Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.
The USS Gerald R. Ford conducts high-speed turns in the Atlantic Ocean in October 2019.
U.S. Navy
The late 20th century was a time of supreme American confidence and rapid innovation. The Cold War was drawing to a close, the digital age was around the corner, and the Pentagon saw an opportunity to capitalize on peacetime and begin preparing for future conflict. With few diplomatic or military distractions, the United States ushered in a revolution in military technology.
Out of that boom period came ambitions for a new class of aircraft carrier headlined by the transformational USS Gerald R. Ford, a ship featuring an expanded flight deck, a boosted power plant, and support for almost two dozen emergent technologies. Expectations were high. The Ford’s nuclear reactor and propulsion system would triple the electrical power of the preceding Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. Its state-of-the-art weapons elevators would move 20,000 pounds of munitions at speeds of 150 feet per minute compared with the Nimitz's speed of 100 feet per minute. Its new launch-and-recovery system would be able to handle 270 planes in a single day. From bow to stern, the ship’s innovations—designed to save time, costs, and crew—would revolutionize the way the U.S. military built and used carriers. The Ford would be a symbol of American superiority, one that would project power to American adversaries for five decades of dependable service.
“There was this thinking of, ‘We are so far ahead of everyone else that we can afford to take a strategic pause and take risks on our acquisition and try new and untested technology,’” says Eric Wertheim, a defense analyst and expert with the U.S. Naval Institute, of the nation’s mindset after the Cold War. “And there was this feeling that the rest of the world is at least 20 years behind us.”
But after two decades of development and delays, the audacity that conceived the Ford seemed to usher its doom. Expected to save the military $4 billion during its life span, the Ford has actually cost billions more than initial estimates. First expected to deploy in 2018, it has been projected to deploy as far out as 2024. When the ship reached the Navy after construction, it was already two years behind schedule, with work outstanding on thousands of items. In 2015, Sen. John McCain, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a former Navy aviator, called packing all that tech onto the Ford “the original sin” that damaged the program.
Even the Navy’s top officer acknowledged the problems that have plagued the carrier. “We had 23 new technologies on [the USS Gerald R. Ford] which, quite frankly, increased the risk of delivery on time and cost right from the get-go,” said Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Gilday at a virtual talk before the Navy League’s 2021 Sea Air Space exposition. “And I think industry’s in full agreement with this: We really shouldn’t introduce more than maybe one or two new technologies on any complex platform like that, in order to keep risk at a manageable level.”
“Warships are the only weapon where the prototype goes out to sea."
Meanwhile, naval advances by U.S. adversaries have added urgency to the Ford’s troubleshooting. The ship's critics point to its expanding budget and timetable as evidence that the U.S. military should reconsider developing massive nuclear carriers as a foundational element of its naval program. Military advisor Norman Polmar points out that America’s most recent conflicts in the Middle East didn’t even use the Nimitz class to full capacity. “Look what we did in Iraq,” he says. “We launched [just] 20 or 30 strikes a day from a carrier that has 70 airplanes.” And Rep. Adam Smith, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, has questioned whether the Ford’s price tag justifies its utility. During a 2021 Brookings Institution discussion, Smith asked if there are other ways “to get unmanned systems closer to the fight that don’t cost $12 billion.”
Today, despite years of setbacks and backlash, the Ford is showing signs that it can complete its mission. Its critical technologies are coming to life, and the Navy is accelerating the carrier’s deployment timetable. But as the Fordapproaches its maiden deployment, its successes and failures are still on public display. Talbot Manvel, a retired Navy captain who led the initial concept development of the Ford carrier class from 1996 to 2001, points out that for this multi-billion dollar floating airport to prove its capability and necessity, it has to become battle-ready under scrutiny. “Warships are the only weapon where the prototype goes out to sea,” he says.
In 1993, a Navy working group began investigating new technologies for a new class of carrier. Technologies on the Nimitz class, already a quarter of a century old, had evolved beyond their means, and the carriers were beginning to sag under their own weight, unable to support all that capability.
In 1998, the Navy launched the CVN(X) program to replace the Nimitz class with another large nuclear-powered carrier class. Technologies under development for this new class would apply to the USS George H.W. Bush—the 10th and final Nimitz carrier—and evolve across the upcoming class. But in 2002, the U.S. Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald Rumsfeld, changed course. Seeking a bolder shift toward the future, he ordered technology development, ship design, and construction for what he called a “transformational” carrier, and the Navy launched the CVN 21 program, later christened the Ford class. This research and development would cost nearly $5 billion (separate from Ford’s eventual $13 billion construction cost), the result being a carrier class that currently comprises four ships—three in addition to the flagship Ford. Prefab construction on the class' frontrunner, the USS Gerald R. Ford, began in 2005.
The Navy designs each carrier with an assembly sequence in mind. Each block of the ship contains a particular arrangement of structural and technological components, and when workers at Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Newport News Shipbuilding division in Virginia—the country’s only builder of nuclear carriers—finish adjacent blocks, they weld them together into a complete section of the ship, called a “lift,” sometimes weighing hundreds of tons. With the help of cranes, the builders hoist the lifts into place to form the ship’s hull. Ford’s construction was elaborate; it required 496 lifts.
“This was transformation run amok.”
Designing a ship in this fashion means material and technological delays can have a cascading effect on the construction timeline. Signs of trouble emerged as early as 2007; the electromagnetic launch system, one of the signature technologies on Ford, was already more than a year behind schedule. “The warning signs were there,” says Shelby Oakley, a director in the Government Accountability Office’s contracting and national security acquisitions team. Even before construction began, the GAO had flagged the Ford to the Navy as a poor business case, noting its risky cost estimates and shipbuilding schedules.
The Ford’s construction contract reached Newport News Shipbuilding in 2008; building the ship was a muddled, disarranged process. The shipyard began construction while some of the Ford’s technologies still lingered in development and faced design revisions. Modifications to accommodate the space, weight, and utilities for these components contributed to a total of 19,000 eventual design changes. The Navy had planned for many of these changes in anticipation of technological evolution, but other changes were unexpected.
