O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

Meu Twitter: https://twitter.com/PauloAlmeida53

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/paulobooks

Mostrando postagens com marcador 70 anos. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador 70 anos. Mostrar todas as postagens

terça-feira, 3 de dezembro de 2019

OTAN aos 70 anos: crise, falta de confiança - Nicholas Burn (Belfer Center, Harvard)

NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis

The Summit of NATO Leaders will take place in London on Wednesday, December 4. NATO Heads of State and Government will discuss how to adapt the world’s oldest and most successful military alliance to current and emerging security challenges.  
In our report, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis,” published this past February, Ambassador Doug Lute and I note that the single greatest threat is the absence of strong, principled American presidential leadership for the first time in NATO's history.

We highlight 10 major challenges that the alliance faces and offer recommendations for how to strengthen NATO:
Challenges from Within NATO
  • Reviving American Leadership of the Alliance   
  • Restoring European Defense Strength   
  • Upholding NATO’s Democratic Values  
  • Streamlining NATO Decision-Making
Challenges from Beyond NATO’s Borders
  • Containing Putin’s Russia  
  • Ending the Afghan War  
  • Refocusing NATO Partnerships  
  • Maintaining an Open Door to Future Members  
Challenges on the Horizon
  • Winning the Technology Battle in the Digital Age   
  • Competing with China  
http://links.hks-belfercenter.mkt4851.com/ctt?kn=10&ms=MjI1MTc1MjES1&r=MzQxMTk0NDYyMjAS1&b=0&j=MTY0MDEzNzI5NgS2&mt=1&rt=0
Please read this report for greater detail on NATO's challenges and opportunities ahead.
Sincerely,
Nick Burns and Doug Lute

domingo, 13 de outubro de 2019

China: 70 anos do comunismo ao capitalismo de Estado -

Uma história factual dos 70 anos de comunismo na China.

The People’s Republic of China: 70 Years of Economic History

70 Years of China’s Economic Growth in One Chart

Chart: 70 Years of China’s Economic Growth

View a high-resolution version of this graphic here.
From agrarian economy to global superpower in half a century—China’s transformation has been an economic success story unlike any other.
Today, China is the world’s second largest economy, making up 16% of $86 trillion global GDP in nominal terms. If you adjust numbers for purchasing power parity (PPP), the Chinese economy has already been the world’s largest since 2014.
The upward trajectory over the last 70 years has been filled with watershed moments, strategic directives, and shocking tragedies — and all of this can be traced back to the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1st, 1949.

How the PRC Came to Be

The Chinese Civil War (1927–1949) between the Republic of China (ROC) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) caused a fractal split in the nation’s leadership. The CPC emerged victorious, and mainland China was established as the PRC.
Communist leader Mao Zedong set out a few chief goals for the PRC: to overhaul land ownership, to reduce social inequality, and to restore the economy after decades of war. The first State Planning Commission and China’s first 5-year plan were introduced to achieve these goals.
Today’s timely chart looks back on seven decades of notable events and policies that helped shape the country China has become. The base data draws from a graphic by Bert Hofman, the World Bank’s Country Director for China and other Asia-Pacific regions.

The Mao Era: 1949–1977

Mao Zedong’s tenure as Chairman of the PRC triggered sweeping changes for the country.
1953–1957: First 5-Year Plan
The program’s aim was to boost China’s industrialization. Steel production grew four-fold in four years, from 1.3 million tonnes to 5.2 million tonnes. Agricultural output also rose, but it couldn’t keep pace with industrial production.
1958–1962: Great Leap Forward
The campaign emphasized China’s agrarian-to-industrial transformation, via a communal farming system. However, the plan failed—causing an economic breakdown and the deaths of tens of millions in the Great Chinese Famine.
1959–1962: Lushan Conference and 7,000 Cadres meeting
Top leaders in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met to create detailed policy frameworks for the PRC’s future.
1966–1976: Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
Mao Zedong attempted to regain power and support after the failures of the Great Leap Forward. However, this was another plan that backfired, causing millions more deaths by violence and again crippling the Chinese economy.
1971: Joined the United Nations
The PRC replaced the ROC (Taiwan) as a permanent member of the United Nations. This addition also made it one of only five members of the UN Security Council—including the UK, the U.S., France, and Russia.
1972: President Nixon’s visit
After 25 years of radio silence, Richard Nixon was the first sitting U.S. President to step foot into the PRC. This helped re-establish diplomatic relations between the two nations.
1976–1977: Mao Zedong Death, and “Two Whatevers”
After Mao Zedong’s passing, the interim government promised to “resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.”
1979: “One-Child Policy”
The government enacted an aggressive birth-planning program to control the size of the country’s population, which it viewed as growing too fast. 

