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Mostrando postagens com marcador Ludwig von Mises. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Ludwig von Mises. Mostrar todas as postagens

terça-feira, 24 de abril de 2018

Was Mises a Neoliberal? - Jeff Deist (Mises)

Was Mises a Neoliberal?

Mises Institute, April 23, 2018

Does neoliberalism, the tired slogan of our time, have a precise definition? 
The short answer is no, it doesn't. At least not readily one readily at hand, if this New Republic article is any guide:
For the left, neoliberalism often connotes a form of liberal politics that has embraced market-based solutions to social problems: the exchanges of the Affordable Care Act, for instance, rather than a single-payer, universal program like Medicare. {Jonathan} Chait argues that leftists use the word to “bracket the center-left together with the right” and so present socialism as the only real alternative. But the term has its critics on the left, too: Political economist Bill Dunn finds it too insular, rarely adopted by the people it is said to describe. The historian Daniel Rodgers, meanwhile, argues that neoliberal means too many different things, and therefore not enough.
But is neoliberal a slur, as some contend, used to attack Democrats who are overly cozy with Wall Street and global corporations? Does it describe left-liberals who have given up the fight for full democratic socialism, and sold out their principles to enjoy the fruits of unjust capitalism?
English anthropologist and geographer David Harvey implies as much, though he does assign reasonably cohesive elements to the term:
An economy built on just-in-time production, the internationalization of capital, the deregulation of industry, insecure labor, and the entrepreneurial self. In the years since, these trends have only accelerated due to improvements in, and the spread of, information technologies. But few call this “post-Fordism” any longer. They mostly call it “neoliberalism.”
Harvey references Henry Ford, not Gerald Ford, in his identification of neoliberalism as the political devolution of western societies from democratic nation states into subdivisions of borderless mass production and mass consumption. And this materialism is at the core of why left-progressives view neoliberalism as a pejorative term; and perhaps not surprisingly label the New Republic itself a neoliberal outlet (notwithstanding protestations by Chait and others). To progressives, the Clintons, the Democratic National Committee, and traditional old guard liberal media outlets are merely center-right leaning mouthpieces for big business.  
As with most political (and politicized) terms, definitions vary wildly depending on who uses them. Murray Rothbard and Elizabeth Warren hardly mean the same thing when they say "capitalism," and we all suffer from the tendency to imbue words with meanings that suit our purposes. Interestingly, use of the term "neoconservative" similarly has been attacked as a slur, one designed as code for undue Zionism or overeagerness to unleash military forces. Helpfully, however, neoconservative Godfather Irving Kristol himself provided us with the broad parameters, and the expression has lost much of its bite in the post Bush 43/Cheny/Rumsfeld era.
Within the current zeitgeist we can offer a less inflammatory yet still loose definition of neoliberalism than Harvey: the basic program of late 20th century liberalism (social democracy, public education, civil rights, entitlements, welfare, feminism, and a degree of global governance), coupled with at least grudging if not open respect for the role of markets in improving human life. In other words, neoliberals are left-liberals who accept the role of markets and the need for economic development as part of the larger liberal program. Think Bono, who considers himself a progressive "citizen of the world" yet admires markets and globalism.
With this definition in mind, the New Republic article goes badly astray when it asserts that neoliberalism "emerged from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the early twentieth century." First and foremost, it's hard to consider any century-old framework of thought as neo anything. And it's difficult to trace meaningful connection between first and second generation Austrian economists, writing before World War II, before truly global trade, and before the triumphant ascension of central banks, with today's neoliberal political program of social democracy and political globalism. Menger, Mises, and Hayek, with their deep regard for specialization, comparative advantage, and global trade, all wrote within a basic framework of nation states.  
As is often the case, critics of markets and private property mistake means with ends, and assume a lack of concern for "human" considerations is necessarily bound up with rigorous concern for material considerations. Hence author Patrick Iber travels a winding path of cherry-picking Misesian and Hayekian thought, the effect of which is deeply misguided though not malevolent. Not much is new here; Iber simply repeats the standard progressive arguments: they favored capital over labor. They supported democracy only as a means of reducing violent people's uprisings. They supported government, but only in service to wealth and property. And so forth. Yet by New Republic standards he treats both men somewhat fairly, far better than, say, The New York Times or Washington Post would and have. There is only one out-of-context cheap shot directed at Mises ("he was pleased when an anti-fascist uprising was violently suppressed in 1927"); meanwhile the article at least recognizes Hayek's moral concerns over apartheid in South Africa and Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile.
But the author errs badly in assuring the reader that Mises (the democrat) preferred capital to labor in service of the bourgeoisie, and that Hayek thought markets took priority over "human rights and social justice." This is especially interesting given Hayek's own perspective on the latter term, and the typically vague manner in which the author employs both.
For our purposes we can neatly distinguish "real" liberalism, or classical liberalism for lack of a better historical term, from neoliberalism. Liberalism in Mises's conception is fundamentally concerned with private property. In this view the means of production — capital — are in private hands. They are not owned by the state, by society, by "the people," or collectively. Full stop. No amount of regulated semi-capitalism or semi-socialism can evade this foundation, because both individual and economic freedom hinge on the free use and control of private property. Control over one's property, meaning the ability to use, alter, alienate, encumber, or sell it, is the essence of true property ownership—albeit always subject to tort liability for harms caused to others. Any amount of taxation, regulation, or outright confiscation necessarily erodes this control, which Mises acknowledged even within his framework of utilitarian democracy as a protector of property rights.
This insistence on property rights at the core of any liberal program is scarcely to be found in today's neoliberalism, yet again it remains at the heart of left-progressive antipathy to the term. They are suspicious of any introduction, or re-introduction, of markets and property into what ought to be a worldview of economic planning by the state.
We should note that Mises also appended his program of liberalism with two important corollaries that were "neo" for the time, specifically the interwar years: freedom and peace. In contrast with what he saw as the "old" 19th century perspective, a "present-day" liberalism had "outgrown" the old version through "deeper and better insights into interrelationships." Meaningful liberalism required political freedom for the individual, especially freedom from involuntary servitude. And peace was the foundation for all true economic activity, inescapably tied to civilization. Undoubtedly New Republic readers would benefit from understanding just how progressive Mises really was when Liberalism first appeared in 1927!
Meaningful argumentation, as opposed to politics and outright war, requires words and precise definitions. This is why, unfortunately, almost all political talk devolves into what Orwell accurately described as "meaningless words." Meaningless words attempt to impugn or attack the "other," rather than convey specific information or create understanding and consensus. Politics is not a science, but we would all benefit from insisting on rigor in definitions from political pundits just as we once did from social scientists. Imprecise meanings and shifting semantics generate more heat than light, and leave us all talking past one another.

