A nova geopolítica mundial: multipolaridade ou visão binária do mundo? - Três artigos para reflexão: Daron Acemoglu, Alexander Vindman, Chris Megerian e Elis Stockhols

 Project Syndicate, Praga – 4.12.2010

The Case for a Quadripolar World

According to the conventional wisdom, the twenty-first century will be characterized by the global shift from American hegemony to Sino-American rivalry. But a bipolar international order is neither inevitable nor desirable, and we should start imagining and working toward alternative arrangements.

Daron Acemoglu

 

Cambridge - Having diminished America’s global role while refusing to accept China’s growing clout, Donald Trump’s presidency represents the last gasp of a unipolar epoch. But while many assume that the unipolar post-Cold War world is giving way to a bipolar international order dominated by the United States and China, that outcome is neither inevitable nor desirable. Instead, there is every reason to hope for, and work toward, a world in which Europe and the emerging economies play a more assertive role.

To be sure, as the world’s most economically successful autocracy, China has already achieved significant geopolitical influence in Asia and beyond. During the two most recent global crises – the 2008 financial collapse and today’s pandemic – the Communist Party of China quickly adjusted the country’s political economy in response to changing circumstances, thereby solidifying its grip on power. Because countries that do not want to toe the US line now routinely turn to China for inspiration and, often, material support, what could be more natural than China emerging as one of the two poles of global power?

In fact, a bipolar world would be deeply unstable. Its emergence would heighten the risk of violent conflict (according to the logic of the Thucydides Trap), and its consolidation would make solutions to global problems wholly dependent on the national interests of the two reigning powers. Three of the biggest challenges facing humanity would either be ignored or made worse.

The first challenge is the concentrated power of Big Tech.While technology is often presented as a key front in the US-China conflict, there is considerable congruence between the two countries. Both are committed to the pursuit of algorithmic dominance over humans, whereby digital platforms and artificial intelligence (AI) are used as tools by the government and corporations for surveilling and controlling the citizenry.

There are differences, of course. Whereas the US government has adopted Big Tech’s own vision and become subservient to the industry, Chinese tech giants remain at the mercy of the government and must abide by its agenda. For example, recent research shows how local governments’ demand for surveillance technologies shapes Chinese AI creators’ research and development. In any case, neither country is likely to strengthen privacy standards and other protections for ordinary people, much less redirect the trajectory of AI research so that its benefits are unambiguous and widely shared.

Likewise, advocacy for human rights and democracy would be a low priority in a bipolar world. With repression in China growing, the US may appear by comparison to remain an exemplar of these values. But America’s principled commitment to democracy and human rights is thin and generally not taken seriously abroad. After all, the US has overthrown democratically elected but insufficiently friendly governments in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. And when it has supported democracy in places like Ukraine, it has generally had an ulterior motive, such as the desire to counter or weaken Russia.

The third big issue likely to receive short shrift in a Sino-American bipolar world is climate change. In recent years, China has appeared more supportive of international agreements aimed at reducing greenhouse-gas emissions than the US has. But the two superpowers are not just the world’s two biggest emitters; they also are both beholden to energy-intensive economic models. China will remain dependent on manufacturing growth, while consumers and growth industries (like cloud computing) will sustain high demand for energy in the US. And one can expect that both sides’ short-term interest in economic supremacy will trump everyone else’s interest in a swift green transition.

All of these problems would be more likely to be addressed in a world with two additional poles, represented by the European Union and a consortium of emerging economies, perhaps within a new organization – an “E10” – comprising Mexico, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, South Africa, and others.Such a quadripolar world would be less conducive to a new cold war, and it would bring more diverse voices to global governance.

For its part, the EU has already emerged as a standard-bearer for privacy protection and regulation of Big Tech, and it is well positioned to push back against algorithmic automation. Even though it is US and Chinese companies that largely drive concerns about privacy, consumer manipulation, and labor-replacing AI, the European market is so large and important that it can tilt the playing field globally.

But a strategic pole that speaks for emerging economies may be even more consequential. If AI continues to displace humans in the workplace, emerging economies will be the biggest losers, because their comparative advantage is abundant human labor. With automation already cutting into the supply of jobs that had previously been offshored to these economies, it is critical that they have a voice in global debates that will determine how new technologies are designed and deployed.

Europe and the emerging world also can form a powerful constituency against fossil-fuel emissions. While the EU has become a world leader in decarbonization, emerging economies have an acute interest in climate action, because they will suffer disproportionately from global warming (despite having contributed the least to the problem).

To be sure, a quadripolar world would not be a panacea. With a wider array of voices and the possibility for more opportunistic coalitions, it would be much more difficult to manage than was the unipolar world of the recent past. With Brazil, Mexico, India, and Turkey all now led by authoritarians intent on silencing their opponents, independent media, and civil-society groups, Europe inevitably would find itself at odds with this bloc when it comes to human rights and democracy.

Yet, even here, a quadripolar world would offer more hope than the bipolar alternative. Bringing these countries to the international table might make them more willing to countenance opposition at home. Moreover, emerging economies can cooperate as a united front only if they abandon their most authoritarian, nationalistic, and destructive behavior. Ushering in a quadripolar world may thus yield unexpected dividends.

 

Daron Acemoglu, Professor of Economics at MIT, is co-author (with James A. Robinson) of Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty and The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty.

 

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Los Angeles Times – 8.12.2020

Biden faces a changed world from when he last held power, and not for the better

Chris Megerian and Elis Stockhols

 

When Joe Biden left the vice president’s office four years ago, the United States was a champion of the Paris climate accord, the architect of the multinational Iran nuclear deal and the leader of a 12-nation free-trade pact in the Pacific Rim region intended to limit China’s growing influence.

None of those things is true anymore as he prepares to be inaugurated as commander in chief next month.

