O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

Mostrando postagens com marcador Institute for the Study of War. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Institute for the Study of War. Mostrar todas as postagens

domingo, 31 de março de 2024

A Igreja Ortodoxa Russa declarou “guerra santa” em favor de uma “Santa Rússia” expansionista (Institute for the Study of War)

A Igreja Ortodoxa Russa declarou “guerra santa” em favor de uma “Santa Rússia” expansionista 

Institute for the Study of War

March 30, 2024

Um documento e uma postura absolutamente inacreditáveis: uma espécie de “Mein Kampf” para o novo “Mundo Russo” do século XXI. A IOR se alinha assim com os defensores de uma Jihad (guerra santa) contra os inimigos da verdadeira religião e do único deus existente. A Igreja Ortodoxa Russa se manifesta contra os inimigos da religião e do único deus existente. Ela está inteiramente, integralmente, devotadamente, “piamente”, a serviço do projeto expansionista militarista de Putin. 

Documento, propostas e incitação à guerra de conquista ao estilo Putin precisam ser denunciadas aos olhos do mundo. Tanto o Vaticano, quanto as conferências protestantes e os clérigos muçulmanos ao redor do mundo precisariam urgentemente tomar posição sobre os absurdos proclamados no documento da IOR, comentado pelo ISW.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 31 de março de 2024


https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-orthodox-church-declares-“holy-war”-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets


THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH DECLARES “HOLY WAR” AGAINST UKRAINE AND ARTICULATES TENETS OF RUSSIA’S EMERGING OFFICIAL NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY 





Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and George Barros

March 30, 2024

The Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP), a Kremlin-controlled organization and a known tool within the Russian hybrid warfare toolkit, held the World Russian People’s Council in Moscow on March 27 and 28 and approved an ideological and policy document tying several Kremlin ideological narratives together in an apparent effort to form a wider nationalist ideology around the war in Ukraine and Russia’s expansionist future.[1] ROC MP Head Patriarch Kirill, reportedly himself a former Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) officer and a known staunch supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin, chaired the congress of the World Russian People's Council that approved the document, and Kirill likely coordinated the document’s ideological narrative and policy recommendations with the Kremlin.[2] The document, "The Present and Future of the Russian World,” addresses Russian legislative and executive authorities with specific calls to amend Russian policy documents and laws. These calls are likely either an attempt to socialize desired Kremlin policies among Russians before their implementation or to test public reactions to policies that Kremlin officials are currently considering. Putin and Kremlin officials have gradually attempted to elaborate on amorphous ideological narratives about the war in Ukraine and their envisioned geopolitical confrontation with the West since the start of the full-scale invasion, and the ROC MP appears to be offering a more coherent ideological framework for Russians.[3] The ROC MP released the document a week after the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack and roughly a month before the start of the Orthodox Easter Holy Week, and likely aims to seize on heightened anxieties following the terrorist attack and increased Russian Orthodoxy observance to garner support for its desired ultranationalist policies and ideological vision.

