisquer assuntos da agenda global, sem ter conhecimento e domínio suficientes sobre cada assunto. A diplomacia presidencial, que ele encarna como nenhum outro presidente das últimas décadas, pode ser um desastre, se partindo de um político despreparado e sobretudo voluntarioso e que se acha dotado de capacidades que ele não tem. Vou resumir numa fórmula: se o Brasil pretende ter sucesso nessas prioridades externas, como anunciou o presidente, ele precisa começar por fazer o dever de casa, ou seja, resolver os problemas internos em todas essas áreas: meio ambiente, direitos humanos, abertura econômica e liberalização comercial, além de predisposição de superar o tradicional protecionismo de suas elites econômicas para abrir-se aos vizinhos.

 

4) A China, nosso maior parceiro comercial, pode representar tanto uma bênção quanto uma maldição para o Brasil. Há, de um lado, toda a pujança do nosso setor primário, responsável por superávits sucessivos junto ao maior mercado mundial. De outro lado, alguns apontam os riscos (já em curso) de reprimarização da economia brasileira e de competição desleal em setores industriais, do varejo e da alta tecnologia. O que a China representa para o desenvolvimento brasileiro?

 

            PRA: Vamos ser claros: a China não é um problema, nem para o Brasil, nem para o mundo. Ela tem – descartando essa conversa de “nova ordem mundial” – um papel positivo na economia mundial, e não pretende exportar o seu “comunismo” para ninguém; aliás, o slogan de “socialismo com características chinesas” é uma conversa para incautos; o que a China tem é um capitalismo com características chinesas, ou seja, uma economia de mercado muito integrada ao mundo, mais pelo lado do comércio até aqui, mas as demais vertentes financeiras, de investimento, moedas e tecnologia também seguem na sequência. A China é um desafio e um estímulo ao desenvolvimento brasileiro, tanto pelo lado dos desafios e da competição, quanto pelo lado do aprendizado do que deve ser feito para superar os problemas do presente: crescer pela integração aos mercados mundiais, oferecer um ambiente de negócios receptivo e aberto, cuidar da infraestrutura e, sobretudo, cuidar do capital humano, ou seja, ter mão-de-obra de alta qualidade em todos os setores.

            O que não se pode é aderir a essa ideia insana de nova ordem global: a ordem de Bretton Woods, a despeito de reformas que podem ser feitas, ainda é a base inquestionável do funcionamento de uma sólida economia de mercado, multilateral e aberta às inovações.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4390: 8 maio 2023, 3 p.

  

A paranoia anti-China dos melhores acadêmicos americanos: criam uma nova guerra por si próprios - Graham Allison e Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Ao mesmo tempo em que assisto a um webinar da Carnegie Institution sobre: 

 Ending the United States' Forever Wars

 (link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jx8pW0yL7s), 

recebo mais uma das cartas do maior especialista americano em "decision making", Graham Allison, do Belfer Center da Harvard University, autor do famoso The Essence of Decision (sobre a crise dos mísseis soviéticos em Cuba em 1962, que foi superada brilhantemente por Kennedy, mais racional do que Kruschev), trazendo mais uma vez as elaborações paranóicas sobre a China como adversária.

Inacreditável como os universitários, os melhores, os maiores, supostamente os mais brilhantes, se deixaram contaminar pela paranoia – que eu sempre considerei normal – dos militares do Pentágonos. Não é possível que eles estejam considerando a China como uma adversária, ao mesmo título que foi a suprema "encarnação do mal", a União Soviética dos tempos da Guerra Fria (e mesmo antes). Não é que eles não reconhecem que a China seja diferente da URSS, mas é que eles interpretam o mundo, e a China, EXCLUSIVAMENTE DO PONTO DE VISTA AMERICANO, numa demonstração de miopia inacreditável para uma grande potência que não é dirigida por nenhum líder psicopata como Stalin ou Hitler – OK, tem o idiota do Trump, mas ele é so um grande idiota, capaz de desmantelar um monte de coisas, mas incapaz de conceber qualquer coisa para colocar no lugar –, mas por presidentes que são assessorados pelas melhores cabeças que um país democrático pode oferecer.

O que realmente me tem surpreendido de maneira frustrante é como esses intelectuais podem ser cegos pela hubris, pela arrogância do poder, como revelado por esta frase da carta abaixo: 

"Recognition that China is not just a twin of Russia and thus another “great power competitor” but a genuine Thucydidean rival whose meteoric rise threatens to upend the American-led international order".

