Os ciclos economicos nos EUA: uma recessao a cada sete meses - Heather Boushey (Brookings)

Recession ready: Fiscal policies to stabilize the American economy

Heather Boushey

Brookings Institution, Thursday, May 16, 2019

Introduction

A constant in the history of economics is that countries encounter recessions. Since World War II, the U.S. economy has been in a recession for about one of every seven months and for at least one month in roughly one-third of the years over that period. Recessions have many causes—financial markets crashing, monetary policy tightening, consumers cutting spending, firms lowering investment, oil prices shifting—but at some point, economic expansions end and the economy begins to contract.

This volume lays out a set of changes to fiscal programs to improve the policy response to a recession in the United States. It starts from three main premises, which are described in more detail in the following chapter:

1. First, recessions are costly. Individuals lose jobs and income. The economy wastes resources and can sometimes even face a permanently lower output path.
2. Second, fiscal policy is an effective aspect of the government’s part of a response to a recession. Expansionary fiscal policy can increase output; it can increase the utilization of resources; and in particular, when monetary policy has reduced interest rates to zero, it can meaningfully shift the economy’s trajectory upwards.
3. Third, increasing the automatic nature of fiscal policy would be helpful. Increasing spending quickly could lead to a shallower and shorter recession.

Using evidence-based automatic “triggers” to alter the course of spending would be a more-effective way to deliver stimulus to the economy than waiting for policymakers to act. Such well-crafted automatic stabilizers are the best way to deliver fiscal stimulus in a timely, targeted, and temporary way. There will likely still be a need for discretionary policy; but by automating certain parts of the response, the United States can improve its macroeconomic outcomes.

The first chapter lays out the case for automatic stabilizers in detail. An important point is that we have sufficient data to discern when a recession is starting in real time, which is a solid foundation for implementing automatic stabilizers. Some stabilizers respond as underlying fundamentals shift—for example, regular unemployment insurance spending rises as more workers lose their jobs, so policymakers do not need to switch on this policy. But one can also tell when a recession is unfolding and more-robust measures are necessary—such as extended unemployment benefits. The policy rule articulated by Claudia Sahm in this volume would generally go into effect within a few months of the start of a recession. A rule like this is both quite timely and far more effective at signaling recessions than other metrics. In a subsequent chapter, Matt Fiedler, Jason Furman, and Wilson Powell III suggest triggers that could be used at the state level as well.

Although automatic stabilizers do exist, they are relatively small in the United States compared with those in other countries. At the same time, there have been frequent discretionary policy changes made in the face of economic downturns to push more money into the economy via tax cuts, direct payments, or increased spending. In the second chapter of this volume, Louise Sheiner and Michael Ng highlight the extent of the U.S. budget’s cyclicality over time. Whereas federal taxes provide a substantial amount of automatic stabilization—and discretionary federal policy is also strongly countercyclical—state and local fiscal policy is slightly procyclical.

The remaining six chapters of the book make concrete proposals for adjusting U.S. fiscal policy to expand the implementation of automatic stabilizers and make them more effective. The first two proposals entail creating new policies that are based on evidence from discretionary policies used in prior recessions. Both aim to avoid damaging contractionary responses to recessions, first on the part of households, and second on the part of state governments.

In the third chapter, Claudia Sahm suggests making an automatic direct payment to qualified households during economic downturns. Such payments have been used before in a variety of ways, through either temporary tax cuts or direct payments, but not in an automated fashion. Sahm demonstrates the effectiveness of such programs and shows how an automated set of payments could have been made earlier and more predictably than discretionary payments in the past. Given the large share of consumption in the U.S. economy and the propensity for consumption to fall during a recession, such a policy could be an important way to combat any sizable fall in demand in the economy.

In the fourth chapter, Matt Fiedler, Jason Furman, and Wilson Powell III suggest a way to provide funds to states to avoid sharp, procyclical cutbacks at the state and local levels. During a recession, the federal government is in principle able to counteract declines in economic activity by increasing spending, even while revenues decline—making up the difference with additional borrowing. However, a large portion of U.S. public spending occurs at the state and local levels, where borrowing is much more difficult and declines in tax revenues generally lead to declines in spending. Fiedler, Furman, and Powell address this concern in the context of Federal Medical Assistance Percentage formula funds, which were adjusted during the Great Recession and could be automatically adjusted to provide state-level fiscal support during future recessions.

