V BRICS Summit - Durban,
March 27, 2013
eThekwini Declaration
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What bureaucrats have written:
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What presidents really think:
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1. We,
the leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the
Republic of India, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South
Africa, met in Durban, South Africa, on 27 March 2013 at the Fifth BRICS
Summit. Our discussions took place under the overarching theme, “BRICS and
Africa: Partnership for Development, Integration and Industrialisation”. The
Fifth BRICS Summit concluded the first cycle of BRICS Summits and we
reaffirmed our commitment to the promotion of international law,
multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations (UN). Our
discussions reflected our growing intra-BRICS solidarity as well as our
shared goal to contribute positively to global peace, stability, development
and cooperation. We also considered our role in the international system as
based on an inclusive approach of shared solidarity and cooperation towards
all nations and peoples.
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1. Hello
folks, here we are again.
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2. We met
at a time which requires that we consider issues of mutual interest and
systemic importance in order to share concerns and to develop lasting
solutions. We aim at progressively developing BRICS into a full-fledged
mechanism of current and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues
of the world economy and politics. The prevailing global governance
architecture is regulated by institutions which were conceived in
circumstances when the international landscape in all its aspects was characterised
by very different challenges and opportunities. As the global economy is
being reshaped, we are committed to exploring new models and approaches
towards more equitable development and inclusive global growth by emphasising
complementarities and building on our respective economic strengths.
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2. Times
are hard.
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3. We are
open to increasing our engagement and cooperation with non-BRICS countries,
in particular Emerging Market and Developing Countries (EMDCs), and relevant
international and regional organisations, as envisioned in the Sanya
Declaration. We will hold a Retreat together with African leaders after this
Summit, under the theme, “Unlocking Africa’s potential: BRICS and Africa
Cooperation on Infrastructure”. The Retreat is an opportunity for BRICS and
African leaders to discuss how to strengthen cooperation between the BRICS
countries and the African Continent.
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3. Hello,
out there…
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4.
Recognising the importance of regional integration for Africa’s sustainable
growth, development and poverty eradication, we reaffirm our support for the
Continent’s integration processes.
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4. Africa
advances…
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5. Within
the framework of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), we
support African countries in their industrialisation process through stimulating
foreign direct investment, knowledge exchange, capacity-building and
diversification of imports from Africa. We acknowledge that infrastructure
development in Africa is important and recognise the strides made by the
African Union to identify and address the continent’s infrastructure
challenges through the development of the Programme for Infrastructure
Development in Africa (PIDA), the AU NEPAD Africa Action Plan (2010-2015),
the NEPAD Presidential Infrastructure Championing Initiative (PICI), as well
as the Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plans that have identified
priority infrastructure development projects that are critical to promoting
regional integration and industrialisation. We will seek to stimulate
infrastructure investment on the basis of mutual benefit to support
industrial development, job-creation, skills development, food and nutrition
security and poverty eradication and sustainable development in Africa. We
therefore, reaffirm our support for sustainable infrastructure development in
Africa.
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5. … but
there is much more to do.
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6. We
note policy actions in Europe, the US and Japan aimed at reducing tail-risks
in the world economy. Some of these actions produce negative spillover
effects on other economies of the world. Significant risks remain and the
performance of the global economy still falls behind our expectations. As a
result, uncertainty about strength and durability of the recovery and the
direction of policy in some major economies remains high. In some key countries
unemployment stays unusually elevated, while high levels of private and
public indebtedness inhibit growth. In such circumstances, we reaffirm our
strong commitment to support growth and foster financial stability. We also
underscore the need for appropriate action to be taken by advanced economies
in order to rebuild confidence, foster growth and secure a strong recovery.
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6.
Hegemonic countries want to export their crises to us…
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7.
Central Banks in advanced economies have responded with unconventional
monetary policy actions which have increased global liquidity. While this may
be consistent with domestic monetary policy mandates, major Central Banks
should avoid the unintended consequences of these actions in the form of
increased volatility of capital flows, currencies and commodity prices, which
may have negative growth effects on other economies, in particular developing
countries.
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7. They
insist with their financial tsunami.