Ou seja, o que vale é a ordem internacional liderada pelos EUA, que eles acham a melhor possível. Não há dúvida de que uma ordem internacional aberta e democrática, livre e flexível às mais diversas variedades culturais e intelectuais, é muito melhor do que um mundo autocrático, dominado pela censura e pelo poder irrestrito do Estado.

Mas quem disse que a China quer e pretende moldar o mundo à sua imagem e semelhança? Os americanos estão ignorando a história milenar da China, com todas as suas magníficas manifestações culturais e artísticas, com todos os progressos científicos e tecnológicos, a extraordinária vitalidade, energia e inventividade do seu povo?

Será que eles acham que o comunismo – do governo, não do povo – é o ponto final da história de uma nação estraordinária, é a realização evolutiva última dessa cultura extraordinária? Será que eles pensam que meros 70 anos de dominação autocrática do Partido Comunista vão dominar a história, a vida e o futuro da China por toda a eternidade? Como eles podem ser tão míopes, e achar que a China quer destruir os EUA e o mundo "dominado" ou liderado pelos EUA?

Parece que sim: eles ainda estão vivendo no mundo da Guerra Fria geopolítica, como revelado ainda por esta pequena frase de Graham Allison: 

"Realism about the inescapable fact that the U.S. and China live on a small globe where each one faces existential threats neither can defeat by itself (including climate MAD as well as nuclear MAD)."

Esse "small globe", eles o tomam como seu, ou devendo ficar eternamente sob sua liderança exclusiva. Essa história de "Thucydidean rival" é uma loucura completa, mas o pior é que essa cegueira pode realmente levar os americanos a tratar a China como um rival, o que é pior coisa que poderá ocorrer no século XXI, talvez condenado a viver sob a sombra de uma catástrofe nuclear, um novo Armageddon, como já ocorreu na segunda metade do século XX (o primeiro foi uma repetição da Guerra de Trinta Anos, do século XVII). Temos que escapar dessa loucura, mas parece que vai ser difícil com os "acadêmicos" americanos.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 3 de dezembro de 2020

============

From Belfer Center, December 2, 2020: 

President-elect Biden recognizes that the impact of the rise of China on the U.S. and the international order will pose the defining international challenge for his first term—and as far beyond that as any eye can see. Because his national security team includes many familiar faces from the Obama Administration, some in the press have suggested that it will be the third term of the Obama Administration. But that misses the extent to which the world has changed, the U.S. has changed, and most importantly, in the new administration Biden will be the decider.

Others, particularly in China, have speculated that in relations with China, this could be a second term of the Trump Administration. That misses what are sure to be even starker differences between what we’ve seen in the past four years and the incoming Biden Administration’s approach to foreign policy in general, and China in particular.

In my recent interview with the Global Times (China’s major English-language mouthpiece of the People’s Daily), I summarize differences that should become visible from day one between Biden and Trump’s China policy under 5 Rs: Restoration of normal foreign policy practices (e.g., an end to idiosyncratic, personalized government by tweet); Reversal of Trump's harmful initiatives (rejoining the Paris Accord, the WHO, etc.); Review of Trump’s “159 accomplishments” in dealing with China asking about each how it impacts American national interests (e.g., tariffs that harmed the U.S. more than China); Recognition that China is not just a twin of Russia and thus another “great power competitor” but a genuine Thucydidean rival whose meteoric rise threatens to upend the American-led international order; and Realism about the inescapable fact that the U.S. and China live on a small globe where each one faces existential threats neither can defeat by itself (including climate MAD as well as nuclear MAD).

If you have reactions, I’ll be interested.

Best regards.

Graham Allison
Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School
Follow me on Twitter

 Read the Interview »

A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century - Nicholas Burns, Marc Grossman, Marcie Ries - Belfer Center (Harvard)

 REPORT - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century

Authors: 
• Nicholas Burns
 
• Marc Grossman
 
• Marcie Ries
 

Related: 
• Alison Hillegeist
 
• Georgiy Kent
 
• Caroline Kim
 

| November 2020

Download the full report:

• A U.S. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY [PDF]

https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-diplomatic-service-21st-century

---

Executive Summary

The United States Foreign Service is confronting one of the most profound crises in its long and proud history. At a time of pandemic, recession, and mounting global challenges, our nation’s career diplomats find themselves without the support, funding, training, and leadership they need to represent the American people effectively overseas and in Washington, D.C. 