There are also several current programs that could be adjusted to improve their effectiveness as automatic stabilizers. In the fifth chapter, Andrew Haughwout proposes setting up and maintaining a list of potential transportation infrastructure projects whose funding could be ramped up during downturns. Though Congress has often used transportation infrastructure as a method to generate spending during a downturn, this process could instead be automated by changing the spending rules for the BUILD program (formerly the TIGER grant program) so that the federal government would fund more projects during downturns and fewer during a boom. Because BUILD is constantly awarding funds, states would have projects ready to be funded and would be familiar with the funding stream, allowing for timely spending.

The programs that make up the social safety net constitute an important set of automatic stabilizers in the current U.S. policy mix. Because these programs provide resources to people with little or no income, the need for the benefits they provide rises along with the unemployment rate. As currently implemented, unemployment benefit spending and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program) spending automatically rise as more people are unemployed or as their incomes fall. These programs, along with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)—which is currently capped in nominal dollars by federal law—could be restructured in ways that would help them accomplish their core goals and serve as better stabilizers for the economy.

The unemployment insurance (UI) system is a core part of the U.S. response to both individual employment loss and overall labor market disruptions. By insuring workers against job loss, UI partially protects them from important risks while also mitigating the decline in consumption that occurs during a recession. In the sixth chapter, Gabriel Chodorow-Reich and John Coglianese propose changes to improve the take-up of UI, increase its benefits during recessions, and make its extended benefit formulas more responsive to changes in the labor market. These changes would enhance the already sizable role that UI plays in stabilization policy.

After federal welfare reform of 1996, the federal program that provides cash to families in need was block-granted, and funds were capped at their 1997 level. The newly created TANF program included a small emergency fund, which has been insufficient to allow TANF to function as needed for families or provide any cushion to the economy in a downturn. In the seventh chapter, Indivar Dutta-Gupta suggests shifting the structure of TANF so that it can expand in downturns as need rises and thus play a countercyclical role both for households and the economy. He also reviews the experience of TANF job subsidies enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and proposes expanding this approach, explaining how employment subsidies can play an important role as part of an overall policy response to economic downturns.

SNAP is the nation’s most-important food support program—and it is also an automatic stabilizer that supports the economy during downturns. In the eighth chapter, Hilary Hoynes and Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach propose reforms to SNAP that would make it a more-effective automatic stabilizer and increase its ability to protect families during downturns. In particular, they focus on ensuring that families in need of food support are not tied to work requirements that may be impossible to meet in an economic downturn; they also suggest increasing SNAP benefits during a recession.

Overall, this set of proposals builds on the best available evidence and analysis. They use programs that have been effective parts of U.S. fiscal policy and have either been an important part of discretionary or automatic spending in prior downturns. The proposals suggest a clear path toward improved automatic stabilizers for the U.S. economy. These programs already exist or have been pursued in the past, suggesting they are feasible and realistic. Though these policies could be implemented separately, there is an advantage in thinking of them as a package. As described in the first chapter, these policies would affect the economy at different points in time, would assist different types of households, and would address differences in economic conditions across places.

Direct payments are fast and can be executed on a large scale, but are not targeted to struggling regions or households. Likewise, though payments to states can stabilize their budgets, they do not necessarily help individuals who have lost their job or lift consumption. Transportation spending is sometimes done over a slightly longer time frame, but this allows continued spending as the economy recovers. Finally, the safety net policies are likely the best targeted, both to individuals and regions, given that their spending rises wherever economic distress is highest. Unemployment insurance is more likely to help middle-income families, while TANF and SNAP are targeted to low-income families. By setting up an array of stabilizers, policymakers can ensure that a wide range of families are supported and that demand in the economy is boosted across a variety of sectors.

Recessions exact a major toll on individuals, families, firms, and budgets throughout the United States. A key aspect of proper macroeconomic policymaking is to minimize losses by responding quickly and effectively to downturns. As discussed in the next chapter, lower interest rates have left the Federal Reserve with less room to cut rates in response to a downturn. This makes it all the more important that policymakers set in place the proper fiscal structures to make sure that fiscal policy plays an active and efficient role in combating recessions.