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8. We
welcome the core objectives of the Russian Presidency in the G20 in 2013, in
particular the efforts to increased financing for investment and ensure
public debt sustainability aimed at ensuring strong, sustainable, inclusive
and balanced growth and job creation around the world. We will also continue
to prioritise the G20 development agenda as a vital element of global
economic stability and long-term sustainable growth and job creation.
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8. We’ll
stick to our agenda.
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9.
Developing countries face challenges of infrastructure development due to
insufficient long-term financing and foreign direct investment, especially
investment in capital stock. This constrains global aggregate demand. BRICS
cooperation towards more productive use of global financial resources can
make a positive contribution to addressing this problem. In March 2012 we
directed our Finance Ministers to examine the feasibility and viability of
setting up a New Development Bank for mobilising resources for infrastructure
and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies
and developing countries, to supplement the existing efforts of multilateral
and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.
Following the report from our Finance Ministers, we are satisfied that the
establishment of a New Development Bank is feasible and viable. We have
agreed to establish the New Development Bank. The initial contribution to the
Bank should be substantial and sufficient for the Bank to be effective in
financing infrastructure.
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9. We’ll
take care of our finances.
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10. In
June 2012, in our meeting in Los Cabos, we tasked our Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors to explore the construction of a financial safety net
through the creation of a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) amongst BRICS
countries. They have concluded that the establishment of a self-managed
contingent reserve arrangement would have a positive precautionary effect,
help BRICS countries forestall short-term liquidity pressures, provide mutual
support and further strengthen financial stability. It would also contribute
to strengthening the global financial safety net and complement existing
international arrangements as an additional line of defence. We are of the
view that the establishment of the CRA with an initial size of US$ 100
billion is feasible and desirable subject to internal legal frameworks and
appropriate safeguards. We direct our Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors to continue working towards its establishment.
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10. China
will borrow us some money.
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11. We
are grateful to our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors for the work
undertaken on the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement
and direct them to negotiate and conclude the agreements which will establish
them. We will review progress made in these two initiatives at our next
meeting in September 2013.
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11. We’ll
see how to expend it.
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12. We
welcome the conclusion between our Export-Import Banks (EXIM) and Development
Banks, of both the “Multilateral Agreement on Cooperation and Co-financing
for Sustainable Development” and, given the steep growth trajectory of the
African continent and the significant infrastructure funding requirements
directly emanating from this growth path, the “Multilateral Agreement on
Infrastructure Co-Financing for Africa”.
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12. There
will be some money to Africa too.
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13. We
call for the reform of International Financial Institutions to make them more
representative and to reflect the growing weight of BRICS and other
developing countries. We remain concerned with the slow pace of the reform of
the IMF. We see an urgent need to implement, as agreed, the 2010
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Governance and Quota Reform. We urge all
members to take all necessary steps to achieve an agreement on the quota
formula and complete the next general quota review by January 2014. The
reform of the IMF should strengthen the voice and representation of the
poorest members of the IMF, including Sub-Saharan Africa. All options should
be explored, with an open mind, to achieve this. We support the reform and
improvement of the international monetary system, with a broad-based
international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. We
welcome the discussion about the role of the SDR in the existing
international monetary system including the composition of SDR’s basket of
currencies. We support the IMF to make its surveillance framework more
integrated and even-handed. The leadership selection of IFIs should be through
an open, transparent and merit-based process and truly open to candidates
from the emerging market economies and developing countries.
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13. We
don’t like Bretton Woods institutions.
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14. We
emphasise the importance of ensuring steady, adequate and predictable access
to long term finance for developing countries from a variety of sources. We
would like to see concerted global effort towards infrastructure financing
and investment through the instrumentality of adequately resourced
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Regional Development Banks (RDBs).
We urge all parties to work towards an ambitious International Development
Association(IDA)17 replenishment.
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14. But
we want more money from them.
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15. We
reaffirm our support for an open, transparent and rules-based multilateral
trading system. We will continue in our efforts for the successful conclusion
of the Doha Round, based on the progress made and in keeping with its
mandate, while upholding the principles of transparency, inclusiveness and
multilateralism. We are committed to ensure that new proposals and approaches
to the Doha Round negotiations will reinforce the core principles and the
developmental mandate of the Doha Round. We look forward to significant and
meaningful deliverables that are balanced and address key development
concerns of the poorest and most vulnerable WTO members, at the ninth
Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Bali.
