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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida

terça-feira, 11 de abril de 2017

David Fleischer explicita a dimensão da lista Fachin dos corruptos da Lava Jato

Brazil Focus David Fleischer
SPECIAL  Report April 11 2017   


         The “list” of politicians accused of receiving kickbacks/bribes during the plea bargaining by the Odebrecht directors, managers and employees has been anxiously awaited in Brasília for several weeks and most thought that it would be made public “after the Easter holiday (next week): “The End of the World”. . 

       But, no – STF Judge José Edson Fachin (the reporter for all Lava Jato accusations) had prepared (on 4th April) the release of this list for Wednesday, 12th April.  However, somehow the O Estado de São Paulo gained access to the “list” and published on its internet site mid-Tuesday afternoon, 11th April.

       This list has one-third of Pres. Temer’s cabinet: 8 ministers; more than one-third of the Senate: 29 Senators; 42 federal deputies; 3 governors; and one TCU judge [14 different parties].  Apparently, there are more governors on the Odebrecht “list” but their cases will be deliberated at the STJ.  There are other politicians, such as Lula and Dilma Rousseff, whose “fate” will be deliberated in the first level federal court of Judge Sérgio Moro in Curitiba.

       This “list” exploded exactly during the “presentation” by former President Dilma Rousseff at Columbia University.  Other senators and deputies are already being investigated and/or prosecuted by the Supreme Court.

       Also, the release of this list by the OESP coincided with final attempt by the Chamber of Deputies to approve the Complementary Law for the fiscal recovery of “bankrupt” state governments (Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul and Minias Gerais) – especially the counterpoint austerity measures to be required by the federal government in lieu of a three-year suspension of these states’ debt payments.

       Two national party presidents are on this list: Sen. Aécio Neves (PSDB-MG) and Sen. Romero Jucá (PMDB-RR). 

       Temer’s “Lame Duck” cabinet:
            Eliseu Padilha (PMDB-RS) – Casa Civil
            Wellington Moreira Franco (PMDB-RJ) – General Sec. of the Presidency
            Gilberto Kassab (PSD-SP) – Science, Technology & Communications
            Helder Barbalho (PMDB-PA) – National Integration
            Alyosio Nunes (PSDB-SP) – Foreign Relations
            Blairo Maggi (PP-MT) – Agriculture
            Bruno Araújo (PSDB-PE) –Cities
            Marcos Pereira (PRB-ES) – MDIC
       Earlier this year, Pres. Temer explained how the “Odebrecht list” would affect his cabinet.  He differentiated the three “stages” of these accusations: 1) Accused – no problem (wait and see during the STF investigation); 2) Denounced at the STF – the cabinet minister would suspended temporarily; and 3) Declared “réu” by the STF – the minister would be gone permanently. 

       Thus, in Brasília it is assumed that Temer will not dismiss any of his “lame duck” ministers.  This episode came at a very important juncture for the Temer government è exactly when it is trying (desperately) to approve important reforms in Congress – social security reform, labor legislation reform and a “timid” tax reform – in addition to “political reform”.

       To gain approval of these reforms (especially the social security reform), Temer’s main political articulators (his “hard core nucleus”) – Eliseu Padilha and Moreira Franco – are VERY important and should remain in their posts at least until they are denounced at the STF (who knows when).  Remember: In order to give Moreira Franco the status of foro previlegiado at the Supreme Court, Temer named him to a cabinet-level position so that he could acquire the special status at the STF.      
Some Possible Consequences:

     1) This episode will delay and make approval of the reforms more difficult.  Sen. Renan Calheiros (PMDB-AL), the current PMDB floor leader in the Senate, will become even more desperate to approve the law regulating the “abuse of authority” that could coerce judges, prosecutors and federal police officers – and derail the Lava Jato investigation -- but probably Congress will not approve this.  If approved, it is possible that Pres. Temer might veto this, or the STF would declare this measure unconstitutional.

     2) The already weakened Pres. Michel Temer will be further weakened and perhaps lose control of his support group in Congress – many of whom are “desperate” regarding their possible reelection in 2018..

     3) Investors (domestic and foreign) who are already a bit “cautious” regarding Brazil will adopt an even more rigorous “wait and see” position.  Although Brazil’s economy has shown some positive signs of recovery, increased levels of foreign and domestic investments are crucial for new job creation and a strong reduction in unemployment.

     4) Perhaps the only item of the “political reform” to be approved might be the closing of the proportional representation lists (the voter could only vote for one pre-ordered list, rather than individual candidates).  Many of the accused think that they would be able to “hide” within their party’s pre-ordered list.

     5) It is possible that in the 2018 elections there might be a much larger turnover rate for federal deputies.  Every four years the average rate is around 50%, but in 2018 might reach 65% or 70%.

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