Economic forecasters rarely correctly call the timing of a recession. Perhaps the one thing they can all agree on, however, is that another economic downturn will come. A crucial part of preparing for the next recession is making sure fiscal policy institutions are ready to provide support when needed to minimize the damage the next recession could do.

Leis de imigracao restritivas nos EUA: prejudicando a economia americana

Broken Borders
Government, Foreign-Born Workers, and the U.S. EconomyBy Benjamin W. Powell, Zachary Gochenour  |  The Independent Institute, September 16, 2013

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The U.S. government interferes with the market for foreign laborers by restricting the number and mix of immigrants and setting tight quantitative limits on foreign-born guest workers. This has created a mismatch between the demand for foreign workers from U.S. businesses and their supply, directly leading to the illegal immigration situation we confront today. The current system inefficiently limits the gains that our economy could achieve from employing larger numbers of foreign workers, and it disproportionately harms small U.S. businesses. The economic fears associated with increased guest workers or immigrants are unfounded. The current Senate immigration reform proposal would be a marginal improvement but does not go far enough. Red Card, an alternative guest worker proposal, would better coordinate labor markets. Ultimately, an immigration market free from government limitations and interference would be the most efficient solution.

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Benjamin Powell is a Senior Fellow at The Independent Institute, Director of the Free Market Institute at Texas Tech University, and former President of the Association of Private Enterprise Education. Dr. Powell received his Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University. He has been Assistant Professor of Economics at San Jose State University, Associate Professor of Economics at Suffolk University, a Fellow with the Mercatus Center's Global Prosperity Initiative, and a Visiting Research Fellow with the American Institute for Economic Research. He is also the editor of the Independent Institute books, Housing America: Building out of Crisis and Making Poor Nations Rich.

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Zachary Gochenour is a Research Fellow at The Independent Institute and a Fellow in the Department of Economics at George Mason University. His articles have been published in such scholarly journals as The Independent Review and The Review of Austrian Economics, and his popular articles have appeared in the Economic Bulletin (American Institute for Economic Research), Reason, and The Conference Board Report.

O FED e as duvidas da economia americana - Rogerio Studart

Sai Summers, ficam as incertezas

Rogerio Studart *

19/09/2013

Como um dos economistas mais influentes na administração Clinton (de quem foi Secretário do Tesouro), Lawrence Summers foi um dos principais defensores do processo de desregulamentação financeira. Este processo por sua vez permitiu os três pilares da crise de 2008: a consolidação acelerada do setor financeiro norte-americano (gerando o problema sistêmico conhecido como “too big to fail”); o desenvolvimento de uma série de instrumentos financeiros (como alguns tipos de derivativos) utilizados basicamente para manobras especulativas; e o crescimento sem precedente da alavancagem e do risco sistêmico.

Já fora do governo, continuou a defender o avanço daquelas inovações e da alavancagem financeiras, mesmo quando os sinais de perigo eram evidentes. Por exemplo, em 2005 na reunião anual de Jackson Hole, dos presidentes dos principais bancos centrais do mundo, Raghuram Rajan (hoje liderando o Banco Central da Índia) demonstrou em um artigo que a existência de produtos financeiros complexos, somada a uma estrutura de remuneração dos principais executivos financeiros, gerava incentivos perversos, que terminavam por engendrar bolhas especulativas e elevados níveis de risco (sistêmico) para toda economia. Com isto, Rajan apresentou uma das mais contundentes evidências de que a liberalização financeira então em curso estaria levando a economia a uma crise de grande escala, com possíveis efeitos catastróficos.  Summers pediu a palavra e, de pé, basicamente desqualificou os argumentos de Rajan, chamando-o por fim de “ludita” – ou seja, um radical que se opõe ao progresso.

Summers é um economista controverso, para dizer o mínimo. Além de seu decisivo apoio a politicas econômicas que se mostraram desastrosas, ele não mede suas palavras, mesmo quando para falar de infundados preconceitos. Por exemplo, ainda como presidente da Universidade de Harvard, fez declarações tidas como sexistas, dentre as quais a de que “a baixa representação de mulheres em ciências exatas e engenharia se devia a uma diferença da habilidade das mulheres nestes campos, e não por razões de discriminação e socialização”.