A Wave of Socio-Economic Reforms: 1980-1999

From 1980 onward, China worked on opening up its markets to the outside world, and closing the inequality gap.
1980–1984: Special Economic Zones (SEZs) established
Several cities were designated SEZs, and provided with measures such as tax incentives to attract foreign investment. Today, the economies of cities like Shenzhen have grown to rival the GDPs of entire countries.
1981: National Household Responsibility System implemented
In the Mao era, quotas were set on how many goods farmers could produce, shifting the responsibility of profits to local managers instead. This rapidly increased the standard of living, and the quota system spread from agriculture into other sectors.
1989: Coastal Development Strategy
Post-Mao leadership saw the coastal region as the potential “catalyst” for the entire country’s modernization.
1989–1991: Post-Tiananmen retrenchment
Early 1980s economic reforms had mixed results, and the growing anxiety eventually culminated in a series of protests. After tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square in 1989, the government “retrenched” itself by initially attempting to roll back economic reforms and liberalization. The country’s annual growth plunged from 8.6% between 1979-1989 to 6.5% between 1989-1991.
1990–1991: Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges open
Combined, the Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen (SZSE) stock exchanges are worth over $8.5 trillion in total market capitalization today.
1994: Shandong Huaneng lists on the NYSE
The power company was the first PRC enterprise to list on the NYSE. This added a new N-shares group to the existing Chinese capital market options of A-shares, B-shares, and H-shares.
1994–1996: National “8-7” Poverty Reduction Plan
China successfully lifted over 400 million poor people out of poverty between 1981 and 2002 through this endeavor.
1996: “Grasp the Large, Let Go of the Small”
Efforts were made to downsize the state sector. Policy makers were urged to maintain control over state-owned enterprises to “grasp the large”. Meanwhile, the central government was encouraged to relinquish control over smaller SOEs, or “let go of the small”. 
1997: Urban Dibao (低保)
China’s social safety net went through restructuring from 1993, and became a nationwide program after strong success in Shanghai.
1997-1999: Hong Kong and Macao handover, Asian Financial Crisis
China was largely unscathed by the regional financial crisis, thanks to the RMB (¥) currency’s non-convertibility. Meanwhile, the PRC regained sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macau back from the UK and Portugal, respectively.
1999: Western Development Strategy
The “Open Up the West” program built out 6 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 1 municipality—each becoming integral to the Chinese economy.

Turn of the Century: 2000-present

China’s entry to the World Trade Organization, and the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program – which let foreign investors participate in the PRC’s stock exchanges – contributed to the country’s economic growth.
Source: CNBC
2006: Medium-term Plan for Scientific Development
The PRC State Council’s 15-year plan outlines that 2.5% or more of national GDP should be devoted to research and development by 2020.
2008-2009: Global Financial Crisis
The PRC experienced only a mild economic slowdown during the crisis. The country’s GDP growth in 2007 was a staggering 14.2%, but this dropped to 9.7% and 9.5% respectively in the two years following.
2013: Belt and Road Initiative
China’s ambitious plans to develop road, rail, and sea routes across 152 countries is scheduled for completion by 2049—in time for the PRC’s 100th anniversary. More than $900 billion is budgeted for these infrastructure projects.
2015: Made in China 2025
The PRC refuses to be the world’s “factory” any longer. In response, it will invest nearly $300 billion to boost its manufacturing capabilities in high-tech fields like pharmaceuticals, aerospace, and robotics.
Despite the recent ongoing trade dispute with the U.S. and an increasingly aging population, the Chinese growth story seems destined to continue on.

China Paving the Way?

The 70th anniversary of the PRC offers a moment to reflect on the country’s journey from humble beginnings to a powerhouse on the world stage.
Because of China’s economic success, more and more countries see China as an example to emulate, a model of development that could mean moving from rags to riches within a generation.