One standout feature of the Ford—albeit a troublesome one—is its state-of-the-art Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG). Prior to Ford, American carriers used a hydraulic arresting system to slow and stop landing aircraft, but the AAG uses an electric engine and a water twister to accommodate a broader range of aircraft—including unmanned aerial vehicles. Engineering and manufacturing of the AAG began in 2005, with 2009 the targeted end date. But a 2016 Pentagon Inspector General report noted that developmental testing for the AAG would continue through 2018; the system still hadn’t proved capable or safe enough to test on the Ford. Between 2009 and 2012, the AAG’s power conditioning system failed across multiple tests, and both its inverter system and cable shock absorber required redesigns. The setbacks ballooned the AAG’s development cost from $143 million to more than $1 billion, according to a report from Sen. McCain’s office.
Manvel says he resisted AAG on the Ford as early as 1998, wanting to push it onto the subsequent ships in the class after its design had matured. He had his way until Rumsfeld stepped in with his transformational vision. “This was transformation run amok,” Manvel says.
As technologies fell behind on the Ford, the structural shipbuilding continued, and that disparity would require corrections. The Ford’s Dual Band Radar (DBR), a combination of both volume search radar and multifunction radar meant to handle long-range surveillance, air traffic control, and missile communications, was originally developed for use on the Zumwalt class of guided missile cruisers. But due to the cruisers’ own construction delays, the Navy dropped volume search for Zumwalt’s DBR, leaving that particular feature untested and incomplete before its implementation on Ford.
“That [brought] a major change to the Ford development and test program,” says Rear Adm. James Downey, the Navy’s program executive officer for carriers, whose assignments have also included chief engineer on the CVN(X) program and program manager for the Zumwalt class.
Land-based tests of the volume search radar that would have proceeded under Zumwalt were suspended, and contracting and additional testing delays hampered its development for Ford.
Those tests continued even after the radar’s installation on Ford, ultimately finishing nearly five years later than planned. The tests themselves unearthed issues with the DBR’s power regulating system, and the resulting modifications required the shipbuilder to cut into Ford’s island—its command and control tower—to make the repairs.
But Manvel says Rumsfeld deemed Ford too important to fail, and goes as far as to say the former defense secretary was right. No matter how much time or money it took, America would make sure the Ford delivered, because as Marvel says: “America always wants the best.” In 2013, after construction overruns and inflation, the Ford’s cost cap ballooned from $10.5 billion to $12.9 billion under order of Congress. As it bumped against that ceiling, the Navy accelerated the Ford to fleet by deferring work on more than 9,000 items.
It took Downey's new leadership—he took over the carrier program office in summer 2019— for the cycle of deference to stop. He was central to the redemption of the Ford’s 11 Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWEs), meant to reduce bomb movement within the ship by up to 75 percent compared to the Nimitz class. Less handling of munitions means increased safety and maneuverability for sailors and aircraft on the flattop. Faster movement plays into increased mission launches (a.k.a. sorties), a key measure of the Ford's success.
When the Navy commissioned the Ford in July 2017, none of the elevators were fully operational. When the Ford began its period of post-delivery testing and trials in 2019, just four elevators were operational. While the GAO has cited premature corrosion of electrical components and faulty parts as problems with the AWEs in earlier years, Downey says the major hindrance appears to have been software-related.
With renewed urgency on having operable elevators, industrial workers began making fixes while the Ford was at sea, rather than waiting until it was pierside. Downey also established offices at the shipyard in Newport News, and also at the Ford’s home port at the nearby Norfolk Naval Station. He goes over daily reviews of work items with project supervisors. “To this day, we do daily closeouts of the work, with me included,” Downey says. "My view is it’s critical to keeping these large projects on track, and you can’t do that monthly or quarterly." His procedural adjustments seem to have worked. The last of the weapons elevators were turned over to the Ford's crew on December 22, 2021, according to the Navy.
Launching and recovering aircraft was another trouble area. The Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, or EMALS, is supposed to average 4,166 launches between failures. A Pentagon report from early 2021 noted that the Ford was averaging just 181 launches between failures. AAG, meanwhile, is meant to average 16,500 recoveries before a failure. It averaged 48. Downey doesn’t dispute those numbers, but he points out that the Pentagon report covered the carrier’s delivery and initial trials period, and largely missed its post-delivery tests and trials, a period when a carrier’s crew learns how to operate the ship. By that time, Ford had completed fewer than 800 aircraft launches and recoveries total. It has now surpassed 8,000 launches and recoveries.
The Ford has corrected its wayward trajectory in large part through finding optimal ways to marry its crew with its new technologies. While at sea, the Ford became the Navy’s East Coast platform for more than 400 pilots to earn or maintain their flight certifications. During that time, sailors gained proficiency on the ship’s systems and made their own recommendations on how to operate them. During eight and a half hours of daytime flight operations in December 2020, the Ford achieved 175 arrested landings, which was more than the 160 expected of it during a 12-hour fly day. EMALS has become a morale boost for the sailors working on that system, says Navy Capt. Paul Lanzilotta, who took command of Ford in early 2021. At the end of a flight day, aviation boatswain mates push a button to put EMALS into standby, saving them the hours of pre- and post-flight maintenance required on the Nimitz class.
“It is a different mindset and environment in which they work,” Lanzilotta says. “[The crew are] a lot smarter about things like electronics and electronic systems.”
Ford completed 18 months of post-delivery tests and trials in spring 2021. As the ship's crew gained proficiency, the Navy did something unheard of: It moved the Ford’s projected first deployment date up, from 2024 to 2022. Here, a military decision to run things concurrently paid off. While the Ford was working through its post-delivery tests, the Navy put the ship through live fire combat system tests and carrier-strike group operations. The Ford cleared all its benchmarks despite the crunch.