Apesar disto tudo, sua nomeação ao Fed, o banco central norte-americano, era dada como certa. De fato, Obama tem razões de ser-lhe grato. No começo do seu governo, Summers atuou como um dos seus principais assessores nos programas de salvamento do setor financeiro e nos de estímulo econômico que se seguiram – cujos resultados, frente à profundidade da crise de 2008, são tidos como bons. Mas Obama teria alguma dificuldade de defender o nome de Summers perante o comitê do senado responsável pela nomeação – já que quatro membros, democratas, entre os doze senadores do comitê já haviam se declarado contrários a esta possível nomeação, mesmo antes das audiências protocolares.

Neste último domingo, Larry Summers retirou sua candidatura. A sua saída da disputa é, de certa forma, uma boa notícia. E não somente por suas declarações machistas, o que, a meu ver, já seria por si só uma boa razão para não nomeá-lo. Mas porque ela sinaliza que uma parte da sociedade americana não esqueceu a História recente, e como a visão de Summers sobre economia e sobre política econômica foram desastrosas para esta sociedade – e para o resto do mundo.

A saída da competição de Summers é, portanto, um alívio. Mas, infelizmente ela não é um indicador de como o Fed irá se comportar no futuro próximo, nem muito menos uma garantia de que a História não se repetirá.  No que tange à futura atuação do banco central norte-americano, o debate principal aqui é se se deve ou não dar continuidade à política extremamente expansionista dos últimos cinco anos – o chamado “quantitive easing” (QE). Esta política se iniciou em 2009 com a compra sistemática de ativos financeiros privados de longo prazo (incluindo hipotecas). Esta política gerou pelo menos dois enormes inconvenientes. Por um lado, desde 2008 o balanço das gigantes instituições financeiras privadas engordou quase simetricamente ao crescimento acumulado do passivo do Fed (cerca de US$ 3,7 trilhões). E como houve um processo de consolidação do setor financeiro após a crise, agora estas instituições são ainda maiores e mais concentradas do que antes. Ou seja, nunca o argumento de “too big to fail” foi mais válido: a bancarrota de uma única grande instituição americana poderia mais que nunca gerar processos encadeados de quebra nos Estados Unidos e no mundo.

Por outro lado, o crescimento e consolidação das instituições financeiras privadas têm possibilitado crescentes “voos especulativos” dentro do sistema. Já falamos, na nossa coluna, como alguns destes “pousaram” em economias emergentes, na forma de fluxos de capital excessivos – com todas as suas sequelas desestabilizadoras. Mas, para o debate interno nos EUA, o que mais tem preocupado é a possibilidade que, de novo, se esteja criando uma bolha no mercado acionário, e, especialmente, no mercado imobiliário. Nós todos já vimos este filme antes, e o final não foi feliz.

Tudo isto indicaria que o Fed deveria começar a repensar sua forma de atuação já na sua próxima reunião. Porém há um “detalhe”: apesar da melhora do mercado de trabalho americano, os sinais de recuperação ainda não são tão fortes assim.

Ou seja, o Fed atualmente enfrenta um dilema de difícil solução: se não para o QE, continua a colocar querosene num processo de crescente risco sistêmico que cada vez mais se assemelha à fogueira especulativa que nos levou ao colapso financeiro de 2008. Mas se ele para, ameaça uma ainda frágil retomada da economia americana. Hoje (terça-feira) e amanhã o comitê do Fed se reúne para discutir esta questão. Mas sabemos que qualquer que seja o resultado desta reunião, as incertezas e as dúvidas sobre a atuação do Fed infelizmente continuaram muito depois que o capítulo da sucessão de Bernanke se resolva.

* Professor da UFRJ e Diretor Executivo Adjunto pelo Brasil no Banco Mundial.

As opiniões aqui expressas são pessoais. 

O Imperio ajuda o Brasil (para desgosto de alguns)

O motor americano04 de fevereiro de 2013
Editorial O Estado de S.Paulo

A economia americana cresceu 2,2% no ano passado, segundo o primeiro cálculo oficial divulgado em Washington. Isso é o dobro do crescimento, cerca de 1%, estimado até agora para o Brasil, o menos dinâmico dos Brics e um dos poucos países, em todo o mundo, atolados numa combinação sinistra de estagnação e inflação (5,8%). Além disso, nenhuma outra economia avançada, nem mesmo a alemã, terá tido um desempenho tão bom quanto o americano, se as novas estimativas do Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) estiverem aproximadamente corretas. De acordo com essa revisão, a produção bruta dos países mais desenvolvidos deve ter-se expandido cerca de 1,3% em 2012. No cenário do Fundo, publicado na semana passada, o avanço americano deveria ter chegado a 2,3%. Mas a diferença de 1 ponto de porcentagem é pouco relevante nessa circunstância.

