Brics Declaration: a more readable version

Received from some nasty people:

BRICS 2013 Declaration: a simplified version 

V BRICS Summit - Durban, March 27, 2013 eThekwini Declaration
What bureaucrats have written:	What presidents really think:
1. We, the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa, met in Durban, South Africa, on 27 March 2013 at the Fifth BRICS Summit. Our discussions took place under the overarching theme, “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation”. The Fifth BRICS Summit concluded the first cycle of BRICS Summits and we reaffirmed our commitment to the promotion of international law, multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations (UN). Our discussions reflected our growing intra-BRICS solidarity as well as our shared goal to contribute positively to global peace, stability, development and cooperation. We also considered our role in the international system as based on an inclusive approach of shared solidarity and cooperation towards all nations and peoples.	1. Hello folks, here we are again.
2. We met at a time which requires that we consider issues of mutual interest and systemic importance in order to share concerns and to develop lasting solutions. We aim at progressively developing BRICS into a full-fledged mechanism of current and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues of the world economy and politics. The prevailing global governance architecture is regulated by institutions which were conceived in circumstances when the international landscape in all its aspects was characterised by very different challenges and opportunities. As the global economy is being reshaped, we are committed to exploring new models and approaches towards more equitable development and inclusive global growth by emphasising complementarities and building on our respective economic strengths.	2. Times are hard.
3. We are open to increasing our engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries, in particular Emerging Market and Developing Countries (EMDCs), and relevant international and regional organisations, as envisioned in the Sanya Declaration. We will hold a Retreat together with African leaders after this Summit, under the theme, “Unlocking Africa’s potential: BRICS and Africa Cooperation on Infrastructure”. The Retreat is an opportunity for BRICS and African leaders to discuss how to strengthen cooperation between the BRICS countries and the African Continent.	3. Hello, out there…
4. Recognising the importance of regional integration for Africa’s sustainable growth, development and poverty eradication, we reaffirm our support for the Continent’s integration processes.	4. Africa advances…
5. Within the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), we support African countries in their industrialisation process through stimulating foreign direct investment, knowledge exchange, capacity-building and diversification of imports from Africa. We acknowledge that infrastructure development in Africa is important and recognise the strides made by the African Union to identify and address the continent’s infrastructure challenges through the development of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), the AU NEPAD Africa Action Plan (2010-2015), the NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI), as well as the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plans that have identified priority infrastructure development projects that are critical to promoting regional integration and industrialisation. We will seek to stimulate infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food and nutrition security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa. We therefore, reaffirm our support for sustainable infrastructure development in Africa.	5. … but there is much more to do.
6. We note policy actions in Europe, the US and Japan aimed at reducing tail-risks in the world economy. Some of these actions produce negative spillover effects on other economies of the world. Significant risks remain and the performance of the global economy still falls behind our expectations. As a result, uncertainty about strength and durability of the recovery and the direction of policy in some major economies remains high. In some key countries unemployment stays unusually elevated, while high levels of private and public indebtedness inhibit growth. In such circumstances, we reaffirm our strong commitment to support growth and foster financial stability. We also underscore the need for appropriate action to be taken by advanced economies in order to rebuild confidence, foster growth and secure a strong recovery.	6. Hegemonic countries want to export their crises to us…
7. Central Banks in advanced economies have responded with unconventional monetary policy actions which have increased global liquidity. While this may be consistent with domestic monetary policy mandates, major Central Banks should avoid the unintended consequences of these actions in the form of increased volatility of capital flows, currencies and commodity prices, which may have negative growth effects on other economies, in particular developing countries.	7. They insist with their financial tsunami.
8. We welcome the core objectives of the Russian Presidency in the G20 in 2013, in particular the efforts to increased financing for investment and ensure public debt sustainability aimed at ensuring strong, sustainable, inclusive and balanced growth and job creation around the world. We will also continue to prioritise the G20 development agenda as a vital element of global economic stability and long-term sustainable growth and job creation.	8. We’ll stick to our agenda.
9. Developing countries face challenges of infrastructure development due to insufficient long-term financing and foreign direct investment, especially investment in capital stock. This constrains global aggregate demand. BRICS cooperation towards more productive use of global financial resources can make a positive contribution to addressing this problem. In March 2012 we directed our Finance Ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of setting up a New Development Bank for mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development. Following the report from our Finance Ministers, we are satisfied that the establishment of a New Development Bank is feasible and viable. We have agreed to establish the New Development Bank. The initial contribution to the Bank should be substantial and sufficient for the Bank to be effective in financing infrastructure.	9. We’ll take care of our finances.
10. In June 2012, in our meeting in Los Cabos, we tasked our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to explore the construction of a financial safety net through the creation of a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) amongst BRICS countries. They have concluded that the establishment of a self-managed contingent reserve arrangement would have a positive precautionary effect, help BRICS countries forestall short-term liquidity pressures, provide mutual support and further strengthen financial stability. It would also contribute to strengthening the global financial safety net and complement existing international arrangements as an additional line of defence. We are of the view that the establishment of the CRA with an initial size of US$ 100 billion is feasible and desirable subject to internal legal frameworks and appropriate safeguards. We direct our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to continue working towards its establishment.	10. China will borrow us some money.
11. We are grateful to our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors for the work undertaken on the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement and direct them to negotiate and conclude the agreements which will establish them. We will review progress made in these two initiatives at our next meeting in September 2013.	11. We’ll see how to expend it.
