United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377 - Wikipedia

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377

Wikipedia: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly_Resolution_377

 

[A case study for Ukraine, PRA, January 8, 2024]

 

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377 A,^[1] the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, states that in any cases where the Security Council, because of a lack of unanimity among its five permanent members (P5), fails to act as required to maintain international security and peace, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately and may issue appropriate recommendations to UN members for collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary, in order to maintain or restore international security and peace. It was adopted 3 November 1950, after fourteen days of Assembly discussions, by a vote of 52 to 5, with 2 abstentions.^[2] The resolution was designed to provide the UN with an alternative avenue for action when at least one P5 member uses its veto to obstruct the Security Council from carrying out its functions mandated by the UN Charter.

To facilitate prompt action by the General Assembly in the case of a deadlocked Security Council, the resolution created the mechanism of the emergency special session (ESS).^[3] Emergency special sessions have been convened under this procedure on eleven occasions, with the most recent convened in February 2022, to address Russia's invasion of Ukraine. However, unlike the preceding ESSs, the tenth ESS has been 'adjourned' and 'resumed' on numerous occasions over the past several years, and remains adjourned. Indeed, more than ten separate 'meetings' have been held by the Assembly, whilst sitting in the tenth ESS, since 2000.^[4]

 

Text of the General Assembly resolution

Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto, ...

Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States ... does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, ...

Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

 

Origins

The Uniting for Peace resolution was initiated by the United States,^[5] and submitted by the "Joint Seven-Powers"^[6] in October 1950, as a means of circumventing further Soviet vetoes during the course of the Korean War (25 June 1950 – 27 July 1953). It was adopted by 52 votes to 5,^[7] with 2 abstentions.^[8]

In the closing days of Assembly discussions leading up to the adoption of 377 A, US delegate to the UN, John Foster Dulles, made specific reference to the Korean War as a chief motivator in the passage of the resolution:

Then came the armed attack on the Republic of Korea and it seemed that the pattern of 1931^[9] had in fact begun to repeat itself and that the third world war might be in the making. And that might have been—and I think it would have been—had it not been for a series of accidental circumstances which made it possible to improvise collective resistance to that aggression.^[10]

The principal accidental circumstance referred to by Dulles was that the Soviet Union was boycotting the Security Council at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, and had been since January 1950, owing to its discontent over the UN's refusal to recognize the People's Republic of China's representatives as the legitimate representatives of China,^[11] returning only on 1 August 1950 to assume the rotating role of Council President, for that month. This circumstance had meant that the Security Council was able to adopt its resolutions 83, of 27 June 1950,^[12] and 84, of 7 July 1950,^[13]thereby establishing a UN-mandated force for South Korea "to repel the armed attack" from the North. Had the Soviet Union been seated at the Council during the months of June and July, the relevant draft resolutions would almost certainly have been vetoed, and the United States was well aware of this, as evidenced by the above statement.

 

Assembly discussions on the "Joint Seven-Power draft resolution"

Some of the key statements made during Assembly discussions on 377 A, whilst sitting in plenary, include:^{[14][15][16][17]}

 

United States (John Foster Dulles)

If, in response to our resolution, the Member States do actually establish a system which ensures that aggression will be promptly exposed, if they maintain a collective strength, and if they have both the will and the way to use that strength promptly in case of need, then a third world war may be permanently averted ... It would be vastly reassuring to all who love peace if here we could adopt unanimously a programme which only aggressors need fear.^[18] ... We must organize dependably the collective will to resist. If the Security Council does not do so, then this Assembly must do what it can by invoking its residual power of recommendation ...^[19] As the world moves in the path that this resolution defines, it will move nearer and nearer to the Charter ideal.^[20]

 

United Kingdom (Kenneth Gilmour Younger)

The Soviet Union ... has attributed to the Council a power which it has never had under the Charter, namely, the power to insist that, because the Council has itself been reduced to impotence in the face of aggression by disagreement among its permanent members, the entire world Organisation shall wash its hands of the whole matter and let aggression take its course. The Council has never possessed any such right. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive that the authors of the Charter at San Francisco would have lent themselves to a proposition so far out of tune with the hopes and wishes of the peoples of the world.^[21] ... This resolution should help to make aggression less likely by giving notice to any intending aggressor that he risks uniting the world against him ...^[22] All the peace-loving nations must welcome the strengthening of the forces of peace which the passing of these resolutions will represent.^[23]

