O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

Mostrando postagens com marcador sanctions. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador sanctions. Mostrar todas as postagens

sexta-feira, 17 de fevereiro de 2023

Sanctions haven’t stopped Russia, but a new oil ban could cut deeper - Jeanne Whalen and Catherine Belton (The Washington Post)

Sanctions haven’t stopped Russia, but a new oil ban could cut deeper

Russia may be the most sanctioned country in human history, yet the economic toll hasn’t deterred Putin’s assault on Ukraine so far

 The Washington Post, February 15, 2023 

In the weeks before Russia invaded Ukraine nearly a year ago, President Biden sought to head it off by warning Russian President Vladimir Putin of “economic consequences like none he’s ever seen.”

As the Kremlin nonetheless began its assault on Feb. 24, the United States and dozens of allies were ready, unleashing a battery of sanctions and trade restrictions aimed at crippling Russia’s finances, isolating its economy and making pariahs of Putin-aligned elites.

The initial impact of sanctions looked deadly, causing the ruble to crash, the banking system to shudder and companies worldwide to stop exporting vital goods to Russia.

But one year later, Russia has remained more resilient than many expected, thanks to its oil and gas exports, deft maneuvering by its central bank and a recent rebound in trade with China and others that has allowed some banned technology to sneak through. Western sanctions have deeply wounded Russia’s economy and military and caused friction among elites — but not enough to change Putin’s calculus and end the war.

With more than 3,000 individuals and entities targeted by the U.S. alone, Russia could be the most sanctioned country “in human history,” a group of economists and Russia experts wrote in a report published in January by the nonprofit Free Russia Foundation. Despite some economic weakness, Russia has continued its military assault on Ukraine.

“Instead of growth we have a decline. But saying all of that, it’s definitely not a collapse, it’s not a disaster. We may not say that the Russian economy is in tatters, that it is destroyed, that Putin lacks funds to continue his war. No, it’s not true,” Sergey Aleksashenko, former first deputy chairman of Russia’s central bank, said at a panel discussion in Washington last month.

There are signs Putin’s luck could be starting to run out, as Western countries slap tough limits on Russia’s energy exports, which they had initially avoided out of fear that it would paralyze Europe and exacerbate global inflation. Since early December, new restrictions on Russia’s oil exports have helped widen the country’s budget deficit, prompting emergency revenue-raising measures by the Kremlin and contributing to a 19 percent drop in the ruble.

Russia’s business ties to the West took 30 years to build and one week to shatter

James O’Brien, head of the Office of Sanctions Coordination at the State Department, said sanctions are meeting their aim of sapping Russia of the finances and technology it needs to support its military. But the measures, he added, are just “one tool to stop the war.”

“They have to work with the other tools,” he said in an interview. “I think we are limiting Russia’s options on the battlefield, and its resources to restore what it’s doing on the battlefield. And that, combined with military assistance and civilian support for Ukraine, is what will win this war.”

Russia’s position looked dire in the early days of the invasion, as Western governments froze a large portion of the country’s hard currency reserves, sanctioned financial institutions and kicked major banks out of SWIFT, the international payments system that is the backbone of global banking.

The measures sparked financial panic, prompting long queues outside ATMs as Russians feared a ruble crash and cash shortages.

“There was a real risk of a bank run at the beginning of the war and shortly after the sanctions were imposed,” said Alexandra Prokopenko, at the time an adviser to the Central Bank’s first deputy chairwoman, now living in exile in the West.

Former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov declared on Twitter that the freezing of the central bank reserves would leave the government without the means to support the ruble. “They will turn on the printing press. Hyperinflation and catastrophe for the economy is not far away,” he said.

But swift countermeasures by Russia’s central bank soon restored a measure of stability. Officials closed down markets, hiked the main interest rate to 20 percent, and imposed draconian restrictions on currency exchange, withdrawals and hard-currency transfers overseas. The measures reversed the ruble’s slide.

“It was real hard 24 hours work behind closed doors,” said Prokopenko, the former central bank official, who left the country in late March. “It wasn’t panicked. But everyone was shocked after the invasion … No one expected full-scale invasion and real war.”

Western sanctions and export restrictions also initially froze much of the world’s trade with Russia, causing a collapse in the country’s imports.