It was a decision born out of weariness and practicality: If there were any more weaknesses aboard the Ford, the Navy wanted to expose them as soon as possible, Downey says.
The Ford class is likely to deploy in a different climate from the ones military leaders anticipated two decades ago. While the U.S. military focused on counterinsurgency efforts in the Middle East, Russia became active in the Arctic, and China began aggressively expanding its naval capabilities. China’s DF-21D “carrier killer” missile has a range of up to 2,485 miles, enough to put U.S. military bases on Guam within striking distance from mainland China.
“If we’re not moving the threshold forward on carrier capabilities, what happens if China continues to incrementally catch up?” asks Matthew Funaiole, a senior fellow with the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. China is now building a third carrier of its own, called the Type 003. Though it’s unlikely to rival a Nimitz-class carrier, it might include an electromagnetic launch system that could bypass today's more common steam-powered launch systems, Funaiole says. Even if the launch system doesn’t appear on the Type 003, Funaiole expects it on the follow-up ship.
The context for the Ford’s deployment is becoming higher pressure, but many see the ship, as well as the three others in its class, to be the pinnacle of carrier technology. “I’m confident that we’re going to get the Ford class, and it’s going to be a great ship,” says the Naval Institute’s Wertheim. “It’s taking longer and it’s more expensive, and it maybe didn’t have to be this way, but we will iron those things out. We shouldn't look at the Ford class as some massive failure. It’s more of a ‘What can we do better next time?’”
That “next time” is already here. The Ford’s three successors—the USS John F. Kennedy, USS Enterprise, and USS Doris Miller—are taking shape at Newport News Shipbuilding. The Kennedy is expected to reach the Navy first, in 2024, and the Miller last, in 2032. In the meantime, the Ford is finally proving its sea legs, but its saga demonstrates the complexities of building a modern aircraft carrier, designing a ship around both an assessment of modern adversaries and a prediction of future military contexts. The lessons of Ford’s construction will inform the larger debate over staking the sea service on a massive nuclear flagship, but the next decade is set—and the Navy expects the world’s newest, most advanced warship to operate for half a century. For now, the Ford is the future.
recebo mais uma das cartas do maior especialista americano em "decision making", Graham Allison, do Belfer Center da Harvard University, autor do famoso The Essence of Decision (sobre a crise dos mísseis soviéticos em Cuba em 1962, que foi superada brilhantemente por Kennedy, mais racional do que Kruschev), trazendo mais uma vez as elaborações paranóicas sobre a China como adversária.
Inacreditável como os universitários, os melhores, os maiores, supostamente os mais brilhantes, se deixaram contaminar pela paranoia – que eu sempre considerei normal – dos militares do Pentágonos. Não é possível que eles estejam considerando a China como uma adversária, ao mesmo título que foi a suprema "encarnação do mal", a União Soviética dos tempos da Guerra Fria (e mesmo antes). Não é que eles não reconhecem que a China seja diferente da URSS, mas é que eles interpretam o mundo, e a China, EXCLUSIVAMENTE DO PONTO DE VISTA AMERICANO, numa demonstração de miopia inacreditável para uma grande potência que não é dirigida por nenhum líder psicopata como Stalin ou Hitler – OK, tem o idiota do Trump, mas ele é so um grande idiota, capaz de desmantelar um monte de coisas, mas incapaz de conceber qualquer coisa para colocar no lugar –, mas por presidentes que são assessorados pelas melhores cabeças que um país democrático pode oferecer.
O que realmente me tem surpreendido de maneira frustrante é como esses intelectuais podem ser cegos pela hubris, pela arrogância do poder, como revelado por esta frase da carta abaixo:
"Recognition that China is not just a twin of Russia and thus another “great power competitor” but a genuine Thucydidean rival whose meteoric rise threatens to upend the American-led international order".
Ou seja, o que vale é a ordem internacional liderada pelos EUA, que eles acham a melhor possível. Não há dúvida de que uma ordem internacional aberta e democrática, livre e flexível às mais diversas variedades culturais e intelectuais, é muito melhor do que um mundo autocrático, dominado pela censura e pelo poder irrestrito do Estado.
Mas quem disse que a China quer e pretende moldar o mundo à sua imagem e semelhança? Os americanos estão ignorando a história milenar da China, com todas as suas magníficas manifestações culturais e artísticas, com todos os progressos científicos e tecnológicos, a extraordinária vitalidade, energia e inventividade do seu povo?
Será que eles acham que o comunismo – do governo, não do povo – é o ponto final da história de uma nação estraordinária, é a realização evolutiva última dessa cultura extraordinária? Será que eles pensam que meros 70 anos de dominação autocrática do Partido Comunista vão dominar a história, a vida e o futuro da China por toda a eternidade? Como eles podem ser tão míopes, e achar que a China quer destruir os EUA e o mundo "dominado" ou liderado pelos EUA?
Parece que sim: eles ainda estão vivendo no mundo da Guerra Fria geopolítica, como revelado ainda por esta pequena frase de Graham Allison:
"Realism about the inescapable fact that the U.S. and China live on a small globe where each one faces existential threats neither can defeat by itself (including climate MAD as well as nuclear MAD)."
Esse "small globe", eles o tomam como seu, ou devendo ficar eternamente sob sua liderança exclusiva. Essa história de "Thucydidean rival" é uma loucura completa, mas o pior é que essa cegueira pode realmente levar os americanos a tratar a China como um rival, o que é pior coisa que poderá ocorrer no século XXI, talvez condenado a viver sob a sombra de uma catástrofe nuclear, um novo Armageddon, como já ocorreu na segunda metade do século XX (o primeiro foi uma repetição da Guerra de Trinta Anos, do século XVII). Temos que escapar dessa loucura, mas parece que vai ser difícil com os "acadêmicos" americanos.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 3 de dezembro de 2020
============
From Belfer Center, December 2, 2020:
President-elect Biden recognizes that the impact of the rise of China on the U.S. and the international order will pose the defining international challenge for his first term—and as far beyond that as any eye can see. Because his national security team includes many familiar faces from the Obama Administration, some in the press have suggested that it will be the third term of the Obama Administration. But that misses the extent to which the world has changed, the U.S. has changed, and most importantly, in the new administration Biden will be the decider.