sexta-feira, 8 de dezembro de 2017

Ludwig von Mises: um texto de 1942, recentemente traduzido para o ingles


Ideas on Postwar Economic Policy


December 8, 2017
 
Mises Institute-Peru is proud to present this English-language version of an article written by Ludwig von Mises that, until now, was only available in Spanish. The text was translated by Lucas Ghersi.
This article was first published in the Mexican journal Cuadernos Americanos, Mexico, Year 1, vol. 4, July-August 1942.  According to Bettina Bien Greaves’ bibliography, an English or German version of this text is not known (Mises: An Annotated Bibliography, p. 46).  It is likely that the Spanish version was translated from English, but an original draft in German cannot be ruled out.

I
We hope that one day this awful war will end and men may, once again, occupy themselves with the works of peace. Then, the production of arms and other instruments of crime will be substituted by the production of consumer goods for men, women and children. No longer will people think in annihilation and destruction but in establishing and increasing human wellbeing.
This return to peace, of course, presupposes the absolute annihilation of the totalitarian powers since, if the dictators were to prevail, the consequence of their victory would not be peace but unending warfare. In these totalitarian powers, a philosophy that proclaims war, instead of peace, is defended as the natural most desirable state for men that will provide them with joy. Their longing is not permanent peace but permanent war; thus, if they achieve triumph, the world will become a great slaughterhouse.
However, the dictators will succumb; therefore, the question is:
What must we do to close, as soon and as thoroughly as possible, the wounds opened in society during these years of fighting? This is the great problem that should worry us and that will never concern us prematurely. Even now, when the roar of battle is still being heard, statesmen and economists must think about the last day of the war. Even now they should prepare, in their spirits, what will be necessary to put in practice later.
II
Above all, it is necessary to make this idea clear: if postwar economic policy is to be successful, it must be based on measures radically different from those pursued before the outbreak of this war.
The main characteristic of policies implemented in the decade that preceded the current war, was economic nationalism; that is, an economic policy based on the belief that it is possible to promote the wellbeing of all nationals of a country, or at least of a specific group of them, through measures harmful to foreigners. It was understood that deterring or prohibiting, in an absolute way, the importation of foreign goods; restricting the immigration of aliens; or expropriating, partially or totally, the capital owned by foreigners could provide an important service to a country. This is not the appropriate place to analyze if those measures are suitable to achieve their desired end. The classical economic theory of free exchange has already proven, beyond refutation, that the final result of restrictions placed on foreign trade is the general decline of the productivity of labor and, therefore, of standards of living. In this way, production ceases to occur in places where a high return may be achieved and moves to others where, with the same investment of capital and labor, much lower returns can be obtained. The classic doctrine of free exchange of Hume, Smith and Ricardo has never been refuted. All objections to it turned out to be unfounded.
However, protectionism not only creates economic disadvantages. It also precludes peaceful cooperation between states leading to a sure war. The Society of Nations’ efforts to stop the new global conflagration, through a system of collective security, were in vain because of this environment since all states, big or small, tended to harm one another by implementing certain economic measures.
If we are unable to overcome economic nationalism, all hopes of achieving the reconstruction of our culture will prove illusory. Economic nationalism prevents industrialized States ¾ that is, all those that are compelled to import foodstuff and raw materials ¾ from gathering the necessary means to pay for their imports. How would they be able to pay if not through the exportation of their industrial products? If not permitted to export their industrial articles, these states would be fatally forced into autarchy; on the other hand, countries that possess raw materials would loose markets for the produce of their land. In industrialized states, this situation provokes the desire to dominate nations that possess raw materials through military means. We must not fool ourselves: ambitions of conquest lie behind apparently innocent claims for the equal distribution of natural sources of wealth and free access to raw materials.
In a peaceful world ruled by free trade, there would be no problems regarding raw materials. Each country would be able to buy all the raw materials it could pay for in international markets. In a world subject to protectionism things happen in a very different way: in this world the problem of raw materials cannot disappear; and for small countries, that is those that are weaker militarily, having mines or a fertile soil within their borders represents a danger.
All arguments regarding the advantages of peace, international cooperation, the creation of a society of nations and the reconstruction of the world economy are hollow words if there is the intention of preserving protectionism. If one is not willing to renounce economic nationalism, small states will lose their autonomy and become the vassals of strong militaristic states. Coalitions of Great Powers, armed to the teeth, will confront one another and take advantage of any momentary weakness of their adversaries to undertake new campaigns of conquest.
It is necessary to understand that this new World War (as well as the First World War) is not the consequence of a natural catastrophe unleashed upon innocent men; rather, it is the inevitable result of the nationalist economic policy pursued in the preceding decades. In a world were free trade prevails, despite the dynamism of Hitler or Mussolini, reaching a state of war would not have been possible. Evil men will always exist; however, it is important to create an economic order in which their power to do harm is reduced to a minimum.
In summary, without the eradication of economic nationalism, it will not be possible to return to peace and wellbeing.
III
The main problem of the postwar era will be general poverty; that is, the shortage of capital.
In the last decade, politics seemed uninterested in the problem of formation and maintenance of capital. Governments acted as if the availability of greater or lesser amounts of capital for production had no importance for the wellbeing of the people. Through their policy of taxes and public spending, these governments not only slowed down the formation of capital but also ¾ at least in recent years and in many countries ¾ caused the consumption of available capital. Thus, they did not practice a policy aimed at increasing general prosperity and raising standards of living but one aimed towards the impoverishment of the people. After the end of the current war, it will not be possible to maintain this policy unless we deliberately seek the destruction of what we nowadays call Western Civilization.
What made possible the development of this civilization, the greatest that has ever existed, was precisely, at least regarding economics, the continued accumulation of capital goods. In the days before this time of world wars and dictatorships, a greater number of people lived, including in this Western Civilization, than in the days before the Industrial Revolution; and each of these men lived much better than their ancestors a century or two before. Each year brought rising living standards for the masses; each year, new products became available for the average man, which made his life healthier, more agreeable, and more stimulating. Contemporary men would find the life of the nobility in pre-capitalist times indignant, not to mention the living conditions of the commoners.
