Covid: a inimiga de todos os sistemas autoritários - Joschka Fischer

 Project Syndicate, Praga – 28.12.2022

COVID and the Chinese Social Contract

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, different countries adopted different strategies, depending on their respective cultural and historical traditions. While China's top-down authoritarian strategy initially seemed effective, the regime's zero-COVID policy ultimately proved to be fatally flawed.

Joschka Fischer

 

BERLIN – In October, the Communist Party of China convened its 20th National Congress, primarily to confirm President Xi Jinping’s hold over the country’s leadership. Everything went according to his plan: the CPC’s top governing body, the Standing Committee, is now staffed only by his most devoted henchmen. With Xi having secured a third term as general secretary – and thus as president – one man now has absolute power in China for the first time since the days of Mao Zedong.

Gone is the principle of collective, term-limited leadership that Deng Xiaoping introduced following Mao’s death – a time when China was just beginning its massively successful modernization phase. Yet, as recent history shows, the return to one-man rule in a country of 1.4 billion people represents one of the greatest risks to China and its status as a rising superpower second only to the United States.

Yes, under Xi, the Chinese regime’s power has increasingly seemed unlimited and unrestricted, owing to massive investments in state-of-the-art digital mass surveillance and social control systems. Yet the CPC’s strength is not based only on all-encompassing “smart” repression. Rather, it is the result of the party’s tremendous successes in modernizing China.

Toward the end of the twentieth century, China integrated itself into the world economy, becoming its “extended workbench” and its number-one exporting country. China then leveraged this growth to develop a highly efficient mixed economy, with a growing private sector operating alongside the traditional party-controlled state sector. The results were phenomenal: China consistently recorded massive annual growth rates, lifting hundreds of millions of people (especially in the coastal regions) out of absolute poverty and into a newly emerging middle class.

As China became richer, it increased its military power and pursued more dominant positions on the technological frontier. Within the space of just a few years, its technological successes – born predominantly of the private high-tech sector – made it a serious rival to US Big Tech. For a few years in the late 2010s, it seemed to be only a matter of time before China would replace the US as the world’s largest economy and overwhelmingly dominant technological superpower.

Then came the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan in late 2019. Despite some Chinese authorities’ efforts to cover up the emerging epidemic, it soon became the entire world’s problem. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the outbreak to be a pandemic, and the global economy ground to a halt as countries locked down to contain the spread of the virus.

But different countries adopted different strategies over the medium term, depending on their respective cultural and historical traditions. The open, democratic societies of the West, for example, embraced transparency and relied on voluntary self-isolation and the rapid development of effective vaccines. Three years later, their populations are now largely immunized – though many people have died.

By contrast, China relied from the beginning on draconian containment measures. Under its zero-COVID policy, every detected infection resulted in forced, closely supervised quarantines for all those affected.For a long time, this strategy seemed superior to the Western approach. China had far fewer deaths, and because it had isolated itself from the rest of the world, its domestic economy also recovered faster than those of the US and Europe. Accordingly, many around the world began to suspect that authoritarian command economies are better equipped for such crises than are the West’s messy, pluralist liberal democracies.

But this view has proved to be deeply mistaken. We now know that China’s zero-COVID policy required a suspension of the social contract between the CPC and the people. Xi seems to have overlooked the fact that today’s China – at least the large metropolises that drive the economy – is not the China of the 1960s and 1970s.

The new China simply is not suited for policies that require the authorities to shut down entire mega-cities with no notice, often locking workers in factories for weeks at a time. Moreover, owing to China’s position in the world economy, self-isolation was always going to be costly. Not only did zero-COVID create enormous disruptions in international supply chains; it also caused considerable damage to China’s own export sector.

Xi wanted to use the pandemic to demonstrate the superiority of the Chinese system over the declining West. Yet this meant that, out of nationalistic arrogance, he refused to import the vastly superior Western mRNA vaccines. With China’s huge population remaining under-vaccinated and unprotected, lifting the zero-COVID measures was bound to be risky.

But so, too, were the never-ending lockdowns. Just weeks after the 20th Party Congress, public frustration exploded across China’s large metropolises. Protesters held up sheets of white paper to decry the CPC’s censorship regime, and the “revolt of the blank sheets” spread like a bushfire. Xi had clearly overreached.