Others, particularly in China, have speculated that in relations with China, this could be a second term of the Trump Administration. That misses what are sure to be even starker differences between what we’ve seen in the past four years and the incoming Biden Administration’s approach to foreign policy in general, and China in particular.
In my recent interview with the Global Times (China’s major English-language mouthpiece of the People’s Daily), I summarize differences that should become visible from day one between Biden and Trump’s China policy under 5 Rs: Restoration of normal foreign policy practices (e.g., an end to idiosyncratic, personalized government by tweet); Reversal of Trump's harmful initiatives (rejoining the Paris Accord, the WHO, etc.); Review of Trump’s “159 accomplishments” in dealing with China asking about each how it impacts American national interests (e.g., tariffs that harmed the U.S. more than China); Recognition that China is not just a twin of Russia and thus another “great power competitor” but a genuine Thucydidean rival whose meteoric rise threatens to upend the American-led international order; and Realism about the inescapable fact that the U.S. and China live on a small globe where each one faces existential threats neither can defeat by itself (including climate MAD as well as nuclear MAD).
If you have reactions, I’ll be interested.
Best regards.
Graham Allison Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School Follow me on Twitter
Ufa! Ainda bem que os nossos militares não conseguem fazer isso: o orçamento ainda não chegou lá, e de toda forma, 80% dos recursos servem apenas para pagar pessoal, ativo e inativo.
Mas um dia vamos chegar lá, em mais ou menos 150 anos...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
The Pentagon has buried an internal study that exposed $125 billion in administrative waste, according to findings by The Washington Post.(Victoria Walker/The Washington Post)
The Pentagon has buried an internal study that exposed $125 billion in administrative waste in its business operations amid fears Congress would use the findings as an excuse to slash the defense budget, according to interviews and confidential memos obtained by The Washington Post.
Pentagon leaders had requested the study to help make their enormous back-office bureaucracy more efficient and reinvest any savings in combat power. But after the project documented far more wasteful spending than expected, senior defense officials moved swiftly to kill it by discrediting and suppressing the results.
Thereport, issued in January 2015, identified “a clear path” for the Defense Department to save $125 billion over five years. The plan would not have required layoffs of civil servants or reductions in military personnel. Instead, it would have streamlined the bureaucracy through attrition and early retirements, curtailed high-priced contractors and made better use of information technology.
The study was produced last year by the Defense Business Board, a federal advisory panel of corporate executives, and consultants from McKinsey and Company. Based on reams of personnel and cost data, their report revealed for the first time that the Pentagon was spending almost a quarter of its $580 billion budget on overhead and core business operations such as accounting, human resources, logistics and property management.
Thedata showedthat the Defense Department was paying a staggering number of people — 1,014,000 contractors, civilians and uniformed personnel — to fill back-office jobs far from the front lines. That workforce supports 1.3 million troops on active duty, the fewest since 1940.
The cost-cutting study could find a receptive audience with President-elect Donald Trump. He has promised a major military buildup and said he would pay for it by “eliminating government waste and budget gimmicks.”
Robert “Bobby” L. Stein, former chairman of the Defense Business Board. He serves as managing director of Chartwell Capital Management and president of the Regency Group. (Thomas Hager/Courtesy of Chartwell Capital Management)
For the military, the major allure of the study was that it called for reallocating the $125 billion for troops and weapons. Among other options, the savings could have paid a large portion of the bill to rebuild the nation’s aging nuclear arsenal, or the operating expenses for 50 Army brigades.
But some Pentagon leaders said they fretted that by spotlighting so much waste, the study would undermine their repeated public assertions that years of budget austerity had left the armed forces starved of funds. Instead of providing more money, they said, they worried Congress and the White House might decide to cut deeper.
So the plan was killed. The Pentagon imposed secrecy restrictions on the data making up the study, which ensured no one could replicate the findings. A 77-page summary report that had been made public was removedfrom a Pentagon website.
“They’re all complaining that they don’t have any money. We proposed a way to save a ton of money,” said Robert “Bobby” L. Stein, a private-equity investor from Jacksonville, Fla., who served as chairman of the Defense Business Board.
Stein, a campaign bundler for President Obama, said the study’s data were “indisputable” and that it was “a travesty” for the Pentagon to suppress the results.
“We’re going to be in peril because we’re spending dollars like it doesn’t matter,” he added.
The missed opportunity to streamline the military bureaucracy could soon have large ramifications. Under the 2011 Budget Control Act, the Pentagon will be forced to stomach $113 billion in automatic cuts over four years unless Congress and Trump can agree on a long-term spending deal by October. Playing a key role in negotiations will probably be Trump’s choice for defense secretary, retired Marine Gen. James Mattis.
The Defense Business Board was ordered to conduct the study by Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work, the Pentagon’s second-highest-ranking official. At first, Work publicly touted the efficiency drive as a top priority and boasted about his idea to recruit corporate experts to lead the way.
After the board finished its analysis, however, Work changed his position. In an interview with The Post, he did not dispute the board’s findings about the size or scope of the bureaucracy. But he dismissed the $125 billion savings proposal as “unrealistic” and said the business executives had failed to grasp basic obstacles to restructuring the public sector.
“There is this meme that we’re some bloated, giant organization,” he said. “Although there is a little bit of truth in that . . . I think it vastly overstates what’s really going on.”
Work said the board fundamentally misunderstood how difficult it is to eliminate federal civil service jobs — members of Congress, he added, love having them in their districts — or to renegotiate defense contracts.
He said the Pentagon is adopting some of the study’s recommendations on a smaller scale and estimated it will save $30 billion by 2020. Many of the programs he cited, however, have been on the drawing board for years or were unrelated to the Defense Business Board’s research.