All of these increases in living standards are due to the fact that, year after year, production exceeded consumption. The surplus was gathered and invested; that is used to develop the production apparatus. In this way, means of transportation were developed and new installations were created to achieve a better and cheaper production of all sorts of goods for consumption. The individual labor of each man yields more today because, for a given quantity of labor, there is a much greater quantity of capital goods than before. Thus, the marginal productivity of labor has been growing and, consequently, real wages have increased. If the standard of living of the masses has increased, it was because the supply of capital in the economy surpassed population growth.
But the masses did not only benefit from the increase of real wages: the modern organization of financial techniques, of systems of credit and of joint stock companies enabled these very masses to become owners of capital. Most holders of deposits in saving banks, bonds and insurance policies are even members of the working class. In a capitalist state, thrift and the formation of new capitals are not the privilege of a minority, but are generalized; and their fruits, in one way or another, benefit everyone.
Governments and politicians have refused to recognize that the increase of capital is the lifeline of economic progress; on the contrary, they made everything they could to take away people`s desire for thrift. They confiscated part of that capital through taxes and impaired small savings by means of inflation. They carried out expropriations thus eroding the stocks of capital that had been achieved.
As an example, we can mention the way Hitler acted in relation to German railroads in the Reich. A long time before the First World War, diverse German states ¾ Prussia, Bavaria, etc. ¾ bought railroads built with private capitals, paying for them with bonds. Since these bonds lost their value due to inflation, in a way, the Government acquired these railroads for free. Hitler managed this vast supply of capital, equivalent to more than 60,000 kilometers of rail, in the most irresponsible way. He did not substitute vehicles (locomotives and railcars) that had been worn out by use, nor did he maintain rails and signal equipment as it would have been convenient; he also completely unattended fixed equipment. The situation is similar in the railroads of southern and eastern Europe. When the current war is over, the greater part of the railroads of Europe will be a heap of stones and scrap metal. In this way, capital worth thousands of millions has been consumed in the strictest sense of the word.
The destruction of capital caused by the war far surpasses that which happened before the war. When the struggle is over, we will see everywhere huge installations dedicated to the production of arms and other materials for war, however these installations cannot be utilized for the production of the goods that are required in peacetime. The capital immobilized in them will be lost and, instead, there will be lack of capital where it is most necessary. Old installations meant to produce goods necessary in peacetime will be useless, either because they have been converted to serve the needs of rearmament, or because they have been ruined after several years of disuse.
IV
What could we do to alleviate this shortage of capital as quickly as possible?
There is only one solution: to produce more than what is consumed; that is, practice thrift and, in this way, form new capital. The more one produces, and the higher the proportion of that production that is invested rather than consumed, the sooner the hard times of capital shortage will be over. All those that propose solutions different from the one explained above are either fooling themselves or trying to fool others.
There are no magical financial procedures to remedy the shortage of capital. The expansion of credit cannot alleviate it and much less, suppress it. On the contrary, the boom artificially produced by the expansion of credit creates distortion and, therefore, a waste of capital by immediately promoting overconsumption; that is, the reduction of capital. Inflationist experiments will only make the ailment worse. What is necessary in this case is, precisely, a monetary and credit policy that guarantees the stability of monetary value.
Governments will have to renounce to all confiscatory measures: they will have to radically change their tax policy.
In many countries, taxes on rent and inheritance have been transformed into ill-disguised measures of confiscation. The continuity of this system is not compatible with the existence of private property and is pointless unless we wished to transit to a communist regime and make standards of living fall to the permanent state of misery that prevails among the Russian masses. Within the limits of a non-communist system, these measures only produce an effect of immobility and destruction. They stimulate the consumption of capital since; what logic is there in thrift for a man who knows that only a small part of his inheritance will go to the hands of his children?
If we wished to preserve an income tax, it would be necessary to transform it into a tax on consumed rent. Incomes that are not consumed, but saved and invested, should be exempt from all taxation since it is of public interest to form as much new capital as possible.
All large corporations are developed through the consumption of only a small part of their profits and the investment of the rest. Due to the simultaneous existence of national and local duties, the current system increased the taxation of larger incomes to rates of 100% or more. This system makes it impossible to create new industries or develop those that already exist. For the benefit of the North American people, the development of corporations that supply markets with a variety of cheap goods did not stop some years ago; however, current efforts to prevent new competitors from emerging cause harm to consumers while granting unjustified protection to the incapable heirs of existing corporations. Tax legislation, considered by its supporters to be in favor of the people, only produces the antisocial effect of hindering the supply of consumer goods.
The decrease of government revenue, as an inevitable consequence of these reforms in the tax system, must be compensated with the restriction of public spending. It is necessary to break free, once and for all, from the illusion that the State has money for everything and everyone. The State cannot give to somebody what it has previously not taken away from others. In order to plan the State’s expenses, it is necessary to carefully assess whether the profits to be obtained from the desired expense are more beneficial than the required increase in taxation and its economic consequences are harmful. It will no longer be possible to give away subsidies or issue bonds to finance the reelection of members of parliament. It will be necessary to return to the economic management of old parliaments, which understood that an ordered budget is preferable to the supposed happiness of leveled budgets.