A boa notícia veio acompanhada de um dado negativo. No quarto trimestre, o Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) dos Estados Unidos encolheu em ritmo equivalente a 0,1% ao ano, mas esse recuo foi qualificado como passageiro por analistas experientes. Decorreu em grande parte de uma redução de gastos militares e de uma queda nos investimentos em estoques. A avaliação otimista foi reforçada no dia seguinte, quinta-feira, pela divulgação, em Chicago, do índice de atividade dos gerentes de compras, bem superior ao projetado por economistas do mercado. Essa informação é considerada um bom indicador indireto do ritmo da produção industrial.

Na quarta-feira, o ministro da Fazenda, Guido Mantega, saudou como altamente importante a recuperação lenta, mas aparentemente firme, da produção americana. Afinal, a recuperação da maior economia do mundo é benéfica para todos. Não se sabe se o ministro, antes desse comentário, consultou o líder Luiz Inácio da Silva. O ex-presidente havia-se mostrado muito feliz por chegar ao fim do mandato com o Brasil ainda em crescimento e os Estados Unidos em recessão. Seria um despropósito, exceto em caso de guerra, festejar as dificuldades de qualquer outro país. Mais que um despropósito, seria uma enorme tolice alegrar-se por uma crise no mais importante mercado do mundo. Mas essa tolice ocorreu.

A recuperação dos Estados Unidos é especialmente importante precisamente pela razão apontada pelo ministro da Fazenda. Se a atividade ganhar impulso na maior potência econômica do mundo, haverá efeitos positivos em todos os mercados. O Brasil será com certeza beneficiado, embora o governo petista atribua prioridade estratégica à relação com outros mercados. A reativação americana favorecerá o País pela importação direta de produtos brasileiros e pelo fortalecimento de grandes clientes do Brasil, como a China.

Além do mais, o mercado americano é um dos principais destinos das exportações brasileiras de manufaturados. Em 2012, a indústria manufatureira vendeu aos Estados Unidos produtos no valor de US$ 13,6 bilhões, 14,9% mais que em 2011. Essa receita correspondeu a 50,5% do total vendido àquele mercado. O comércio com os Estados Unidos foi um dos poucos pontos positivos no balanço do ano passado, quando o conjunto das exportações rendeu US$ 242,6 bilhões, 5,3% menos que em 2011.

O FMI projeta para a economia americana uma expansão de 2% em 2013, bem maior que a prevista para o conjunto dos países avançados, 1,4%. Para a zona do euro a estimativa é de mais um ano de contração. O produto regional deve ter encolhido 0,4% em 2012 e deverá diminuir mais 0,2% neste ano. A atividade global dependerá muito dos emergentes, mas com a ajuda, como em 2012, da recuperação americana. O motor da maior economia de novo contribuirá para impulsionar os mercados.

Essa previsão depende, naturalmente, das negociações entre governo e oposição, em Washington, sobre importantes problemas remanescentes. O abismo fiscal foi evitado no começo do ano, mas falta cuidar da elevação do teto da dívida pública e de questões complicadas, como detalhes dos cortes de gastos e o ajuste das contas públicas no médio prazo. O mundo inteiro será afetado por essas discussões.