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15. WTO
and Doha Round are already dead.
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16. We
note that the process is underway for the selection of a new WTO
Director-General in 2013. We concur that the WTO requires a new leader who
demonstrates a commitment to multilateralism and to enhancing the
effectiveness of the WTO including through a commitment to support efforts
that will lead to an expeditious conclusion of the DDA. We consider that the
next Director-General of the WTO should be a representative of a developing
country.
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16. But
we want to manage WTO.
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17. We
reaffirm the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD)
mandate as the focal point in the UN system dedicated to consider the
interrelated issues of trade, investment, finance and technology from a
development perspective. UNCTAD’s mandate and work are unique and necessary
to deal with the challenges of development and growth in the increasingly
interdependent global economy. We also reaffirm the importance of
strengthening UNCTAD’s capacity to deliver on its programmes of consensus
building, policy dialogue, research, technical cooperation and capacity
building, so that it is better equipped to deliver on its development
mandate.
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17.
UNCTAD is OK.
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18. We
acknowledge the important role that State Owned Companies (SOCs) play in the
economy and encourage our SOCs to explore ways of cooperation, exchange of
information and best practices.
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18. Our
State companies are great! We love them!
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19. We
recognise the fundamental role played by Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
(SMEs) in the economies of our countries. SMEs are major creators of jobs and
wealth. In this regard, we will explore opportunities for cooperating in the
field of SMEs and recognise the need for promoting dialogue among the
respective Ministries and Agencies in charge of the theme, particularly with
a view to promoting their international exchange and cooperation and
fostering innovation, research and development.
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19. Small
companies exist too.
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20. We
reiterate our strong commitment to the United Nations (UN) as the foremost
multilateral forum entrusted with bringing about hope, peace, order and
sustainable development to the world. The UN enjoys universal membership and
is at the centre of global governance and multilateralism. In this regard, we
reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its
Security Council, with a view to making it more representative, effective and
efficient, so that it can be more responsive to global challenges. In this
regard, China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status
of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their
aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.
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20.
Brazil and India continue to wait for the support of China and Russia in
their bid for the UNSC (but are loosing their patience).
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21. We
underscore our commitment to work together in the UN to continue our
cooperation and strengthen multilateral approaches in international relations
based on the rule of law and anchored in the Charter of the United Nations.
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21. UN is
OK.
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22. We
are committed to building a harmonious world of lasting peace and common
prosperity and reaffirm that the 21st century should be marked by peace,
security, development, and cooperation. It is the overarching objective and
strong shared desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that
brought together BRICS countries.
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22. We
love peace, and love.
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23. We
welcome the twentieth Anniversary of the World Conference on Human Rights and
of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and agree to explore
cooperation in the field of human rights.
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23. Here
again those damned humanitarians with their nasty demands.
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24. We
commend the efforts of the international community and acknowledge the
central role of the African Union (AU) and its Peace and Security Council in
conflict resolution in Africa. We call upon the UNSC to enhance cooperation
with the African Union, and its Peace and Security Council, pursuant to UNSC
resolutions in this regard. We express our deep concern with instability
stretching from North Africa, in particular the Sahel, and the Gulf of
Guinea. We also remain concerned about reports of deterioration in
humanitarian conditions in some countries.
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24.
Africa continues to be a miserable continent.
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25. We
welcome the appointment of the new Chairperson of the AU Commission as an
affirmation of the leadership of women.
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25. Women
are great.
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26. We
express our deep concern with the deterioration of the security and
humanitarian situation in Syria and condemn the increasing violations of
human rights and of international humanitarian law as a result of continued
violence. We believe that the Joint Communiqué of the Geneva Action Group
provides a basis for resolution of the Syrian crisis and reaffirm our
opposition to any further militarization of the conflict. A Syrian-led
political process leading to a transition can be achieved only through broad
national dialogue that meets the legitimate aspirations of all sections of
Syrian society and respect for Syrian independence, territorial integrity and
sovereignty as expressed by the Geneva Joint Communiqué and appropriate UNSC
resolutions. We support the efforts of the UN-League of Arab States Joint
Special Representative. In view of the deterioration of the humanitarian
situation in Syria, we call upon all parties to allow and facilitate
immediate, safe, full and unimpeded access to humanitarian organisations to
all in need of assistance. We urge all parties to ensure the safety of
humanitarian workers.