Work acknowledged that the push to improve business operations lost steam after then-Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel was replaced by Ashton B. Carter in February 2015. Carter has emphasized other goals, such as strengthening the Pentagon’s partnerships with high-tech firms.
“We will never be as efficient as a commercial organization,” Work said. “We’re the largest bureaucracy in the world. There’s going to be some inherent inefficiencies in that.”
‘Dark matter’
Work, a retired Marine officer, became deputy defense secretary in May 2014. With the military budget under the most pressure since the end of the Cold War, he sought help from the Defense Business Board, an advisory panel known for producing management studies that usually gathered dust.
Work told the board that the outcome of this assignment would be different. In a memo, he directed the board to collect sensitive cost data from the military services and defense agencies that would reveal how much they spent on business operations.
Pentagon officials knew their back-office bureaucracy was overstaffed and overfunded. But nobody had ever gathered and analyzed such a comprehensive set of data before.
Some Defense Business Board members warned that exposing the extent of the problem could have unforeseen consequences.
“You are about to turn on the light in a very dark room,” Kenneth Klepper, the former chief executive of Medco Health Solutions, told Work in the summer of 2014, according to two people familiar with the exchange. “All the crap is going to float to the surface and stink the place up.”
“Do it,” Work replied.
To turn on the light, the Pentagon needed more outside expertise. A team of consultants from McKinsey was hired.
In a confidential August 2014 memo, McKinsey noted that while the Defense Department was “the world’s largest corporate enterprise,” it had never “rigorously measured” the “cost-effectiveness, speed, agility or quality” of its business operations.
Nor did the Pentagon have even a remotely accurate idea of what it was paying for those operations, which McKinsey divided into five categories: human resources; health-care management; supply chain and logistics; acquisition and procurement; and financial-flow management.
McKinsey hazarded a guess: anywhere between $75 billion and $100 billion a year, or between 15 and 20 percent of the Pentagon’s annual expenses. “No one REALLY knows,” the memo added.
The mission would be to analyze, for the first time, dozens of databases that tracked civilian and military personnel, and labor costs for defense contractors. The problem was that the databases were in the grip of the armed forces and a multitude of defense agencies. Many had fought to hide the data from outsiders and bureaucratic rivals, according to documents and interviews.
Information on contractor labor, in particular, was so cloaked in mystery that McKinsey described it as “dark matter.”
Prying it loose would require direct orders from Work. Even then, McKinsey consultants predicted the bureaucracy would resist.
“This is a sensitive exercise conducted with audiences both ‘weary’ and ‘wary’ of efficiency, cost, sequestration and budget drills,” the confidential memo stated. “Elements of the culture are masterful at ‘waiting out studies and sponsors,’ with a ‘this too shall pass’ mindset.”
Overstaffed chow hall
From the outset, access to the data was limited to a handful of people. A $2.9 million consulting contract signed by the Pentagon stipulated that none of the data or analysis could be released to the news media or the public.
Moreover, the contract required McKinsey to report to David Tillotson III, the Pentagon’s acting deputy chief management officer. Anytime the Defense Business Board wanted the consultants to carry out a task, Tillotson would have to approve. His office — not the board — would maintain custody of the data.
“Good news!” Work emailed Tillotson once the contract was signed. “Time to cook.”
In an Oct. 15, 2014, memo, Work ordered the board to move quickly, giving it three months to produce “specific and actionable recommendations.”
In a speech the next month, Work lauded the board for its private-sector expertise. He said he had turned it into “an operational arm” of the Pentagon leadership and predicted the study would deliver transformational results.
In an aside, he revealed that early findings had determined the average administrative job at the Pentagon was costing taxpayers more than $200,000, including salary and benefits.
“And you say, hmmm, we could probably do better than that,” he said.
The initial results did not come as a surprise.
Former defense secretaries William S. Cohen, Robert M. Gates and Chuck Hagel had launched similar efficiency drives in 1997, 2010 and 2013, respectively. But each of the leaders left the Pentagon before their revisions could take root.
“Because we turn over our secretaries and deputy secretaries so often, the bureaucracy just waits things out,” said Dov Zakheim, who served as Pentagon comptroller under President George W. Bush. “You can’t do it at the tail end of an administration. It’s not going to work. Either you leave the starting block with a very clear program, or you’re not going to get it done.”
Arnold Punaro, a retired Marine general and former staff director for the Senate Armed Services Committee, said lawmakers block even modest attempts to downsize the Pentagon’s workforce because they do not want to lose jobs in their districts.
Without backing from Congress, “you can’t even get rid of the guy serving butter in the chow hall in a local district, much less tens of thousands of jobs,” he said.
Deputy Defense Secretary Robert O. Work, the Pentagon’s second-highest-ranking official, ordered the Defense Business Board to conduct the study. (Kate Patterson/for The Washington Post)
‘Time to hunt!’
The Defense Business Board assigned five members to conduct the study alongside consultants from McKinsey. Scott Rutherford, senior partner at McKinsey’s Washington office, declined to comment.
The team ran into resistance as several Pentagon offices delayed requests for data, according to emails and memos. Work and Tillotson had to intervene to get the data flowing. At one point, more than 100 people were feeding data from different sectors of the bureaucracy.
Laboring under its tight deadline, the team hashed out an agreement with Pentagon officials over which job classifications to count in their survey. The board added a sixth category of business operations — real property management. That alone covered 192,000 jobs and annual expenses of $22.6 billion.
On Christmas Eve, Klepper emailed Work and Tillotson to thank them for putting their muscle behind the project. Without it, he said, “this would all have been DOA and the naysayers would all have been right.”
He hinted the board would make some eye-catching recommendations and expressed relief its work had not been torpedoed.
“I have to admit, with all the caution, negative reaction and pushback,” Klepper said, “I had a bit of concern at the end of the analysis some form of censorship would stop us from showing the true opportunity.”