This infographic explores how China’s proposed social credit system will monitor and surveil citizens, and how it’ll be used to reward or punish them.

Published
3 weeks ago
on
September 18, 2019
In an attempt to imbue trust, China has announced a plan to implement a national ranking system for its citizens and companies. Currently in pilot mode, the new system will be rolled out in 2020, and go through numerous iterations before becoming official. 
While the system may be a useful tool for China to manage its growing 1.4 billion population, it has triggered global concerns around the ethics of big data, and whether the system is a breach of fundamental human rights. 
Today’s infographic looks at how China’s proposed social credit system could work, and what the implications might be.

The Government is Always Watching

Currently, the pilot system varies from place to place, whereas the new system is envisioned as a unified system. Although the pilot program may be more of an experiment than a precursor, it gives a good indication of what to expect. 
In the pilot system, each citizen is assigned 1,000 points and is consistently monitored and rated on how they behave. Points are earned through good deeds, and lost for bad behavior. Users increase points by donating blood or money, praising the government on social media, and helping the poor. Rewards for such behavior can range from getting a promotion at work fast-tracked, to receiving priority status for children’s school admissions. 
In contrast, not visiting one’s aging parents regularly, spreading rumors on the internet, and cheating in online games are considered antisocial behaviors. Punishments include public shaming, exclusion from booking flights or train tickets, and restricted access to public services.

Big Data Goes Right to the Source

The perpetual surveillance that comes with the new system is expected to draw on huge amounts of data from a variety of traditional and digital sources. 
Police officers have used AI-powered smart glasses and drones to effectively monitor citizens. Footage from these devices showing antisocial behavior can be broadcast to the public to shame the offenders, and deter others from behaving similarly.
For more serious offenders, some cities in China force people to repay debts by switching the person’s ringtone without their permission. The ringtone begins with the sound of a police siren, followed by a message such as: 
“The person you are calling has been listed as a discredited person by the local court. Please urge this person to fulfill his or her legal obligations.”
Two of the largest companies in China, Tencent and Alibaba, were enlisted by the People’s Bank of China to play an important role in the credit system, raising the issue of third-party data security. WeChat—China’s largest social media platform, owned by Tencent—tracked behavior and ranked users accordingly, while displaying their location in real-time. 
Following data concerns, these tech companies—and six others—were not awarded any licenses by the government. However, social media giants are still involved in orchestrating the public shaming of citizens who misbehave.

The Digital Dang’an

The social credit system may not be an entirely new initiative in China. The dang’an (English: record) is a paper file containing an individual’s school reports, information on physical characteristics, employment records, and photographs. 
These dossiers, which were first used in the Maoist years, helped the government in maintaining control of its citizens. This gathering of citizen’s data for China’s social credit system may in fact be seen as a revival of the principle of dang’an in the digital era, with the system providing a powerful tool to monitor citizens whose data is more difficult to capture. 

Is the System Working?

In 2018, people with a low score were prohibited from buying plane tickets almost 18 million times, while high-speed train ticket transactions were blocked 5.5 million times. A further 128 people were prohibited from leaving China, due to unpaid taxes.
The system could have major implications for foreign business practices—as preference could be given to companies already ranked in the system. Companies with higher scores will be rewarded with incentives which include lower tax rates and better credit conditions, with their behavior being judged in areas such as:
  • Paid taxes
  • Customs regulation
  • Environmental protection
Despite the complexities of gathering vast amounts of data, the system is certainly making an impact. While there are benefits to having a standardized scoring system, and encouraging positive behavior—will it be worth the social cost of gamifying human life? 

A Timeline of U-Turns from the Chinese Market


It’s hard to ignore the massive economic opportunities available in the Chinese market, but it’s also notoriously difficult to succeed in.

Published
4 months ago
on
June 5, 2019
China’s economic surge is one of the biggest stories of the 21st century.
Hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out of poverty, and China’s swelling middle class has attracted the interest of Western companies.
As many American companies have discovered, doing business in China is far from straightforward. Recent history is littered with examples of companies that entered the Chinese market to great fanfare, only to retreat a few years later.