The measures banned companies globally from selling Russia computer chips and other high-tech goods it needed to build weapons and military vehicles. They also severed so many banking links that Russian importers had trouble paying overseas counterparts. By April, Russia’s imports were 43 percent below prewar levels, according to a recent report by the think tank Silverado Policy Accelerator.

The restrictions clobbered Russia’s military-industrial base, according to U.S. officials, who say that Russia’s recent reliance on older weaponry demonstrates that it can’t replenish its munitions. “They started off with some of their most sophisticated weapons and they are now using essentially retreads. They are using equipment that in some cases has been around for many decades,” Don Graves, deputy secretary of commerce, said in an interview.

“They’re also having to basically pull components out of a whole range of appliances. So we see them dismantling dishwashers and washing machines and electric breast pumps to get the components they need to keep their military moving forward, to keep their planes and weapons systems working,” Graves said, declining to detail the source of that intelligence but saying he had a “very high degree of confidence” in it.

Sanctions forcing Russia to use appliance parts in military gear, U.S. says

While Russia’s military continues to wreak destruction on Ukraine, a lack of modern armaments is holding it back, said Alan Estevez, a former Pentagon official now overseeing export controls as Commerce Department undersecretary for industry and security. “It’s much harder to take out a HIMARS battery without a precision guided weapon because you need to target the exact point in order to do that,” he said in an interview, referring to a type of missile launcher that the United States is supplying to Ukraine.

But thanks partly to Russia’s revived trade with China, the export controls are proving leaky.

By November, chip exports to Russia from China and Hong Kong alone had grown to 55 percent of median prewar chip exports from all countries, according to export data analyzed by Silverado Policy Accelerator.

Data reviewed by the Commerce Department show a 70 percent drop in the value of chips going to Russia after the war, Estevez said. But “it should be 100 percent,” he said, noting that any chip now traveling to Russia “would be a likely violation” of the rules.

“Frankly right now evasion is my number one priority with regard to Russia — closing those networks,” he said. “We are talking to the countries where lots of this trade goes on … When we see it we’re going to shut it down.” He said the United States is certain that “the highest-end chips are not getting through.”

The biggest failure in the effort to wallop Russia, experts agree, was the West’s reluctance to go after the country’s biggest cash cow — oil and gas exports. The United States quickly banned imports of Russian energy, but Europe’s dependence on pipelines from Siberia was much harder to break. The continent imported about 40 percent of its gas and a quarter of its oil from Russia.

Soon after Russia invaded, the European Commission proposed cutting Russian gas imports by two-thirds by the end of 2022. But German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and others dismissed the idea of an immediate oil and gas boycott, worried that it would leave Europe in the dark and exacerbate already soaring global inflation.

“I think the thinking was, let’s try these financial-sector sanctions and trade controls and in the meantime we try to prepare for oil and gas measures,” said Elina Ribakova, deputy chief economist at the Institute of International Finance.

Europe’s continued purchases helped create a cash bonanza for Russia amid a sharp rise in global oil prices last spring. Far from draining the Kremlin’s war chest, Europe was helping fill it anew.

By June, the European Union adopted a measure to ban most Russian oil imports starting on Dec. 5, and to prohibit E.U. companies from insuring or financing Russian oil shipments to any buyer worldwide.

The decision “terrified the Biden administration” because it came as U.S. gas prices were spiking to $5 a gallon, said Bob McNally, an energy consultant and former adviser to President George W. Bush, who was following the discussions closely in Washington. U.S. officials worried that Europe would block too much Russian oil from the global market and inflate prices even more, he said.

Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen went on a global tour promoting a modification she’d first floated in the spring — price caps that she argued would lower Russia’s revenue but prevent energy price spikes. Soon, a deal was reached: Europe would proceed with its import ban but allow companies to insure Russian oil shipments elsewhere so long as the buyers paid Russia no more than $60 a barrel.

“We were supportive of Europe moving towards energy independence from Russia, and thought that the best way to accomplish that was both with the import ban, but adding the price cap to it,” Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo said.

Those measures, which began Dec. 5, are now starting to bite. Russia’s oil and gas revenue plummeted by 46 percent in January from a year earlier, which, together with soaring spending on the war, caused the budget deficit to balloon.

Janis Kluge, an economist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, predicts Russia’s budget deficit could reach five percent of GDP this year, up from two percent last year, due to the drop in energy exports and the rapidly falling tax take from the declining economy.

Economists say this will put even greater pressure on the ruble, which has already fallen since the oil embargo.

