Graham Allison on Thucydides Trap - The South China Morning Post

Graham Allison on Thucydides Trap - The South China Morning Post 

My Interview With The South China Morning Post

The South China Morning Post interviewed me a couple of weeks ago after I returned from Beijing. Overall, it reflects my current thinking about how the U.S. is meeting the China challenge. The interview captures my optimism about the remainder of 2024 based on my reading of what Biden and Xi accomplished at the summit in San Francisco last November. As that reading predicted, we are now seeing increased numbers of serious conversations between their subordinates—including this past weekend between Secretary of Defense Austin and his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Dong Jun. Dong’s talking points could have come directly out of the Biden administration’s desired script. For example, whereas earlier Chinese leaders were saying that as long as the U.S. insisted on competition, they would not talk to their counterparts, Dong now said: “We believe that it is precisely because the two militaries have differences that they need to communicate more.” Indeed, the two Secretaries reaffirmed their plans to reopen direct lines of communication.  They asked me whether the Biden administration has a coherent strategy for trying to meet the China challenge. I answered yes and offered my best, short description of it. It consists of three components: fierce competition, deep communication, and serious cooperation. And to what end? To the end of a long-term, peaceful competition in which over the next quarter-century or half-century we will see which of the two systems more successfully delivers what people want. On America’s strategic trilemma, I agreed that we have a fundamental problem. The U.S. certainly has the greatest military force in the world. But if our capabilities and attention must be divided into three components: China, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the Middle East, then what?   Facing a China that is focused on just one set of scenarios, namely the Taiwan Straits and their peripheral waters, and a Russia focused on Ukraine, not to mention Iran and its proxies surrounding Israel—yikes. As I conclude: “The hardest problem American foreign policy will face over the next decade will be to try to pay less attention to some things in order to pay more attention to others.”   If you have reactions, we will be interested to receive them.   Graham Allison Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard Kennedy School Follow me on Twitter