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26. We
should continue to talk about Syria, but not too much. Hegemonic countries
should stay away.
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27. We
welcome the admission of Palestine as an Observer State to the United
Nations. We are concerned at the lack of progress in the Middle East Peace
Process and call on the international community to assist both Israel and
Palestine to work towards a two-state solution with a contiguous and
economically viable Palestinian state, existing side by side in peace with
Israel, within internationally recognized borders, based on those existing on
4 June 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital. We are deeply concerned
about the construction of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, which is a violation of international law and harmful to the
peace process. In recalling the primary responsibility of the UNSC in
maintaining international peace and security, we note the importance that the
Quartet reports regularly to the Council about its efforts, which should
contribute to concrete progress.
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27. We
love the Palestinians.
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28. We
believe there is no alternative to a negotiated solution to the Iranian
nuclear issue. We recognise Iran´s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy
consistent with its international obligations, and support resolution of the
issues involved through political and diplomatic means and dialogue,
including between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran and
in accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council
Resolutions and consistent with Iran’s obligations under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We are concerned about threats of
military action as well as unilateral sanctions. We note the recent talks
held in Almaty and hope that all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear
programme will be resolved through discussions and diplomatic means.
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28. We
should continue to talk about Iran’s nuclear programme, but not too much.
Hegemonic countries should stay away.
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29.
Afghanistan needs time, development assistance and cooperation, preferential
access to world markets, foreign investment and a clear end-state strategy to
attain lasting peace and stability. We support the global community’s
commitment to Afghanistan, enunciated at the Bonn International Conference in
December 2011, to remain engaged over the transformation decade from
2015-2024. We affirm our commitment to support Afghanistan’s emergence as a
peaceful, stable and democratic state, free of terrorism and extremism, and
underscore the need for more effective regional and international cooperation
for the stabilisation of Afghanistan, including by combating terrorism. We
extend support to the efforts aimed at combating illicit traffic in opiates
originating in Afghanistan within the framework of the Paris Pact.
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29. Afghanistan
is a mess, and will continue to be a mess, whatever “solution” is devised for
that mess.
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30. We
commend the efforts of the AU, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) and Mali aimed at restoring sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Mali. We support the civilian efforts of the Malian Government and its
international community partners in realising the transitional programme
leading up to the presidential and legislative elections. We emphasise the
importance of political inclusiveness and economic and social development in
order for Mali to achieve sustainable peace and stability. We express concern
about the reports of the deterioration in humanitarian conditions in Mali and
call upon the international community to continue to cooperate with Mali and
its neighbouring countries in order to ensure humanitarian assistance to
civilian population affected by the armed conflict.
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30. Mali
is a mess, but the fault is with the hegemonic countries.
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31. We
are gravely concerned with the deterioration in the current situation in the Central
African Republic (CAR) and deplore the loss of life. We strongly
condemn the abuses and acts of violence against the civilian population and urge
all parties to the conflict to immediately cease hostilities and return to
negotiations. We call upon all parties to allow safe and unhindered
humanitarian access. We are ready to work with the international community to
assist in this endeavour and facilitate progress to a peaceful resolution of
the conflict. Brazil, Russia and China express their sympathy to the South
African and Indian governments for the casualties that their citizens
suffered in the CAR.
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31. Central
African Republic is a mess; we are becoming tired of all this African mess.
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32. We
are gravely concerned by the ongoing instability in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC). We welcome the signing in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013
of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and the Region. We support its independence, territorial
integrity and sovereignty. We support the efforts of the UN, AU and
sub-regional organisations to bring about peace, security and stability in
the country.
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32.
Congo, whatever Congo could be, is a mess. We have already dropped it.
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33. We
reiterate our strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations and stress that there can be no justification, whatsoever, for
any acts of terrorism. We believe that the UN has a central role in
coordinating international action against terrorism within the framework of
the UN Charter and in accordance with principles and norms of international
law. In this context, we support the implementation of the UN General
Assembly Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and are determined to strengthen
cooperation in countering this global threat. We also reiterate our call for
concluding negotiations as soon as possible in the UN General Assembly on the
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and its adoption by all
Member States and agreed to work together towards this objective.