Even as he will be preoccupied by the deadly coronavirus crisis at home, Biden faces a daunting array of global challenges, frayed alliances and emboldened adversaries. And he must confront these issues even as the country he’s set to lead has increasingly become skeptical of interventionism and a robust leadership role internationally — especially after President Trump’s inward-looking “America first” approach.

“As much as there are a lot of people who just want to say, ‘We’re back,’ you can’t erase the last four years. And we’ve been heading in this direction for a long time,” said Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, a global risk assessment firm. “Everything Trump represents is symptomatic of something deeper in the American body politic.”

Biden, who will represent a sharp break from Trump’s caustic presence on the world stage, is likely to enjoy something of a honeymoon with transatlantic allies, eager as they are for the United States to return to its traditional role as a pillar of the international democratic order. And his preexisting relationships with many leaders — as senator, vice president and the longest-tenured U.S. member of the 57-year-old Munich Security Conference, where he spoke last year — will help to soothe the jangled nerves of those from Ottawa to Berlin to Seoul.

Even so, some allies have expressed a resigned determination to continue relying less on Washington, as they were forced to do under Trump. And repairing the diplomatic achievements that Trump abandoned won’t be easy.

Sanctions on Iran and tariffs on imports from China, two key pieces of the current president’s agenda, could remain in place as Biden plots his own strategy and seeks new negotiations. Moreover, having opposed troop surges in Afghanistan over a decade ago, Biden may opt not to reverse Trump’s troop drawdown to bring that 19-year-old war to a close.

The president-elect’s team, many of them veterans like him of the Obama administration, knows the pieces won’t fit together the same as before.

“This is not about going back to the world as it was,” said Antony Blinken, Biden’s choice for secretary of State, in an interview earlier this year. “It’s about dealing with the major transformations we’ve seen since — in power among nations, the diffusion of power away from states and the cratering of trust of governance within them. Your policies have to account for that.”

Some of the most drastic changes have occurred in the Middle East. In 2018, Trump withdrew from the multilateral deal the United States had brokered three years before with Iran, European allies, Russia and China, under which Iran agreed to greatly limit its nuclear program through 2025.

Instead of diplomacy, Trump pursued a “maximum pressure” campaign to squeeze Tehran with sanctions, and he ordered the killing of Qassem Suleimani, the powerful Iranian general who died in a U.S. drone strike Jan. 3. The heightened tensions have emboldened hard-liners within Iran, a barrier to getting the country’s leaders back to the negotiating table.

 “It’s very unrealistic to talk about just rejoining an agreement that was crafted in 2015,” said Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at the left-leaning Center for American Progress. “That was then, this was now.”

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, his country’s longest-serving leader, could remain an obstacle as well. He opposed the Iran nuclear deal and now opposes revisiting it.

“When Arabs and Israelis agree on something, I think it’s critical to pay attention,” Netanyahu said in an interview Thursday with the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank. “We’re in this region, we know it very well.”

Iran is now closer to a nuclear weapon than when Trump took office. Its “breakout time” — an estimate of how long it would take Tehran to build a bomb — has dropped from one year to a few months.

The challenge hasn’t deterred Biden from his plan to revisit the Iran nuclear deal. “It’s going to be hard, but yeah,” he told Thomas Friedman, a New York Times columnist, in a recent interview.

European allies may be more eager to collaborate with the new administration in containing China, given its growing economic might and increasing assertiveness abroad.

 “The best China strategy, I think, is one which gets every one of our — or at least what used to be our — allies on the same page,” Biden told Friedman. “It’s going to be a major priority for me in the opening weeks of my presidency to try to get us back on the same page with our allies.”

Jake Sullivan, the incoming national security advisor, is considering expanding the China team inside the White House National Security Council, to underscore that the issue is a foreign policy priority and that Biden wants to work with allies, according to a person close to the president-elect’s team. Also, because the White House advisors, like Sullivan, would not require Senate approval, Biden could avoid confirmation fights with Republicans who might control the chamber when he takes office.

Hammering out his own trade strategy will prove complicated. Obama was pushing to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the free-trade agreement that would have linked the United States with other Pacific-fronting countries while leaving out China. The deal was on life support, however, even before Trump took office because of opposition from some Democrats and unions as well as Republicans.

Now China has reached its own trade deal, called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, with many of those same countries, leaving the United States on the sidelines.

 “It strengthens the continued growth of an Asian supply chain in which China is the hub. It poses a real challenge to the United States,” said Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Another shared — and even more immediate — global priority is addressing the ongoing pandemic. Distributing newly approved vaccines will require coordination among countries in the near term, and cooperation in the longer term to stabilize markets and mitigate broad economic fallout. The crisis provides an opportunity for Biden to rebuild relationships, but it could also prevent the 78-year-old president-elect from making a symbolic visit to Europe early on.

Rejoining the Paris climate accord will be among the easiest steps. All he needs to do is submit paperwork — something he’s pledged to do shortly after he is inaugurated, possibly on his first day— and wait a month to rejoin.

The challenge will be showing the rest of the world that the United States can make progress on global warming, said Robert Stavins, who leads the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements.

Each signatory to the Paris deal must submit “nationally determined contributions,” which are the country’s plans for meeting certain targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Putting together a credible plan will be difficult, Stavins said, because of domestic political opposition in Congress.

“It’s not just conservative Republicans,” he said. “It’s moderate Democrats and Democrats from coal states. So true climate legislation will be extremely difficult.”

Obama sought emissions reductions through regulations, such as his Clean Power Plan and stricter fuel-efficiency standards for cars. That may be more difficult now that Trump’s administration has been unraveling those policies and stocking the federal judiciary with more conservative, anti-regulatory judges who could prove to be an obstacle.

Biden chose John F. Kerry, his former Senate colleague who was Obama’s secretary of State when the Paris accord was signed in 2015, to lead international efforts on climate change. 