Despite rising budget deficits, the Kremlin will be able to continue funding its war machine for several more years to come, Kluge argued. The authorities are cutting spending this year on nonmilitary items such as road construction and education, “things that don’t make a difference in the next year but do over a longer future,” Kluge said. The government has also been raising money by issuing domestic debt and imposing windfall taxes on energy companies, including a payment of 1.2 trillion rubles (about $16.5 billion) Gazprom was forced to pay.

To cover the deficit this year, Russia is also expected to dip into its rainy day fund, the National Wealth Fund, now consisting mostly of Chinese yuan and gold. But economists say the fund could be depleted over the next two years.

“All of this together tells you the sanctions are a problem,” Kluge said. “But because the war is such a huge priority, it will not be the reason that makes Putin reconsider his Ukraine strategy. Yet.”

Some Russians see bigger troubles mounting. Putin has often touted Russia’s lower than expected drop in GDP last year as demonstrating that sanctions aren’t working. Western economists estimate the economy contracted between 2.2 percentand 3.5 percent, versus initial forecasts of ten percent or more. However, those headline figures could mask a deeper recession, due to signs of weakness in household and corporate spending, as well as Russia’s manufacturing and gas sectors, Russian business executives, officials and economists say.

“There is the official statistical drop, but unofficially it could be deeper,” said a senior Russian financial official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid reprisals, citing a recent survey showing that Russian companies were in “survival mode” and “not making any serious investments.”

A collapse in Russian auto production last year, as factories struggled to import parts, is another ominous sign for the economy. So is the 9.3 percent drop in retail spending in the second half of 2022, compared with a year earlier, which suggests households are “in crisis mode,” Kluge said.

Increased spending on weapons production, meanwhile, has helped offset a big decline in industrial production. “The military industrial complex is helping the Russian government and Russian propaganda maintain the illusion that everything is ok, but in reality it is adding nothing in terms of people’s well being and productivity,” Prokopenko said.

Government figures show an unemployment rate of just 3.9 percent, but that reflects Russian companies’ practice of keeping employees on unpaid leave rather than firing them, the senior finance official said. Analysts at the consulting firm Finexpertiza estimated that the level of “hidden unemployment” reached almost 13 percent in the third quarter last year.

“The tension is felt practically everywhere,” said one Russian state official close to diplomatic circles, who declined to be named out of fear of reprisals. “There is construction that is not completed; equipment that never arrives. There is a lack of money among the population who are facing all these difficulties.”

Putin, unaccustomed to losing, is increasingly isolated as war falters

As the outlook has worsened, the government has begun classifying some economic data that used to be released. Most recently, Russia’s gas production and export numbers were deemed secret, after production fell by 19.6 percent in the first eleven and a half months of 2022 compared with 2021. Economists say some of the official economic data appears to be being manipulated. “They are certainly lying about the overall economic picture,” said Ben Hilgenstock, senior economist at the Kyiv School of Economics.

For much of the Russian elite, the sanctions — and Putin’s war — have shattered three decades of empire building and integration with the West. “No one approves of the war. Everyone considers it to be a mistake. But no one sees a way out,” said one Russian billionaire who declined to be named. Even those among Putin’s closest inner circle are increasingly dissatisfied with developments, said the Russian state official. That includes Igor Sechin, Putin’s deputy since the early 1990s and now president of oil giant Rosneft, and Sergei Chemezov, who served with Putin in the KGB in east Germany in the late 80s and now heads the state arms conglomerate, the official said. “The businesses that they built over all these years are under enormous pressure due to the sanctions. What can they be happy about?” the official said. Amid all the friction, western officials and some economists said they believed sanctions were working — even if the net impact has not deterred Putin from funding his war. “The way I think about sanctions is that we are shaking the tree on which the regime sits,” said Kluge. “We can’t really tell what’s going to come out of it, what’s going to happen. We are not shaking it enough for it to fall down. But we’re creating problems for them. It consumes a lot of political energy in Moscow. And it makes it clear to everyone, to all insiders, that it was a huge mistake to start this invasion.

segunda-feira, 6 de fevereiro de 2023

How Iran beats Russia at sanctions game - Ian Bremer, GZero Signal Newsletter

 Israel o faz por causa própria ou para ajudar a Ucrania?