We argue in this report that the United States needs a strong and high performing Foreign Service to defend our country and advance its interests in the 21st century. That is why President-elect Biden and Congress should launch a major bipartisan initiative to revive, reform, and reimagine the Foreign Service. 

Many of the most serious challenges the United States will face in 2021 and beyond will require our diplomats to take the lead. These include the return of great power competition, leading a global response to the pandemic and its consequences, supporting American companies overseas during a devastating recession, mounting a major effort on climate change, negotiating an end to the Afghan and Iraq wars, and helping American citizens in every corner of the world who need the support of their government. Morale in the State Department, however, is at an all-time low and efforts to promote greater racial and ethnic diversity have failed just when the country needs women and men of all backgrounds as our primary link to nearly every country in the world. There are challenges to be met inside the Foreign Service, including an honest self-assessment of the Service’s internal culture.

Just as the United States succeeded in renewing both the military and intelligence agencies in recent decades, we must now do the same for our diplomats and diplomacy.

Under the auspices of the nonpartisan American Diplomacy Project at the Harvard Kennedy School, we met during the past year in 40 workshops and meetings with more than 200 people. They included serving State Department Officers, retired Foreign Service members, foreign diplomats, business leaders, and senior U.S. military officers, including two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as two former CIA Directors and retired intelligence officials. 

We sought the advice of senior Trump administration officials, members of the Biden transition team, former National Security Advisors and Secretaries of State, as well as members of Congress and their staffs from both parties.

In addition, we met more than 800 Americans in virtual conferences with think tanks, the University of Nebraska–Lincoln, and with World Affairs Councils in one national meeting and with chapters in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas; Peoria, Illinois; Nashville, Tennessee; Cleveland, Ohio; and Boston, Massachusetts. 

In every meeting, we listened to, and benefited from, the advice of concerned citizens who agree it is time to elevate diplomacy as a major national priority. To accomplish this, we must reimagine the Foreign Service for the current generation and those to come. 

Finally, we hope to honor with this call to action the women and men of the Service who work each day to promote and protect our great nation in difficult and dangerous places around the world. They deserve our full support. The time has come to help them rebuild the U.S. Foreign Service and Department of State.

10 Actions to Reimagine American Diplomacy and Reinvent the Foreign Service

Around the world, the face of the United States is embodied in the women and men of the U.S. Foreign Service. To ensure that we have the most robust and effective diplomatic corps in the world, we recommend these 10 actions:

1. President-elect Biden and Congress should define a new mission and mandate for the Foreign Service, and launch an urgent nonpartisan initiative to reform, rebuild, and reimagine the diplomatic corps.

• Together, the President and Congress should restore the State Department's lead role in executing the nation's foreign policy and reaffirm the role of American Ambassadors overseas as the President's personal representatives.
• They should strengthen budgetary support for the Foreign
  Service so that it is the strongest and most able diplomatic corps in the world.

2. Congress should pass a new Foreign Service Act to reshape the Service for the decades ahead and set the highest standards for diplomatic readiness, expertise, and leadership.

• There have been only three such acts in the previous 100 years and the most recent was 40 years ago. A new act would establish a new strategic mandate and mission for a strengthened Foreign Service and guidelines for many of the actions proposed below. A new act, based upon what is best about the 1980 act, is essential to catalyze the transformational change that is needed.
• Just as past Presidents and Congress undertook successful initiatives to renew the armed forces after Vietnam and the intelligence agencies after 9/11 and the Iraq War, a new act could serve as the foundation for a true 21st century Foreign Service.

3. Challenge the Foreign Service to transform its internal culture by incentivizing greater innovation, smart risk taking, individual accountability, inclusive management, and visionary leadership.

• Establish institutional service requirements for promotion to include participation in recruiting, service on promotion panels, teaching assignments at the Foreign Service Institute,
  and mentoring.
• Instill an ethos of stewardship of the profession of diplomacy by creating a Seniors Panel of all diplomats with the rank of Career Ambassador charged with promoting resilience, readiness, and inclusion for the diplomatic service.

4. Direct a relentless focus on diversity as a first-order strategic priority. Diversity is an essential element of producing high performance. America’s diplomats should be representative of the American people, their values, and their aspirations.