 

France (Jean Chauvel)

France supports the Charter—the whole Charter ... Where peace and security are at stake, France considers that the General Assembly and the Security Council should assume all the responsibilities laid upon them by the Charter ...^[24] It is unthinkable that this entire machinery, designed to safeguard the peace and security of the world, should remain inactive when there is a threat to peace and security. And if ... there is a real danger of such inactivity, then we must revise our customs, our methods, our rules and our interpretations.^[25] ... My delegation felt ... that it was unnecessary to revise the Charter, which itself afforded the means of ensuring that its principles should be applied ... The draft resolution does not infringe upon the Security Council’s competence, responsibilities or powers. The Council should fulfil its role; if it does so it will be adequate ... If, however, for some reason, it does not fulfil its role, the United Nations will not thereby be paralysed. A special [emergency] session of the General Assembly can be convened within twenty-four hours and the Assembly ... can discuss and adopt any recommendations which appear necessary for the maintenance or re-establishment of peace and security.^[26][27]

 

Soviet Union (Andrey Vyshinsky)

The organizers of the Anglo-American bloc, in their inflammatory speeches against the USSR ... yesterday and today, tried to create the impression that they wanted to organize a check against any possible aggressor ... As if our troops were waging war in every country! As if we had surrounded the world with a fiery ring of naval, air and other bases! As if we were conducting a furious armaments race, daily spending more and more thousands of millions which the taxpayer, the ordinary American people, have to provide! As if we really did not want to outlaw the atomic bomb! Yet this draft resolution does not even refer to the necessity of ensuring that the atomic bomb is outlawed! ...^[28] We must now have been seeking for some five years to ensure that a decision to outlaw the atomic bomb—the use of the atomic bomb—is taken.^[29] ... We base our arguments on the fundamental provision laid down in Article 10 of the Charter, namely, that the General Assembly may discuss and make recommendations on any matters relating to the powers and functions of any organs of the United Nations—and consequently of an organ such as the Security Council—except as otherwise provided. But two exceptions are provided. The first, which applies to all matters, is to be found in Article 12, paragraph 1, which says that when the Security Council is considering these questions or exercising its functions in respect thereof, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation ... The other exception is in the last sentence of Article 11, paragraph 2, which says that if a question which may be considered by the General Assembly calls for enforcement action ... then it must necessarily be referred to the Security Council ... But there is a basic reservation ... It is that ... the General Assembly may decide, what measures "not involving the use of force" are to be employed. Severance of diplomatic relations is a measure not involving the use of armed force. Interruption of economic relations is an enforcement measure not involving the use of armed force.^[30]

 

Invocation of General Assembly 377

The Uniting for Peace resolution was implemented 13 times between 1951 and 2022. It has been invoked by both the Security Council (8 times) and the General Assembly (5 times). Eleven of those cases took the form of Emergency Special Sessions.

 

Security Council invoked

 

Middle East (1956) – France and UK veto – 1st Emergency Special Session

Invoked by Security Council Resolution 119. Although "Uniting for Peace" was enacted because of Soviet vetoes, its first use was against two NATO members.^[31] The Assembly's first emergency special session was instigated by a procedural vote of the Security Council on its Resolution 119 of 31 October 1956,^[32] as a result of the Suez Crisis, which commenced 29 October 1956. France and the United Kingdom were the only two Council members to vote against the adoption of Council resolution 119, and were likewise, along with Israel, the principal antagonists in the conflict with Egypt. The session's meetings were held between 1 November and 10 November 1956.

On 7 November 1956, the Assembly adopted resolution 1001,^[3] thereby establishing the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) to "secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities". The Assembly, by its own resolutions, not only established UNEF I, but also called for "an immediate cease-fire", and recommended "that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area", thereby authorizing military sanctions.

 

Hungary (1956) – USSR veto – 2nd Emergency Special Session

Further information: Hungarian Revolution of 1956

Invoked by Security Council Resolution 120. Second UNGA Emergency Special Session on "The Situation in Hungary" adopted five resolutions, including Resolution 1004 (ES-II) mandating a commission of inquiry into foreign intervention in Hungary.