   

recent attack on a weapons manufacturing compound in the Iranian city of Isfahan, presumably by Israel, has again highlighted the Islamic Republic's position as a global arms powerhouse. 

While it’s hard to know exactly what projects are in the works at the Isfahan facility, there are reports that the site is used to produce "suicide drones.” These are the same cheap and dirty contraptions Vladimir Putin’s military is using to pummel Ukrainian cities. 

With attention yet again on Iran’s drone-making prowess, a big question emerges: How has heavily sanctioned Iran managed to become a one-stop shop for Russia’s advanced weapons needs, while Moscow, largely cut off from Western supply chains, is desperately searching for weapons and parts? 

What are some of the biggest pain points for Russia in procuring weapons and parts? Moscow has long relied heavily on Western components for making advanced weaponry. Before the war, the bulk of its stash came from US firms. But access to semiconductors, the nearly invisible microchips essential for running modern military hardware, changed after the outset of the war when more than 30 countries – like Japan, the Netherlands, and the EU – joined US-driven bans on exports to Russia. 

What’s more, Russia has struggled to bulk up its domestic semiconductor industry. Some firms have gone bust, and private companies have refused to use domestically made chips, citing quality concerns – again reinforcing Russia’s reliance on foreign manufacturers. But global supply kinks have made procuring chips harderfor everyone

Still, Moscow has found ways to access these and other parts through third parties – including China and Turkey, a NATO member! Russia also imported $777 million worth of products from Western tech firms between April and October 2022 despite export bans. But Putin needs to get his hands on way more components to fuel his war machine. 

Iran to the rescue, but how? Tehran, meanwhile, has developed a knack for skirting Western sanctions and finding gaps in international arms control agreements to procure Western-made components.

“Iran has been living under sanctions for more than 40 years, so they’ve developed elaborate processes to do it [evade sanctions],” says Dr. Jon B. Alterman, director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The smuggling operations in Iran are run by people close to the government. They’ve gotten good at it, and they’ve gotten wealthy doing it. They have the infrastructure.”

One part of their solution is quite relatable: Like you and me, the mullahs turn to the World Wide Web to shop. 

“Some of the stuff [needed to make drones], they can buy on eBay and Amazon,” says Alterman. “In a world of a huge amount of commerce, a lot of things are obtainable.” 

It’s also a matter of proactive preparedness. Iran has for decades invested heavily in its arms industry, launching a modernization program that’s allowed it to make major advancements in ballistic and cruise missile production. 

Iranian officials have also been known to scour conflict zones for American and Israeli debris for research purposes, including reverse-engineering. In fact, President Joe Biden recently tapped a task force to establish why a whopping 82% of components found in downed Iranian drones in Ukraine were reportedly made in … America. (Not exactly the Made in America promo Biden wanted).

Why would Iran help Russia? Like so many things in geopolitics, it’s a case of I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine, but Iran is also playing the long game.

“The war in Ukraine has reshuffled the deck of alliances, and Iran now has access to modern weaponry,” says Pierre Boussel, a Middle East expert at the Liechtenstein-based Geopolitical Intelligence Service. So Iran is arming the Russians and, in return, the Russians are giving Tehran some advanced hardware. Case in point: Moscow recently sent Tehran the US Javelin anti-tank missile and Stinger anti-aircraft missile, as well as British anti-tank missiles.

While Iran’s rustic approach can’t compete with the West’s, it has helped Tehran carve out a nice space for itself in the arms-making world: “US sanctions have forced Tehran to position itself in a low-cost arms market,” Boussel says, adding that “Iranian drones may be slow and inaccurate … but they are numerous enough to overwhelm enemy defenses.”

Plagued by crises at home and abroad, Iran has enough on its plate. So what’s its game plan? “The Iranians have an interest in having at least one of the great powers being indebted to them,” says Alterman, adding “they see an opportunity to lock in some gains.”

“Iran has no partners, so the fact that somebody might owe it is kind of a big deal in Iran.”

segunda-feira, 16 de maio de 2022

Biden’s sanctions against Russia are a double-edged sword -Fareed Zakaria (The Washington Post)

Opinion 

Biden’s sanctions against Russia are a double-edged sword

Fareed Zakaria

The Washington Post, May 12, 2022

 

The Biden administration deserves huge credit for the tough economic sanctions it has been able to impose on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. As Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan note in a March essay, they “are the most comprehensive imposed against a major power since the Second World War.” On a “punishment scale of 1 to 10” — the two authors give the sanctions a ranking of at least an 8.