The next Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State must lead this effort. They should:

• Take personal responsibility to achieve this goal.
• Appoint a Chief Diversity Officer and be transparent about progress.
• Seek legislation to establish and fund a large-scale diplomatic ROTC program for under-represented college students seeking a career in the Foreign and Civil Services.
• Eliminate structural and procedural bias within recruitment, entry, assignment, and promotion processes.
• Enforce accountability for diversity, inclusion, and mentoring by
  all managers.
• Make promotions from junior to mid-level to senior ranks dependent on success in helping to create a more diverse
  Foreign Service.

5. Strengthen the professionalization of our diplomats through a vastly expanded career-long program of education and training that focuses on mastery of substantive foreign policy issues, diplomatic expertise, and leadership.

• Seek congressional authorization and funding for a 15 percent increase in Foreign Service personnel levels to create a training float like that maintained by the U.S. military. We recommend an increase of 2,000 positions over three years to meet this goal.

6. Initiate a wholesale overhaul of the personnel system to make it more modern, flexible, transparent, and strategically oriented to future challenges and workforce needs.

• Make multifunctional competence in political, economic, public diplomacy, consular, and management skills the standard for professional success and promotion by eliminating the individual “cones,” which separate Officers into job categories.
• After the 15 percent increase in positions is achieved, launch a four-year commitment to increase the size of the Foreign Service by another 1,400-1,800 positions to fill current and projected staffing gaps.
• Reduce the size of the massive embassies created to support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and other large overseas outposts.
• Prioritize development of regional and linguistic expertise through mandatory multiple tours using languages studied.
• Instill more flexibility in personnel policies to address the needs of a globally deployed workforce and their family members.

7. Create a defined mid-level entry program so that the Foreign Service can recruit and employ Americans with critical or unique skills in areas such as technology, science, business, and engineering. This program must have rigorous, transparent, nonpolitical entry and retention requirements, including worldwide availability. It can also be a vehicle to expand the diversity of the Foreign Service and provide for the return of some who left the Service in recent years.

8. Seek legislative authorization and funding for a Diplomatic Reserve Corps, like the military, with annual training requirements and activation commitments. This will create a surge capacity in the event of a national emergency or international crisis and open opportunities for citizens with special skills to support American diplomacy.

• Reservists would provide a positive connection between their communities and the Foreign Service.

9. Create a stronger and more nonpartisan Foreign Service by expanding the number of ambassadorial and senior Washington assignments for career professionals. The Department of State has more Senate-confirmed political appointee positions than any other Executive Branch agency.1 Currently, there is not a single serving career official in the 23 Senate-confirmed Assistant Secretary positions, which is unprecedented in the modern history of the State Department.2

• The next administration should seek by 2025 to:
  • Appoint career professionals to 90 percent of all ambassadorial positions.
  • Appoint a career professional to the position of Under Secretary for Political Affairs and one of the other four Under Secretaries of State.
  • Appoint career professionals to 75 percent of all Assistant Secretary of State positions.
  • Mandate these guidelines in legislation to promote a strengthened and more nonpartisan Foreign Service.
• This would bring the Foreign Service into symmetry with the small number of political appointee positions in the senior ranks of the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.

10. Rename the Foreign Service of the United States as the “United States Diplomatic Service” to signal transformation and to reinforce the vital role our diplomats perform in service to our nation. A name that begins with the term “foreign” and ends with “United States” is the reverse of how we should view America’s diplomats.

1 Partnership for Public Service. Political Appointee Tracker, last modified November 9, 2020, https://ourpublicservice.org/political-appointee-tracker/.
2 There are 4 other positions that hold the rank of Assistant Secretary: the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Coordinator for International Information Programs, and the Director of the Foreign Service Institute. Currently only the Director General of the Foreign Service and the Director of the Foreign Service institute are Career Foreign Service.

For more information on this publication: Belfer Communications Office

For Academic Citation: Burns, Nicholas, Marc Grossman and Marcie Ries. “A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, November 2020.