 

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Foreign Affairs, Nova York – 8.12.2020

The United States Must Marshal the “Free World”

Together, Democracies Can Counter the Authoritarian Threat

Alexander Vindman

 

At noon on January 20, 2021, Joseph R. Biden will be sworn in as the 46th president of the United States. He will confront a daunting domestic agenda: the legacy of outgoing President Donald Trump will include a rampant pandemic and a host of unresolved social, cultural, ideological, economic, and administrative problems. Having committed himself to being the president of all Americans, Biden will need to contend with the grievances of millions who did not support him and who even question the legitimacy of his election. These domestic concerns will understandably consume the preponderance of the president’s time and energy.

But Biden’s de facto leadership of the “free world” beyond the United States’ borders will be equally important. China, Russia, and other authoritarian states, which have long seen democracy as an existential threat, are on the offensive, deploying all means of statecraft—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to advance their ends. The “un-free” world seeks to undermine international norms, Western liberal values, and democracy itself in order to enable the ascendancy of autocratic governments and permit their exercise of raw power. Biden will need to marshal the very strengths that define democratic government if he is to both mend domestic wounds and temper the threats that face democracies globally.

 

RIVAL GREAT POWERS

 

For two decades, a distracted United States neglected the reemergence of great-power competition, and China and Russia reaped the benefits.During its moment of unipolarity, the United States narrowly focused much of its energies on the Middle East and on immediate concerns, to the exclusion of emerging and long-term national security interests. China took advantage of the United States’ distraction and effectively marshaled its strengths to surge in power at a moment when the United States should have held the edge.

Under Trump, the United States disengaged from global affairs, and China and Russia took advantage of its absence to act with impunity and accelerate China’s climb toward preeminence. If the United States further retrenches or shifts to such strategies as offshore balancing, a void will expand that autocratic states will fill.

For decades, Russia has been using the well-honed tools of the Soviet security apparatus to assault democracies. Inside the United States, Russia has unleashed information warfare to exploit divisions and magnify inequities. In Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, Russia is even less constrained and draws on a broader array of tools. There, the Kremlin attacks democratic values not only through illicit financial and organized crime networks and information and cyberwarfare but also with energy coercion, assassinations, and military force. In this zero-sum game, Russia’s objective is simple: magnify discord, divide societies, and weaken democratic institutions in order to subdue opponents and thereby shift power to Russia.

China, as the world’s most populous nation and its second-largest economy, poses an even more potent and pernicious threat to the United States than Russia does. The Chinese Communist Party’s “hide and bide” doctrine helped mask the danger until recently. Like Russia, China uses statecraft and malign influence to advance its interests and undermine democracies. More menacing, however, is its use of economic coercion against the United States and its closest allies. China has seized on the inequities of globalization and the perceived failure of the U.S.-led international financial system effectively to market the notion that state-led capitalism provides the better path to economic prosperity. China’s success in modeling an alternative, authoritarian, state-commanded capitalist system bolsters autocrats and lures some forces within struggling democracies.

Although there is no clear consensus as to whether China and Russia are collaborating to undermine democracies or simply advancing their independent interests, their common efforts are bearing fruit. During the Trump administration, nationalist populist movements blossomed globally, while many democracies backslid. The United States did not respond to these trends, but authoritarian states did—with support. Under a new administration, the United States must organize a concerted effort, by democracies and for democracies, to counter the rise of illiberalism and authoritarianism. The United States must host a democracy summit.

 

SHARED PURPOSE

 

A multipolar world—even one in which the United States remains disproportionally powerful—calls for a level of burden sharing to which democracies are not accustomed. In 1992, the democracies in what is now the G-20 accounted for nearly 90 percent of the group’s GDP. Today, those same democracies account for only 73 percent of the G-20’s GDP. Their economic influence has diminished, but the problems they seek to solve in common have not, and the United States is no longer able or willing to carry the whole load. The sharing of burdens will be essential if democracies are to remain united in the pursuit of common interests and in the face of common threats.

Uniting the democratic world against the clear and present danger of rising authoritarianism is not an act of idealism but of realism. China and Russia already hold similar interests and perceive similar threats, such that they are inclined to view the world in terms of “us versus them.”To convene a summit of democracies will not therefore drive authoritarian states together so much as it will acknowledge the stark reality of a world bifurcated into authoritarian and democratic camps. The project of supporting democracies and advancing democratic values, in this context, is continuous with past U.S. policy.

The idea of a democracy summit is not new, but the need for one has never been greater. Together, the world’s democracies can devise cooperative solutions to their most vexing domestic problems by collectively addressing such shared issues as demographic shifts, social polarization, and growing inequality. Such shared efforts will make democracies more internally cohesive and collectively resilient.

At the same time, democracies can help protect one another against external attacks, including those that take the form of information warfare or economic coercion. Democracies must deter bad actors from interfering in their internal affairs by making clear that those who seek to exploit the openness of democracies by sowing discord will face reciprocal responses. Forewarned in this fashion, authoritarian states will accept the new ground rules, and all powers will benefit from the elimination of one area of increasingly serious conflict.

The summit should be a forum in which democracies can exchange best practices for addressing many areas of common concern. For instance, participants could share ideas for protecting important industries and technologies from foreign influence or for countering China’s economic exploitation. They could coordinate efforts to promote media literacy, expose information operations, and buttress civil society. And democracies could seek collaborative solutions to such global problems as climate change—and the authoritarian subversion of international norms.

Ultimately, the summit should include all the world’s democracies. But it might begin as a kind of “coalition of the willing,” setting forth a democracy compact that identifies the shared objectives of its participants and pledges institutional, technical, and financial support to those who join.Democracies that are insecure or backsliding may then find themselves attracted to the summit consensus, whether in principle or because they don’t wish to be labeled as holdouts. They would have the opportunity to sign on to the principles. The summit should not tolerate free riders: it must take extreme care to be sure that all burdens are shared.