How could China’s seemingly all-powerful autocrat understand so little about the social contract on which his power rests? For all its difficulties, liberal democracy – with its transparency and self-imposed limits – has once again proved more efficient and resilient than autocracy. Accountability to the people and the rule of law is not a weakness; it is a decisive source of strength. Where Xi sees a cacophony of clashing opinions and subversive free expression, the West sees a flexible and self-correcting form of collective intelligence. The results speak for themselves.

Joschka Fischer, Germany’s foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, was a leader of the German Green Party for almost 20 years.

 

Covid afasta servidores de divisão do Itamaraty em trabalho presencial e acende alerta no órgão - Metropoles

 Covid afasta servidores de divisão do Itamaraty em trabalho presencial e acende alerta no órgão

Metrópoles Online

29 de Julho de 2021

Funcionários da Divisão de Comunicações e Arquivo do Itamaraty estão em trabalho presencial desde o início da pandemia

Três servidores públicos e dois funcionários terceirizados da Divisão de Comunicações e Arquivo do Ministério das Relações Exteriores estão afastados das atividades após terem testado positivo para a Covid-19 na semana passada. Eles trabalham presencialmente no prédio do Itamaraty, no setor que é responsável por serviços como a correspondência diplomática com embaixadas e consulados do Brasil pelo mundo.

Mesmo em órgãos públicos que adotaram majoritariamente o trabalho remoto ao longo da pandemia, como o próprio Itamaraty, setores considerados essenciais tiveram de se manter em expediente presencial dos servidores. É o caso da Divisão de Comunicações e Arquivo.

De acordo com o MRE, o setor tem 68 servidores lotados, dos quais 38 têm trabalhado presencialmente, mas em sistema de rodízio: metade numa semana, metade na outra. Os outros 30, segundo a pasta, estão em trabalho remoto.

Uma pessoa que trabalha no local relatou ao Metrópoles que uma servidora combinou de cobrir um colega na semana que não era a dela e compareceu ao trabalho presencial por 15 dias seguidos, os últimos com visíveis sintomas de Covid-19. Ao longo da semana passada, ela e em seguida mais quatro colegas desse mesmo setor acabaram testando positivo. Ainda de acordo com essa fonte, já há outros casos suspeitos - o que o Itamaraty não confirma ainda.

Outro ladoO MRE confirmou os cinco afastamentos de funcionários da Divisão de Comunicações e Arquivo após testes positivos de Covid-19 e alegou que segue protocolos para minimizar os riscos de contaminação.

"A área responsável pela limpeza e desinfecção do MRE foi comunicada dos resultados positivos e realizou limpeza cuidadosa das instalações", informou o órgão.

"Todos os servidores são orientados a usar máscara durante todo o expediente nos termos do Decreto 40.648 do GDF, de 23 de abril de 2020. Encontram-se disponíveis máscaras descartáveis e álcool em gel na unidade. O MRE adotou ainda rígido controle de segurança sanitária, com restrição de acesso, aferidor de temperatura nas portas de entrada, torres de álcool em gel, campanhas de conscientização, novo protocolo de tramitação digital de documentos e digitalização do atendimento sempre que possível", diz ainda a nota oficial.

A fonte que conversou com a reportagem reclamou, porém, que os protocolos não são seguidos por parte dos servidores e que não há cobrança para quem deixa, por exemplo, de usar máscara no ambiente de trabalho.

Subserviência nunca foi boa conselheira Embaixador - Cesario Melatonio Neto

 Subserviência nunca foi boa conselheira 

Embaixador Cesario Melatonio Neto

O presidente norte-americano Joe Biden sugeriu a quebra de patentes das empresas farmacêuticas que produzem as vacinas contra o novo coronavírus.

A medida foi saudada por cerca de uma centena de países, mas não pelo Brasil. O Brasil já foi mais lúcido, ousado e civilizado em outros tempos, como o da ação do então ministro da saúde, José Serra, para quebrar patentes de medicamentos de combate ao HIV.

O mundo médico e científico-acadêmico foi unânime em reconhecer a importância dessa política sanitária para a sobrevivência dos afetados pelo vírus da AIDS.

Há muitos acadêmicos hoje que estudam a questão da propriedade intelectual e suas consequências para o bem-estar dos cidadãos que vivem no sistema do capitalismo moderno.

É urgente uma renúncia, em caráter emergencial, das regras de propriedade intelectual da organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC).

As corporações farmacêuticas estão concentradas em seus lucros e menos na saúde global, com uma tática de preservar o máximo poder no mercado, com o objetivo de maximizar os benefícios financeiros.