 

But the unprecedented nature of these measures is producing concerns around the world that the United States has “weaponized” its financial power and could lead, over time, to the decline of the dollar’s dominance, which is what gives America its financial superpowers in the first place.

I’ve been hearing about this firsthand from three sources I trust. The first, in New Delhi, recently told me about a conversation that took place at the highest levels of India’s government. The topic: how to make sure that the United States could never do to India what it has just done to Russia. The second, from Brussels, where staff at the European Commission has been tasked — even while working with Washington on the sanctions — with finding ways to reduce the role of the dollar in its energy imports. The third, an Asian observer of China, speculated that the overly severe lockdowns in Shanghai — which involved the rationing of food and basic supplies — might be part of an effort by Beijing to experiment with a scenario in which it faced economic sanctions from Washington (perhaps after an invasion of Taiwan).

 

A debate is raging around the world about whether the dollar’s total dominance of the international financial system is waning. Even Goldman Sachs and the IMF have warned that that might well happen. I tend toward the opposite view: Namely, that you can only beat the dollar if you have an effective alternative, which so far does not exist.

 

But it’s clear that many countries — from hostile powers such as China and Russia to friendly nations such as India and Brazil — are working hard on ways to reduce their vulnerability to Washington’s whims. None of these efforts has so far gained much traction, though it is worth noting that the share of global foreign exchange reserves held in dollars has declined from 72 percent to 59 percent over the past two decades.

 

Partly this is because the United States appears less stable and predictable in the use of its extraordinary privilege. In the two decades preceding Russia’s invasion, Washington massively ramped up sanctions for all kinds of reasons — by more than 900 percent. Many of these measures were overreactions and should be rolled back. After 9/11, Washington put in place highly intrusive measures aimed at tracking money going to terrorists. It has inflicted harsh punishments on banks that did not adhere to all U.S. sanctions. It has imposed sanctions on IranVenezuelaNorth KoreaCuba and other countries often simply to satisfy domestic critics who wanted to “do something” without paying much of a price. This type of economic warfare has failed to change the regimes in these countries but has caused widespread misery for ordinary people in them. Sanctions against Russia are aimed at policy change, not regime change, and therefore could be more effective.

 

Economic sanctions increased sharply during the Trump administration, which unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and then threatened to impose sanctions on any firms that traded with Iran — even though Tehran had adhered to the agreement, which took place under a U.N. framework. And then there are the fines pursued domestically by American regulators and judges, such as the almost $9 billion penalty against the French bank BNP Paribas in 2014. Again, such measures work only because of the power of the dollar.

I support the sanctions against Russia, but President Biden needs to make a speech explaining them. He needs to make clear that the Russian invasion of Ukraine marks the most serious assault on the rules-based international system in decades. If it succeeds, it could tear that system apart. That is why Washington has worked with its allies to impose these extraordinary measures. The president needs to detail the legal basis for the actions taken by the United States and its allies.

 

How exactly can governments seize privately owned property for which the owner, even if he is a Russian oligarch, has clear legal title? How can people be sure these powers will not be abused? Biden needs to emphasize that the United States will only take such measures in the future when there are blatant violations of international law, on the scale of Russia’s actions.

 

The dollar maintains its crucial role in the international system because the United States has the world’s largest economy. It also has the most liquid debt markets, its currency floats freely, and, crucially, it is regarded as a country based on the rule of law and not one prone to arbitrary and unilateral actions. That last criterion is not one that Washington has lived up to in recent years. Biden should make sure that, in fighting this battle against Russia, he does not erode America’s unique financial superpower.

 

sexta-feira, 18 de março de 2022

Um novo containment econômico institucionalizado contra a Rússia - Daniel W. Drezner (WP)

 Parte de artigo do professor Daniel Drezner, da Fletcher Scholl of Diplomacy:

Institutionalizing the Russia sanctions

We are in the sustainable containment phase now

Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a regular contributor to PostEverything.
The Washington Post, March 16, 2022 at 7:00 a.m. EDT

Artigo completo neste link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/16/institutionalizing-russia-sanctions/?utm_campaign=wp_the_daily_202&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_daily202 

(...)