The Authors

Nicholas Burns

• Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School
• Member of the Board, Belfer Center
• Faculty Chair, Future of Diplomacy Project
• Faculty Chair, Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship
• Faculty Affiliate, Middle East Initiative
• Director, American Secretaries of State Project

Expertise: 

• Russia
 
• Asia & the Pacific
 
• North America
 
• South Asia
 
• Europe
 
• Middle East & North Africa
 

• Conflict & Conflict Resolution
 
• Rogue/Repressive States
 
• Governance
 
• Intrastate conflict
 
• International cooperation
 
• Coronavirus
 
• Intelligence in policymaking
 
• Middle East policy
 
• European studies
 
• Educating policymakers
 
• U.S. foreign policy
 
• U.S. primacy
 
• United Nations
 
• Sanctions
 
• Globalization
 
• International Security & Defense
 
• Weapons of Mass Destruction
 
• Negotiation
 
• Preventive defense
 
• Security Strategy
 
• Terrorism & Counterterrorism
 
• NATO
 
• Afghanistan war
 
• Military intervention
 
• Democracy
 
• Nuclear Issues
 
• India nuclear program
 
• Iran nuclear program
 
• Nuclear proliferation
 
• Nuclear weapons
 
• Russia nuclear program
 
• U.S. nuclear issues

• Bio/Profile
• Media Inquiries
• 617-495-2495
• Email
• More by this author
• @rnicholasburns
• Website

Marc Grossman

• Former Fisher Family Fellow 2010-2011, Future of Diplomacy Project

• Bio/Profile
• More by this author

Marcie Ries

• Senior Fellow, Future of Diplomacy Project

Expertise: 

• Europe
 
• Middle East & North Africa
 

• International cooperation
 
• Educating policymakers
 
• Diplomacy
 
• NATO
 
• U.S. foreign policy
 
• United Nations
 
• International Security & Defense
 
• Iraq war

• Bio/Profile
• More by this author

O Imperio do Algodao: uma historia global - Sven Beckert (book)

Acabo de terminar de ler este livro, que recomendo vivamente, por se tratar, realmente, de uma história global do algodão, de sua cultura, de seu comércio e sobretudo de sua industrialização, o primeiro empreendimento da revolução industrial e a primeira indústria verdadeiramente global, com seu centro em Manchester, depois se espalhando pelo mundo inteiro. A informação disponível sobre o Brasil é da melhor qualidade, baseada em nossos historiadores econômicos, em teses universitárias e no famoso livro do brasilianista Stanley J. Stein, The Brazilian Cotton Manufacture. Transcrevo aqui a parte final, por mim traduzida, de suas referências ao Brasil, quando a industrialização realmente deslancha:

“As três décadas pós-1892 foram chamadas de a idade do ouro da manufatura brasileira de algodão. Foi na sequência da emancipação da escravidão que as elites manufatureiras ganharam mais influência sobre o governo e conseguiram induzir políticas coerentes com os seus interesses, especialmente tarifas. Em 1860, a tarifa sobre o algodão era tão baixa quanto 30% sobre o valor das importações, em 1880 ela tinha dobrado para 60%, e, depois de batalhas delongadas, elas se elevaram para 100% em 1885. Elas ainda ascenderam em 1886, em 1889 e em 1900. As tarifas protecionistas de 1900 permaneceram então em vigor durante três décadas, criando um mercado protegido altamente lucrativo para os fabricantes. Como resultado, em torno de 1920, 75 a 85% de todos os produtos de algodão usados no Brasil eram fiados e fabricados internamente. Um inglês disse com grande pesar em 1921 que '21 anos atrás o Brasil era um excelente mercado para Manchester... Primeiramente os tecidos ordinários caíram fora, e agora todos esses bens estão sendo fabricados no país, e apenas os de qualidade superior ficaram para ser importados'”. p. 400, frase do inglês citado, no livro de Stanley Stein, p. 101."

Um grande livro de história econômica e de história do capitalismo.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida  

Sven Beckert: The Empire of Cotton: A Global History 

 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014, 616 p.; ISBN: 978-0-375-41414-5)

About The Book

Cotton is so ubiquitous as to be almost invisible, yet understanding its history is key to understanding the origins of modern capitalism. Sven Beckert’s rich, fascinating book tells the story of how, in a remarkably brief period, European entrepreneurs and powerful statesmen recast the world’s most significant manufacturing industry, combining imperial expansion and slave labor with new machines and wage workers to change the world. Here is the story of how, beginning well before the advent of machine production in the 1780s, these men captured ancient trades and skills in Asia, and combined them with the expropriation of lands in the Americas and the enslavement of African workers to crucially reshape the disparate realms of cotton that had existed for millennia, and how industrial capitalism gave birth to an empire, and how this force transformed the world.

The empire of cotton was, from the beginning, a fulcrum of constant global struggle between slaves and planters, merchants and statesmen, workers and factory owners. Beckert makes clear how these forces ushered in the world of modern capitalism, including the vast wealth and disturbing inequalities that are with us today. The result is a book as unsettling as it is enlightening: a book that brilliantly weaves together the story of cotton with how the present global world came to exist.