12. We welcome the conclusion between our Export-Import Banks (EXIM) and Development Banks, of both the “Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Co-financing for Sustainable Development” and, given the steep growth trajectory of the African continent and the significant infrastructure funding requirements directly emanating from this growth path, the “Multilateral Agreement on Infrastructure Co-Financing for Africa”.	12. There will be some money to Africa too.
13. We call for the reform of International Financial Institutions to make them more representative and to reflect the growing weight of BRICS and other developing countries. We remain concerned with the slow pace of the reform of the IMF. We see an urgent need to implement, as agreed, the 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Governance and Quota Reform. We urge all members to take all necessary steps to achieve an agreement on the quota formula and complete the next general quota review by January 2014. The reform of the IMF should strengthen the voice and representation of the poorest members of the IMF, including Sub-Saharan Africa. All options should be explored, with an open mind, to achieve this. We support the reform and improvement of the international monetary system, with a broad-based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. We welcome the discussion about the role of the SDR in the existing international monetary system including the composition of SDR’s basket of currencies. We support the IMF to make its surveillance framework more integrated and even-handed. The leadership selection of IFIs should be through an open, transparent and merit-based process and truly open to candidates from the emerging market economies and developing countries.	13. We don’t like Bretton Woods institutions.
14. We emphasise the importance of ensuring steady, adequate and predictable access to long term finance for developing countries from a variety of sources. We would like to see concerted global effort towards infrastructure financing and investment through the instrumentality of adequately resourced Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Regional Development Banks (RDBs). We urge all parties to work towards an ambitious International Development Association(IDA)17 replenishment.	14. But we want more money from them.
15. We reaffirm our support for an open, transparent and rules-based multilateral trading system. We will continue in our efforts for the successful conclusion of the Doha Round, based on the progress made and in keeping with its mandate, while upholding the principles of transparency, inclusiveness and multilateralism. We are committed to ensure that new proposals and approaches to the Doha Round negotiations will reinforce the core principles and the developmental mandate of the Doha Round. We look forward to significant and meaningful deliverables that are balanced and address key development concerns of the poorest and most vulnerable WTO members, at the ninth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Bali.	15. WTO and Doha Round are already dead.
16. We note that the process is underway for the selection of a new WTO Director-General in 2013. We concur that the WTO requires a new leader who demonstrates a commitment to multilateralism and to enhancing the effectiveness of the WTO including through a commitment to support efforts that will lead to an expeditious conclusion of the DDA. We consider that the next Director-General of the WTO should be a representative of a developing country.	16. But we want to manage WTO.
17. We reaffirm the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) mandate as the focal point in the UN system dedicated to consider the interrelated issues of trade, investment, finance and technology from a development perspective. UNCTAD’s mandate and work are unique and necessary to deal with the challenges of development and growth in the increasingly interdependent global economy. We also reaffirm the importance of strengthening UNCTAD’s capacity to deliver on its programmes of consensus building, policy dialogue, research, technical cooperation and capacity building, so that it is better equipped to deliver on its development mandate.	17. UNCTAD is OK.
18. We acknowledge the important role that State Owned Companies (SOCs) play in the economy and encourage our SOCs to explore ways of cooperation, exchange of information and best practices.	18. Our State companies are great! We love them!
19. We recognise the fundamental role played by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the economies of our countries. SMEs are major creators of jobs and wealth. In this regard, we will explore opportunities for cooperating in the field of SMEs and recognise the need for promoting dialogue among the respective Ministries and Agencies in charge of the theme, particularly with a view to promoting their international exchange and cooperation and fostering innovation, research and development.	19. Small companies exist too.
20. We reiterate our strong commitment to the United Nations (UN) as the foremost multilateral forum entrusted with bringing about hope, peace, order and sustainable development to the world. The UN enjoys universal membership and is at the centre of global governance and multilateralism. In this regard, we reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and efficient, so that it can be more responsive to global challenges. In this regard, China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.	20. Brazil and India continue to wait for the support of China and Russia in their bid for the UNSC (but are loosing their patience).
21. We underscore our commitment to work together in the UN to continue our cooperation and strengthen multilateral approaches in international relations based on the rule of law and anchored in the Charter of the United Nations.	21. UN is OK.
22. We are committed to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity and reaffirm that the 21st century should be marked by peace, security, development, and cooperation. It is the overarching objective and strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries.	22. We love peace, and love.
23. We welcome the twentieth Anniversary of the World Conference on Human Rights and of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and agree to explore cooperation in the field of human rights.	23. Here again those damned humanitarians with their nasty demands.
24. We commend the efforts of the international community and acknowledge the central role of the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council in conflict resolution in Africa. We call upon the UNSC to enhance cooperation with the African Union, and its Peace and Security Council, pursuant to UNSC resolutions in this regard. We express our deep concern with instability stretching from North Africa, in particular the Sahel, and the Gulf of Guinea. We also remain concerned about reports of deterioration in humanitarian conditions in some countries.	24. Africa continues to be a miserable continent.
25. We welcome the appointment of the new Chairperson of the AU Commission as an affirmation of the leadership of women.	25. Women are great.