 

Middle East (1958) – USSR veto – 3rd Emergency Special Session

Invoked by Security Council Resolution 129. Third UNGA Emergency Special Session on "The Situation in the Middle East" adopted Resolution 1237 (ES-III) calling for early withdrawal of foreign troops from Jordan and Lebanon.

 

Congo (1960) – USSR veto – 4th Emergency Special Session

Further information: United Nations Operation in the Congo

Invoked by Security Council Resolution 157. UNGA Fourth Emergency Special Session on the "Congo Situation" adopted Resolution 1474/Rev. 1/(ES-IV) requesting Secretary-General to continue to take vigorous action in accordance with Security Council resolutions and appealing to all Members for urgent voluntary contributions to a UN Fund for the Congo and to refrain from sending military assistance except through the UN.^[33]

 

Bangladesh (1971) – USSR veto – Resolved without Special Session

Further information: Bangladesh Liberation War

Invoked by Security Council Resolution 303. The Twenty-Sixth Regular Session was seated no Emergency Special Session was needed so the issue was handled under the agenda item "UN Assistance to East Pakistan Refugees".

 

Afghanistan (1980) – USSR veto – 6th Emergency Special Session

Further information: Soviet–Afghan War

Invoked by Security Council Resolution 462. Sixth Emergency Special Session on "The Situation in Afghanistan" adopted Resolution ES-6/2 calling for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

 

Middle East (1982) – US veto – 9th Emergency Special Session

Invoked by Security Council Resolution 500. Ninth Emergency Special Session on "The Situation in the Middle East" adopted Resolution ES-9/1 declaring Israel a non-peace-loving state and calling on members to apply a number of measures on Israel.

 

Ukraine (2022) – Russia veto – 11th Emergency Special Session

Further information: 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

Invoked by Security Council Resolution 2623. Eleventh Emergency Special Session on "The Situation in Ukraine" met on 28th February 2022.

 

General Assembly invoked

 

Korea (1951) – USSR veto

Further information: Korean War

Following three vetoes by the USSR on the situation in Korea, six Security Council members requested the General Assembly to consider the situation (A/1618). The Security Council subsequently removed the item from its agenda, enabling the General Assembly to freely discuss the matter under Article 11 of the UN Charter. In resolution 498(V), the Assembly used the language of the Uniting for Peace resolution: "noting that the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security with regard to Chinese communist intervention in Korea ..."

 

Middle East (1967) – USSR failed to obtain 9 votes – 5th Emergency Special Session

Further information: Six-Day War

Invoked by General Assembly at the request of USSR (A/6717) and vote (98-3-3). Fifth Emergency Special Session on "The Situation in the Middle East" adopted six resolutions, including Resolutions 2253 and 2254 (ES-V) calling on Israel to rescind unilateral measures in Jerusalem.

 

Palestine (1980) – US veto – 7th Emergency Special Session

Invoked by General Assembly request Senegal (A/ES-7/1). Seventh Emergency Special Session on "The Question of Palestine" adopted eight resolutions (ES-7/2 through ES-7/9) calling for the unconditional and total withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied since 1967.

 

Namibia (1981) – France, UK and US veto – 8th Emergency Special Session

Further information: South African Border War

Invoked by General Assembly at the request of Zimbabwe (A/ES-8/1). The UNGA's eighth emergency special session was convened by Zimbabwe in order to discuss the "Question of Namibia". Its meetings were conducted between 3 September and 14 September 1981.^[3]

At the conclusion of the final meeting of the session, the Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/ES-8/2:^[3]

Declaring that the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa together with the repeated acts of aggression committed by South Africa against neighbouring States constitute a breach of international peace and security,

Noting with regret and concern that the Security Council failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security when draft resolutions proposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations were vetoed by the three Western permanent members of the Council on 30 April 1981, ...

6. Calls upon Member States, specialized agencies and other international organizations to render increased and sustained support and material, financial, military and other assistance to the South West Africa People's Organization to enable it to intensify its struggle for the liberation of Namibia; ...