The United States, in concert with the world’s democracies, can resist the coercion of authoritarian regimes without forcing a direct confrontation between the two systems. In fact, in a multipolar world, democracies must both cooperate and compete with authoritarian powers. Countries of both descriptions see climate change, nuclear proliferation, and transnational terror as threats: to counter these forces, among others, will require the United States to cooperate with China, Russia, and emerging powers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The United States once ushered in an era of new democracies, giving those states succor and benefiting from their allegiance. Today, authoritarianism is once again on the rise, and it poses an existential threat to that order. The United States must lead the democratic world in defending itself from a reversion to historical patterns that could well lead to democracy’s demise.

ALEXANDER VINDMAN, a retired Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army and former Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council, is a doctoral student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Pritzker Military Fellow at the Lawfare Institute, and the author of the forthcoming book Here, Right Matters: An American Story. 

 

La Argentina no es Venezuela, pero lo intenta y va por buen camino - Loris Zanatta (La Nación)

 O Brasil, como eu já disse, cambaleia entre a Argentina e a Grécia, mas poderia ser pior. A Argentina tenta chegar na Venezuela. Vou postar o artigo no blog Diplomatizzando:

La Argentina no es Venezuela, pero lo intenta y va por buen camino

Loris Zanatta

La Nación, 10/11/20

Argentina no es Venezuela, pero lo intenta. Hay semejanzas que dejan pensando. A ver si esta historia les sugiere algunas.

Hacia 2004, una ola de ocupaciones sacudió el campo venezolano. ¿Espontánea? Como abetos en los trópicos, palmeras en los polos. Hugo Chávez dirigía la orquesta, sus secuaces golpeaban el bombo. El grito de batalla aún no era "tierra, techo, trabajo", el papa Francisco era monseñor Bergoglio, los "movimientos populares" no gozaban de fama mundial. Pero el fondo ya era eso: el "pueblo surgido de la oscuridad", tronó el caudillo por cadena nacional, volverá a los campos de donde los ha expulsado el "neoliberalismo", los campos exentos de la inmoralidad de las ciudades opulentas.

El chavismo banqueteaba con el petróleo, pero teorizaba una Arcadia rural. Prometió prosperidad, juró erradicar la pobreza: aguanta caballo.

Muy raro: tierra de inmigrantes, Venezuela es un país urbano. Pocos de esos improvisados ocupantes habían sido alguna vez campesinos, menos aún tenían la vocación de serlo: obtenida la tierra, muchos la abandonaban para regresar a la ciudad. No importa. Ante el "clamor popular", Chávez anunció una reforma agraria: repartir la tierra, combatir el latifundio, ocupar los terrenos improductivos; música para oídos revolucionarios, bálsamo para corazones cristianos, Viagra para tiernos intelectuales.

¿Las invasiones, expropiaciones, requisas violaban la ley? ¿Infringían la Constitución que protegía la propiedad privada? ¿"Su" Constitución? Olvídenlo: ¡es la Constitución del pueblo, no de los "escuálidos"!

Se vio de todo: teatro político, espejuelos, acuerdos por la trastienda. Un gobernador se ensañó contra una reserva natural, modelo de eficiencia y destino turístico: ¡era propiedad privada, intolerable! La arruinó. Las ocupaciones se extendieron a los predios urbanos, ante el aplauso de los funcionarios. ¿Cómo medir la productividad de la tierra? La lógica de la tribu se impuso: los "latifundios" baldíos para incautar eran las tierras de los enemigos, los "productivos" eran los de los clientes del régimen. Los invasores solían quemar las cosechas: la tierra quemada parecía sin cultivar y el Estado enviaba a los militares a requisarla. La propiedad, se sabe, corrompe el alma: ¡créanse cooperativas!, ordenó entonces Chávez.

Ábrete cielo: el gobierno les ordenó qué debían cultivar, pero no les brindó maquinaria ni asistencia técnica. Habilidades, productividad, legalidad: al macerador. Reinaban el caos, la corrupción, el clientelismo, la arbitrariedad. Especialmente la ineficiencia. Chávez se jactaba de repartir millones de hectáreas, pero era una patraña: no había demanda de tanta tierra y el Estado no sabría cómo hacerlo. "No le importa producir más", señaló un diplomático, sino "controlar la cadena del suministro de alimentos", capturar los votos rurales, hacerse el Cristo que redime a los pobres. ¿Soberanía? ¿O hambre?

La producción colapsó. Leche y maíz fueron los primeros en escasear; luego frijoles, trigo, huevos, pollo. El control de precios, arma letal, les dio el golpe de gracia. ¿De qué sorprenderse, si lo mismo le pasó incluso al sector petrolero, el ganso de oro venezolano ? ¿Si en pleno auge de los precios la petrolera estatal no lograba producir la cuota que le asignaba la OPEP?

La ineptitud estaba en todas partes, dorada por enfáticos llamamientos al pueblo, por vacuas peanas a los pobres: "Ninguna asociación con el capital privado -confió el presidente de Pdvsa-, solo expropiaciones". ¡Enhorabuena!

Hacía tiempo que Chávez había tomado la Justicia por asalto: sus legisladores habían aumentado el número de jueces de la Corte Suprema, para llenarla de fieles chavistas

Expuestos a la picota, señalados por pecadores culpables de producir y ganar, por codiciosos explotadores del pueblo, los propietarios estaban de espaldas a la pared: tanto los más grandes y poderosos como los más pequeños e indefensos. Ni lerdos ni perezosos, sumaron dos y dos: el chavismo usaba las instituciones estatales para apropiarse de sus tierras. Algunos levantaron barricadas, otros intentaron acicalarse con el régimen, todos dejaron de invertir. Lógico, dadas las circunstancias. Muchos confiaron en los tribunales: ilusos. Sí, porque la "Justicia" ya había pasado por las horcas caudinas, ya era la Justicia chavista. Hacía tiempo que Hugo Chávez la había tomado por asalto: sus legisladores habían aumentado el número de jueces de la Corte Suprema, para llenarla de fieles chavistas. De ahí el efecto en cascada, la depuración de fiscales y procuradores, la ocupación política de los tribunales locales. En 2006, en la inauguración del año judicial, los jueces de la Corte entonaron a coro "Chávez no se va". ¿Qué esperar de esa Justicia? Buscar protección allí era como meterse en la boca del lobo. Muchos empezaron a arrojar la esponja, a dejar el país.