26. We express our deep concern with the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in Syria and condemn the increasing violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law as a result of continued violence. We believe that the Joint Communiqué of the Geneva Action Group provides a basis for resolution of the Syrian crisis and reaffirm our opposition to any further militarization of the conflict. A Syrian-led political process leading to a transition can be achieved only through broad national dialogue that meets the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect for Syrian independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty as expressed by the Geneva Joint Communiqué and appropriate UNSC resolutions. We support the efforts of the UN-League of Arab States Joint Special Representative. In view of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Syria, we call upon all parties to allow and facilitate immediate, safe, full and unimpeded access to humanitarian organisations to all in need of assistance. We urge all parties to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers.	26. We should continue to talk about Syria, but not too much. Hegemonic countries should stay away.
27. We welcome the admission of Palestine as an Observer State to the United Nations. We are concerned at the lack of progress in the Middle East Peace Process and call on the international community to assist both Israel and Palestine to work towards a two-state solution with a contiguous and economically viable Palestinian state, existing side by side in peace with Israel, within internationally recognized borders, based on those existing on 4 June 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital. We are deeply concerned about the construction of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which is a violation of international law and harmful to the peace process. In recalling the primary responsibility of the UNSC in maintaining international peace and security, we note the importance that the Quartet reports regularly to the Council about its efforts, which should contribute to concrete progress.	27. We love the Palestinians.
28. We believe there is no alternative to a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We recognise Iran´s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations, and support resolution of the issues involved through political and diplomatic means and dialogue, including between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran and in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and consistent with Iran’s obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We are concerned about threats of military action as well as unilateral sanctions. We note the recent talks held in Almaty and hope that all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme will be resolved through discussions and diplomatic means.	28. We should continue to talk about Iran’s nuclear programme, but not too much. Hegemonic countries should stay away.
29. Afghanistan needs time, development assistance and cooperation, preferential access to world markets, foreign investment and a clear end-state strategy to attain lasting peace and stability. We support the global community’s commitment to Afghanistan, enunciated at the Bonn International Conference in December 2011, to remain engaged over the transformation decade from 2015-2024. We affirm our commitment to support Afghanistan’s emergence as a peaceful, stable and democratic state, free of terrorism and extremism, and underscore the need for more effective regional and international cooperation for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, including by combating terrorism. We extend support to the efforts aimed at combating illicit traffic in opiates originating in Afghanistan within the framework of the Paris Pact.	29. Afghanistan is a mess, and will continue to be a mess, whatever “solution” is devised for that mess.
30. We commend the efforts of the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mali aimed at restoring sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali. We support the civilian efforts of the Malian Government and its international community partners in realising the transitional programme leading up to the presidential and legislative elections. We emphasise the importance of political inclusiveness and economic and social development in order for Mali to achieve sustainable peace and stability. We express concern about the reports of the deterioration in humanitarian conditions in Mali and call upon the international community to continue to cooperate with Mali and its neighbouring countries in order to ensure humanitarian assistance to civilian population affected by the armed conflict.	30. Mali is a mess, but the fault is with the hegemonic countries.
31. We are gravely concerned with the deterioration in the current situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) and deplore the loss of life. We strongly condemn the abuses and acts of violence against the civilian population and urge all parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and return to negotiations. We call upon all parties to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access. We are ready to work with the international community to assist in this endeavour and facilitate progress to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Brazil, Russia and China express their sympathy to the South African and Indian governments for the casualties that their citizens suffered in the CAR.	31. Central African Republic is a mess; we are becoming tired of all this African mess.
32. We are gravely concerned by the ongoing instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). We welcome the signing in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013 of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. We support its independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. We support the efforts of the UN, AU and sub-regional organisations to bring about peace, security and stability in the country.	32. Congo, whatever Congo could be, is a mess. We have already dropped it.
33. We reiterate our strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and stress that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for any acts of terrorism. We believe that the UN has a central role in coordinating international action against terrorism within the framework of the UN Charter and in accordance with principles and norms of international law. In this context, we support the implementation of the UN General Assembly Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and are determined to strengthen cooperation in countering this global threat. We also reiterate our call for concluding negotiations as soon as possible in the UN General Assembly on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and its adoption by all Member States and agreed to work together towards this objective.	33. Terrorism is a nuisance. We should talk about that too.
34. We recognize the critical positive role the Internet plays globally in promoting economic, social and cultural development. We believe it’s important to contribute to and participate in a peaceful, secure, and open cyberspace and we emphasise that security in the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) through universally accepted norms, standards and practices is of paramount importance.	34. We do not want the internet controlled by the Americans.
35. We congratulate Brazil on hosting the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in June 2012 and welcome the outcome as reflected in “The Future we Want”, in particular, the reaffirmation of the Rio Principles and political commitment made towards sustainable development and poverty eradication while creating opportunities for BRICS partners to engage and cooperate in the development of the future Sustainable Development Goals.	35. Brazil is beautiful, albeit too expensive.
36. We congratulate India on the outcome of the 11th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Conference on Biological Diversity (CBD COP11) and the sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.	36. India is fine, but it is a mess too.