Divida Publica dos EUA maior do que o PIB: desafios presentes

O que tinha de acontecer aconteceu. Aliás, desde fevereiro último, mas só tomei conhecimento dessa matéria hoje, 1 de maio de 2012.
A dívida pública total do governo dos EUA tinha acabado de ultrapassar o tamanho do PIB, ou seja, o que os americanos devem, a si mesmos, aos estrangeiros que detém títulos da dívida federal -- feita pelo governo da União, excluindo, portanto, os particulares, que devem ter uma dívida maior do que o seu patrimônio, na média -- ultrapassa, por enquanto de pouco, o que os americanos produzem anualmente como riqueza.
Simplesmente ultrapassar não seria talvez o problema, se ela não crescesse a um ritmo três vezes mais rápido do que a produção de riqueza. Como dito na matéria abaixo, nenhum país, aliás nenhuma família, ou pessoa, pode viver tranquilamente devendo mais do que ela ganha, legalmente, como rendimentos, salários, honorários, royalties, etc.
Claro, se você tem uma "tia rica", que lhe paga o seu cartão de crédito, você ainda pode viver, durante certo tempo, gastando mais do que tem, mas isso um dia acaba: a tia rica pode morrer, ou simplesmente deixar de financiá-lo generosamente.
Os europeus, e alguns asiáticos, no pós-guerra, viveram com essa tia rica generosa, que eram os próprios EUA. Depois os EUA encontraram outra "tia rica", espalhada pelo resto do mundo, que eram todos os povos que tinham imensa confiança na economia e no poderio americanos, que viviam à sombra dessa potência -- evitando, assim, de ter de gastar mais com sua própria defesa -- e que não se incomodavam de devolver um pouco dos dólares que ganhavam exportando para os EUA investindo em títulos americanos.
Até hoje, aliás, o esquema funciona assim: os chineses realizam um superávit extraordinário exportando produtos americanos para os EUA, e retribuem com a compra de títulos do Tesouro americano.
A "tia rica" dos EUA ainda é o direito de senhoriagem sobre os dólares que emitem e que espalham abusivamente pelo resto do mundo, empurrando para os outros, portanto, um pouco da sua prodigalidade.
Mas tudo isso um dia acaba.
Americanos, talvez de direita, mas certamente conservadores, no plano fiscal, pretendem um governo limitado, que não construa desastres no futuro, ou seja, para os seus filhos.
Este é o sentido da matéria abaixo...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Debt officially larger than the economy

By Robert Romano

Americans For Limited Government, Feb. 9, 2012.


You can put it in the history books now. That was the day the $15.6 trillion national debt surpassed 100 percent of the $15.4 trillion Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
Based on the latest data by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the economy just grew by $142.2 billion in the first quarter, or an annual rate of 2.2 percent. That compares to data from the U.S. Treasury showing the national debt grew by $359.6 billion at an annual rate of 9.4 percent.
That’s at a rate of $3.95 billion in new debt every day, compared with just $1.56 billion in economic growth. This year, at that rate, it will expand by $1.4 trillion. $14 trillion over the next ten years.
“No nation can long sustain itself when it takes on debt at nearly 5 times the rate its economy grows,” remarked Americans for Limited Government President Bill Wilson.
Wilson noted the tepid 2.2 percent rate in the first quarter came well below the Obama Administration’s rosy projection of 3 percent growth for the year.
“In 2011, they projected 3.1 percent growth and only got 1.8 percent. As their growth projections prove to be way off once again, revenues will fall short of expectations, and the national debt will continue to grow that much faster,” he explained.
That, coupled with foolish administration and congressional policies underfunding the Social Security program by $95 billion this year, explains why there will have to be another vote in Congress to raise the $16.394 trillion debt ceiling.
Ironically, Republican leaders in Congress reportedly were attempting avoid a controversial showdown on the payroll tax issue in an election year. But by voting for the payroll tax deal, they guaranteed the mother of all controversial issues will likely come up this summer in the midst of the heated election battle.
But, this time, Congress will likely just sweep the issue under the rug and pass another gargantuan debt ceiling increase, not demanding any spending cuts or significant in return. After all, they caved last time. All they got was that stupid committee.
Which is just as well, really. Congress has not been able to reduce the debt at all since 1957, despite numerous claims of having “balanced” the budget since then.
Plus, the only way we can even meet our debt obligations right now is with a printing press. The Federal Reserve holds over $1.66 trillion in U.S. treasuries, with hundreds of billions in more purchases guaranteed for the foreseeable future.
That is because we are spending so much that not even financial institutions with unlimited credit lines from the central bank and sovereigns the world over have enough to lend to us. So we have to print in order to fill the gap.
In that context, it is no wonder the U.S. lost its gold-plated Triple-A credit rating with Standard & Poor’s, despite Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s assurances that we would not.
“Absolutely not,” Geithner had said in an interview with ABC News’s “This Week” about the prospect in Feb. 2010, adding, “That will never happen to this country.”
Except it did. The establishment was wrong. Just like it was wrong about the positive effects of trillions of dollars of fiscal and monetary stimulus. Said ALG’s Wilson, “Unemployment is still above 8 percent, which the Administration said would never happen if the ‘stimulus’ was passed. Growth is still quite sluggish, only coming in at 2.2 percent in the first quarter, despite promises of a V-shaped recovery.”
So much for that.
Wilson said the weak economy would hurt Obama’s reelection chances: “[With] almost $4 a gallon for gasoline, food prices once again increasing, home values continuing to drop into a double-dip recession, 1 in 2 recent college graduates cannot find full-time work to pay off hundreds of billions of student loan debt, the election outlook for Obama must look quite gloomy.”
“This is Jimmy Carter all over again — only worse,” Wilson concluded. That’s actually true. When Jimmy Carter was running for reelection, the gross debt was just $907.7 billion or 32.5 percent of the $2.785 trillion GDP.
All of which gives Obama the unique honor of being the most awful president since Carter was run out of town on a rail. Come to think of it, that may not be a bad idea. Voters should consider that before we reach any more depressing milestones that threaten to bankrupt the entire country.