Calling Off The Offensive

Today’s infographic highlights 11 companies that ended up tapping the brakes on their ambitious forays on the other side of the Pacific.
Then, we take a look at the factors that influenced these strategic withdrawals.
Here are some high profile examples of corporate u-turns by American companies operating in the Chinese market:

Google

When Google China’s search engine was launched in 2006, the company had made the controversial decision to censor search results within the country. Google publicly displayed a disclaimer indicating that some results were removed, which created tensions with the Chinese government.
For a while, things seemed to be going well. Even though a domestic company, Baidu, had captured the majority of the Chinese search market, Google did have a respectable market share of about 30%.
Google China’s fortune took a turn for the worse in 2010 after a major hack – Operation Aurora – exposed user data as well as intellectual property. The hack, which originated from within China, was the last straw for Google’s executive team. After one last ditch effort to provide unfiltered search results within China, the company retreated beyond the firewall.

Amazon

Amazon was an early entrant into the Chinese market. In 2004, the company acquired Joyo – an online shopping site – which was eventually rebranded to Amazon China in 2011. 
Amazon China achieved some early success hitting a market share of around 15%, but today, that market share has eroded to less than 1%. Facing nearly insurmountable competition from domestic e-commerce platforms like JD and Taobao, the company recently announced it would be exiting the Chinese market.

Uber

After arriving fashionably late for the ride-hailing party in 2014, it quickly became clear that Uber was facing an uphill battle against well-funded domestic rivals. After only two years, Uber elected to u-turn out of the Chinese market.
Though Uber’s tactical exit from China is often viewed as a failure, the company has earned upwards of $8B through its sale to competitor Didi Chuxing.

A Two-Way Street

Now that red-hot growth at home is beginning to taper off, a number of Chinese companies have begun their push into other markets around the world. Much like their American counterparts, brands pushing beyond China’s borders are seeing varied success in their expansion efforts.
One high-profile example is Huawei. The telecommunications giant has been making inroads in countries around the world – particularly in emerging markets – but has seen pushback and scrutiny in a number of developed economies. Huawei has become a lightning rod for growing concerns over government surveillance and China’s growing influence over the global communications network.
Already, Australia has blocked the company from participating in its 5G network, and in the United States, government agencies are banned from buying Huawei gear.
If negative sentiment continues to build, it remains to be seen whether Huawei and other Chinese companies will follow the playbook of American brands in China, and turn the car around.

Os 70 anos da China comunista - editorial da Economist

Xi’s embrace of false history and fearsome weapons is worrying
China’s leader is stoking hair-trigger nationalism with his idea that the Communist Party never makes mistakes
The Economist – 8/10/2019