37. While acknowledging that climate change is one of the greatest challenges and threats towards achieving sustainable development, we call on all parties to build on the decisions adopted in COP18/CMP8 in Doha, with a view to reaching a successful conclusion by 2015, of negotiations on the development of a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties, guided by its principles and provisions.	37. Developed countries should pay for the global warming; and they have to transfer some free technology to us.
38. We believe that the internationally agreed development goals including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) address the needs of developing countries, many of which continue to face developmental challenges, including widespread poverty and inequality. Low Income Countries (LICs) continue to face challenges that threaten the impressive growth performance of recent years. Volatility in food and other commodity prices have made food security an issue as well as constraining their sources of revenue. Progress in rebuilding macro-economic buffers has been relatively slow, partly due to measures adopted to mitigate the social impact of exogenous shocks. Many LICs are currently in a weaker position to deal with exogenous shocks given the more limited fiscal buffers and the constrained aid envelopes, which will affect their ability to sustain progress towards achieving the MDGs. We reiterate that individual countries, especially in Africa and other developing countries of the South, cannot achieve the MDGs on their own and therefore the centrality of Goal 8 on Global Partnerships for Development to achieve the MDGs should remain at the core of the global development discourse for the UN System. Furthermore, this requires the honouring of all commitments made in the outcome documents of previous major international conferences.	38. If developed countries want developing countries to achieve at least 10 per cent of the Millennium Development Goals, they should give more money.
39. We reiterate our commitment to work together for accelerated progress in attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the target date of 2015, and we call upon other members of the international community to work towards the same objective. In this regard, we stress that the development agenda beyond 2015 should build on the MDG framework, keeping the focus on poverty eradication and human development, while addressing emerging challenges of development taking into consideration individual national circumstances of developing countries. In this regard the critical issue of the mobilization of means of implementation in assisting developing countries needs to be an overarching goal. It is important to ensure that any discussion on the UN development agenda, including the “Post 2015 Development Agenda” is an inclusive and transparent inter-Governmental process under a UN-wide process which is universal and broad based.	39. Millennium Development Goals are fine but we do not believe they will be reached.
40. We welcome the establishment of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in line with the Rio+20 Outcome Document which reaffirmed the Rio Principles of Sustainable Development as the basis for addressing new and emerging challenges. We are fully committed to a coordinated inter-governmental process for the elaboration of the UN development agenda.	40. Sustainability is fine; we like it.
41. We note the following meetings held in the implementation of the Delhi Action Plan:	41. There are too much meetings.
• Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the margins of UNGA.	Food was not famous last time.
• Meeting of National Security Advisors in New Delhi.	One of our guys was robbed in the last meeting.
• Meetings of Finance Ministers, and Central Bank Governors in Washington DC and Tokyo.	They love to talk about money.
• Meeting of Trade Ministers in Puerto Vallarta.	There is no hope, you who enter here.
• Meetings of Health Ministers in New Delhi and Geneva.	Attention to new flu strain.
42. We welcome the establishment of the BRICS Think Tanks Council and the BRICS Business Council and take note of the following meetings which were held in preparation for this Summit:	42. We think too, sometimes.
• Fifth Academic Forum	Talk and talk…
• Fourth Business Forum	Real discount, sales.
• Third Financial Forum	How much is the dollar?
43. We welcome the outcomes of the meeting of the BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors and endorse the Joint Communique of the Third Meeting of the BRICS Trade Ministers held in preparation for the Summit.	43. Those guys are too slow…
44. We are committed to forging a stronger partnership for common development. To this end, we adopt the eThekwini Action Plan.	44. We’ll meet again; we love each other.
45. We agree that the next summit cycles will, in principle, follow the sequence of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.	45. BRICS should be Brics. Or, perhaps: C + Bris?
46. Brazil, Russia, India and China extend their warm appreciation to the Government and people of South Africa for hosting the Fifth BRICS Summit in Durban.	46. Next time, try to meet with less Heads of State: Africa has too much.
47. Russia, India, China and South Africa convey their appreciation to Brazil for its offer to host the first Summit of the second cycle of BRICS Summits, i.e. the Sixth BRICS Summit in 2014 and convey their full support thereto.	47. Brazil should become less expensive.
eThekwini Action Plan:	More work to do…
1. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the margins of UNGA.	1. They are becoming tiresome.
2. Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors.	2. Of what security are you talking?
3. Mid-term meeting of Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas.	3. Here come the per-diem slaves.
4. Meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in the margins of G20 meetings, WB/IMF meetings, as well as stand-alone meetings, as required.	4. They love to compare exchange rates.
5. Meetings of BRICS Trade Ministers on the margins of multilateral events, or stand-alone meetings, as required.	5. We have to mask our protectionist moves…
6. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, preceded by a preparatory meeting of experts on agro-products and food security issues and the Meeting of Agriculture Expert Working Group.	6. Is there any food insecurity?
7. Meeting of BRICS Health Ministers and preparatory meetings.	7. Don’t kiss erratically.
8. Meeting of BRICS Officials responsible for population on the margins of relevant multilateral events.	8. We love people.
9. Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Science and Technology and meeting of BRICS Senior Officials on Science and Technology.	9. Will the new iPhone be there?
10. Meeting of BRICS Cooperatives.	10. Cooperate guys.
11. Meetings of financial and fiscal authorities in the margins of WB/IMF meetings as well as stand-alone meetings, as required.	11. Again, comparing exchange rates.
12. Meetings of the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI).	12. Oh, forget Doha Round.
13. Meeting of the BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation Forum.	13. Mayors love to travel too.
14. Meeting of the BRICS Urbanisation Forum.	14. And their architects.
15. Meeting of BRICS Competition Authorities in 2013 in New Delhi.	15. Too much competition is not always to prescribe.
16. 5th Meeting of BRICS Heads of National Statistical Institutions.	17. Damn statistics!
17. Consultations amongst BRICS Permanent Missions and/or Embassies, as appropriate, in New York, Vienna, Rome, Paris, Washington, Nairobi and Geneva, where appropriate.	17. Besides Nairobi, the rest is OK.
18. Consultative meeting of BRICS Senior Officials in the margins of relevant sustainable development, environment and climate related international fora, where appropriate.	18. Diplomats are made for travel.
Source: Brics Reflection Group; California.