Work replied that he could not be happier.
“Time to hunt!” he said in an email, adding that he was “very excited about 2015” and ready to make “some bold moves.”
The year kicked off with promise. On Jan. 21, 2015, the Pentagon announced Stein, the private-equity investor, had been reappointed as the board’s chairman and praised him for his “outstanding service.”
The next day, the full board held its quarterly public meeting to review the results of the study. The report had a dry title, “Transforming DoD’s Core Business Processes for Revolutionary Change,” and was packed with charts and jargon. But it began plainly enough.
“We are spending a lot more money than we thought,” the report stated. It then broke down how the Defense Department was spending $134 billion a year on business operations — about 50 percent more than McKinsey had guessed at the outset.
Almost half of the Pentagon’s back-office personnel — 457,000 full-time employees — were assigned to logistics or supply-chain jobs. That alone exceeded the size of United Parcel Service’s global workforce.
The Pentagon’s purchasing bureaucracy counted 207,000 full-time workers. By itself, that would rank among the top 30 private employers in the United States.
More than 192,000 people worked in property management. About 84,000 people held human-resources jobs.
The study laid out a range of options. At the low end, just by renegotiating service contracts and hiring less-expensive workers, the Pentagon could save $75 billion over five years. At the high end, by adopting more aggressive productivity targets, it could save twice as much.
After a discussion, the full board voted to recommend a middle option: to save $125 billion over five years.
Hordes of contractors
Afterward, board members briefed Work. They were expecting an enthusiastic response, but the deputy defense secretary looked uneasy, according to two people who were present.
He singled out a page in the report. Titled “Warfighter Currency,” it showed how saving $125 billion could be redirected to boost combat power. The money could cover the operational costs for 50 Army brigades, or 3,000 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters for the Air Force, or 10 aircraft-carrier strike groups for the Navy.
“This is what scares me,” he said, according to the two people present. Work explained he was worried Congress might see it as an invitation to strip $125 billion from the defense budget and spend it somewhere else.
A few weeks later, Carter replaced Hagel as defense secretary. Carter sounded as though he would welcome the kind of revolutionary change the board was urging.
“To win support from our fellow citizens for the resources we need, we must show that we can make better use of every taxpayer dollar,” Carter said in an inaugural message in February 2015. “That means a leaner organization, less overhead, and reforming our business and acquisition practices.”
In briefings that month, uniformed military leaders were receptive at first. They had long groused that the Pentagon wasted money on a layer of defense bureaucracies — known as the Fourth Estate — that were outside the control of the Army, Air Force and Navy. Military officials often felt those agencies performed duplicative services and oversight.
But the McKinsey consultants had also collected data that exposed how the military services themselves were spending princely sums to hire hordes of defense contractors.
For example, the Army employed 199,661 full-time contractors, according to a confidential McKinsey report obtained by The Post. That alone exceeded the combined civil workforce for the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, and Housing and Urban Development.
The average cost to the Army for each contractor that year: $189,188, including salary, benefits and other expenses.
The Navy was not much better. It had 197,093 contractors on its payroll. On average, each cost $170,865.
In comparison, the Air Force had 122,470 contractors. Each cost, on average, $186,142.
Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter has emphasized goals such as strengthening the Pentagon’s partnerships with high-tech firms. (Alex Wong/Getty Images)
Taking fire
Meantime, the backlash to the $125 billion savings plan intensified.
On Feb. 6, 2015, board members briefed Frank Kendall III, the Pentagon’s chief weapons-buyer. Kendall’s operations were a major target of the study; he oversaw an empire of purchasing agents and contractors that were constantly under attack from Congress for cost overruns and delays.
Kendall put up a stiff fight. He challenged the board’s data and strenuously objected to the conclusion that his offices were overstaffed.
“Are you trying to tell me we don’t know how to do our job?” he said, according to two participants in the meeting. He said he needed to hire 1,000 more people to work directly under him, not fewer.
“If you don’t believe me, call in an auditor,” replied Klepper, the board’s restructuring expert. “They’ll tell you it’s even worse than this.”
In an interview, Kendall acknowledged he was “very disappointed” by the board’s work, which he criticized as “shallow” and “very low on content.” He said the study had ignored efforts by his agencies to become more efficient, and he accused the board of plucking the $125 billion figure out of thin air.
“It was essentially a ballpark, made-up number,” he said.
Still, Kendall knew that lawmakers might view the study as credible. Alarmed, he said, he went to Work and warned that the findings could “be used as a weapon” against the Pentagon.
“If the impression that’s created is that we’ve got a bunch of money lying around and we’re being lazy and we’re not doing anything to save money, then it’s harder to justify getting budgets that we need,” Kendall said.
More ominously, board members said they started to get the silent treatment from the Pentagon’s highest ranks.
Briefings that had been scheduled for military leaders in the Tank — the secure conference room for the Joint Chiefs of Staff — were canceled. Worse, the board was unable to secure an audience with Carter, the new defense secretary.
Stein, the board chairman, accused Carter of deliberately derailing the plan through inaction. “Unfortunately, Ash — for reasons of his own — stopped this,” he said in an interview.
Peter Cook, a spokesman for Carter, said the Pentagon chief was busy dealing with “a long list of national security challenges.” He added that Work and other senior officials had already “concluded that the report, while well-intentioned, had limited value.”
The fatal blow was struck in April. Just three months after Stein had been reappointed as board chairman, Carter replaced him with Michael Bayer, a business consultant who had previously served on the panel and clashed with Stein. Bayer declined to comment.
A few weeks later, Klepper resigned from the board. The $125 billion savings plan was dead.
In an interview, Tillotson, the Pentagon’s acting deputy chief management officer, called the board’s recommendations too ambitious and aggressive. “They, perhaps, underestimated the degree of difficulty we have in doing something that in the commercial sector would seem to be very easy to do.”
Yet he acknowledged that its overall strategy for scaling back the bureaucracy was sound and that, given more time, it would be possible to realize huge savings.