The most revealing moment of the national day parade through Tiananmen Square on October 1st lasted just a few seconds. It came as China’s fearsome new df-41 nuclear missiles, capable of striking any city in America, neared Chaguan’s press seat on the Avenue of Eternal Peace. Loudspeakers came to life as their camouflaged, many-wheeled carriers growled towards the grand gateway of the Forbidden City where President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders waited on a rostrum. Unseen voices explained how the weapons would ensure that China always retains a deterrent capability, thus safeguarding peace. Turning lyrical, the voices compared the missiles to large dragons that can hide in massive mountains or boundless seas before delivering earth-shaking blows. The hand-picked crowd erupted in spontaneous cheers.
Those cheers reflect two messages conveyed by the parade, which marked 70 years of Communist rule. The first is that China wields such firepower that no country may safely defy it. The second is that China is great again thanks to the Communist Party which is, and has always been, a force for good.
That second message was pressed home by the civilian half of the parade, which began with open-topped, gold-painted buses carrying red princelings and other descendants of Communist China’s founders and martyrs. One was a grandson of Mao Zedong, squeezed into a general’s uniform. The point was reinforced by marchers dressed as Mao-era farmers, soldiers and workers, dancing and singing in celebration of party-ordained campaigns of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to tame nature, mobilise the masses and turn China into an industrial power. Such sanitising of the Mao years is indecent. On balance those were lost decades that left millions of Chinese dead, whether from man-made famines, class warfare or ideological purges. Yet under Mr Xi, the twists, turns and dead-ends of party rule have been tidily woven into a glorious story of national progress. China’s boss has not hidden his motives. He links the Soviet Union’s collapse to the moment that Russian leaders disavowed crimes by Stalin and other Communist leaders. Mr Xi has chosen another course, curtailing the party’s previous, limited tolerance for historical candour.
Previous parades have nodded to live debates. On national day in 1984 Deng Xiaoping, then China’s leader, said the country’s primary task was to reform the economy to remove obstacles to growth. That parade included busts of leaders purged or sidelined under Mao, and a float from Shekou, a pioneering special economic zone that Deng’s leftist critics called capitalist.
In elite settings, largely for the benefit of insiders, Mr Xi has repudiated past crimes by ultra-leftists who were deemed by Deng to have deviated from the party line. Honouring revolutionary heroes on the eve of this year’s national day, Mr Xi remembered Zhang Zhixin, a party member executed in 1975 for speaking out against Mao-era excesses, though not before her larynx was cut to stop her calling to fellow inmates as she died.
No such candour is offered to the masses. The true story of China’s recovery from Maoist ruin was written by hundreds of millions of individual Chinese. They were enabled to raise themselves from poverty through hard work and risk-taking, after Deng pragmatically embraced market forces. Yet in this year’s parade, a vast painting of Deng in a Mao suit was escorted by identically dressed dancers waving fronds of grain, as if he were the skilled boss of a collective farm rather than the man who let peasants grow their own crops, transforming rural lives. Later floats, lauding the Xi era, showed such centrally planned glories as high-speed trains and space rockets. Some of the few visible representatives of private enterprise were delivery drivers on scooters, a low-paid group once praised by Mr Xi for being like diligent bees. In apparent homage to this simile, the parade’s delivery drivers wore yellow and black hats topped with bee antennae, like heroes in a children’s book. As if vanquishing the ghosts of the Tiananmen protests of 1989, students from the city’s universities marched beneath their college flags, hopping with excitement as they saw Mr Xi, through air still heavy with the fumes from parading tanks.

China’s nationalism is the world’s problem

It is understandable, indeed inevitable, that a wealthier China would seek to become a great military power. What was not inevitable was that Mr Xi would embrace populist, nostalgic, red-flag waving nationalism, while glossing over the party’s terrible mistakes. Traditionally, those urging China to reckon honestly with the past have appealed to rational self-interest. Brave, embattled liberals have called for more open debate about the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, to prevent such mistakes from being repeated. That argument feels weak today. Mr Xi is not a revolutionary like Mao, bent on dismantling the party. Rather, he is an authoritarian obsessed with stability, determined to assert the party’s absolute authority. To that end his team is happy to harness Maoist rhetoric, nostalgia for a simpler, less materialist China and the public’s justifiable pride in the endurance of past hardships. Judged cynically, such propaganda is astute domestic politics. Mao-style strongman rule is still a danger, but there is little risk of a return to the mayhem of the Cultural Revolution.
Other countries may have more to fear from Mr Xi’s embrace of false history. By telling his people that Communist China has never taken a wrong turn, he is stoking an impatient, hair-trigger nationalism in which criticism from abroad equates to hostility.
China is not the first rising power to seek fearsome weapons. Its people’s patriotism cannot be dismissed as brainwashing. Many are clear-eyed and rational in their love for their country and support for Mr Xi. But heavily armed, self-righteous nationalism can start wars. Both China and the rest of the world would be somewhat safer if party chiefs were to acknowledge their fallibility. That Mr Xi is heading in the other direction should alarm everybody. ?

quarta-feira, 5 de junho de 2019

A OTAN aos 70 anos: tem futuro? - Karen Donfried (German Marshall Fund)

3 Ways Europe Is Looking at a Fraying NATO

U.S. paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg in North Carolina take part in 'Saber Strike 2018' a major U.S.-led military exercise with 18,000 soldiers from 19 primarily NATO countries outside of Vilnus, Lithuania, June 9, 2018.
Karen Donfried, president German Marshall Fund
DefenseOne, April 2, 2019