Capital shortage will probably be less severe in the United States of America than in the British Empire and less oppressive there then in the European continent. In central, eastern and southern Europe, the situation will be completely catastrophic. The industrialized nations of Europe, the most densely populated places on earth, cannot feed their people without exporting the products of their industry, which are largely manufactured from imported raw materials. Those countries will be forced to compete in global markets with their industrialized products and this will not be done successfully unless they rebuild their apparatus of production, which was destroyed by hostile policies towards capital in the previous era and by the war itself, to the levels of capital that existed before the outbreak of the war. They will have to completely renovate their transport infrastructure and the machinery of their factories; in other words, completely address all the problems of industrial production again. But before achieving it, they will have to endure years or decades of hunger and misery.
It is clear that, in these circumstances in Europe, particularly in central and southern Europe, the activities of labor unions will not be possible for a long time. The tendency of labor unions to forcefully obtain higher wages and shorter working hours for their members, through unionist means, must be forgotten wherever capital is completely lacking. Workers will have to satisfy themselves with a job that can protect them from misery. To whom will they address their complaints in a country where there is no capital to set industry in motion? Low salaries, low standards of living, and a general decline of culture: these are the sad but inevitable consequences of the shortage of capital.
When they notice the pitiful luck of their European peers, North American workers must realize that they have effective means to remedy the situation: opening up American borders to European immigration would create a tendency to equate the level of European wages to those of the United States. However, if restrictions to immigration persist, wages in Europe, where natural conditions of production will be worst and capital shortage most acute, will be much lower than those in North America.
Thus, it is clear that, after the war, the shortage of capital will produce radical changes in domestic policy. Now we shall examine what the consequences will be regarding foreign policy.
V
The development of international markets for capital and currency during the 19th century was a great achievement of far reaching worldwide political consequence. The peoples of Western Europe, which where the first to create political and economic institutions favorable to the formation and conservation of capital, made part of their wealth available to less favored nations through a system of credit. The excess savings of Europe where invested around the world and helped the peoples of Eastern Europe and Asia overcome their state of economic backwardness; it also provided Americans and Australians with the means necessary to exploit the riches of their land. European culture provided all humanity, not only the fruits of modern technique, but also the material means to transform the economy according to the demands of modern technique. Billions poured from Europe (and later also from the United States) to all the countries of the earth and, as payment, European capitalists, men of business and thrift, received property rights and industrial values.
This international organization of credit is now in ruins; the same countries that, once, prospered because of it have destroyed it. Neither the debts’ interest nor their principals were paid either because debtors openly defaulted on their obligations or because governments cancelled the rights of creditors through inflation or currency controls. Businesses belonging to foreigners were expropriated or taxed in such a way that their owners where left with nothing but hollow legal titles. Creditors and foreign capitalists have been completely dispossessed of their rights.
In these circumstances we cannot expect that, after the war, the least ruined countries will make their capital available to the most ruined. The experience of capitalists and businessmen, regarding the concession of credit and participation in foreign ventures, is sufficiently explicit for them to feel inclined to expose themselves to the dangers of such adventures. Maybe the United States, motivated by old friendships, will invest some capital in Anglo-Saxon countries or in Mexico, as help to a neighbor. However, even this is doubtful since American trade unions tend to regard exports of capital as contrary to their interests and, therefore, demand measures aimed at preventing them. In any case, it is certain that other peoples will not expect foreign capital, to help rebuild their economies, unless the dire condition of foreign capitalists changes radically.
Energetic reforms in international law are necessary to set the international mechanisms of capital and credit in motion again. Only states willing to accept great restriction on their sovereignty can hope to obtain credit or direct investment from abroad. In all matters related to foreign capital, these states will have to renounce their autonomy in favor of the Society of Nations; that is, in all that affects monetary and credit policy as well as mercantile and fiscal powers over foreign capital, they will have to submit unconditionally to the jurisdiction of international courts and tolerate the decisions of those courts to be executed through an international coercive power.
Undoubtedly, all this may seem very strange and the leaders of most states will simply consider it unacceptable. But, above all, it is necessary to consider two things: firstly, every state will be free to submit or not to these conditions and to accept or decline the assistance of foreign capital; secondly, it is inevitable to liquidate a conception of state sovereignty that is no longer in harmony with current circumstances. In no way is it possible to accept that cases such as those of Austria, Albania or Ethiopia can repeat themselves. Great Powers must award effective protection to small states from violations such as these. The ambitions of states that secretly practice a policy of rearmament must be contained through an international police force. It will be necessary to treat governments that disturb the peace in the same way as bandits and murderers are treated within states. By establishing such a system, restrictions of sovereignty regarding financial and fiscal policy will not seem intolerable and much will have been gained.
However, we must point out that all these measures will not be able to completely remedy the shortage of capital. What may be achieved is a more equitable distribution of existing capital and with this much will have been gained.
VI
After the current war, the world will not be a paradise. Men will be poor and have to endure the spiritual and moral consequences of poverty.
Not all peoples will suffer in the same way the consequences of war. Latin American countries will probably be among the least affected ones. Thus, their backwardness in relation to Anglo-Saxon countries will be compensated in part. A new era will begin in which the handicap of Latin America will be smaller.
The supposed backwardness of Central and Southern America, that always made ordinary Cook tourists smile compassionately, was only due to the shortage of capital in those countries. Since capitalism reached Latin America two centuries late in relation to other countries, certain institutions familiar elsewhere were lacking in the region. The low level was not moral or intellectual: it was nothing else than a relatively higher shortage of capital.
But now, more or less, all countries will begin again; and, therefore, with the passing of the years, these differences may gradually fade. Through a wise economic policy, it may be possible that Latin American countries can conquer the place in the World Economy to which they are predestined by the genius and industry of their citizens and the wealth of their land. 