A Lei dos Efeitos Contrarios (ao que diz o Governo)

Não, não é do nosso que quero falar, mas também serve.
Sempre que algum funcionário público, ministro, gênio da economia, disser para você fazer, ou não fazer, tal coisa, faça exatamente o contrário.
Geralmente dá certo.
Duvidam?
Vejam esta história com Los Hermanos...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

El que apuesta al dólar ahora es terrorista

Por Fernando Laborda

 La Nación - Buenos Aires, 26 de marzo de 2013

(La Nación. Argentina) “…  Poco después de ganar las elecciones presidenciales de 2011, acosado por una corrida cambiaria y por la fuga de divisas, el gobierno cristinista inició una ardua campaña para persuadir sin éxito a la población de quedejara de ver al dólar como una buena alternativa de inversión. A fines de octubre de ese año, el vicepresidente del Banco Central, Miguel Angel Pesce, sentenció: “El que compra dólares con el sueldo o la jubilación, hace mal negocio”. Y pocos días después, el 5 de noviembre de ese año, el por entonces ministro de Economía, Amado Boudou, afirmó que “ahorrar en dólares es una mala idea”. En esos días, un dólar se podía adquirir a alrededor de 4,27 pesos, aproximadamente la mitad de lo que cuesta hoy en el mercado informal.
La presidenta de la Nación fue más allá cuando en junio del año pasado, en momentos en que ya regía el cepo cambiario, con la idea de desdolarizar la cultura del ahorro de los argentinos, anunció que vendería sus ahorros personales en moneda extranjera, unos tres millones de dólares, para constituir un plazo fijo en pesos. Por entonces, el tipo de cambio oficial se ubicaba en 4,49 pesos, aunque ya el dólar paralelo se acercaba a los 6 pesos.
Más recientemente, el diputado nacional kirchnerista Roberto Feletti, cuando el dólar marginal volaba hacia 8,75 pesos, expresó: “No hay que preocuparse por el dólar paralelo”.
Como señala el especialista en inversiones Federico Tessore, “siempre, sin excepción en la historia argentina, cuando un funcionario afín al Gobierno dice algo así, termina ocurriendo lo contrario”.
La suba del dólar producida la semana pasada provocó un hecho al que no estamos acostumbrados: la Presidenta convocó a una reunión a todas sus espadas económicas, entre ellas a Hernán Lorenzino, a Axel Kicillof, a Mercedes Marcó del Pont, a Guillermo Moreno y a Ricardo Echegaray.
A la luz de los movimientos de los funcionarios al cabo de ese encuentro, lo que se decidió fue volver a empuñar las teorías conspirativas. Fruto de este debate, se habría decidido actuar contra aquellos productores agropecuarios que prefieran diferir la venta de su cosecha de soja a la espera de mejores condiciones cambiarias. Y, por añadidura, se resolvió sacar a relucir la ley antiterrorista, sancionada a fines de 2011, para amenazar a los productores sojeros que se resistan a vender, demorando el ingreso de dólares al país.
Estimaciones privadas dan cuenta de que las exportaciones de soja podrían generar un ingreso de unos 25.600 millones de dólares este año, de los cuales casi 9000 millones quedarían para el Estado nacional, en concepto de retenciones.
El problema para los exportadores es que los dólares que reciban serán tomados al tipo de cambio oficial, de aproximadamente 5,12 pesos, a lo cual deberá restársele el 35% de retención, lo que equivaldría a recibir apenas algo menos de 3,33 pesos por cada dólar, bastante menos de la mitad de la cotización del dólar paralelo. Esta situación está haciendo cundir entre no pocos productores la idea de guardar su cosecha en silobolsas todo lo posible, hasta que la situación cambiaria cambie o hasta que se vean forzados a desprenderse de ella progresivamente para ir afrontando futuros costos.
La suba del dólar producida la semana pasada provocó un hecho al que no estamos acostumbrados: la Presidenta convocó a una reunión a todas sus espadas económicas
De ahí que desde el Gobierno se haya dejado trascender la posibilidad de obligarlos a liquidar la cosecha, empleando, de manera harto cuestionable, la ley antiterrorista, que modificó el artículo 41 del Código Penal, estableciendo que cuando alguno de los delitos previstos allí hubiere sido cometido “con la finalidad de aterrorizar a la población u obligar a las autoridades públicas nacionales o gobiernos extranjeros o agentes de una organización internacional a realizar un acto o abstenerse de hacerlo”, la escala de penas se incrementará en el doble del mínimo y el máximo. …
Lo cierto es que la amenaza insinuada por el Gobierno, que para muchos es más una acción psicológica que una probable medida concreta, trae a la memoria algunas frases que, en medio del proceso electoral que le dio la reelección a Cristina Kirchner, encendieron señales de alarma. Como la de Feletti, cuando expresó que, con el triunfo de la Presidenta, el populismo “no tendría límites” para “apropiarse de la renta”. O la del titular de la Unidad de Información Financiera (UIF), José Sbattella, quien advirtió que la ley antiterrorista podría ser utilizada hasta contra medios periodísticos que pudieran inducir a golpes de mercado”.