La cruzada contra la propiedad privada, madre del egoísmo, cuna del individualismo, pecado original que corrompe al "pueblo" y contamina a los "pobres", recién comenzaba. El Estado lanzó al ataque sus fanáticos misioneros: ¡arrepiéntanse, conviértanse, expíen! Una ley lo autorizó a intervenir en la producción y venta de todos los bienes y servicios que "mejoran la calidad de vida". ¡Teléfonos celulares incluidos! En nombre de la "solidaridad", no hace falta decirlo. ¿Resultado? La calidad de vida empezó a empeorar, para los ricos y para los pobres.

El siguiente paso se daba por sentado: ¿podrían no surgir el "hombre nuevo", la armonía natural, la hermandad universal de las cenizas de Gomorra, de la expiación de la culpa "neoliberal"? El Ministerio de Educación tenía ideas claras: basta, decretó, con el respeto a todas las corrientes de pensamiento, el bolivarianismo iba a ser la única doctrina, el nuevo catecismo. Como decía Fidel Castro, "la escuela burguesa da mil explicaciones, la revolucionaria solo la verdadera". El chavismo se reveló inepto incluso para eso.

Cuál fue el resultado de tanta furia redentora está a la vista: a que infierno han llevado tantas bellas intenciones, tanta "justicia social". Para tener un poco de tierra, techo y trabajo, los venezolanos tuvieron que escaparse. ¡En su patria falta incluso la gasolina! La comida es importada y racionada, la agricultura desbandada: ¡felicidades por la reforma agraria! ¿Salarios y pensiones? Pocos dólares. La salud agoniza, la escuela se derrumba.

¿Moraleja? Pobrismo e ilegalidad, autoritarismo y paternalismo, estatismo y anticapitalismo, campaña contra ciudad, pueblo contra oligarquía, solidaridad contra propiedad: un déjà-vu, un disco rayado.

La Argentina no es Venezuela, es cierto. Pero lo intenta, y va por buen camino.

 

Loris Zanatta, Ensayista y profesor de Historia en la Universidad de Bolonia, Italia

Russia economy: a very short introduction - Book review (EH net)

 Published by EH.Net (November 2020)

Richard Connolly, The Russian Economy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. xv + 151 pp. $12 (paperback), ISBN: 978-0-198-84890-5.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Ilya Voskoboynikov, Department of Economics, HSE University.

The Russian economy is, modifying Winston Churchill (1939), “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”; Russian economic performance is volatile. In the last three decades its institutional environment changed from a command to a market economy. Its industrial structure shifted from overinvestment in manufacturing and agriculture in the late 1980s to market services and mining (Voskoboynikov 2020). Trade conditions seem to be unpredictable. This is a sensitive issue for the economy, which depends on oil and gas exports. How can one understand the Russian development pattern over its centuries-old history and, possibly, outline Russia’s prospects for the future?

Perhaps there is a key. Richard Connolly dubs that key the “Russian system of political economy” — the System. For centuries, Russia could be characterized by (1) the weakness of its legal system, (2) the underdevelopment of modern economic activities, (3) technological underdevelopment and (4) lower living standards in comparison with major developed economies. The System explains why these features have proven to be so persistent.

Connolly departs from the system of political economy of Robert Gilpin, who highlights three main respects of any economy: the primary purpose of economic activity, the role of the state in the economy and the structure of private business. Historically, in Russia, this purpose was the subordination of economic activity to national security, both external and internal. This has predetermined the primary role of the state in the economy, reallocating resources to national security. Consequently, the position of private business is relatively weak and is characterized by weak property rights. To be successful, it is much more important to connect with state officials and block competition, rather than to produce competitive products.

The System explains the persistence of features (1)–(4). The central state delegated to the so-called state agents — pomeshchiki (landowners), governors or individual communist party bureaucrats — power to extract and reallocate resources and match target objectives at the cost of other activities. The central state granting agents autonomy and overlooking some abuses of power fueled the weakness of the legal system and of property rights. The threat of expropriations reduced the incentives of local private businesses to invest in new production, qualified workers, new technology and innovation. As a consequence, modern economic activities remained underinvested and technology underdeveloped. All these factors impacted productivity growth negatively and led to the deterioration of living standards.

The chapters of the book demonstrate effectively how this framework was formed and how it has worked throughout Russian history. Chapter 1 covers the four centuries from the formation of the Tsardom of Russia (later the Russian Empire) in sixteenth century to the October Revolution in 1917. This period demonstrates that the subordination of economic activities to national security originated from threats from several strong powers in the West and nomadic raiders in South and East. Russia was not alone in dealing with such external pressures, but with no natural geographically defined borders, such as mountains, coastlines, border lakes or rivers, the challenge for Russia was much stronger than for other Eurasian empires. Chapter 2 shows that the Soviet system of political economy, which formed by the mid-1930s and remained unchanged until the end of 1980s, turned out to be the extreme version of the traditional Russian System. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss the formation of the modern system of political economy, which passed through the stages of market stabilization, liberalization and privatization in 1990s; the recovery of the role of the state in 2000s, accompanied by soaring growth rates; and the economic stagnation of 2010s.

The book is worth reading for economic historians. It provides a very simple and consistent conceptual framework, which helps to deal with the wealth of facts and data on the last five centuries of Russian economic history. This framework also demonstrates the difference between modern Russia and its predecessors – the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the Russian Empire. Although national security remains one of the priorities for modern Russia, general social and macroeconomic stability are also the priorities (pp. 78, 85-89). The level of inflation is now at the historically lowest level since 1990. The budget deficit and unemployment are more than reasonable (pp. 83, 87).