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33.
Terrorism is a nuisance. We should talk about that too.
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34. We
recognize the critical positive role the Internet plays globally in promoting
economic, social and cultural development. We believe it’s important to
contribute to and participate in a peaceful, secure, and open cyberspace and
we emphasise that security in the use of Information and Communication
Technologies (ICTs) through universally accepted norms, standards and
practices is of paramount importance.
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34. We do
not want the internet controlled by the Americans.
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35. We
congratulate Brazil on hosting the UN Conference on Sustainable Development
(Rio+20) in June 2012 and welcome the outcome as reflected in “The Future we
Want”, in particular, the reaffirmation of the Rio Principles and political
commitment made towards sustainable development and poverty eradication while
creating opportunities for BRICS partners to engage and cooperate in the
development of the future Sustainable Development Goals.
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35.
Brazil is beautiful, albeit too expensive.
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36. We
congratulate India on the outcome of the 11th Conference of the Parties to
the United Nations Conference on Biological Diversity (CBD COP11) and the
sixth meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the
Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
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36. India
is fine, but it is a mess too.
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37. While
acknowledging that climate change is one of the greatest challenges and
threats towards achieving sustainable development, we call on all parties to
build on the decisions adopted in COP18/CMP8 in Doha, with a view to reaching
a successful conclusion by 2015, of negotiations on the development of a protocol,
another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the
Convention applicable to all Parties, guided by its principles and
provisions.
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37.
Developed countries should pay for the global warming; and they have to
transfer some free technology to us.
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38. We
believe that the internationally agreed development goals including the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) address the needs of developing
countries, many of which continue to face developmental challenges, including
widespread poverty and inequality. Low Income Countries (LICs) continue to
face challenges that threaten the impressive growth performance of recent
years. Volatility in food and other commodity prices have made food security
an issue as well as constraining their sources of revenue. Progress in
rebuilding macro-economic buffers has been relatively slow, partly due to
measures adopted to mitigate the social impact of exogenous shocks. Many LICs
are currently in a weaker position to deal with exogenous shocks given the more
limited fiscal buffers and the constrained aid envelopes, which will affect
their ability to sustain progress towards achieving the MDGs. We reiterate
that individual countries, especially in Africa and other developing
countries of the South, cannot achieve the MDGs on their own and therefore
the centrality of Goal 8 on Global Partnerships for Development to achieve
the MDGs should remain at the core of the global development discourse for
the UN System. Furthermore, this requires the honouring of all commitments
made in the outcome documents of previous major international conferences.
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38. If
developed countries want developing countries to achieve at least 10 per cent
of the Millennium Development Goals, they should give more money.
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39. We
reiterate our commitment to work together for accelerated progress in
attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the target date of 2015,
and we call upon other members of the international community to work towards
the same objective. In this regard, we stress that the development agenda
beyond 2015 should build on the MDG framework, keeping the focus on poverty
eradication and human development, while addressing emerging challenges of
development taking into consideration individual national circumstances of
developing countries. In this regard the critical issue of the mobilization
of means of implementation in assisting developing countries needs to be an
overarching goal. It is important to ensure that any discussion on the UN
development agenda, including the “Post 2015 Development Agenda” is an
inclusive and transparent inter-Governmental process under a UN-wide process
which is universal and broad based.
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39. Millennium
Development Goals are fine but we do not believe they will be reached.
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40. We welcome
the establishment of the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs), in line with the Rio+20 Outcome Document which reaffirmed the
Rio Principles of Sustainable Development as the basis for addressing new and
emerging challenges. We are fully committed to a coordinated
inter-governmental process for the elaboration of the UN development agenda.
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40.
Sustainability is fine; we like it.
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41. We
note the following meetings held in the implementation of the Delhi Action
Plan:
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41. There
are too much meetings.
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• Meeting
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the margins of UNGA.
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Food was
not famous last time.
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• Meeting
of National Security Advisors in New Delhi.
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One of
our guys was robbed in the last meeting.