13. Calls upon all States, in view of the threat to international peace and security posed by South Africa, to impose against that country comprehensive mandatory sanctions in accordance with the provisions of the Charter;

14. Also strongly urges States to cease forthwith, individually and collectively, all dealings with South Africa in order totally to isolate it politically, economically, militarily and culturally; ...

This was the first occasion on which the Assembly authorized economic, diplomatic and cultural sanctions against a state; it had already authorized military sanctions by its resolution 1001 of 7 November 1956,^[3] during its first emergency special session.

 

Palestine (1997) – US veto – 10th Emergency Special Session

Invoked by General Assembly request of Qatar (A/ES/10/1). Tenth Emergency Special Session on "The Question of Palestine", still in session, adopted inter alia, Resolution ES-10/14 requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. For more information see Tenth Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly

 

Uniting for Peace and the Security Council 'veto power'

Main article: United Nations Security Council veto power

It has been argued that with the adoption of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution by the General Assembly, and given the interpretations of the Assembly's powers that became customary international law as a result, the Security Council 'power of veto' problem could be surmounted.^[34] By adopting A/RES/377 A, on 3 November 1950, over two-thirds of UN Member states declared that, according to the UN Charter, the permanent members of the UNSC cannot and should not prevent the UNGA from taking any and all action necessary to restore international peace and security, in cases where the UNSC has failed to exercise its 'primary responsibility' for maintaining peace. Such an interpretation sees the UNGA as being awarded 'final responsibility'—rather than 'secondary responsibility'—for matters of international peace and security, by the UN Charter. Various official and semi-official UN reports make explicit reference to the Uniting for Peace resolution as providing a mechanism for the UNGA to overrule any UNSC vetoes.^{[35][36][37][38]}

 

Treatment of the Uniting for Peace resolution by the International Court of Justice

• ICJ, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 151.
• ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16.
• ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136.
•  

Notes

1.     ^ United Nations General Assembly (November 3, 1950). "377 (V). Uniting for peace" (PDF). United Nations. Retrieved 2023-12-15.

2.     ^ The Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the Ukrainian SSR voted against. Argentina and India abstained. See United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 302. A/PV.302page 7. 3 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-07.

3.     ^ Jump up to:a b c d e UN General Assembly Emergency Special Sessions. UN.org.

4.     ^ See A/ES-10/PV.1 onwards. UN.org[permanent dead link]

5.     ^ Williams, W: Intergovernmental Military Forces and World Public Order, page 284, Oceana Publications, 1971

6.     ^ United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Turkey, Philippines and Uruguay

7.     ^ Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic

8.     ^ India and Argentina

9.     ^ A reference to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.

10.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 299. A/PV.299 page 4. John Foster Dulles 1 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

11.  ^ Malanczuk, P: Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, Ed. 7, page 375, Routledge, 1997

12.  ^ United Nations Security Council Resolution 83. S/RES/83(1950) (1950) Retrieved 2008-02-10.

13.  ^ United Nations Security Council Resolution 84. S/RES/84(1950) (1950) Retrieved 2008-02-10.

14.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal A/PV.299 1 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

15.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal A/PV.300 2 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

16.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal A/PV.301 2 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

17.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal A/PV.302 3 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

18.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 299. A/PV.299 page 4. John Foster Dulles 1 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

19.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 299. A/PV.299 page 4. John Foster Dulles 1 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

20.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 299. A/PV.299 page 5. John Foster Dulles 1 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

21.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 300. A/PV.300 page 1. Kenneth Gilmour Younger 2 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-07.

22.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 300. A/PV.300 page 1. Kenneth Gilmour Younger 2 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

23.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 300. A/PV.300 page 2. Kenneth Gilmour Younger 2 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

24.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 299. A/PV.299 page 10. Jean Chauvel 1 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

25.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 299. A/PV.299 page 11. Jean Chauvel 1 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

26.  ^ UN General Assembly. 299th Plenary Meeting 1 November 1950.

27.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 299. A/PV.299 page 11. Jean Chauvel 1 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

28.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 301. A/PV.301 page 8. Andrey Vyshinsky 2 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

29.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 301. A/PV.301 page 9. Andrey Vyshinsky 2 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

30.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 5 Proces Verbal 301. A/PV.301 page 14. Andrey Vyshinsky 2 November 1950. Retrieved 2008-04-13.