A revolucao energetica nos EUA - Leonardo Maugeri (Harvard Belfer Center)

"The Shale Oil Boom: A U.S. Phenomenon"

Study Forecasts Tripling of U.S. Shale Oil Output

Discussion Paper 2013-05, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

June 2013

Author: Leonardo Maugeri, Roy Family Fellow, Geopolitics of Energy Project

Belfer Center Programs or Projects: Environment and Natural Resources; The Geopolitics of Energy Project

Introduction

There are several issues in the current debate on the so-called U.S. tight and shale oil ... revolution that contribute to reinforce extreme and seemingly irreconcilable attitudes. One of the central questions revolves around the real potential of this revolution and can be formulated simply as follows: Is oil production from shale formations just a temporary bubble or is it an event capable of significantly altering the U.S.—and possibly global—energy outlook?

This study addresses such questions on the basis of a general analysis of more than 4,000 shale wells and a much more focused analysis of 2,000 of these wells along with the activities of about one hundred oil companies involved in shale oil exploitation. The main results of such analysis are multifaceted.

On one hand, the large resource size – and the ability of the industry to develop it through steady improvements in technology and cost – dwarf earlier forecasts, suggesting the possibility that the United States may become the largest global oil producer in just a few years. On the other hand, the unique characteristics of shale oil – the drilling intensity in particular – make it extremely vulnerable to both price drops and environmental opposition in new and populated areas.

Drilling intensity is a key point in order to understand the real evolution of shale oil (as well as shale gas) activity in the United States and its flexibility – e.g. the possibility to rapidly adapt to shifting circumstances.

Given the early state of knowledge and technology, the U.S. shale oil boom is mostly a function of bringing as many wells as possible on line, due to the dramatic decline in production that follows the early months of activity with each new well. For example, by December 2012 it took about 90 new producing wells per month just to maintain North Dakota’s Bakken-Three Forks (the largest shale oil play so far in the United States) oil production of 770,000 barrels per day.

Drilling intensity in U.S. shale oil plays skyrocketed from a few hundred wells brought online (e.g., becoming productive) before 2011 to more than 4,000 in 2012 – a figure that outpaces the total number of oil and gas wells (both conventional and unconventional) brought online in the same year in the rest of the world (except Canada).

In the short- to medium-term (3 to 5 years), the correlation between drilling intensity and shale oil production will shape the evolution of U.S. oil production more than any other factor. And because drilling intensity is largely a function of the oil price, a significant dip in oil price may trigger a rapid twist in the shale oil boom.

The central role played by drilling intensity in this early stage of shale oil and gas development has a crucial but almost unnoticed implication for the possibility of replicating the success of the American experience in other parts of the world. The United States concentrates in its territory 60 percent of the global availability of drilling rigs; moreover, 95 percent of U.S. drilling rigs can perform horizontal drilling that together with hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” is required to liberate shale resources.

Combined with a relatively low population density in several shale areas, this vast supply is a key factor that allows the United States to achieve a drilling intensity level that is impossible for other countries to achieve. No other country in the world has ever experienced even a fraction of the overall U.S. drilling intensity, a common feature of the U.S. oil and gas industry since its inception. In 2012, for example, the United States completed 45,468 oil and gas wells (and brought online 28,354 of them) as against 3,921 wells completed in the rest of the world, except Canada.¹

The drilling-intense nature of the shale business is a factor that will make the expansion of the shale phenomenon in other parts of the world improbable – at least in this decade. But there are other factors that will make the global replication of a U.S. style shale boom difficult, including an absence of private mineral rights in most countries, as well as the absence of the U.S. independent companies whose guerilla-style operational mindset has proven essential to the exploitation of shale formations that (unlike conventional oil and gas fields) require companies to move on a micro-scale, on multiple micro-objectives, and flexibly leverage short-term opportunities.

Although highly difficult to replicate, the U.S. shale experience may have a dramatic impact on the hydrocarbon sector by gradually introducing hydraulic fracturing as a means to recover more oil from conventional, mature, and declining oilfields worldwide.

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• "The Shale Oil Boom: A U.S. Phenomenon" (2.3 MB PDF)

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For Academic Citation:

Maugeri, Leonardo. "The Shale Oil Boom: A U.S. Phenomenon." Discussion Paper 2013-05, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2013.