The real challenges for Russia are demography, energy dependence and, probably the biggest, the weak legal system. The origins of this weakness are of specific interest and are of my main concern about the book. Connolly states (pp. 6-9) that the use of agents helps the central government to extract revenue, control vast territories and the population, and mobilize resources in times of the crisis with few formal controls. Most of the time the agents ruled their areas as their own domain and sometimes ignored the law. The central government needed the agents and controlled them weakly. As a result, national laws and informal local rules co-existed and collided, weakening the legal system and fueling the conflict between the central government and its agents for centuries.

A related issue is the lack of clarity on the ambiguous concept of the state in the book – specifically, a lack of clarity about the role of the state or its agents in proizvol (the arbitrary treatment) of serfs by their landlords or of a collective farmer by the local Communist Party authority. The same conflict appears in relations among the Soviet government, the ministries and managers of state enterprises (Gregory and Harrison 2005) and in the illusion of State Planning Committee control (p. 14). In all these cases, the state is both strong and weak. It is strong, because the landlord in eighteenth century and the local Communist Party authority in the Soviet era had power within their responsibilities or communities. It is weak, because the central government usually lacked the capacity to keep such agents under control and overlooked the abuse of law by its agents.

The central government made multiple attempts to enforce law and bind its agents. Kormlenie (feeding — the practice in pre-modern Russia of maintaining local officials at the expense of those they governed) was cancelled in sixteenth century. These attempts can also be seen in the constraints of serfdom up to the Emancipation Manifesto (1861) of Aleksandr II, which abolished serfdom. Unfortunately, the abolition of serfdom and its consequences are not discussed in the book, except the short paragraph of consequences of reforms after the Crimean War (p. 11). Scholars link Russian economic growth in the second half of nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to these reforms, including the abolition of serfdom and the subsequent progressive judicial reform. This was an important step forward, which improved the legal system and had a strong impact on economic performance (see, e.g., Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2018)). That is also an important lesson for Russia today.

Another concern is the issue of human capital, closely connected with the middle class and prospective future growth and development. Connolly notices that the Russian population now is highly educated by global standards (p. 114). I would add that the advances of education at all levels and healthcare system are achievements of the Soviet period (see, e.g., Nove 1992, pp. 359–62). This legacy of the Soviet Union makes the position of modern Russia in the global economy different from the Russian empire. In the early twentieth century, the illiteracy rate in Russia was 60% (1913) versus 11% (1900) in the US (Gregory and Stuart 2001, tab. 2.5).

These aspects, however, do not diminish the merits of the book, which helps us reflect on the centuries of Russian economic history and outline its future. Demography, energy dependence and the weak legal system (chapter 7) are particular challenges. The latter was explicitly exposed by the case of Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky (pp. 44-45, 60-61) with the questionable legacy of privatization of oil company Yukos in the early 1990s, his payments to deputies in Russia’s parliament to support legislation of his business interests in the early 2000s and the transfer of the main oil-producing arm within Yukos to the state-owned company Rosneft. However, the Russian economy now is in a better position in comparison with 1917 or 1991. In spite of the importance of security issues and the high military expenditure, nobody seriously considers the big push approach or mass property confiscations and deportations, similar to the industrialization or collectivization of late 1920s–early 1930s. The primary purpose of the state is not only security. The role of the state is high, probably excessive, but not as high as three decades ago, and the chances of returning to a Soviet-like planned economy are negligible. In contrast with the period of the empire, the level of education in Russia now is much higher. In contrast with the Soviet period, the middle class, formed in 1990s, is also remarkable. Success will come when not only the government, but also Russian citizens, start considering improvements to the legal system as the top priority. The new book of Richard Connolly is very supportive of this idea.

References:

Churchill, Winston. 1939.  \”The Russian Enigma.\” London: BBC. The Churchill Society. http://churchill-society-london.org.uk/RusnEnig.html.

Gregory, Paul, and Mark Harrison. 2005. “Allocation under Dictatorship: Research in Stalin’s Archives.” Journal of Economic Literature 43 (3): 721–61.

Gregory, Paul, and Robert Stuart. 2001. Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure. 7th ed. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Markevich, Andrei, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2018. “Economic Effects of the Abolition of Serfdom: Evidence from the Russian Empire.” American Economic Review 108 (4–5): 1074–1117.

Nove, Alec. 1992. An Economic History of the USSR. 1917-1991. 3d ed. Penguin Books.

Voskoboynikov, Ilya B. 2020. “Economic Growth and Sectoral Developments, 1990-2008.” In The Economic History of Central, East and South-East Europe: 1800 to the Present, edited by Matthias Morys, 520. Routledge (forthcoming).

 

Ilya Voskoboynikov is a Leading Research Fellow and an Assistant Professor at National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He is currently focuses on consequences of a command economy period for development and long run growth.

Copyright (c) 2020 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator (administrator@eh.net). Published by EH.Net (November 2020). All EH.Net reviews are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview.

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A Constituicao Contra o Brasil: Ensaios de Roberto Campos  byPaulo Roberto de Almeida, Ministry of External… A Constituição Contra o Brasil: Ensaios de Roberto Campos sobre a Constituinte e a Constituição de 1988 1(1) (2018): 480 Brazilian Studies • Brazilian Politics + 2 more Apresentação geral da obra, com prefácio e links para dois vídeos preparados para seminário comemorativo dos 30 anos da Constituição de 1988. Download ‌  ‌Save to Library ‌  ‌3,225 Views ‌  ‌1.4 Paper Rank

Já que a "fronda empresarial" não veio, talvez tenhamos uma "fronda" dos investidores - O Globo

 Alguns anos atrás, eu preparei um artigo e até dei palestras sobre a necessidade de uma fronda empresarial – os curiosos vejam na Wikipedia o que foi a fronda aristocrática –, ou seja, que os empresários, os grandes capitalistas brasileiros se revoltassem contra o Estado espoliador e conduzissem uma "revolução burguesa" economicamente liberal e aberta ao mundo. Vejam ao final essas referências.