Apenas os governos podem intervir na solução do problema para salvar milhões de vidas. Dezoito farmacêuticas acumularam 588 milhões de dólares de lucro, entre 2009 e 2018. No período, essas empresas recompensaram seus acionistas com 92% sobre os benefícios acumulados. As empresas farmacêuticas poderiam reinvestir mais os lucros em pesquisa e inovação, mesmo que haja diminuição na distribuição de dividendos.

A escassez de vacinas contra o novo coronavírus, em muitos continentes, é consequência dos esforços de laboratórios de porte para preservar seu controle e os lucros.

O Brasil pode estar na contramão da história ao opor-se à mencionada quebra das patentes das vacinas anticovid-19.

Essa subserviência a interesses inconfessáveis pode ser má conselheira e isolar ainda mais o nosso país no panorama mundial. A diplomacia brasileira sempre se caracterizou pela solidariedade com as nações mais pobres e granjeou respeito e credibilidade por essa postura.

Uma revisão dessa postura, contrária aos interesses nacionais, se impõe até mesmo pelo isolamento internacional acarretado pela submissão às empresas farmacêuticas.

Em oposição, no caso da quebra de patentes, a três membros do BRICS (China, Índia e África do Sul), enfraquecemos a unidade do grupo e ainda abrimos confronto com Moscou no caso da vacina russa.

A proteção abusiva e exagerada aos monopólios farmacêuticos demonstra uma passividade ou subserviência diante de extorsões indecentes.

Uma das maiores conquistas dos laboratórios foi o Acordo Internacional sobre a propriedade intelectual na Organização Mundial do Comércio. Com este mecanismo as potentes as patentes de remédios conseguiram a proteção dos mecanismos de solução de controvérsias da OMC e de seus dispositivos de retaliação.

Esse acordo TRIPs denota uma pequena referência insignificante do proprietário das patentes com relação à sociedade, dando ênfase à proteção dos direitos empresariais. Algumas patentes, por exemplo, podem ter vigência por cerca de três décadas.

A pandemia demonstrou a fragilidade e dependência tecnológicas da indústria brasileira de vacinas.

Será que a missão a cumprir, ou cumprida, pelo governo federal é a defesa dos lucros das empresas farmacêuticas, ou a proteção sanitária dos cidadãos brasileiros? 

Donald Trump já deixou a casa Branca e Joe Biden se posicionou, neste tema, contra a postura do antigo mandatário. 

Errar é humano, mas insistir no erro parece inaceitável. Até o governo do presidente dos Estados Unidos, Joe Biden, repito, juntou-se no início do mês a países em desenvolvimento, como Índia e África do Sul para solicitar uma quebra temporária de patentes para vacinas contra a Covid-19, na esperança de que essa medida aumente a produção e permita uma distribuição mais justa em todo o mundo.

Em 21 do mês corrente, em Roma, na Cúpula Global de Saúde, este assunto voltou a ser debatido em um dos principais eventos deste ano para coordenar ações globais contra a pandemia.

A China já anunciou o apoio à quebra da patente das vacinas contra covid-19. Com isso, muitos países pobres e menos desenvolvidos poderão ter acesso e sua população vacinar-se com mais facilidade.

Este é mais um gesto histórico em direção da suspensão dessas patentes. Durante a pior pandemia em 100 anos, o Itamaraty foi usado como instrumento de promoção ideológica abandonando os esforços internacionais para combater o novo coronavírus e enfraquecendo uma resposta global à pandemia.

Chegou a hora de rever esta hesitação em fazer parte da coalizão internacional por vacinas e deixar de lado medidas deliberadas para pôr a política e a ideologia acima da saúde pública.

Has covid-19 killed globalisation? - The Economist

Globalisation unwound
Has covid-19 killed globalisation?

The flow of people, trade and capital will be slowed

The Economist, Leader May 14, 2020 edition

Editor’s note: The Economist is making some of its most important coverage of the covid-19 pandemic freely available to readers of The Economist Today, our daily newsletter. To receive it, register here. For our coronavirus tracker and more coverage, see our hub

Even before the pandemic, globalisation was in trouble. The open system of trade that had dominated the world economy for decades had been damaged by the financial crash and the Sino-American trade war. Now it is reeling from its third body-blow in a dozen years as lockdowns have sealed borders and disrupted commerce (see Briefing). The number of passengers at Heathrow has dropped by 97% year-on-year; Mexican car exports fell by 90% in April; 21% of transpacific container-sailings in May have been cancelled. As economies reopen, activity will recover, but don’t expect a quick return to a carefree world of unfettered movement and free trade. The pandemic will politicise travel and migration and entrench a bias towards self-reliance. This inward-looking lurch will enfeeble the recovery, leave the economy vulnerable and spread geopolitical instability.