A Journey Inside the Whale: menu do O'Porto

Sem pretender vangloriar-me de nada, apenas de iniciativas gastronômicas, transcrevo aqui o menu do Restaurant O'Porto, de Hartford, tal como degustado no último domingo dia 24, por apenas duas pessoas (eu e Carmen Lícia), mas cercados de muitas outras, portugueses, brasileiros, americanos, etc.

Comecei com um apertivo, Mojito (que me pareceu muito pálido, mas o rum era bom), e camarões grelhados. Depois encomendei o vinho Borba do Alentejo, Visconde de Borba 2010, fresco e muito saboroso, o que nos permitiu acompanhar as Lulas Grelhadas, da Carmen Lícia, e eu um Bacalhau Lagareiro.
Terminei por uma salada de frutas, e café, sem licor, pois já havia tomado 3/4 da garrafa e ainda tinha de dirigir até o shopping...
Esqueci o valor exato, mas deu menos de 90 dólares, o que no Brasil seria impensável, suponho.
Saímos meio borrachos, o que não impediu uma simpática passante de registrar nossa foto na frente do restaurante.
Até a próxima (em Washington).

To Bric or not Too Brics? - Le Monde, Estadao, NYT

Um piquenique de chefes de Estado, ou como já disse alguém dos summits iberoamericanos: um envelope em busca de algum conteúdo...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Le Monde, blog Amérique Latine (Paulo Paranaguá)

26 mars 2013

Que fait le Brésil dans le bric-à-brac des BRICS ?

Le Brésil, la Russie, l’Inde, la Chine et l’Afrique du Sud se retrouvent au 5^e Sommet des BRICS, à Durban, en Afrique du Sud, mercredi 27 mars. L’acronyme, inventé en 2001 par un analyste de Goldman Sachs, s’est taillé une réputation, à défaut d’une identité.
Les Brésiliens veulent y voir une « entité politico-diplomatique » destinée à mieux faire entendre la voix des émergents sur la scène internationale, tout en mettant l’accent sur les performances économiques. Ainsi, la croissance de 6,9 % prévue en 2013 pour les BRICS serait presque le double des pronostics pour l’économie mondiale dans son ensemble. Sauf qu’à cette aune, le Brésil fait figure de canard boiteux, avec une hausse du produit intérieur brut d’à peine 0,9 % en 2012, ce que les Brésiliens appellent un Pibinho (un PIB minuscule).
Les échanges entre les BRICS s’élèvent à 282 milliards de dollars (219 milliards d'euros), soit dix fois le volume d’il y a dix ans. Cependant, ils restent négligeables en comparaison avec le volume du commerce entre ces cinq pays et le reste du monde : 6 000 milliards de dollars.
Un examen plus attentif des chiffres confirme ce qu’on sait déjà : les BRICS comptent un géant, la Chine, la seule justifiant le terme de puissance émergente. La Russie est une puissance en déclin, maintenue à flot par les exportations de gaz et des ventes d’armes. L’Inde n’est pas sortie du bourbier de ses contradictions et conflits, tandis que l’Afrique du Sud, puissance régionale à l’échelle de l’Afrique australe, gère tant bien que mal (plutôt mal) le lourd héritage de l’apartheid.