31.  ^ Eayrs, James (1964). The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey. Oxford University Press. p. 171.

32.  ^ UN Security Council resolutions of 1956|date=February 2022}}. UN.org

33.  ^ UN Headquarters Library, "Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly: 4th Emergency Special Sess., 1960‑09‑17–19; 15th Sess., 1960‑09‑20–12‑20 (Pt. 1), 1961‑03‑07–04‑21 (Pt. 2)" ST/LIB/SER.B/A.11 (1961), p. 2.

34.  ^ Hunt, C. "The 'veto' charade", ZNet, 7 November 2006. Retrieved 1 March 2008

35.  ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 52 Document 856. A/52/856 Retrieved 2008-03-01.

36.  ^ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. "The Responsibility to Protect ArchivedSeptember 10, 2005, at the Wayback Machine", ICISS.ca, December 2001. Retrieved 1 March 2008.

37.  ^ "A/58/47 Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council", UN.org, 21 July 2004. Retrieved 1 March 2008.

38.  ^ Non-Aligned Movement. "MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT Archived April 11, 2008, at the Wayback Machine", UN.int, 27 May – 30 May 2006. Retrieved 1 March 2008.

39.   

References

• UN General Assembly Emergency Special Sessions. UN.org
• UN General Assembly resolutions of the Fifth Regular Session (1950). UN.org
• UN General Assembly Landmark Documents. UN.org
• UN Security Council resolutions of 1956. UN.org

 

Further reading

• J. Andrassy, “Uniting for Peace”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 50 (1956) 563-582.
• R. Barber, "Uniting for Peace Not Aggression: Responding to Chemical Weapons in Syria Without Breaking the Law", J Conflict Security Law (2019) 24(1), 71-110.
• A.J. Carswell, 'Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution', J Conflict Security Law (Winter 2013) 18 (3), 453-480.
• J. Krasno and M. Das, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution and Other Ways of Circumventing the Authority of the Security Council”, in: B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds.), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, London et al.: Routledge, 2008, 173-195.
• K. S. Petersen, “The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950”, International Organization, vol. 13 (1959) 219-232.
• M. Ramsden, "'Uniting for Peace' and Humanitarian Intervention: The Authorising Function of the U.N. General Assembly, Washington International Law Journal, vol. 25 (2016), 267-304.
• H. Reicher, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of its Passage”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 20 (1982) 1-49.
• E. Stein and R. Morrissey, “Uniting for Peace Resolution”, in: Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4, Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier, 2000, 1232-1235.
• Christian Tomuschat, Introductory note, procedural history note and audiovisual material on General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950 (Uniting for Peace) in the Historic Archives of the United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law
• D. Zaum, ‘The Security Council, the General Assembly and War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution’, in Vaughan Lowe; Adam Roberts; Jennifer Welsh; Dominik Zaum, eds. (6 June 2010). The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford University Press, 2008. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199583300., pp. 154–74. ISBN 978-0-19-953343-5 (hardback); ISBN 978-0-19-958330-0 (paperback). US edition.

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A “desdolarização” fracassa na primeira tentativa - Vinod DSouza

BRICS: India Gets Reality Check, Ditching US Dollar Becomes Impossible

Vinod Dsouza

4/01/2024

BRICS member India had convinced 22 countries to accept the Rupee for international trade and ditch the US dollar. The majority of the countries hail from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the global south. India also opened special Vostro bank accounts to make it easier to settle payments in their local currency, the Rupee. All the 22 countries had signed the agreement to trade a part of goods in the Rupee and sideline the US dollar.

However, things are not going as planned for India as the majority of countries are now unwilling to keep the Rupee as reserves. India finds no takers for the Rupee as the currency is declining against the US dollar. Hoarding the Rupee in reserves serves no purpose, as the demand for the currency lacks strength in the global market.

The default payment is now either the US dollar, Euro, Pound, Chinese Yuan, Japanese Yen, or UAE’s Dirhams. The Rupee is finding no seat at the table, making the idea of ditching the US dollar impossible.

at the table, making the idea of ditching the US dollar impossible.