The ROC MP intensified Kremlin rhetoric about Russia’s war in Ukraine and cast it as an existential and civilizational “holy war,” a significant inflection for Russian authorities who have so far carefully avoided officially framing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as any kind of “war.” The ROC MP called Putin’s “special military operation” a holy war (Svyashennaya Voyna) and a new stage in the Russian people’s struggle for “national liberation...in southwestern Russia,” referencing eastern and southeastern Ukraine.[4] The ROC MP claimed that the Russian people are defending their lives, freedom, and statehood; their civilizational, religious, national, and cultural identity; and their right to live within the borders of a single Russian state by waging Putin’s war of conquest in Ukraine. The ROC MP argued that the war in Ukraine is a holy war because Russia is defending “Holy Russia” and the world from the onslaught of globalism and the victory of the West, which has fallen into Satanism. The ROC MP asserted that the war in Ukraine will conclude with Russia seizing exclusive influence over the entire territory of modern Ukraine and the exclusion of any Ukrainian government that the Kremlin determines to be hostile to Russia. The ROC MP’s description of Russian goals is in line with repeated Kremlin statements indicating that Putin retains his objective to destroy Ukrainian sovereignty and statehood.[5] The ROC MP’s use and description of the holy war in Ukraine is also consistent with Kremlin efforts to frame the war as an existential national struggle against Ukraine and the collective West but notably expands the alleged threats that defeat in Ukraine poses for Russians.[6] The term “holy war” may also conjure allusions to the Great Patriotic War (the Second World War), as the Soviet Union’s unofficial war anthem shared the same name, and the Kremlin has routinely invoked the mythos of the Great Patriotic War to generate domestic support for the war in Ukraine.[7] The Kremlin has continued to stress that the war in Ukraine is a “special military operation,” however, and the ROC MP’s direct acknowledgment of the conflict as a holy war may elicit support from Russians who have found the Kremlin’s comparatively restrained rhetoric uninspiring. The ROC MP did not define the holy war as a purely Orthodox concept and instead tied it to the Kremlin’s purposefully broad conception of who is a part of the Russian nation and Russkiy Mir (Russian World).[8] Ukrainian victory does not pose these existential threats, however, as Ukraine’s struggle to restore its territorial integrity, return its people, and defend its national identity does not infringe on Russian identity, statehood, or territorial integrity.

The ROC MP called for the codification of elements of the Russkiy Mir and may be gauging public support for the formal inclusion of ethnic Ukrainians and Belarusians in the Kremlin’s concept of the Russian nation. The ROC MP stated that Russia is the “creator, support, and defender” of the Russkiy Mir and that the Russkiy Mir is a “spiritual, cultural, and civilizational phenomenon” that transcends the borders of the Russian Federation and historical Russian lands and encompasses everyone that values Russian traditions and culture.[9] The ROC MP claimed the Russkiy Mir’s mission is to destroy and prevent efforts to establish “universal hegemony in the world” and that the reunification of the “Russian nation” should be one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy. The ROC MP stated that Russia should return to the “trinity doctrine” of the Russian nation, which falsely asserts that the “Russian nation” is comprised of sub-groups of ethnic Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians whom Russia should reunify. The ROC MP called on Russia to codify the “trinity doctrine” in law, make it an “integral part” of the Russian legal system, include it in the “normative list” of Russian spiritual and moral values, and give the concept legal protection. Putin and other Kremlin officials have consistently invoked similar claims about the “Russian people” and Russkiy Mir since before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine as a means to justify Russian aggression against Ukraine while undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and denying the existence of a Ukrainian ethnic identity.[10] The ROC MP may be gauging the response to the idea of codifying the “trinity doctrine” on the Kremlin’s orders. The Kremlin may codify this doctrine as official Russian policy.

The ROC MP heavily emphasized Russia’s need for traditional family values and an updated migration policy to counter Russia’s ongoing demographic crisis. The ROC MP labeled Russia’s demographic crisis as Russia’s main existential threat and characterized steady demographic growth as a critical national security priority. The ROC MP asserted that Russia should aim to grow its population to 600 million people (a roughly 450 million increase) in the next 100 years and laid out a series of measures that it envisions would allow Russia to achieve this monumental task. The ROC MP called for the revival of the “traditional large family” and traditional family values in Russia – echoing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on 2024 as the “Year of the Family” in recent major national addresses.[11] The ROC MP claimed that the Russian government should recognize the family and its well-being as Russia’s ”main national development goal” and a “strategic national priority” and should amend Russia’s main strategic planning documents to reflect this.[12] The ROC MP called on Russian popular culture to create a “cult of the family” in society and suggested various economic benefits the state should enact to encourage larger families. The ROC MP claimed that a new state migration policy is also key to an “effective” demographic policy. The ROC MP complained that migrants who do not speak Russian, do not understand Russian history and culture, and cannot integrate into Russian society are “deforming” Russia’s unified legal, cultural, and linguistic space. The ROC MP alleged that the “uncontrolled” influx of migrant labor decreases the “indigenous” population’s wages and access to jobs and that “closed ethnic enclaves” are “breeding grounds” for corruption, organized crime, extremism, and terrorism. The ROC MP offered a series of policy recommendations that Russia should prioritize in a new migration policy, including “significant” restrictions on low-skilled foreign laborers, guarantees of employment and high incomes for Russian citizens, protections of the rights and interests of ethnic Russians, and other indigenous peoples of Russia, the mass repatriation of "compatriots” to Russia, and the relocation of highly-skilled foreign specialists who are loyal to Russia and ready to integrate into Russian society.