Robert Romano is the Senior Editor of Americans for Limited Government.

Read more at NetRightDaily.com: http://netrightdaily.com/2012/04/debt-officially-larger-than-the-economy/#ixzz1tcVnA5zr

O Federal Reserve pune poupadores e premia devedores...

Inacreditável! O Federal Open Market Committee, do Federal Reserve, vai continuar punindo os poupadores e beneficiando devedores, ao manter a mesma taxa irrealista de juros até o FINAL DE 2014!
Estão supostamente beneficiando a atividade produtiva, mas na verdade acumulando distorções até perder de vista.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

APRIL 25, 2012. 

FEDERAL RESERVE ISSUES FOMC STATEMENT. 

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in March suggests that the economy has been expanding moderately. Labor market conditions have improved in recent months; the unemployment rate has declined but remains elevated. Household spending and business fixed investment have continued to advance. Despite some signs of improvement, the housing sector remains depressed. Inflation has picked up somewhat, mainly reflecting higher prices of crude oil and gasoline. However, longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable. Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects economic growth to remain moderate over coming quarters and then to pick up gradually. Consequently, the Committee anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline gradually toward levels that it judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. Strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. The increase in oil and gasoline prices earlier this year is expected to affect inflation only temporarily, and the Committee anticipates that subsequently inflation will run at or below the rate that it judges most consistent with its dual mandate. To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy. In particular, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions--including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run--are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014. The Committee also decided to continue its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in September. The Committee is maintaining its existing policies of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities and of rolling over maturing Treasury securities at auction. The Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability. Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Dennis P. Lockhart; Sandra Pianalto; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Daniel K. Tarullo; John C. Williams; and Janet L. Yellen. Voting against the action was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who does not anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate through late 2014.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120425a.htm

o  APRIL 25, 2012. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AND FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE RELEASE ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FROM THE APRIL 24-25 FOMC MEETING. The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Open Market Committee on Wednesday released the attached table and charts summarizing the economic projections and the target federal funds rate projections made by Federal Reserve Board members and Federal Reserve Bank presidents for the April 24-25 meeting of the Committee. The table will be incorporated into a summary of economic projections released with the minutes of the April 24-25 meeting. Summaries of economic projections are released on an approximately quarterly schedule. ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS OF FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD MEMBERS AND FEDERAL RESERVE BANK PRESIDENTS, APRIL 2012. ADVANCE RELEASE OF TABLE 1 OF THE SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS TO BE RELEASED WITH THE FOMC MINUTES: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcprojtabl20120425.pdf

Quatro licoes de (des)economia, ou seja al reves - Gregory Mankiw

Não, o autor não tomou aulas de deseconomia com o Professor Chávez, que tem seu manual al revés, mas entende do assunto. Tanto porque tem um dos manuais de economia mais lidos do planeta, e conhece os programas dos candidatos, por trabalhar para um deles...

The New York Times, October 22, 2011

Four Nations, Four Lessons

By N. GREGORY MANKIW

AS the economy languishes, politicians and pundits are debating what to do next. When we look around the world, it’s hard to find positive role models. But as we search for answers, it is useful to keep in mind those fates that we would like to avoid.