Pena e tempo perdidos: nenhum dos covardes, pusilânimes, medíocres e introvertidos (protecionistas) dos grandes capitalistas se moveu um milímetro nessa direção: eles continuaram vindo a Brasília para pedir favores setoriais e parciais, e apoiando indistintamente todos os governos: socialdemocratas, esquerdistas, centristas, direitistas, como sempre fazem.

Agora, parece que são os investidores que vão se recusar a colocar dinheiro no Brasil até se colocar em ordem a balbúrdia que é o governo atual. Acho que vão ter de esperar certo tempo.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasil vive rebelião no mercado com crise fiscal, após gastos no combate a Covid

Nos círculos financeiros, dúvida é como o país vai arcar com os custos das medidas de estímulo, como o auxílio emergencial
O Globo, 28/10/2020

BRASÍLIA — Os estímulos à economia, especialmente o auxílio emergencial, do presidente Jair Bolsonaro, ganharam elogios em todos os lugares por salvar os brasileiros do pior da crise econômica causada pela pandemia. Mas, agora, enquanto o pior da crise da saúde começa a diminuir, a ansiedade aumenta nos círculos financeiros sobre como ele vai arcar com os custos disso.

Os investidores estão se desfazendo da moeda brasileira e das ações, desencadeando um movimento quase sem paralelo no mundo este ano. Na manhã desta quarta-feira, o dólar chegou a operar próximo dos R$ 5,80 e só perdeu fôlego após a atuação do Banco Central.

O cenário mostra que os investidores estão cada vez mais se recusando a comprar qualquer coisa, exceto os títulos do governo de curto prazo.

Com US$ 107 bilhões, o programa de socorro de Bolsonaro se parece mais com os pacotes de estímulo engendrados pelas nações mais ricas do mundo do que com aqueles apresentados por seus pares, com classificação de risco em mercados emergentes semelhante à brasileira.

O socorro equivale a 8,4% da produção econômica anual do país. É ainda proporcionalmente maior do que os planos anunciados pelo Reino Unido e pela Nova Zelândia.

Tudo isso transforma o Brasil em uma espécie de estudo de caso econômico da Covid-19: um país em desenvolvimento de nível médio pode igualar a resposta fiscal e monetária dos países mais dignos de crédito do mundo e sair impune? Ou afundará em uma crise financeira?

Arminio Fraga, talvez o ex-presidente do Banco Central mais respeitado do Brasil, diz que um desastre completo é uma possibilidade muito real agora.

— Vejo economias maduras fazendo todos os tipos de acrobacias com seus bancos centrais. Tudo bem, eles podem — diz Fraga, que ajudou a evitar o calote da dívida em 1999 e hoje dirige o Gávea Investimentos, no Rio de Janeiro. — Aqui no Brasil é diferente. Temos muitas dívidas.

É claro que a maioria dos países ricos também tem muitas dívidas. O Fundo Monetário Internacional prevê que os Estados Unidos e o Canadá terminarão este ano com uma relação dívida/Produto Interno Bruto acima de 100%. Afirma ainda que a do Japão subirá para 266%, muito acima da relação de 95% que o governo Bolsonaro prevê para o fim de ano.

Mas o Brasil, com sua longa história de inadimplência e inflação galopante, não tem a credibilidade arduamente conquistada nos mercados que esses países têm. Além disso, o ritmo no qual o percentual da dívida está subindo — aumentou 30 pontos percentuais apenas nos últimos cinco anos — alarma os investidores.

As expectativas para a inflação no Brasil, embora em nada pareça com os anos hiperinflacionários de meados da década de 1990, estão subindo rapidamente em meio à preocupação de que o governo não tenha vontade política para controlar os gastos.

Em meio à pandemia de Covid-19, outros países em desenvolvimento, como Peru e Chile, realmente produziram mais estímulos em relação ao tamanho de suas economias. Mas eles desfrutam de classificações de crédito de grau de investimento e começaram com dívidas muito menores.

Auxílio emergencial
No Brasil, a maior parte do estímulo — cerca de US$ 57 bilhões do total — foi dedicada ao auxílio emergencial,  benefícios mensais concedidos a trabalhadores informais, desempregados, pequeno empreendedores, e outros trabalhadores que perderam a renda durante o isolamento social, que se mantiveram alimentados e consumindo enquanto a economia estava encolhendo.

O benefício acabou diminuindo a pobreza e disparando a popularidade de Bolsonaro. O Fundo Monetário Internacional aplaudiu a iniciativa do governo para evitar uma desaceleração econômica mais profunda e estabilizar os mercados financeiros.

O que faz os economistas torcerem as mãos é como o presidente vai reconciliar um déficit primário recorde com um desejo repentino de tornar parte da ajuda permanente depois que o estímulo expirar em 31 de dezembro.

Relatório elogiando a ajuda inicial alertou que os níveis crescentes de dívida pública representam um risco para o Brasil.

Um déficit orçamentário primário estimado em 12,1% do PIB e dúvidas crescentes sobre a capacidade de Bolsonaro encontrar uma maneira de pagar por mais gastos sociais perturbaram os mercados.

A demanda dos traders premium para manter dívida de prazo mais longo disparou em meio ao aumento do risco, com as taxas de swap expirando em cerca de cinco anos a 6,82%, ante 5,39% em julho. O real  caiu quase 30% neste ano, puxando para baixo os retornos das ações baseados em dólares.

A moeda, já sob pressão com as baixas taxas históricas corroendo seu apelo ao carry trade, viu a volatilidade disparar com a reação dos comerciantes às manchetes sobre os gastos do governo.

Taxas de equilíbrio
As expectativas de inflação também dispararam, com os investidores agora avaliando aumentos anuais de preços de 4,4% na próxima década, frente aos 3,8% de um ano atrás.