The ROC MP’s demographic and migration policy suggestions continue to highlight how the Kremlin struggles with inconsistent and contradictory policies concerning migrants and the interests of its ultranationalist population. Select Russian officials and ultranationalist voices have recently called for Russia to enact anti-migrant policies following the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack, but ISW continues to assess that Russia is unlikely to introduce any restrictions that would reduce the number of migrants in Russia given that Russia continues to heavily rely on migrants to offset domestic labor shortages and for force generation efforts.[13] Putin asserted in December 2023 that Russia’s “compatriots abroad” are those who have historical, cultural, or linguistic ties to Russia, and the ROC MP appears to suggest that the repatriation of such “compatriots” to Russia could be a large resource Russia could tap into to solve its demographic crisis.[14] Some of the ROC MP’s other policy recommendations, however, contradictorily seek to restrict some of the very migrants that would fall under Putin’s definition of “compatriots abroad.” The ROC MP’s approach to the Russkiy Mir appears to be at odds with Putin’s previous definition of Russkiy Mir which posits a diverse and inclusive Russian civic nationalism.[15]

The ROC MP appears to be combining previously parallel Kremlin narrative efforts into a relatively cohesive ideology focusing on national identity and demographic resurgence that promises Russians a period of national rejuvenation in exchange for social and civic duties. The ROC MP highlighted that “the restoration of the unity of the Russian people” through the war in Ukraine is a key condition for Russia’s survival and successful development throughout the 21st century. This call for restoration amounts to the full-scale destruction of the Ukrainian nation and its envelopment into Russia. The ROC MP aims to also envelop ethnic Belarusians into the Russian nation through its conception of the “trinity doctrine” while also massively repatriating other “compatriots” abroad. The ROC MP’s calls for Russians to assume the responsibility for steadily increasing birth rates and averting demographic catastrophe similarly promises Russians that Russian sovereignty and identity will persist in the 21st century. These efforts to expand Russia’s control over those it considers to be a part of the Russkiy Mir, whether through mass repatriation or forceful means like Russia’s war of conquest in Ukraine, serve the same purpose as the calls for Russians to increase birth rates — increasing Russia’s overall population with people that ultranationalists consider to be “Russian.” The ROC MP argued that the establishment of a stable and sovereign Russkiy Mir under the Russian state will lead to economic opportunity and Russia’s role as one of the leading centers of a multipolar world order. The ROC MP stated that the typical embodiment of the Russkiy Mir after the promised national rejuvenation would be a Russian family with three or more children and their own single-family home, offering ordinary Russians future socioeconomic benefits in exchange for sacrifices made now in backing the ROC MP’s suggested ultranationalist ideology and achieving Russia’s “unification” with Ukraine and Belarus. The ROC MP’s suggested ideology explicitly ties Russian national security to the preservation of an imagined and disputed Russian nation and Russian demographic growth, offering the Kremlin expanded justifications for acts of aggression against neighboring countries and the West in the name of protecting the overall size and growth of the imagined Russkiy Mir. The Kremlin may choose not to fully align itself publicly with the ultranationalist ideology that the ROC MP has proposed at this time but will highly likely borrow from and leverage it to generate support for the war effort in Ukraine and any future acts of aggression against Russia’s neighbors and the West.

1] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/6116189.html

[2] https://www.tdg dot ch/pretre-espion-propagandiste-la-vie-secrete-du-chef-de-leglise-russe-en-suisse-766374038310 ; https://www.rts dot ch/info/suisse/13758343-le-patriarche-orthodoxe-russe-kirill-a-espionne-la-suisse-pour-le-kgb-dans-les-annees-70.html

[3] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar013024

[4] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/6116189.html

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022424

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020724 ; https:...

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar020224 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar012724

[8] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar030424 ;https://isw.pub/UkrWar021924

[9] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/6116189.html

[10] http://en dot kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar121323 ; https:...

[11] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/6116189.html ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar022924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar123123 ;https://isw.pub/UkrWar012324

[12] http://www.patriarchia dot ru/db/text/6116189.html

[13] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032824 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032724 ; https:...https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/ukraine-conflicts-updates-2023

[15] https://isw.pub/UkrWar112823

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quarta-feira, 20 de dezembro de 2023

Russia-Ukraine: assessment of the Institute for the Study of War

 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Institute for the Study of War 

December 19, 2023: 

Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly invoking the Kremlin's pre-invasion pseudo-historical rhetoric to cast himself as a modern Russian tsar and framing the invasion of Ukraine as a historically justified imperial reconquest.

Full report: https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923

Key Takeaways: 1/5 🧵

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated during the Russian MoD Collegium on Dec. 19 that the Russian MoD will prioritize continuing the war in Ukraine and training newly formed units and formations in 2024 while also reiterating threats against Finland and the wider NATO alliance.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated that the Russian military intends to recruit up to 745,000 contract personnel by the end of 2024 at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Collegium on Dec. 19. 2/5

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave an end-of-the-year press conference on December 19 during which he commented on Russia’s continued unwillingness to negotiate, his confidence in future Western aid provisions, Ukrainian domestic weapons production, and possible future mobilization in Ukraine. 3/5

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin discussed Russian and Chinese economic cooperation and bilateral relations with Chinese Premier Li Quang in Beijing on December 19. 4/5

Russian forces made confirmed advances northeast of Kupyansk, north of Bakhmut, and southwest of Avdiivka, and continued positional meeting engagements along the entire line of contact.

Russian authorities continued attempts to use military conscription in occupied Ukraine to augment force generation efforts and legitimize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. 5/5 

https://isw.pub/UkrWar121923

domingo, 2 de outubro de 2022

Assessing Putin's implicit nuclear threats after annexation - Mason Clark, Katherine Lawlor, and Kateryna Stepanenko (Institute for the Study of War)

 

SPECIAL REPORT: ASSESSING PUTIN’S IMPLICIT NUCLEAR THREATS AFTER ANNEXATION

 

Mason Clark, Katherine Lawlor, and Kateryna Stepanenko

September 30, 12:45pm ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin did not threaten an immediate nuclear attack to halt the Ukrainian counteroffensives into Russian-occupied Ukraine during his speech announcing Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. Putin announced Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts on September 30 even as Ukrainian forces encircled Russian troops in the key city of Lyman, Luhansk Oblast, immediately demonstrating that Russia will struggle to hold the territory it claims to have annexed. Putin likely intends annexation to freeze the war along the current frontlines and allow time for Russian mobilization to reconstitute Russian forces. The annexation of parts of four Ukrainian oblasts does not signify that Putin has abandoned his stated objective of destroying the Ukrainian state for a lesser goal. As ISW assessed in May, if Putin’s annexation of occupied Ukraine stabilizes the conflict along new front lines, “the Kremlin could reconstitute its forces and renew its invasion of Ukraine in the coming years, this time from a position of greater strength and territorial advantage.”[1]