“If we had a longer timeline, yes, it would be a reasonable approach,” he said. “You might get there eventually.”
Ending the debate
Frustration, however, persisted in some corners over the Pentagon’s unwillingness to tackle the inefficiency and waste documented by the study.
On June 2, 2015, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus delivered a speech at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank. He complained that 20 percent of the defense budget went to the Fourth Estate — the defense agencies that provide support to the armed forces — and called it “pure overhead.”
Navy Secretary Ray Mabus takes his seat to testify to the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2016. (Kevin Lamarque /Reuters)
He singled out the Defense Finance and Accounting Service and the Defense Logistics Agency, which together employ about 40,000 people, as egregious examples.
When a reporter in the audience asked whether he thought the agencies should be abolished, Mabus resisted the temptation to say yes.
“Nice try on getting me into deep trouble,” he replied.
But trouble arrived in Mabus’s email the next day.
“Ray, before you publicly trash one of the agencies that reports through me I’d really appreciate a chance to discuss it with you,” wrote Kendall, the Pentagon’s chief weapons-buyer, whose management portfolio included the Defense Logistics Agency.
He said that if Mabus had a complaint, he should raise it directly with their mutual bosses, Carter and Work, and copied the email to both.
In his interview with The Post, Kendall said he was “completely blindsided” by the Navy secretary’s criticism, “so I sent him what I thought under the circumstances was a pretty polite note.”
Mabus did not back down. In an emailed retort to Kendall, he referred to the ill-fated Defense Business Board study.
“I did not say anything yesterday that I have not said both publicly . . . and privately inside this building,” he said. “There have been numerous studies, which I am sure you are aware of, pointing out excessive overhead.”
That prompted a stern intervention from Work.
“Ray, please refrain from taking any more public pot shots,” Work said in an email. “I do not want this spilling over into further public discourse.”
When President Obama called on the U.S. military to shift its focus to Asia earlier this year, Andrew Marshall, a 91-year-old futurist, had a vision of what to do.
Marshall’s small office in the Pentagon has spent the past two
decades planning for a war against an angry, aggressive and heavily
armed China.
No one had any idea how the war would start. But the
American response, laid out in a concept that one of Marshall’s
longtime proteges dubbed “Air-Sea Battle,” was clear.
Stealthy
American bombers and submarines would knock out China’s long-range
surveillance radar and precision missile systems located deep inside the
country. The initial “blinding campaign” would be followed by a larger
air and naval assault.
The concept, the details of which are
classified, has angered the Chinese military and has been pilloried by
some Army and Marine Corps officers as excessively expensive. Some Asia
analysts worry that conventional strikes aimed at China could spark a
nuclear war.
Air-Sea Battle drew little attention when U.S. troops were fighting and dying in large numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Now the military’s decade of battling insurgencies is ending, defense
budgets are being cut, and top military officials, ordered to pivot
toward Asia, are looking to Marshall’s office for ideas.
In recent
months, the Air Force and Navy have come up with more than 200
initiatives they say they need to realize Air-Sea Battle. The list
emerged, in part, from war games conducted by Marshall’s office and
includes new weaponry and proposals to deepen cooperation between the
Navy and the Air Force.
A former nuclear strategist, Marshall has
spent the past 40 years running the Pentagon’s Office of Net
Assessment, searching for potential threats to American dominance. In
the process, he has built a network of allies in Congress, in the
defense industry, at think tanks and at the Pentagon that amounts to a
permanent Washington bureaucracy.
While Marshall’s backers praise
his office as a place where officials take the long view, ignoring
passing Pentagon fads, critics see a dangerous tendency toward alarmism
that is exaggerating the China threat to drive up defense spending.
“The
old joke about the Office of Net Assessment is that it should be called
the Office of Threat Inflation,” said Barry Posen, director of the MIT
Security Studies Program. “They go well beyond exploring the worst
cases. . . . They convince others to act as if the worst cases are
inevitable.”
Marshall dismisses criticism that his office focuses
too much on China as a future enemy, saying it is the Pentagon’s job to
ponder worst-case scenarios.
“We tend to look at not very happy futures,” he said in a recent interview. China tensions
Even as it has embraced Air-Sea Battle, the Pentagon has
struggled to explain it without inflaming already tense relations with
China. The result has been an information vacuum that has sown confusion
and controversy.
Senior Chinese military officials warn that the Pentagon’s new effort could spark an arms race.
“If
the U.S. military develops Air-Sea Battle to deal with the [People’s
Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to develop anti-Air-Sea
Battle,” one officer, Col. Gaoyue Fan, said last year in a debate
sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a
defense think tank.
Pentagon officials counter that the concept is focused solely on defeating precision missile systems.
“It’s not about a specific actor,” a senior defense official told reporters last year. “It is not about a specific regime.”
The
heads of the Air Force and Navy, meanwhile, have maintained that
Air-Sea Battle has applications even beyond combat. The concept could
help the military reach melting ice caps in the Arctic Circle or a
melted-down nuclear reactor in Japan, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, the U.S.
chief of naval operations, said in May at the Brookings Institution.
At
the same event, Gen. Norton Schwartz, the Air Force chief, upbraided a
retired Marine colonel who asked how Air-Sea Battle might be employed in
a war with China.
“This inclination to narrow down on a particular scenario is unhelpful,” Schwartz said.
Privately,
senior Pentagon officials concede that Air-Sea Battle’s goal is to help
U.S. forces weather an initial Chinese assault and counterattack to
destroy sophisticated radar and missile systems built to keep U.S. ships
away from China’s coastline.
Their concern is fueled by the
steady growth in China’s defense spending, which has increased to as
much as $180 billion a year, or about one-third of the Pentagon’s
budget, and China’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.
“We
want to put enough uncertainty in the minds of Chinese military
planners that they would not want to take us on,” said a senior Navy
official overseeing the service’s modernization efforts. “Air-Sea Battle
is all about convincing the Chinese that we will win this competition.”