Ludwig von Mises was the acknowledged leader of the Austrian School of economic thought, a prodigious originator in economic theory, and a prolific author. Mises's writings and lectures encompassed economic theory, history, epistemology, government, and political philosophy. His contributions to economic theory include important clarifications on the quantity theory of money, the theory of the trade cycle, the integration of monetary theory with economic theory in general, and a demonstration that socialism must fail because it cannot solve the problem of economic calculation. Mises was the first scholar to recognize that economics is part of a larger science in human action, a science that he called "praxeology."

segunda-feira, 13 de junho de 2016

Sobre a Revolucao industrial - David Landes e Ludwig von Mises

Recebo, hoje, um comentário a uma resenha minha (de 2005) do livro de David Landes sobre a revolução industrial, Unbound Prometheus, que prefiro ao título brasileiro Prometeu Desacorrentado. Está aqui, nesta postagem de 31/01/2012:
 http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2012/01/revolucao-industrial-por-seu-mais.html
Quando fui ver, havia um outro comentário, também da mesma época, feito pelo

Eduardo Rodrigues, Rio

4 anos atrás
Paulo, obrigado por mais esse artigo. Ofereço-lhe um texto sobre o mesmo assunto escrito por um gigante. -- Fatos e mitos sobre a "Revolução Industrial" --, por Ludwig von Mises http://www.mises.org.br/Article.aspx?id=1056

remetendo a esse artigo do Ludwig von Mises, que transcrevo aqui:

Fatos e mitos sobre a "Revolução Industrial"
Instituto Ludwig von Mises Brasil, terça-feira, 1 de janeiro de 2013