Also Read: 25 New Countries Ready To Join BRICS in 2024

UN Resolution, "Uniting for Peace" in favor of Ukraine - Anton Geraschenko, Christian Tomuschat

 Hoje no Mundo Militar liked

Anton Gerashchenko

@Gerashchenko_en

It is very important! I ask for maximum dissemination and cooperation! Let's do it! There is a UN Resolution commonly known as "Uniting for Peace" resolution. It was adopted in 1950 and states that if the UN Security Council cannot reach an agreement on urgent international peace matters, then the responsibility for this is handed over to UN General Assembly (where there is no veto power). Here is a Wikipedia article about this: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly_Resolution_377 UN Security Council is scheduled to meet on January 10th regarding Russia using missiles from North Korea in Ukraine. With Russia having veto power in the Security Council, isn't that the right time to put this resolution in action? One of the most serious consequences of the Russian aggression in Ukraine is destroying the global security system as now it is de-facto not functioning. Without firm, decisive actions, without a clear position, the world will plummet into chaos and constant wars.

Uniting for Peace

General Assembly resolution 377 (V)

New York, 3 November 1950

By Christian Tomuschat

Professor emeritus at Humboldt University, Berlin

 

https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html

 

(Paper from 2008)

 

On 3 November 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 377 A (V), which was given the title “Uniting for Peace”. The adoption of this resolution came as a response to the strategy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to block any determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from North Korea. At the initial stage of this armed conflict, in June 1950, the Security Council had been able to recommend to the Members of the United Nations to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area” (resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950). The resolution could be passed because the USSR, at that time, boycotted the meetings of the Security Council with the aim of obtaining the allocation of the permanent Chinese seat to the communist Government in Beijing. It assumed that in its absence the Security Council would not be able to discharge its functions since Article 27, paragraph 3, of the Charter provides that substantive resolutions of the Security Council require an affirmative vote of nine members “including the concurring votes of the permanent members”. The majority of the members of the Security Council, however, were of the view that absence from the meeting room could not prevent the key organ of the United Nations from acting validly, a view that was later endorsed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971, p. 16, at para. 22). Given that its protests remained fruitless, the USSR sent again, as from August 1950, a delegation to the meetings of the Council which cast a negative vote on a United States draft resolution condemning the continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean authorities. In order to overcome this impasse, the United States, under the leadership of its Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson, succeeded in persuading the General Assembly that it should claim for itself a subsidiary responsibility with regard to international peace and security, as enunciated by Article 14 of the Charter. The result of these efforts was resolution 377 A (V).

The most important part of resolution 377 A (V) is section A which states that where the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly shall seize itself of the matter. Procedural and substantive steps are suggested. First of all, if the Assembly is not in session, it may meet in emergency special session at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of its own members. Second, such a session shall be convened with a view to making appropriate recommendations for “collective measures…including the use of armed force when necessary”. As also the language of the resolution clearly reveals, the General Assembly can never be a full substitute for the Security Council in this area. Accordingly, only “recommendations” are mentioned, i.e., pronouncements devoid of any binding legal force. Additionally, resolution 377 A (V) establishes two auxiliary bodies, a Peace Observation Commission, which existed until 1960, and a Collective Measures Committee, which had a short life of only two years. None of these bodies has played any role of major significance.

Although the General Assembly did not attempt to arrogate to itself powers akin to those rooted in Chapter VII of the Charter, it stands to reason that originally resolution 377 A (V) was hardly reconcilable with the Charter. Articles 11 and 12 establish unequivocally the primacy of the Security Council with regard to all matters relating to international peace and security. As far as procedure is concerned, Article 12, paragraph 1, stipulates that while the Council is exercising its function in respect of any dispute or situation, “the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation”. On the other hand, where “action” seems to be necessary, the General Assembly is enjoined to refer the matter to the Council (Article 11, paragraph 2). This configuration, however, was hard to uphold. Politically, it is definitely quite unwise to keep the General Assembly on the sidelines when a major conflict erupts. Almost as a logical consequence, Article 11, paragraph 2, and Article 12, paragraph 1, have suffered an erosion process of which resolution 377 A (V) constitutes only one element among many others. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ has formally confirmed that the prohibition of simultaneous action has been superseded by practice (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136, at paras. 27-28).