Like others quoted in this article, the official spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. A military tech ‘revolution’
Air-Sea Battle grew out of Marshall’s fervent belief, dating to
the 1980s, that technological advancements were on the verge of ushering
in a new epoch of war.
New information technology allowed
militaries to fire within seconds of finding the enemy. Better precision
bombs guaranteed that the Americans could hit their targets almost
every time. Together these advances could give conventional bombs almost
the same power as small nuclear weapons, Marshall surmised.
Marshall
asked his military assistant, a bright officer with a Harvard
doctorate, to draft a series of papers on the coming “revolution in
military affairs.” The work captured the interest of dozens of generals
and several defense secretaries.
Eventually, senior military
leaders, consumed by bloody, low-tech wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
seemed to forget about Marshall’s revolution. Marshall, meanwhile,
zeroed in on China as the country most likely to exploit the revolution
in military affairs and supplant the United States’ position as the
world’s sole superpower.
In recent years, as the growth of China’s
military has outpaced most U.S. intelligence projections, interest in
China as a potential rival to the United States has soared.
“In
the blink of an eye, people have come to take very seriously the China
threat,” said Andrew Hoehn, a senior vice president at Rand Corp.
“They’ve made very rapid progress.”
Most of Marshall’s writings
over the past four decades are classified. He almost never speaks in
public and even in private meetings is known for his long stretches of
silence.
His influence grows largely out of his study budget,
which in recent years has floated between $13 million and $19 million
and is frequently allocated to think tanks, defense consultants and
academics with close ties to his office. More than half the money
typically goes to six firms.
Among the largest recipients is the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a defense think tank run
by retired Lt. Col. Andrew Krepinevich, the Harvard graduate who wrote
the first papers for Marshall on the revolution in military affairs.
In
the past 15 years, CSBA has run more than two dozen China war games for
Marshall’s office and written dozens of studies. The think tank
typically collects about $2.75 million to $3 million a year, about
40 percent of its annual revenue, from Marshall’s office, according to
Pentagon statistics and CSBA’s most recent financial filings.
Krepinevich
makes about $865,000 in salary and benefits, or almost double the
compensation paid out to the heads of other nonpartisan think tanks such
as the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Brookings
Institution. CSBA said its board sets executive compensation based on a
review of salaries at other organizations doing similar work.
The
war games run by CSBA are set 20 years in the future and cast China as a
hegemonic and aggressive enemy. Guided anti-ship missiles sink U.S.
aircraft carriers and other surface ships. Simultaneous Chinese strikes
destroy American air bases, making it impossible for the U.S. military
to launch its fighter jets. The outnumbered American force fights back
with conventional strikes on China’s mainland, knocking out long-range
precision missiles and radar.
“The fundamental problem is the same
one that the Soviets identified 30 years ago,” Krepinevich said in an
interview. “If you can see deep and shoot deep with a high degree of
accuracy, our large bases are not sanctuaries. They are targets.”
Some critics doubt that China, which owns $1.6 trillion in U.S. debt and
depends heavily on the American economy, would strike U.S. forces out
of the blue.
“It is absolutely fraudulent,” said Jonathan D.
Pollack, a senior fellow at Brookings. “What is the imaginable context
or scenario for this attack?”
Other defense analysts warn that an
assault on the Chinese mainland carries potentially catastrophic risks
and could quickly escalate to nuclear armageddon.
The war games
elided these concerns. Instead they focused on how U.S. forces would
weather the initial Chinese missile salvo and attack.
To survive,
allied commanders dispersed their planes to austere airfields on the
Pacific islands of Tinian and Palau. They built bomb-resistant aircraft
shelters and brought in rapid runway repair kits to fix damaged
airstrips.
Stealthy bombers and quiet submarines waged a counterattack. The allied approach became the basis for the Air-Sea Battle. Think tank’s paper
Although the Pentagon has struggled to talk publicly about
Air-Sea Battle, CSBA has not been similarly restrained. In 2010, it
published a 125-page paper outlining how the concept could be used to
fight a war with China.
The paper contains less detail than the
classified Pentagon version. Shortly after its publication, U.S. allies
in Asia, frustrated by the Pentagon’s silence on the subject, began
looking to CSBA for answers.
“We started to get a parade of senior
people, particularly from Japan, though also Taiwan and to a lesser
extent China, saying, ‘So, this is what Air-Sea Battle is,’ ”
Krepinevich said this year at an event at another think tank.
Soon, U.S. officials began to hear complaints.
“The PLA went nuts,” said a U.S. official who recently returned from Beijing.
Told
that Air-Sea Battle was not aimed at China, one PLA general replied
that the CSBA report mentioned the PLA 190 times, the official said.
(The actual count is closer to 400.)
Inside the Pentagon, the Army
and Marine Corps have mounted offensives against the concept, which
could lead to less spending on ground combat.
An internal
assessment, prepared for the Marine Corps commandant and obtained by The
Washington Post, warns that “an Air-Sea Battle-focused Navy and Air
Force would be preposterously expensive to build in peace time” and
would result in “incalculable human and economic destruction” if ever
used in a major war with China.
The concept, however, aligns with
Obama’s broader effort to shift the U.S. military’s focus toward Asia
and provides a framework for preserving some of the Pentagon’s most
sophisticated weapons programs, many of which have strong backing in
Congress.
Sens. Joseph I. Lieberman (I-Conn.) and John Cornyn (R-Tex.)
inserted language into the 2012 Defense Authorization bill requiring
the Pentagon to issue a report this year detailing its plans for
implementing the concept. The legislation orders the Pentagon to explain
what weapons systems it will need to carry out Air-Sea Battle, its
timeline for implementing the concept and an estimate of the costs
associated with it.
Lieberman and Cornyn’s staff turned to an unsurprising source when drafting the questions.
“We asked CSBA for help,” one of the staffers said. “In a lot of ways, they created it.”