Putin’s annexation speech made several general references to nuclear use that are consistent with his past language on the subject, avoiding making the direct threats that would be highly likely to precede nuclear use. Putin alluded to Russia’s willingness to use “all available means” to defend claimed Russian territory, a common Kremlin talking point. Putin stated that “the US is the only country in the world that twice used nuclear weapons, destroying the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Incidentally, they created a precedent.” Putin stretched his historical allusions, stating that the United States and the United Kingdom demonstratively and without a military need destroyed many German cities during World War II with the “sole goal, just like in the case of nuclear bombardments in Japan, to scare our country and the entire world,” attempting to portray Western states as the true aggressor. Putin did not directly articulate any new red lines or overtly threaten to use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine if Ukrainian counteroffensives continue.

Putin is attempting to force Kyiv to the negotiating table by annexing Russian-occupied territory and threatening nuclear use.[2] He is following the trajectory that ISW forecasted he might on May 13. As ISW wrote at the time: “A Russian annexation would seek to present Kyiv with a fait accompli that precludes negotiations on territorial boundaries even for a ceasefire by asserting that Russia will not discuss the status of (illegally annexed through military conquest) Russian territory—the argument the Kremlin has used regarding Crimea since 2014.” Predictably, Putin demanded that Ukraine return to negotiations in his September 30 speech announcing annexation and precluded any discussion of returning illegally annexed Ukrainian territory to Kyiv’s control: “We call on the Kyiv regime to immediately cease all fire and hostilities and end the war it initiated in 2014 and return to the negotiations table. We are ready for it and have said that several times. But the decision of the people in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson we will not negotiate. This choice has been made and Russia will not betray it.”

Putin’s call for negotiations and implicit nuclear threats are aimed at both Ukraine and the West; he likely incorrectly assesses that his nuclear brinksmanship will lead the United States and its allies to pressure Ukraine to negotiate. As ISW wrote in May: “The Kremlin could threaten to use nuclear weapons against a Ukrainian counteroffensive into annexed territory to deter the ongoing Western military aid that would enable such a counteroffensive.” However, Ukraine and its international backers have made clear that they will not accept negotiations at gunpoint and will not renounce Ukraine’s sovereign right to its territories. As Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba wrote on September 20, “Ukraine has every right to liberate its territories and will keep liberating them whatever Russia has to say.”[3] Where does this leave Putin, then, and what are the actual prospects for the Russian use of nuclear weapons?

ISW cannot forecast the point at which Putin would decide to use nuclear weapons. Such a decision would be inherently personal, but Putin’s stated red lines for nuclear weapon use have already been crossed in this war several times over without any Russian nuclear escalation. Reported Ukrainian cross-border raids into Belgorod Oblast and strikes against Russian-occupied Crimea could arguably meet the stated Russian nuclear use threshold of “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”[4] Putin framed Ukraine as posing an existential threat to Russian sovereignty repeatedly at the start of his full-scale invasion—a phrase that meets that stated threshold: “For our country, it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation. … It is not only a very real threat to our interests but to the very existence of our state and to its sovereignty. It is the red line which we have spoken about on numerous occasions,” he said on February 24.[5] Formal Russian nuclear doctrine is evidently not a deciding factor for Putin, who has reportedly been micromanaging this war down to the operational level.[6]

Putin has set in motion two major means short of nuclear use through which he will try to achieve his objectives: partial mobilization to replace Russian losses, and wintertime energy pressures on Europe to deter European support. He likely intends Russia’s ongoing mobilization to stabilize Russian positions and enable the temporary freezing of the conflict. He is unlikely to succeed; rushing thousands of untrained and unmotivated Russian men to the front will not meaningfully increase Russian combat power, particularly in places like western Luhansk oblast where the Ukrainian counteroffensives are making significant progress. Putin intends his second approach, curtailing natural gas exports to Europe, to fracture the Western consensus around supporting Ukraine and limit Western military aid to Ukrainian forces. This too is unlikely to succeed; Europe is in for a cold and difficult winter, yet the leaders of NATO and non-NATO European states have not faltered in their support for Ukrainian sovereignty and may increase that support in light of Russia’s illegal annexation even in the face of economic costs.[7] European states are actively finding alternatives to Russian energy and will likely be far more prepared by winter 2023.[8] It is difficult to assess what indicators Putin will use to evaluate the success of either effort. But both will take considerable time to bear fruit or to demonstrably fail, time Putin will likely take before considering a nuclear escalation.