Industrial.jpgAutores socialistas e intervencionistas costumam dizer que a história do industrialismo moderno, e especialmente a história da "Revolução Industrial" na Inglaterra, constitui uma evidência empírica da procedência da doutrina denominada "realista" ou "institucional", e refuta inteiramente o dogmatismo "abstrato dos economistas".[1] Os economistas negam categoricamente que os sindicatos e a legislação trabalhista possam e tenham beneficiado a classe dos assalariados e elevado o seu padrão de vida de forma duradoura.  Porém, dizem os antieconomistas, os fatos refutaram essas ideias capciosas.
Segundo eles, os governantes e legisladores que regulamentaram as relações trabalhistas revelaram possuir uma melhor percepção da realidade do que os economistas.  Enquanto a filosofia do laissez-faire, sem piedade nem compaixão, pregava que o sofrimento das massas era inevitável, o bom senso dos leigos em economia conseguia terminar com os piores excessos dos empresários ávidos de lucro.  A melhoria da situação dos trabalhadores se deve, pensam eles, inteiramente à intervenção dos governos e à pressão sindical.
São essas ideias que impregnam a maior parte dos estudos históricos que tratam da evolução do industrialismo moderno.  Os autores começam esboçando uma imagem idílica das condições prevalecentes no período que antecedeu a "Revolução Industrial". Naquele tempo, dizem eles, as coisas eram, de maneira geral, satisfatórias.  Os camponeses eram felizes.  Os artesãos também o eram, com a sua produção doméstica; trabalhavam nos seus chalés e gozavam de certa independência, uma vez que possuíam um pedaço de jardim e suas próprias ferramentas.  Mas, aí, "a Revolução Industrial caiu como uma guerra ou uma praga" sobre essas pessoas.[2]  O sistema fabril transformou o trabalhador livre em virtual escravo; reduziu o seu padrão de vida ao mínimo de sobrevivência; abarrotando as fábricas com mulheres e crianças, destruiu a vida familiar e solapou as fundações da sociedade, da moralidade e da saúde pública.  Uma pequena minoria de exploradores impiedosos conseguiu habilmente subjugar a imensa maioria.
A verdade é que as condições no período que antecedeu à Revolução Industrial eram bastante insatisfatórias.  O sistema social tradicional não era suficientemente elástico para atender às necessidades de uma população em contínuo crescimento.  Nem a agricultura nem as guildas conseguiam absorver a mão de obra adicional.  A vida mercantil estava impregnada de privilégios e monopólios; seus instrumentos institucionais eram as licenças e as cartas patentes; sua filosofia era a restrição e a proibição de competição, tanto interna como externa.
O número de pessoas à margem do rígido sistema paternalista de tutela governamental cresceu rapidamente; eram virtualmente párias.  A maior parte delas vivia, apática e miseravelmente, das migalhas que caíam das mesas das castas privilegiadas.  Na época da colheita, ganhavam uma ninharia por um trabalho ocasional nas fazendas; no mais, dependiam da caridade privada e da assistência pública municipal.  Milhares dos mais vigorosos jovens desse estrato social alistavam-se no exército ou na marinha de Sua Majestade; muitos deles morriam ou voltavam mutilados dos combates; muitos mais morriam, sem glória, em virtude da dureza de uma bárbara disciplina, de doenças tropicais e de sífilis.[3]
Milhares de outros, os mais audaciosos e mais brutais, infestavam o país vivendo como vagabundos, mendigos, andarilhos, ladrões e prostitutos.  As autoridades não sabiam o que fazer com esses indivíduos, a não ser interná-los em asilos ou casas de correção.  O apoio que o governo dava ao preconceito popular contra a introdução de novas invenções e de dispositivos que economizassem trabalho dificultava as coisas ainda mais.
O sistema fabril desenvolveu-se, tendo de lutar incessantemente contra inúmeros obstáculos.  Teve de combater o preconceito popular, os velhos costumes tradicionais, as normas e regulamentos vigentes, a má vontade das autoridades, os interesses estabelecidos dos grupos privilegiados, a inveja das guildas.  O capital fixo das firmas individuais era insuficiente, a obtenção de crédito extremamente difícil e cara.  Faltava experiência tecnológica e comercial.  A maior parte dos proprietários de fábricas foi à bancarrota; comparativamente, foram poucos os bem-sucedidos.  Os lucros, às vezes, eram consideráveis, mas as perdas também o eram.  Foram necessárias muitas décadas para que se estabelecesse o costume de reinvestir a maior parte dos lucros e a consequente acumulação de capital possibilitasse a produção em maior escala.
A prosperidade das fábricas, apesar de todos esses entraves, pode ser atribuída a duas razões.  Em primeiro lugar, aos ensinamentos da nova filosofia social que os economistas começavam a explicar e que demolia o prestígio do mercantilismo, do paternalismo e do restricionismo.  A crença supersticiosa de que os equipamentos e processos economizadores de mão de obra causavam desemprego e condenavam as pessoas ao empobrecimento foi amplamente refutada.  Os economistas do laissez-faire foram os pioneiros do progresso tecnológico sem precedentes dos últimos duzentos anos.
Um segundo fator contribuiu para enfraquecer a oposição às inovações.  As fábricas aliviaram as autoridades e a aristocracia rural de um embaraçoso problema que estas já não tinham como resolver.  As novas instalações fabris proporcionavam trabalho às massas pobres que, dessa maneira, podiam ganhar seu sustento; esvaziaram os asilos, as casas de correção e as prisões.  Converteram mendigos famintos em pessoas capazes de ganhar o seu próprio pão.[4]
Os proprietários das fábricas não tinham poderes para obrigar ninguém a aceitar um emprego nas suas empresas. Podiam apenas contratar pessoas que quisessem trabalhar pelos salários que lhes eram oferecidos.  Mesmo que esses salários fossem baixos, eram ainda assim muito mais do que aqueles indigentes poderiam ganhar em qualquer outro lugar.  É uma distorção dos fatos dizer que as fábricas arrancaram as donas de casa de seus lares ou as crianças de seus brinquedos.  Essas mulheres não tinham como alimentar os seus filhos.  Essas crianças estavam carentes e famintas.  Seu único refúgio era a fábrica; salvou-as, no estrito senso do termo, de morrer de fome.