To date, ten emergency special sessions have been convened. The first one took place on the occasion of the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt and the British-French attack on the Suez Canal zone; the tenth emergency special session, dealing with the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, started in 1997 and has not yet come to its end. (It was adjourned by resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006, para. 13, and can at any time be resumed upon request by Member States.)

According to political criteria, different patterns can be distinguished. If the Security Council is unanimous in requesting such a session, the harmony between the two main organs of the United Nations is not disturbed. The crisis in Lebanon prompted the Security Council in 1958 to convene an emergency special session of the General Assembly (resolution 129 (1958) of 7 August 1958). It did so without mentioning explicitly resolution 377 A (V), and one may indeed have doubts as to whether this was a case of application of that resolution since there was no lack of unanimity of the permanent members. The situation in Lebanon was referred to the General Assembly because the Security Council had no solution to offer. The second situation is characterized by a vote of a majority of the members of the Security Council against the opposition of some other members, including permanent members. In such instances, the veto does not operate since referral to the General Assembly is considered to constitute a procedural determination and hence not subject to such blocking power. Understandably, the first emergency special session was called by the Security Council against the resistance of France and the United Kingdom (resolution 119 (1956) of 31 October 1956). In the Hungarian crisis, which unfolded almost at the same time, the roles were distributed differently, with only the USSR opposing the motion (resolution 120 (1956) of 4 November 1956). Similar configurations could be observed with regard to the holding of emergency special sessions on the Republic of the Congo (resolution 157 (1960) of 17 September 1960: opposition of Poland and the USSR), on the conflict between India and Pakistan on account of East Pakistan/Bangladesh (resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971: abstention of France, Poland, the USSR and the United Kingdom), and on Afghanistan (resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980: opposition of the German Democratic Republic and the USSR). Total emancipation from the Security Council is reached where the Secretary-General convenes an emergency special meeting at the request of a United Nations Member acting with the support of a majority in the General Assembly. The seventh emergency special session on Palestine (1980-1982) was in fact initiated by Senegal, the eighth emergency special session on Namibia (1981) goes back to a request by Zimbabwe, and the tenth emergency special session was solicited by Qatar as the Chair of the Group of Arab States at the United Nations. It stands to reason that in such instances the overwhelming weight of third world countries can manifest itself to its full extent. Urgent matters may also be dealt with during the ordinary sessions of the General Assembly if the Security Council takes no action owing to the negative vote of a permanent member. (A prominent example is provided by General Assembly resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986, dealing with the aerial and naval attack on Libya by the United States.)

Although the shifting of responsibilities to the General Assembly may not be consistent with the original intentions of the drafters of the Charter, it is today fully accepted that emergency special sessions have become an integral part of the legal order of the United Nations. On the other hand, the need for the holding of such sessions has considerably decreased, as for many years the General Assembly is frequently in session much beyond the usual period from September to December. On a regular basis sessions are resumed in plenary meetings for short periods in the months before the start of a new session in September. In the early years, Member States were not represented in New York throughout the year. Today, urgent matters can be dealt with by the General Assembly at short notice. As already pointed out, the tenth emergency special session, which started in 1997, has not yet been concluded and has for many years operated alongside the regular sessions of the General Assembly. (In its Advisory Opinion on the Wall case (I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 152, at para. 34), the ICJ did not raise any objections against that practice.) It has become a special forum to deliberate on the policies and practices of Israel with regard to the occupied Palestinian territories, totally changing its character from a meeting convened to discuss urgent matters to a permanent, but intermittent conference on a topic of paramount interest to the international community.