The world has had several epochs of integration, but the trading system that emerged in the 1990s went further than ever before. China became the world’s factory and borders opened to people, goods, capital and information (see Chaguan). After Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008 most banks and some multinational firms pulled back. Trade and foreign investment stagnated relative to gdp, a process this newspaper later called slowbalisation. Then came President Donald Trump’s trade wars, which mixed worries about blue-collar jobs and China’s autocratic capitalism with a broader agenda of chauvinism and contempt for alliances. At the moment when the virus first started to spread in Wuhan last year, America’s tariff rate on imports was back to its highest level since 1993 and both America and China had begun to decouple their technology industries.

Since January a new wave of disruption has spread westward from Asia. Factory, shop and office closures have caused demand to tumble and prevented suppliers from reaching customers. The damage is not universal. Food is still getting through, Apple insists it can still make iPhones and China’s exports have held up so far, buoyed by sales of medical gear. But the overall effect is savage. World goods trade may shrink by 10-30% this year. In the first ten days of May exports from South Korea, a trade powerhouse, fell by 46% year-on-year, probably the worst decline since records began in 1967.

The underlying anarchy of global governance is being exposed. France and Britain have squabbled over quarantine rules, China is threatening Australia with punitive tariffs for demanding an investigation into the virus’s origins and the White House remains on the warpath about trade. Despite some instances of co-operation during the pandemic, such as the Federal Reserve’s loans to other central banks, America has been reluctant to act as the world’s leader. Chaos and division at home have damaged its prestige. China’s secrecy and bullying have confirmed that it is unwilling—and unfit—to pick up the mantle. Around the world, public opinion is shifting away from globalisation. People have been disturbed to find that their health depends on a brawl to import protective equipment and on the migrant workers who work in care homes and harvest crops.

This is just the start. Although the flow of information is largely free outside China, the movement of people, goods and capital is not. Consider people first. The Trump administration is proposing to curtail immigration further, arguing that jobs should go to Americans instead. Other countries are likely to follow. Travel is restricted, limiting the scope to find work, inspect plants and drum up orders. Some 90% of people live in countries with largely closed borders. Many governments will open up only to countries with similar health protocols: one such “travel bubble” is mooted to include Australia and New Zealand and, perhaps, Taiwan and Singapore (see article). The industry is signalling that the disruption to travel will be lasting. Airbus has cut production by a third and Emirates, a symbol of globalisation, expects no recovery until 2022.

Trade will suffer as countries abandon the idea that firms and goods are treated equally regardless of where they come from. Governments and central banks are asking taxpayers to underwrite national firms through their stimulus packages, creating a huge and ongoing incentive to favour them. And the push to bring supply chains back home in the name of resilience is accelerating. On May 12th Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, told the nation that a new era of economic self-reliance has begun. Japan’s covid-19 stimulus includes subsidies for firms that repatriate factories; European Union officials talk of “strategic autonomy” and are creating a fund to buy stakes in firms. America is urging Intel to build plants at home. Digital trade is thriving but its scale is still modest. The sales abroad of Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Microsoft are equivalent to just 1.3% of world exports.

The flow of capital is also suffering, as long-term investment sinks. Chinese venture-capital investment in America dropped to $400m in the first quarter of this year, 60% below its level two years ago. Multinational firms may cut their cross-border investment by a third this year. America has just instructed its main federal pension fund to stop buying Chinese shares, and so far this year countries representing 59% of world gdp have tightened their rules on foreign investment. As governments try to pay down their new debts by taxing firms and investors, some countries may be tempted to further restrict the flow of capital across borders.

It’s lonely out there

Don’t be fooled that a trading system with an unstable web of national controls will be more humane or safer. Poorer countries will find it harder to catch up and, in the rich world, life will be more expensive and less free. The way to make supply chains more resilient is not to domesticate them, which concentrates risk and forfeits economies of scale, but to diversify them. Moreover, a fractured world will make solving global problems harder, including finding a vaccine and securing an economic recovery.

Tragically, this logic is no longer fashionable. Those three body-blows have so wounded the open system of trade that the powerful arguments in its favour are being neglected. Wave goodbye to the greatest era of globalisation—and worry about what is going to take its place.■

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This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Goodbye globalisation"