É deplorável que tal situação existisse.  Mas, se quisermos culpar os responsáveis, não devemos acusar os proprietários das fábricas, que — certamente movidos pelo egoísmo e não pelo altruísmo — fizeram todo o possível para erradicá-la.  O que causava esses males era a ordem econômica do período pré-capitalista, a ordem daquilo que, pelo que se infere da leitura das obras destes historiadores, eram os "bons velhos tempos".
Nas primeiras décadas da Revolução Industrial, o padrão de vida dos operários das fábricas era escandalosamente baixo em comparação com as condições de seus contemporâneos das classes superiores ou com as condições atuais do operariado industrial.  A jornada de trabalho era longa, as condições sanitárias dos locais de trabalho eram deploráveis.
A capacidade de trabalho do indivíduo se esgotava rapidamente.  Mas prevalece o fato de que, para o excedente populacional — reduzido à mais triste miséria pela apropriação das terras rurais, e para o qual, literalmente, não havia espaço no contexto do sistema de produção vigente —, o trabalho nas fábricas representava uma salvação. Representava uma possibilidade de melhorar o seu padrão de vida, razão pela qual as pessoas afluíram em massa, a fim de aproveitar a oportunidade que lhes era oferecida pelas novas instalações industriais.
A ideologia do laissez-faire e sua consequência, a "Revolução Industrial", destruíram as barreiras ideológicas e institucionais que impediam o progresso e o bem-estar.  Demoliram a ordem social na qual um número cada vez maior de pessoas estava condenado a uma pobreza e a uma penúria humilhantes.  A produção artesanal das épocas anteriores abastecia quase que exclusivamente os mais ricos.  Sua expansão estava limitada pelo volume de produtos de luxo que o estrato mais rico da população pudesse comprar.  Quem não estivesse engajado na produção de bens primários só poderia ganhar a vida se as classes superiores estivessem dispostas a utilizar os seus serviços ou o seu talento.  Mas eis que surge um novo princípio: com o sistema fabril, tinha início um novo modo de comercialização e de produção.
Sua característica principal consistia no fato de que os artigos produzidos não se destinavam apenas ao consumo dos mais abastados, mas ao consumo daqueles cujo papel como consumidores era, até então, insignificante. Coisas baratas, ao alcance do maior número possível de pessoas, era o objetivo do sistema fabril.  A indústria típica dos primeiros tempos da Revolução Industrial era a tecelagem de algodão.  Ora, os artigos de algodão não se destinavam aos mais abastados.  Os ricos preferiam a seda, o linho, a cambraia.  Sempre que a fábrica, com os seus métodos de produção mecanizada, invadia um novo setor de produção, começava fabricando artigos baratos para consumo das massas.  As fábricas só se voltaram para a produção de artigos mais refinados, e portanto mais caros, em um estágio posterior, quando a melhoria sem precedentes no padrão de vida das massas tornou viável a aplicação dos métodos de produção em massa também aos artigos melhores.
Assim, por exemplo, os sapatos fabricados em série eram comprados apenas pelos "proletários", enquanto os consumidores mais ricos continuavam a encomendar sapatos sob medida.  As tão malfaladas fábricas que exploravam os trabalhadores, exigindo-lhes trabalho excessivo e pagando-lhes salário de fome, não produziam roupas para os ricos, mas para pessoas cujos recursos eram modestos.  Os homens e mulheres elegantes preferiam, e ainda preferem, ternos e vestidos feitos pelo alfaiate e pela costureira.
O fato marcante da Revolução Industrial foi o de ela ter iniciado uma era de produção em massa para atender às necessidades das massas.  Os assalariados já não são mais pessoas trabalhando exaustivamente para proporcionar o bem-estar de outras pessoas; são eles mesmos os maiores consumidores dos produtos que as fábricas produzem.  A grande empresa depende do consumo de massa.  Em um livre mercado, não há uma só grande empresa que não atenda aos desejos das massas.  A própria essência da atividade empresarial capitalista é a de prover para o homem comum.  Na qualidade de consumidor, o homem comum é o soberano que, ao comprar ou ao se abster de comprar, decide os rumos da atividade empresarial.  Na economia de mercado não há outro meio de adquirir e preservar a riqueza, a não ser fornecendo às massas o que elas querem, da maneira melhor e mais barata possível.
Ofuscados por seus preconceitos, muitos historiadores e escritores não chegam a perceber esse fato fundamental.  Segundo eles, os assalariados labutam arduamente em benefício de outras pessoas.  Nunca questionaram quem são essas "outras" pessoas.
O Sr. e a Sra. Hammond [citados na nota de referência número 2] nos dizem que os trabalhadores eram mais felizes em 1760 do que em 1830.[5]  Trata-se de um julgamento de valor arbitrário.  Não há meio de comparar e medir a felicidade de pessoas diferentes, nem da mesma pessoa em momentos diferentes.
Podemos admitir, só para argumentar, que um indivíduo nascido em 1740 estivesse mais feliz em 1760 do que em 1830.  Mas não nos esqueçamos de que em 1770 (segundo estimativa de Arthur Young) a Inglaterra tinha 8,5 milhões de habitantes, ao passo que em 1830 (segundo o recenseamento) a população era de 16 milhões.[6]  Esse aumento notável se deve principalmente à Revolução Industrial.  Em relação a esses milhões de ingleses adicionais, as afirmativas dos eminentes historiadores só podem ser aprovadas por aqueles que endossam os melancólicos versos de Sófocles: "Não ter nascido é, sem dúvida, o melhor; mas para o homem que chega a ver a luz do dia, o melhor mesmo é voltar rapidamente ao lugar de onde veio".
Os primeiros industriais foram, em sua maioria, homens oriundos da mesma classe social que os seus operários. Viviam muito modestamente, gastavam no consumo familiar apenas uma parte dos seus ganhos e reinvestiam o resto no seu negócio.  Mas, à medida que os empresários enriqueciam, seus filhos começaram a frequentar os círculos da classe dominante.  Os cavalheiros de alta linhagem invejavam a riqueza dos novos-ricos e se indignavam com a simpatia que estes devotavam às reformas que estavam ocorrendo.  Revidaram investigando as condições morais e materiais de trabalho nas fábricas e editando a legislação trabalhista.