The recent economic histories of four nations are noteworthy: France, Greece, Japan and Zimbabwe. Each illustrates a kind of policy mistake that could, if we are not careful, presage the future of the United States economy. Think of them as the four horsemen of the economic apocalypse.

Let’s start with Zimbabwe. If there were an award for the world’s worst economic policy, it might well have won it several times over the past decade. In particular, in 2008 and 2009, it experienced truly spectacular hyperinflation. Prices rose so fast that the central bank eventually printed 100 trillion-dollar notes for people to carry. The nation has since abandoned using its own currency, but you can still buy one of those notes as a novelty item for about $5 (American, that is).

Some may find it hard to imagine that the United States would ever go down this route. But reckless money creation is apparently a concern of Gov. Rick Perry of Texas, who is seeking the Republican nomination for president. He suggested in August that it would be “almost treasonous” if Ben S. Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, were to print too much money before the election. Mr. Perry is not alone in his concerns. Many on the right fear that the Fed’s recent policies aimed at fighting high unemployment will mainly serve to ignite excessive inflation.

Mr. Bernanke, however, is less worried about the United States turning into Zimbabwe than he is about it turning into Japan.

Those old enough to remember the 1980s will recall that Japan used to be an up-and-coming economic superpower. Many people then worried (too much, in my view) that Japan’s rapid growth was a threat to prosperity in the United States, in much the same way that many people worry today (too much, in my view) about rapid growth in China.

The concerns about Japanese hegemony came to a quick end after bubbles in the real estate and stock markets burst in the early 1990s. Since then, Japan has struggled to regain its footing. Critics of the Bank of Japan say it has been too focused on quelling phantom inflationary threats and insufficiently concerned about restoring robust economic growth.

One of those critics was Mr. Bernanke, before he became Fed chairman. Watching Japanese timidity and failures has surely made him more willing to experiment with unconventional forms of monetary policy in the aftermath of our own financial crisis.

The economists in the Obama administration are also well aware of the Japanese experience. That is one reason they are pushing for more stimulus spending to prop up the aggregate demand for goods and services.

Yet this fiscal policy comes with its own risks. The more we rely on deficit spending to keep the economy afloat, the more we risk the kind of sovereign debt crisis we have witnessed in Greece over the past year. The Standard & Poor’s downgrade of United States debt over the summer is a portent of what could lie ahead.  In the long run, we have to pay our debts — or face dire consequences.

To be sure, the bond market doesn’t seem particularly worried about the solvency of the federal government. It is still willing to lend to the United States at low rates of interest. But the same thing was true of Greece four years ago. Once the bond market starts changing its mind, the verdict can be swift, and can lead to a vicious circle of rising interest rates, increasing debt service and budget deficits, and falling confidence.

Bond markets are now giving the United States the benefit of the doubt, partly because other nations look even riskier, and partly in the belief that we will, in time, get our fiscal house in order. The big political question is how.

The nation faces a fundamental decision about priorities. To maintain current levels of taxation, we will need to substantially reduce spending on the social safety net, including Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and the new health care program sometimes called Obamacare. Alternatively, we can preserve the current social safety net and raise taxes substantially to pay for it. Or we may choose a combination of spending cuts and tax increases. This brings us to the last of our cautionary tales: France.

Here are two facts about the French economy. First, gross domestic product per capita in France is 29 percent less than it is in the United States, in large part because the French work many fewer hours over their lifetimes than Americans do. Second, the French are taxed more than Americans. In 2009, taxes were 24 percent of G.D.P. in the United States but 42 percent in France.

Economists debate whether higher taxation in France and other European nations is the cause of the reduced work effort and incomes there. Perhaps it is something else entirely — a certain joie de vivre that escapes the nose-to-the-grindstone American culture.

We may soon be running a natural experiment to find out. If American policy makers don’t rein in entitlement spending over the next several decades, they will have little choice but to raise taxes close to European levels. We can then see whether the next generation of Americans spends less time at work earning a living and more time sipping espresso in outdoor cafes.

N. Gregory Mankiw is a professor of economics at Harvard. He is advising Mitt Romney, the former governor of Massachusetts, in the campaign for the Republican presidential nomination.