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•
Meetings of Finance Ministers, and Central Bank Governors in Washington DC
and Tokyo.
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They love
to talk about money.
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• Meeting
of Trade Ministers in Puerto Vallarta.
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There is
no hope, you who enter here.
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•
Meetings of Health Ministers in New Delhi and Geneva.
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Attention
to new flu strain.
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42. We
welcome the establishment of the BRICS Think Tanks Council and the BRICS
Business Council and take note of the following meetings which were held in
preparation for this Summit:
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42. We
think too, sometimes.
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• Fifth
Academic Forum
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Talk and
talk…
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• Fourth
Business Forum
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Real
discount, sales.
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• Third
Financial Forum
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How much
is the dollar?
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43. We
welcome the outcomes of the meeting of the BRICS Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors and endorse the Joint Communique of the Third Meeting
of the BRICS Trade Ministers held in preparation for the Summit.
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43. Those
guys are too slow…
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44. We
are committed to forging a stronger partnership for common development. To
this end, we adopt the eThekwini Action Plan.
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44. We’ll
meet again; we love each other.
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45. We
agree that the next summit cycles will, in principle, follow the sequence of
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
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45. BRICS
should be Brics. Or, perhaps: C + Bris?
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46.
Brazil, Russia, India and China extend their warm appreciation to the
Government and people of South Africa for hosting the Fifth BRICS Summit in
Durban.
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46. Next
time, try to meet with less Heads of State: Africa has too much.
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47.
Russia, India, China and South Africa convey their appreciation to Brazil for
its offer to host the first Summit of the second cycle of BRICS Summits, i.e.
the Sixth BRICS Summit in 2014 and convey their full support thereto.
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47.
Brazil should become less expensive.
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eThekwini
Action Plan:
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More work
to do…
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1. Meeting
of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the margins of UNGA.
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1. They
are becoming tiresome.
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2.
Meeting of BRICS National Security Advisors.
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2. Of
what security are you talking?
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3.
Mid-term meeting of Sherpas and Sous-Sherpas.
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3. Here
come the per-diem slaves.
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4.
Meetings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in the margins of
G20 meetings, WB/IMF meetings, as well as stand-alone meetings, as required.
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4. They
love to compare exchange rates.
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5.
Meetings of BRICS Trade Ministers on the margins of multilateral events, or
stand-alone meetings, as required.
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5. We
have to mask our protectionist moves…
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6.
Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Agriculture and Agrarian Development, preceded
by a preparatory meeting of experts on agro-products and food security issues
and the Meeting of Agriculture Expert Working Group.
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6. Is
there any food insecurity?
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7.
Meeting of BRICS Health Ministers and preparatory meetings.
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7. Don’t
kiss erratically.
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8.
Meeting of BRICS Officials responsible for population on the margins of
relevant multilateral events.
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8. We
love people.
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9.
Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Science and Technology and meeting of BRICS
Senior Officials on Science and Technology.
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9. Will
the new iPhone be there?
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10.
Meeting of BRICS Cooperatives.
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10.
Cooperate guys.
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11.
Meetings of financial and fiscal authorities in the margins of WB/IMF
meetings as well as stand-alone meetings, as required.
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11.
Again, comparing exchange rates.
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12.
Meetings of the BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI).
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12. Oh,
forget Doha Round.
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13.
Meeting of the BRICS Friendship Cities and Local Governments Cooperation
Forum.
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13.
Mayors love to travel too.
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14.
Meeting of the BRICS Urbanisation Forum.
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14. And
their architects.
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15.
Meeting of BRICS Competition Authorities in 2013 in New Delhi.
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15. Too
much competition is not always to prescribe.
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16. 5th
Meeting of BRICS Heads of National Statistical Institutions.
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17. Damn
statistics!
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17.
Consultations amongst BRICS Permanent Missions and/or Embassies, as
appropriate, in New York, Vienna, Rome, Paris, Washington, Nairobi and
Geneva, where appropriate.
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17.
Besides Nairobi, the rest is OK.
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18.
Consultative meeting of BRICS Senior Officials in the margins of relevant
sustainable development, environment and climate related international fora,
where appropriate.
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18.
Diplomats are made for travel.
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Source: Brics Reflection
Group; California.
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