This is far from an academic question. Assessments vary on how long Russia can keep up the current military campaign. It seems increasingly unlikely, however, that sanctions alone will lead to either President Vladimir Putin’s downfall or his acquiescence. Russia’s oligarchs rely on Putin more than he relies on them. Perhaps military leaders get sick of the meat grinder and try to oust Putin, but that seems unlikely as well and super dangerous in a country possessing nuclear weapons. The invasion polls relatively well among Russians, so a revolution seems unlikely. Indeed, the sanctions are just as likely to trigger a rally around the flag effect as antipathy toward Putin.

If these sanctions are designed to be a new form of containment, more thought needs to be given about their long-term sustainability. Ad hoc sanctions coalitions are the ones most likely to fall apart over time, particularly if the target state incentivizes sanctions-busting. With its energy reserves, Russia has the capacity to offer such sweeteners.

If the Biden administration wants to keep the economic pressure on, it needs to consider the following interim goals:

  1. Institutionalize the coalition. Creating a treaty-based organization is out of the question, but something like the old CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) regime from the Cold War might now be appropriate. The Financial Action Task Force would be another reference point. The idea would be to create a structure that allows for participating actors to stay on the same page as the sanctions regime evolves — and to signal to Putin that he can’t wait out his opponents.
  2. Clarify the conditions under which some sanctions can be lifted. For sanctions to have any coercive impact, the target needs to believe concessions will translate into sanctions being removed. Articulating the steps Russia needs to take for sanctions to be lifted is also a useful exercise in preventing what Chatham House’s Hans Kundnani characterizes as “overcompensation.” He warns, “At this fraught moment, the biggest danger is recklessness.” Laying out terms for sanctions removal will remind everyone of the point of this project.
  3. Keep private-sector actors on board. The official sanctions have obviously had an effect, but the private sector has massively amplified the effect. Close to 400 companiesranging from Boeing to Ikea to Maersk to McDonald’s to Starbucks to Western Union have ceased operating in Russia. Most of these actions have been “suspensions,” however. Just as contagion effects led to mass corporate withdrawal at the outset of the invasion, a reverse contagion could take place ahead of government wishes. This is where ongoing consultations between G-7 governments and firms would be useful.
  4. Minimize the global collateral damage. The war and the sanctions combined will have significant and deleterious effects on the global economy. Food prices are likely to soar in some places as Ukrainian wheat goes off the market. Other commodity prices will spike as well. U.N. Secretary General António Guterres noted on Monday: “All of this is hitting the poorest the hardest and planting the seeds for political instability and unrest around the globe.” As Russia attempts to construct a narrative of blame for those imposing sanctions, the governments responsible for the sanctions need to take actions to minimize suffering and thwart adverse narratives. Working closely with the U.N. Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance would help in this area.
  5. Keep Congress from passing any more sanctions measures. Congress loves imposing sanctions but loathes removing them. In other words, any new congressional measures are going to be extremely difficult to remove. Maybe there will come a time when that step is necessary. Now is not that time.


quinta-feira, 16 de setembro de 2021

The United States of Sanctions - Daniel W. Drezner (Foreign Affairs)


The United States of Sanctions

The Use and Abuse of Economic Coercion

Daniel W. Drezner

Foreign Affairs, Nova York – 16/09/2021

 

In theory, superpowers should possess a range of foreign policy tools: military might, cultural cachet, diplomatic persuasion, technological prowess, economic aid, and so on. But to anyone paying attention to U.S. foreign policy for the past decade, it has become obvious that the United States relies on one tool above all: economic sanctions.

Sanctions—measures taken by one country to disrupt economic exchange with another—have become the go-to solution for nearly every foreign policy problem. During President Barack Obama’s first term, the United States designated an average of 500 entities for sanctions per year for reasons ranging from human rights abuses to nuclear proliferation to violations of territorial sovereignty. That figure nearly doubled over the course of Donald Trump’s presidency. President Joe Biden, in his first few months in office, imposed new sanctions against Myanmar (for its coup), Nicaragua (for its crackdown), and Russia (for its hacking). He has not fundamentally altered any of the Trump administration’s sanctions programs beyond lifting those against the International Criminal Court. To punish Saudi Arabia for the murder of the dissident Jamal Khashoggi, the Biden administration sanctioned certain Saudi officials, and yet human rights activists wanted more.Activists have also clamored for sanctions on China for its persecution of the Uyghurs, on Hungary for its democratic backsliding, and on Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians. 