Lula et Dilma Rousseff à Sao Paulo en 2012.
Photo Ricardo Stuckert

Le bric-à-brac des BRICS est une auberge espagnole. Le Brésil est en concurrence avec la Chine en Amérique latine et en Afrique, mais aussi sur son propre marché intérieur. Tandis que les Brésiliens leur vendent du fer et du soja, les Chinois font du dumping face aux produits industriels « made in Brazil ». Si prompt à dénoncer la « guerre des monnaies », en pointant du doigt le dollar, Brasilia se tait sur le taux du  yuan.
Il y a une sorte de schizophrénie brésilienne, partagée entre l’empressement à conforter les BRICS et une diplomatie économique pour le moins poussive, pour ne pas dire erratique. Sous les présidences de Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva et de Dilma Rousseff, le Brésil a beaucoup misé sur les relations Sud-Sud, comme si l’Union européenne (UE) et les Etats-Unis n’étaient pas ses principaux partenaires.
Le Mercosur et l'UE, un mariage de raison ?
Pourtant, le Mercosur (l’union douanière sud-américaine) et l’Amérique latine ne semblent plus vraiment prioritaires pour les Brésiliens, si ce n’est dans la rhétorique. Le Mercosur est en panne, sans que Brasilia ne réagisse autrement que par la fuite en avant, l’élargissement au Venezuela compliquant la donne. L’Union des nations sud-américaines (Unasur) et la Communauté des Etats latino-américains et caribéens (Celac) restent des forums politiques, tandis que d’autres pays de la région avancent vers une intégration et une ouverture accrues, grâce à l’Alliance du Pacifique.
Ce contexte éclaire la place accordée aux BRICS. Le Brésil se rêve en puissance émergente et n’hésite pas à faire cavalier seul par rapport à ses turbulents voisins. Bien sûr, les diplomates brésiliens font ce qu’ils peuvent pour éviter des problèmes de voisinage, mais ne vont pas jusqu’à se salir les mains dans les litiges qui les entourent. Seule exception, la participation à la Mission des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (Minustah), gage de la candidature brésilienne à un poste permanent au Conseil de sécurité, insaisissable faute de réforme de l’ONU.
Cette gestion diplomatique à la petite semaine est en crise. Brasilia se voit menacé par le projet de Trans-Pacific Partnership (Accord de partenariat trans-pacifique, TPP) et la future négociation d’un Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Accord de commerce et d’investissement transatlantique, TTIP) entre les Etats-Unis et l’UE.
Pris de court, le Brésil tente de relancer les échanges et le partenariat avec le Canada et avec les Etats-Unis, et mise aussi sur un accord entre le Mercosur et l’UE, après dix ans de négociations infructueuses. Le moment est difficile pour la reprise des tractations entre le Mercosur et l’UE, car l’Argentine est réticente, le Venezuela s’oppose à tout accord de libre-échange et la crise rend problématiques des concessions de l'UE sur le marché agricole. Les Brésiliens pourraient essayer de négocier seuls, à l’instar des négociations entre l’UE et les pays andins.
Pour le Brésil, la présence dans le club exclusif des BRICS ne règle rien, c’est une sorte d’ersatz, une façon de jouer dans la cour des grands, par le verbe et la posture.
==========
Um fundo político
27 de março de 2013 | 2h 08
Celso Ming - O Estado de S.Paulo

Na reunião de cúpula iniciada ontem e que continua hoje, na África do Sul, os chefes de governo dos Brics (Brasil, Rússia, Índia, China e África do Sul) criaram um fundo de resgate cuja utilidade não é clara. Parece mais uma iniciativa destinada a passar para o mundo a ideia de que a sigla Brics não é artificial e que pode vir a construir boa unidade política.

Pela sua condição de contingência, esse fundo estaria disponível sempre que um dos países-membros enfrentasse crise de liquidez, ou seja, tivesse de lidar com repentina incapacidade de honrar compromissos no exterior. Assim, desempenharia função parecida com a do Fundo Monetário Internacional e, nesse sentido, se apresentaria como alternativa ao Fundo.

A tabela que está logo aí mostra que as cinco economias têm impressionante volume de reservas internacionais. E reserva é o que o nome diz: uma carteira de recursos imediatamente disponíveis cuja função é proteger a economia contra eventuais crises de caixa.

Em outras palavras, fica difícil entender como um fundo extra de somente US$ 100 bilhões poderia propiciar mais defesa contra sufocos dessa natureza do que esse montão de recursos formado pelas próprias reservas internacionais. As da China, por exemplo, são 35 vezes maiores do que será o patrimônio desse fundo; as da Rússia, 5 vezes; as do Brasil, 3,7; e as da Índia, 2,9.

Neste momento, o único país que poderia ser atingido por um esvaziamento relativamente rápido de suas reservas seria a África do Sul, que, no entanto, tem sozinha mais da metade dos recursos disponíveis nesse fundo.

Do ponto de vista do Brasil, a disponibilidade dessa nova fonte de recursos de contingência poderia servir para que o Banco Central reduzisse sua demanda de dólares que depois fossem estocados nas reservas, como são hoje, a um custo muito alto. (Porque cada compra de dólares que depois serão aplicados a juros baixos exige emissão de títulos da dívida pública, que pagam juros de ao menos 7,25% ao ano.)

Mas a decisão de aumentar ou diminuir as reservas internacionais do Brasil não é determinada pela necessidade de construir um colchão de proteção contra crises, mas pela de executar a política cambial. Se o governo federal entende que é preciso desvalorizar o real (elevar a cotação do dólar) ou impedir valorização maior, o Banco Central compra moeda estrangeira no câmbio interno; se o objetivo é o contrário, vende.

Do ponto de vista técnico, esse fundo não faz lá muito sentido. Nenhum grupo de países se disporia a criar um patrimônio desses somente para uma ajuda eventual à África do Sul.

O que se pode dizer é que se trata de uma iniciativa destinada a passar o recado de que as cinco economias que fazem parte do Brics querem demonstrar que são mais do que uma sigla inventada em 2001 por um economista (Jim O'Neill, então do Grupo Goldman Sachs). E que, agora, se propõem a dar certo conteúdo político a uma aglomeração que, no momento, está longe de compor uma unidade.
 ===========

Group of Emerging Nations Plans to Form Development Bank

Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on Tuesday in Durban, South Africa,  just ahead of Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, South Africa’s defense minister.