Putin would likely need to use multiple tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine to achieve his desired operational effect—freezing the front lines and halting Ukrainian counteroffensives. But the operational effect would need to outweigh the potentially very high costs of possible NATO retaliation. Putin might try a nuclear terror attack against one or more major Ukrainian population centers or critical infrastructure in hopes of shocking Ukraine into surrender or the West into cutting off aid to Ukraine.  Such attacks would be highly unlikely to force Ukraine or the West to surrender, however, and would be tremendous gambles of the sort that Putin has historically refused to take. Ukraine’s government and people have repeatedly demonstrated their will to continue fighting, and the West would find it very challenging simply to surrender in the face of such horrific acts because of the precedent such surrender would set. Putin is therefore far more likely to use nuclear weapons to change the operational environment, if he uses them at all. We assess Putin has two main tactical nuclear weapon use options: striking key Ukrainian ground lines of communication nodes and command centers to paralyze Ukrainian offensive operations, and/or striking major Ukrainian force concentrations near the line of contact. A single nuclear weapon would not be decisive against either of these target sets. Putin would likely need to use several tactical nuclear weapons across Ukraine to achieve significant effects and disrupt Ukraine’s ability to conduct counteroffensives. The scale of nuclear use likely required would raise the risks of Western retaliation, likely increasing the potential costs Putin would have to weigh against the likely temporary benefits the strikes themselves might provide.

Russian nuclear use would therefore be a massive gamble for limited gains that would not achieve Putin’s stated war aims. At best, Russian nuclear use would freeze the front lines in their current positions and enable the Kremlin to preserve its currently occupied territory in Ukraine. Russian nuclear use would not enable Russian offensives to capture the entirety of Ukraine (the Kremlin’s original objective for their February 2022 invasion). Russian military doctrine calls for the Russian Armed Forces to be able to effectively fight on a nuclear battlefield, and the “correct” doctrinal use of tactical nuclear weapons would involve tactical nuclear strikes to punch holes in Ukrainian lines, enabling Russian mechanized units to conduct an immediate attack through the targeted area and drive deep into Ukrainian rear areas.[9] The degraded, hodgepodge Russian forces currently operating in Ukraine cannot currently conduct effective offensive operations even in a non-nuclear environment. They will be flatly unable to operate on a nuclear battlefield. DNR/LNR proxy units, Wagner Group fighters, BARS reservist units, and the depleted remnants of the Russian conventional units that actually exercised fighting on a nuclear battlefield in annual exercises—not to mention newly mobilized replacements shipped to the front lines with less than a week of training—will not have the equipment, training, and morale necessary to conduct offensive operations following nuclear use. NATO is additionally likely to respond to Russian nuclear weapon use in Ukraine with conventional strikes on Russian positions there.  Russian use of multiple weapons (which would be required to achieve decisive operational effects) would only increase the likelihood and scale of a Western conventional response.

The more confident Putin is that nuclear use will not achieve decisive effects but will draw direct Western conventional military intervention in the conflict, the less likely he is to conduct a nuclear attack. 


[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-annexation-occupie...

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-annexation-occupie...

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[4] https://rusemb dot org dot uk/press/2029#:~:text=25.,with%20the%20Collective%20Security%20Treaty; https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-de-escalation-russias-deterrenc...

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/putin-ukraine-speech.htm...;

[6] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/16/putin-involved-russia-ukra...

[7] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[8] https://www.npr.org/2022/09/20/1124008571/russias-attempt-to-use-energy-...

[9] https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2....