This reliance on economic sanctions would be natural if they were especially effective at getting other countries to do what Washington wants, but they’re not. The most generous academic estimate of sanctions’ efficacy—a 2014 study relying on a data set maintained by the University of North Carolina—found that, at best, sanctions lead to concessions between one-third and one-half of the time. A 2019 Government Accountability Office study concluded that not even the federal government was necessarily aware when sanctions were working. Officials at the Treasury, State, and Commerce Departments, the report noted, “stated they do not conduct agency assessments of the effectiveness of sanctions in achieving broader U.S. policy goals.” 

The truth is that Washington’s fixation with sanctions has little to do with their efficacy and everything to do with something else: American decline. No longer an unchallenged superpower, the United States can’t throw its weight around the way it used to. In relative terms, its military power and diplomatic influence have declined. Two decades of war, recession, polarization, and now a pandemic have dented American power. Frustrated U.S. presidents are left with fewer arrows in their quiver, and they are quick to reach for the easy, available tool of sanctions.

The problem, however, is that sanctions are hardly cost free. They strain relations with allies, antagonize adversaries, and impose economic hardship on innocent civilians.Thus, sanctions not only reveal American decline but accelerate it, tooTo make matters worse, the tool is growing duller by the year. Future sanctions are likely to be even less effective as China and Russia happily swoop in to rescue targeted actors and as U.S. allies and partners tire of the repeated application of economic pressure. Together, these developments will render the U.S. dollar less central to global finance, reducing the effect of sanctions that rely on that dominance. 

Washington should use sanctions surgically and sparingly. Under a more disciplined approach to economic statecraft, officials would clarify the goal of a particular measure and the criteria for repealing it. But most important, they would remember that there are other tools at their disposal. Sanctions are a specialized instrument best deployed in controlled circumstances, not an all-purpose tool for everyday use. Policymakers should treat them like a scalpel, not a Swiss Army knife. 

 

A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC VIOLENCE

 

Economic statecraft has been a vital component of U.S. diplomacy since the early days of the republic. As president, Thomas Jefferson urged passage of the Embargo Act of 1807 to punish the United Kingdom and Napoleonic France for harassing U.S. ships. That effort at sanctions was a disaster. Back in the day, the United States needed European markets far more than the United Kingdom and France needed a fledgling country in the New World; the Embargo Act cost the United States far more than it did the European great powers. Even so, the United States continued to use trade as its main foreign policy tool, focusing on prying open foreign markets for export and promoting foreign investment at home. This was only natural given the paltry size of the U.S. military for most of the nineteenth century. The preeminence of the British pound in global finance also meant that the U.S. dollar was not an important currency. Trade was the primary way the United States conducted diplomacy. 

At the end of World War I, the United States renewed its enthusiasm for trade sanctions as a means of regulating world politics. President Woodrow Wilson urged Americans to support the League of Nations by arguing that its power to sanction would act as a substitute for war. “A nation boycotted is a nation that is in sight of surrender,” he said in 1919. “Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy.” Americans were unconvinced, and the United States never joined the League of Nations. In the end, sanctions imposed by the league failed to deter Italy from invading Ethiopia in 1935 or stop any other act of belligerence that led to World War II. To the contrary, the U.S. embargo on fuel and other war materials going to Japan helped precipitate the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Policymakers should treat sanctions like a scalpel, not a Swiss Army knife. 

The advent of the Cold War expanded the array of tools of economic statecraft available to the United States. For the first time, the country supplied a significant amount of multilateral and bilateral foreign aid; stopping that aid was an easy way of applying economic pressure. The United States’ most successful use of economic sanctions in this period came during the 1956 Suez crisis. Outraged by the British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt, Washington prevented the United Kingdom from drawing down its International Monetary Fund reserves to defend its currency. The subsequent run on the pound forced London to withdraw its troops.

Most of the time, however, U.S. sanctions failed. In the early years of the Cold War, the United States embargoed Soviet allies to deny them access to vital resources and technologies. That embargo succeeded as an act of containment. But sanctions designed to compel changes in behavior had little bite, since the Soviet Union simply stepped in to offer economic support to the targeted economies. In the early 1960s, for example, as the United States tightened its embargo on exports to Cuba, the Soviets threw Fidel Castro’s regime an economic lifeline by channeling massive amounts of aid to Havana. Later in the Cold War, the United States used economic sanctions to pressure allies and adversaries alike to improve their human rights records. Beyond the rare success of sanctioning a close ally, economic pressure worked only when it came from a broad multilateral coalition, such as the UN sanctions against apartheid-era South Africa.