By LYDIA POLGREEN

The New York Times, March 26, 2013

JOHANNESBURG — A group of five emerging world economic powers met in Africa for the first time Tuesday, gathering in South Africa for a summit meeting at which they plan to announce the creation of a new development bank, a direct challenge to the dominance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, all members of the so-called BRICS Group of developing nations, have agreed to create the bank to focus on infrastructure and development in emerging markets. The countries are also planning to discuss pooling their foreign reserves as a bulwark against currency crises, part of a growing effort by emerging economic powers to build institutions and forums that are alternatives to Western-dominated ones.

“Up until now, it has been a loose arrangement of five countries meeting once a year,” said Abdullah Verachia, director of the Frontier Advisory Group, which focuses on emerging markets. “It is going to be the first real institution we have seen.”

But the alliance faces serious questions about whether the member countries have enough in common and enough shared goals to function effectively as a counterweight to the West.

“Despite the political rhetoric around partnerships, there is a huge amount of competition between the countries,” Mr. Verachia said.

For all the talk of solidarity among emerging giants, the group’s concrete achievements have been few since its first full meeting, in Russia in 2009. This is partly because its members are deeply divided on some basic issues and are in many ways rivals, not allies, in the global economy.

They have widely divergent economies, disparate foreign policy aims and different forms of government. India, Brazil and South Africa have strong democratic traditions, while Russia and China are autocratic.

The bloc even struggles to agree on overhauling international institutions. India, Brazil and South Africa want permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, for example, but China, which already has one, has shown little interest in shaking up the status quo.

The developing countries in the bloc hardly invest in one another, preferring their neighbors and the developed world’s major economies, according to a report released Monday by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Just 2.5 percent of foreign investment by BRICS countries goes to other countries in the group, the report said, while more than 40 percent of their foreign investment goes to the developed world’s largest economies, the European Union, the United States and Japan.

Africa, home to several of the world’s fastest-growing economies, drew less than 5 percent of total investment from BRICS nations, the report said. France and the United States still have the highest rate of foreign investment in Africa. Despite China’s reputation for heavy investment in Africa, Malaysia has actually invested $2 billion more in Africa than China has.

Still, 15 African heads of state were invited to the summit meeting in South Africa as observers, a sign of the continent’s increasing importance as an investment destination for all of the BRICS countries.

China is in many ways a major competitor of its fellow BRICS member, South Africa. South African manufacturers, retail chains, cellphone service providers, mining operations and tourism companies have bet heavily on African economic growth and in some ways go head-to-head against Chinese companies on the continent.

South Africa is playing host for the first time since becoming the newest member of what had been known previously as BRIC. Many analysts have questioned South Africa’s inclusion in the group because its economy is tiny compared with the other members, ranking 28th in the world, and its growth rates in recent years have been anemic.

In an interview last year with a South African newspaper, Jim O’Neill, the Goldman Sachs executive who coined the term BRIC, said South Africa did not belong in the group.

“South Africa has too small an economy,” Mr. O’Neill told the newspaper, The Mail & Guardian. “There are not many similarities with the other four countries in terms of the numbers. In fact, South Africa’s inclusion has somewhat weakened the group’s power.”

But South Africa’s sluggish growth has become the rule, not the exception, among the onetime powerhouse nations. India’s hopes of reaching double-digit growth have ebbed. Brazil’s surging economy, credited with pulling millions out of poverty, has cooled drastically. Even China’s growth has slowed.

And once welcome, Chinese investment in Africa is viewed with increasing suspicion.

On a visit to Beijing last year, President Jacob Zuma of South Africa warned that Chinese trade ties in Africa were following a troubling pattern.

“Africa’s commitment to China’s development has been demonstrated by supply of raw materials, other products and technology transfer,” Mr. Zuma said. “This trade pattern is unsustainable in the long term. Africa’s past economic experience with Europe dictates a need to be cautious when entering into partnerships with other economies.”

Mr. Zuma appeared to have a change of heart before the summit meeting, saying Monday that China does not approach Africa with a colonial attitude.

But other African leaders are not so sure. Lamido Sanusi, governor of Nigeria’s central bank, wrote in an opinion article published in The Financial Times this month that China’s approach to Africa is in many ways as exploitative as the West’s has been.

“China is no longer a fellow underdeveloped economy — it is the world’s second-biggest, capable of the same forms of exploitation as the West,” he wrote. “It is a significant contributor to Africa’s deindustrialization and underdevelopment.”

A version of this article appeared in print on March 27, 2013, on page A4 of the New York edition with the headline: Group of Emerging Nations Plans to Form Development Bank.

Albert Hirschman: uma homenagem em Princeton

Imperdível... para quem está perto...

HONORING ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN (1915-2012)
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 4:30 P. M.

Dear friends, colleagues and students,
The Program in Latin American Studies (PLAS) at Princeton University will hold an event honoring Albert O. Hirschman (1915-2012)  on Wednesday, April 24th,  4:30 p. m. in 219 Aaron Burr Hall.

 Jeremy Adelman, Peter Hakim, Hilda Sabato, Lilia Schwarcz, and Deborah Yashar will participate in a roundtable discussion on Hirschman’s work and contribution to Latin America.

The event will also include the presentation of  Jeremy Adelman’s biography The Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman (Princeton University Press).

Program in Latin American Studies
Princeton University
309-316 Burr Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
(tel.) 609.258.4148 (fax) 609.258.0113
www.princeton.edu/plas