Obviously, the crucial element of resolution 377 A (V) was the affirmation that the General Assembly may, if deemed appropriate by it, recommend collective action, including the use of force. In this core sense, the resolution has been implemented only once in the Korean crisis. By resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951 it made a finding to the effect that the People’s Republic of China had engaged in aggression in Korea (para. 1) and “call[ed] upon all States and authorities to continue to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea” (para. 4), which of course meant military assistance. The resolution does not explicitly refer to the Uniting for Peace resolution, but it emphasizes that the Security Council, “because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (preamble). Thus, the wording is exactly copied from resolution 377 A (V). The establishment of the peacekeeping operation First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) by resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 with a view to monitoring the frontline between Israel and Egypt does not come within the same category since UNEF I had no combat function to discharge but was meant to neutralize the conflict solely by its presence between the two opposing parties in accordance with the “classic” peacekeeping concept which was given birth on that occasion. On the whole, it is not easy to draw the demarcation line between “measures” contemplated specifically by resolution 377 A (V) and other measures which the General Assembly may recommend within the framework of its general mandate without any hindrance. According to the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the Certain Expenses case, the exclusive powers of the Security Council are confined to coercive or enforcement action (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151, at 164), but the ICJ did not discuss specifically the impact of resolution 377 A (V). In this connection, the question arises, inter alia, how the imposition of an embargo, as formerly practiced by the General Assembly in a sustained fashion to the detriment of South Africa, is to be characterized (this practice commenced with resolution 41/35 F of 10 November 1986). In any event, it has become a regular feature of resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to armed conflicts to call upon the parties to desist from any hostilities and to withdraw their troops to their own territories (see, for instance, resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008, on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan). Such requests are not considered as requiring any particular legitimation under resolution 377 A (V).

Resolution 377 A (V) has a potential that could subvert the well-equilibrated balance of power within the United Nations, a potential that is not disclosed in a recent description of the role and authority of the General Assembly (see resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006, annex, para. 1). But it would actually be used against the Security Council only in case of general dissatisfaction with the policies of the permanent members. Notwithstanding their sheer numerical superiority, the many Members of the United Nations are much too weak to attempt to challenge the decisions made at the Security Council. Any application of Uniting for Peace with a view to taking enforcement action would at least need the support of one of the permanent members. To date, resolution 498 (V) of 1951 remains the only example of a situation where the General Assembly, at that time under dominating Western influence, recommended taking such action, notwithstanding the firm resistance of a permanent member.

 

This Introductory Note was written in October 2008.

 

Related Materials

 

A. Jurisprudence

International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.

International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J Reports 1971,p. 16.

International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p. 136.

 

B. Documents

Security Council

Resolution 83 (1950) of 27 June 1950 (Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea).

Resolution 119 (1956) of 31 October 1956 (Complaint by Egypt against France and the United Kingdom).

Resolution 120 (1956) of 4 November 1956 (The situation in Hungary).

Resolution 129 (1958) of 7 August 1958 (Complaint by Lebanon - Complaint by Jordan).

Resolution 157 (1960) of 17 September 1960 (The Congo Question).

Resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971 (The Situation in the India/Pakistan Subcontinent).

Resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980 (International peace and security).

 

General Assembly

Resolution 498 (V) of 1 February 1951 (Intervention of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in Korea).

Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956 (UNEF I).

Resolution 41/35 F of 10 November 1986 (Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa).

Resolution 41/38 of 20 November 1986 (Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the aerial and naval military attack against the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the present United States Administration in April 1986).

Resolution 60/286 of 8 September 2006 (Revitalization of the General Assembly).

Resolution ES-10/16 of 17 November 2006 (Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory).

Resolution 62/243 of 14 March 2008 (The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan).

 

C. Doctrine

J. Andrassy, “Uniting for Peace”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 50 (1956) 563-582.

J. Krasno and M. Das, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution and Other Ways of Circumventing the Authority of the Security Council”, in: B. Cronin and I. Hurd (eds.), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, London et al.: Routledge, 2008, 173-195.

K. S. Petersen, “The Uses of the Uniting for Peace Resolution since 1950”, International Organization, vol. 13 (1959) 219-232.

H. Reicher, “The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of its Passage”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 20 (1982) 1-49.

E. Stein and R. Morrissey, “Uniting for Peace Resolution”, in: Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 4, Amsterdam et al.: Elsevier, 2000, 1232-1235.

C. Tomuschat, “‘Uniting for Peace’: ein Rückblick nach 50 Jahren”, Die Friedens-Warte, Journal of International Peace and Organization, vol. 76 (2001) 289-303.

D. Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: the Uniting for Peace Resolution”, in: Low, Vaughan et al. (eds.), The United Nations Security Council and War: the Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, 154-174.

A. Zimmermann, “Uniting-for-Peace und Gutachtenanfragen der Generalversammlung”, in: Weltinnenrecht. Liber amicorum Jost Delbrück, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2005, 909-925.