When 29 foreign ministers gather this week to mark NATO’s 70th birthday in Washington, D.C., their bonhomie will seek to mask important divisions within the alliance, not only across the Atlantic but also within Europe. 
In Paris, the talk is all about strategic autonomy. Many French feel America has gone bad. President Trump’s antipathy toward NATO has led them to conclude that the U.S. security guarantee, enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty pledging each ally to collective defense, can no longer be relied on. Even with their nuclear-weapons capacity and permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, the French admit that they are far from strategic autonomy today given their clear dependence on the United States for their security and defense needs. Unsurprisingly, they are the most ardent evangelists about the need for Europeans to double down on building their own independent assets and capabilities. 
In Berlin, the focus is on strategic patience. While some Germans find the French argument compelling, more have reached a different conclusion. Many Germans perceive the change in the United States as cyclical, having to do with a particular U.S. president, rather than structural, signifying a fundamental turning-away from the Alliance as an enduring commitment, not just a series of transactions. To be sure, they do not foresee a return to the status quo antewhen the Trump era ends. But they do believe that the President’s successor will have a clear-eyed view of the benefits NATO brings to the United States and, accordingly, will return to a more traditional view of transatlantic relations. Chancellor Merkel has talked about how the times have changed and Germany can no longer “completely depend on others,” and she has called on Europe to take its fate into its own hands — but still, she describes the relationship with the United States as “crucial.” 
In Warsaw, the buzzwords are strategic embrace. The Poles see a big, bad neighbor to their East: Russia. U.S. troops are currently deployed to Poland on a rotational basis as part of NATO’s effort to buttress defenses on its eastern flank after Russia illegally annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. The Poles are not convinced that their European allies will defend them if push comes to shove and thus the Polish government has offered to pay $2 billion to establish a permanent U.S. military presence in Poland. Polish President Duda even offered to call the base “Fort Trump.” In Polish eyes, there is simply no substitute for the U.S. security guarantee.
To stop further fraying of alliance cohesion, NATO allies need to unify around a policy of strategic responsibility. Having European military forces that are more effective, efficient, and capable is in the interest of every NATO member, whether France, Germany, Poland, or the United States. It is hard to imagine future scenarios in which Europeans will not be called on to take greater responsibility, especially in their neighborhood.
To the Trump administration, the most important expression of taking strategic responsibility is the level of defense spending. Most Americans agree that their NATO partners are largely failing on that front. Only six of Washington’s 28 allies spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense (a NATO guideline that members recommitted themselves to back in 2014 with a vague formulation of “aim[ing] to move toward the 2 percent guideline within a decade”).
Defense spending is an important metric, but it is not the only one. Alliance cohesion has long been NATO’s holy grail. 
Congress has grown increasingly concerned about mixed signals emanating from the administration about NATO’s value and has stepped up its engagement over the past year. Most recently, in a rare expression of bipartisanship, House Speaker Pelosi and Senate Majority Leader McConnell invited NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to address a joint session of Congress. 
Ever since last July’s NATO Summit in Brussels, rumors have been flying that the U.S. president wants to pull the United States out of NATO. Congress has sought to reassure the allies. In the immediate run-up to that summit, the Senate voted 97-2 to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the collective defense of the alliance. This January, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the NATO Support Act, 357 to 22, thus “reject[ing] any efforts to withdraw the United States from NATO” and prohibiting any use of federal funds for that purpose.
Members are also taking their support on the road. Over 50 members of Congress, from Senate Judiciary Chairman Graham to Speaker Pelosi, attended the Munich Security Conference – the largest Congressional delegation in the half-century history of this annual high-level gathering. Their message was clear: The United States will stay engaged in the world and values its allies; and because we are stronger together, the Europeans need to up their contribution. Europeans applauded this bipartisan show of support for NATO and welcomed the message of reform, rather than obsolescence.
Congress’s engagement could prove to be the critical variable for unifying transatlantic partners around a shared goal of strategic responsibility. Anniversaries are not only for celebrating. Remembering past achievements can inspire, but neither nostalgia nor hope is a policy. Foreign ministers need to unify around a common sense of purpose and recommit their countries to investing more in credible capabilities. The reason to do so is not because the United States is asking; it is because the current strategic reality demands it. 

Related: To Strengthen NATO, Congress Must Help End Its Reliance On Russian Equipment

Related: We Need a NATO/EU for Cyber Defense

Related: French MOD Rebukes Trump Administration for Arms-Sales Focus