Talvez o sinal mais nefasto seja a dificuldade de vender dívidas de longo prazo, mesmo que nações como os EUA flertem com a ideia de oferecer títulos com vencimentos de 50 a cem anos.

No Brasil, o prazo médio dos títulos do governo local vendidos em leilão era de 2,36 anos em agosto, ante 4,95 anos um ano antes. Desde então, o movimento em direção às notas de prazo mais curto só cresceu.

Nos leilões de títulos até agora neste mês, por exemplo, as notas de seis meses — o menor prazo disponível com uma taxa fixa —- responderam por 44% da dívida a taxa fixa vendida, em comparação com apenas 11% em outubro de 2019.

— Sem reformas, é possível que o país enfrente outra grave crise macroeconômica — disse Alberto Ramos, economista do Goldman Sachs Group Inc., em Nova York. — Os altos gastos do governo têm sido um problema para o Brasil há décadas. A deterioração fiscal trouxe alta inflação, baixo crescimento e a necessidade da ajuda do FMI no passado. Hoje, a situação não é melhor.

Deficit orçamentário
A mudança para a venda de títulos de curto prazo nos últimos meses resultou na preocupação dos investidores sobre o valor dos gastos públicos, reconheceu José Franco de Morais, subsecretário da dívida pública do Departamento do Tesouro, em uma entrevista.

Ele espera que as coisas se normalizem nos próximos meses, à medida que os investidores ganham confiança de que os gastos serão reduzidos.

Mas o problema que os investidores têm com o Brasil é seu histórico de gastos excessivos e permitir que os aumentos dos preços ao consumidor inflacionem sua dívida.

O Brasil deixou de pagar sua dívida externa nove vezes desde 1800, de acordo com o livro “Desta vez é diferente: Oito séculos de loucura financeira”. O país declarou moratória em 1987 e não foi capaz de retomar os pagamentos até 1994, ano em que a inflação atingiu o pico de 4.923%.

Durante a crise financeira de 2008, o Brasil injetou dinheiro nos bancos públicos e reduziu os impostos para ajudar a sair da recessão. Mas o alívio temporário tornou-se permanente, levando a déficits orçamentários e eventuais rebaixamentos de sua dívida, o que acabou custando bilhões ao governo em custos de empréstimos mais altos.

— Nossa própria dinâmica interna é insustentável — disse Armínio Fraga. — A resposta tem que ser ampla e profunda e tem que cobrir questões fiscais, o que é difícil.

Quase uma década após a crise de 2008, o antecessor de Bolsonaro instituiu um teto de gastos obrigatório constitucionalmente para ajudar a recuperar a confiança dos investidores. Mas o Congresso deu a Bolsonaro um passe único para ultrapassá-lo neste ano, e os investidores estão ansiosos por sinais de que ele colocará o país de volta no caminho da estabilidade fiscal.

Gerações futuras
— O teto de gastos é um símbolo, uma bandeira que alguns de nós nas trincheiras usamos para defender as gerações futuras — disse o ministro da Economia, Paulo Guedes, em evento este mês. — Não podemos continuar com dívidas em forma de bola de neve, altas taxas de juros e altos impostos.

Mas até agora é difícil dizer o que o presidente Bolsonaro está planejando. Sua última tacada para pagar a ajuda pós-pandemia sacudiu os mercados no mês passado, deixando sua própria equipe econômica incumbida de controlar os danos sobre as crescentes preocupações de que o compromisso com limites de gastos não é sério.

Desde então, Bolsonaro arquivou futuras discussões até depois das eleições municipais do próximo mês, deixando-o com apenas uma pequena janela para chegar a um acordo entre o fechamento das urnas e o início do ano novo.

Morais disse que a regra fiscal será respeitada e que o próximo programa de estímulo será menor do que alguns investidores temiam. Ele acrescentou que há bastante liquidez no mercado de títulos local.

— O tempo estará trabalhando contra o governo — disse Roberto Secemski, economista com foco no Brasil do Barclays Plc.

Em última análise, acrescenta, os investidores querem um plano “que nos diga que o endividamento público vai se estabilizar”.

https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/brasil-vive-rebeliao-no-mercado-com-crise-fiscal-apos-gastos-no-combate-covid-24716488

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Textos PRA:

2433. “Brasil: o futuro do país está no passado (de outros países...): proposta para uma Fronda Empresarial”, Brasília, 13 outubro 2012, 24 p. Texto-base para palestras no ciclo Liberdade na Estrada: “Brasil, país do futuro: até quando?” (Porto Alegre, FCE/UFRGS, dia 17/10/2012, 19:00hs), no “Papo Amigo” da Associação dos Dirigentes Cristãos de Empresas (Porto Alegre, 18/10/2012, 12:00hs) e no Instituto de Formação de Líderes de Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte, 24/10/2012, 19:30hs). Divulgado na plataforma Academia.edu (links: https://www.academia.edu/5962599/2433_Brasil_o_futuro_do_pa%C3%ADs_est%C3%A1_no_passado_de_outros_pa%C3%ADses..._proposta_para_uma_Fronda_Empresarial_2102_). Postado novamente no blog Diplomatizzando em 8/07/2015 (link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2015/07/brasil-o-futuro-do-pais-esta-no-passado.html). Canal pessoal no YouTube: https://youtu.be/RL6ZcpWyAWY.

2543. “Por uma Fronda Empresarial Brasileira”, Hartford, 8 Dezembro 2013, 2 p. Artigo em colaboração com o acadêmico e diplomata Paulo Fernando Pinheiro Machado, animador do blog No Bico da Chaleira (http://nobicodachaleira.wordpress.com). Publicado no jornal O Estado de S. Paulo (ISSN: 1516-2931; 18/12/2013; link: http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,por-uma-fronda--empresarial-brasileira-,1109902,0.htm). Divulgado no blog Diplomatizzando (i18/12/2013; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2013/12/por-uma-fronda-empresarial-paulo-f-p.html).