The end of the Cold War brought an initial burst of hope about sanctions. With the Soviets no longer automatically vetoing UN Security Council resolutions, it seemed possible that multilateral trade sanctions could replace war, just as Wilson had dreamed. Reality quickly proved otherwise. In 1990, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Security Council imposed a comprehensive trade embargo on Iraq. These crushing sanctions cut the country’s GDP in half. They were nonetheless unable to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait; it took the Gulf War to accomplish that. Sanctions against Iraq continued after the war, but the humanitarian costs were staggering: infant mortality rates were widely viewed to have skyrocketed, and per capita income remained stagnant for 15 years. Iraq manipulated figures to exaggerate the humanitarian costs of the sanctions, but the deception worked. Policymakers came to believe that trade sanctions were a blunt instrument that harmed ordinary civilians rather than the elites whose behavior they were intended to alter. So they searched for smarter sanctions that could hit a regime’s ruling coalition.

The centrality of the U.S. dollar seemed to offer a way of doing just that. Beginning in the late 1990s and accelerating after 9/11, the United States made it harder for any financial institution to engage in dollar transactions with sanctioned governments, companies, or people. U.S. and foreign banks need access to U.S. dollars in order to function; even the implicit threat of being denied such access has made most banks in the world reluctant to work with sanctioned entities, effectively expelling them from the global financial system.

These sanctions have proved more potent. Whereas restrictions on trade incentivize private-sector actors to resort to black-market operations, the opposite dynamic is at play with measures concerning dollar transactions. Because financial institutions care about their global reputation and wish to stay in the good graces of U.S. regulators, they tend to comply eagerly with sanctions and even preemptively dump clients seen as too risky. In 2005, when the United States designated the Macao-based bank Banco Delta Asia as a money-laundering concern working on behalf of North Korea, even Chinese banks responded with alacrity to limit their exposure. 

As U.S. sanctions grew more powerful, they scored some notable wins. The George W. Bush administration cracked down on terrorist financing and money laundering, as governments bent over backward to retain their access to the U.S. financial system. The Obama administration amped up sanctions against Iran, which drove the country to negotiate a deal restricting its nuclear program in return for the lifting of some sanctions. The Trump administration threatened to raise tariffs and shut down the U.S.-Mexican border to compel Mexico to interdict Central American migrants; in response, the Mexican government deployed its new National Guard to restrict the flow.

 

(……………………………………………………………………………)

 

Yet for every success, there were more failures. The United States has imposed decades-long sanctions on Belarus, Cuba, Russia, Syria, and Zimbabwe with little to show in the way of tangible results. The Trump administration ratcheted up U.S. economic pressure against Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela as part of its “maximum pressure” campaigns to block even minor evasions of economic restrictions. The efforts also relied on what are known as “secondary sanctions,” whereby third-party countries and companies are threatened with economic coercion if they do not agree to participate in sanctioning the initial target. In every case, the target suffered severe economic costs yet made no concessions. Not even Venezuela, a bankrupt socialist state experiencing hyperinflation in the United States’ backyard, acquiesced.

Sanctions cannot and will not go away anytime soon. Other great powers, such as China and Russia, are becoming increasingly active sanctioners. China has used an array of informal measures to punish Japan, Norway, South Korea, and even the National Basketball Association over the past decade; Russia sanctioned former Soviet republics to deter them from joining an EU initiative in eastern Europe. Aspiring great powers, such as Saudi Arabia, have also tried their hand at economic coercion. There will be more sanctions in the future, not fewer. 

But that doesn’t mean the United States has to be part of the problem. Even the countries now discovering sanctions still rely on them for only a fraction of their foreign policy goals; they also sign trade deals, engage in cultural diplomacy, and dole out foreign aid to win friends and influence countries. So did the United States once. Washington needs to exercise the policy muscles it has let atrophy, lest a statecraft gap emerge between it and other governments. U.S. policymakers have become so sanctions-happy that they have blinded themselves to the long-term costs of this tool. To compete with the other great powers, the United States needs to remind the world that it is more than a one-trick pony.

 

DANIEL W. DREZNER is Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

 

Para acessar a íntegra: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/united-states-sanctions