A história do capitalismo na Inglaterra, assim como em todos os outros países capitalistas, é o registro de uma tendência incessante de melhoria do padrão de vida dos assalariados.  Essa evolução coincidiu, por um lado, com o desenvolvimento da legislação trabalhista e com a difusão do sindicalismo, e, por outro, com o aumento da produtividade marginal.  Os economistas afirmam que a melhoria nas condições materiais dos trabalhadores se deve ao aumento da quota de capital investido per capita e ao progresso tecnológico decorrente desse capital adicional.  A legislação trabalhista e a pressão sindical, na medida em que não impunham a concessão de vantagens superiores àquelas que os trabalhadores teriam de qualquer maneira, em virtude de a acumulação de capital se processar em ritmo maior do que o aumento populacional, eram supérfluas.  Na medida em que ultrapassaram esses limites, foram danosas aos interesses das massas.  Atrasaram a acumulação de capital, diminuindo assim o ritmo de crescimento da produtividade marginal e dos salários.  Privilegiaram alguns grupos de assalariados às custas de outros grupos.  Criaram o desemprego em grande escala e diminuíram a quantidade de produtos que os trabalhadores, como consumidores, teriam à sua disposição.
Os defensores da intervenção do governo na economia e do sindicalismo atribuem toda melhoria da situação dos trabalhadores às ações dos governos e dos sindicatos.  Se não fosse por isso, dizem eles, o padrão de vida atual dos trabalhadores não seria maior do que nos primeiros anos da Revolução Industrial.
Certamente essa controvérsia não pode ser resolvida pela simples recorrência à experiência histórica.  Os dois grupos não têm divergências quanto a quais tenham sido os fatos ocorridos.  Seu antagonismo diz respeito à interpretação desses fatos, e essa interpretação depende da teoria escolhida.  As considerações de natureza lógica ou epistemológica que determinam a correção ou a falsidade de uma teoria são, lógica e temporalmente, antecedentes à elucidação do problema histórico em questão.  Os fatos históricos, por si só, não provam nem refutam uma teoria.  Precisam ser interpretados à luz da compreensão teórica.
A maioria dos autores que escreveu sobre a história das condições de trabalho no sistema capitalista era ignorante em economia e disso se vangloriava.  Entretanto, tal desprezo por um raciocínio econômico bem fundado não significa que esses autores tenham abordado o tema dos seus estudos sem preconceitos e sem preferência por uma determinada teoria; na realidade, estavam sendo guiados pelas falácias tão difundidas que atribuem onipotência ao governo e consideram a atividade sindical como uma bênção.  Ninguém pode negar que os Webbs, assim como Lujo Brentano e uma legião de outros autores menores, estavam, desde o início de seus estudos, imbuídos de uma aversão fanática pela economia de mercado e de uma entusiástica admiração pelas doutrinas socialistas e intervencionistas.  Foram certamente honestos e sinceros nas suas convicções e deram o melhor de si.  Sua sinceridade e probidade podem eximi-los como indivíduos; mas não os eximem como historiadores.  As intenções de um historiador, por mais puras que sejam, não justificam a adoção de doutrinas falaciosas.  O primeiro dever de um historiador é o de examinar com o maior rigor todas as doutrinas a que recorrerá para elaborar suas interpretações históricas.  Caso ele se furte a fazê-lo e adote ingenuamente as ideias deformadas e confusas que têm grande aceitação popular, deixa de ser um historiador e passa a ser um apologista e um propagandista.
O antagonismo entre esses dois pontos de vista contrários não é apenas um problema histórico: está intimamente ligado aos problemas mais candentes da atualidade.  É a razão da controvérsia naquilo que se denomina hoje de relações industriais.
Salientemos apenas um aspecto da questão: em vastas regiões — Ásia Oriental, Índias Orientais, sul e sudeste da Europa, América Latina — a influência do capitalismo moderno é apenas superficial.  A situação nesses países, de uma maneira geral, não difere muito da que prevalecia na Inglaterra no início da "Revolução Industrial".  Existem milhões de pessoas que não encontram um lugar seguro no sistema econômico vigente.  Só a industrialização pode melhorar a sorte desses desafortunados; para isso, o que mais necessitam é de empresários e de capitalistas.
Como políticas insensatas privaram essas nações do benefício que a importação de capitais estrangeiros até então lhes proporcionava, precisam proceder à acumulação de capitais domésticos.  Precisam percorrer todos os estágios pelos quais a industrialização do Ocidente teve de passar.  Precisam começar com salários relativamente baixos e com longas jornadas de trabalho.  Mas, iludidos pelas doutrinas prevalecentes hoje em dia na Europa Ocidental e na América do Norte, seus dirigentes pensam que poderão consegui-lo de outra maneira.  Encorajam a pressão sindical e promovem uma legislação pretensamente favorável aos trabalhadores.  Seu radicalismo intervencionista mata no nascedouro a criação de uma indústria doméstica.  Seu dogmatismo obstinado tem como consequência a desgraça dos trabalhadores braçais indianos e chineses, dos peões mexicanos e de milhões de outras pessoas que se debatem desesperadamente para não morrer de fome.


[1] A atribuição da expressão "Revolução Industrial" ao período dos reinados dos dois últimos reis da casa de Hanover — George III e George IV (1760-1830) — resultou do desejo de dramatizar a história econômica, de maneira a ajustá-la aos esquemas marxistas procustianos.* A transição dos métodos medievais de produção para o sistema de livre iniciativa foi um processo longo que começou séculos antes de 1760 e que, mesmo na Inglaterra, em 1830, ainda não tinha terminado.  Entretanto, é verdade que o desenvolvimento industrial na Inglaterra acelerou-se bastante na segunda metade do século XVIII.  Consequentemente, é admissível usar a expressão "Revolução Industrial" ao se examinarem as conotações emocionais que lhe foram imputadas pelo fabianismo, pelo marxismo e pela Escola Historicista.
* Relativo a Procusto, gigante salteador da Ática que, segundo a mitologia grega, despojava viajantes e torturava-os deitando-os num leito de ferro: se a vítima fosse maior, cortava-lhe os pés; se menor, esticava-a por meio de cordas até que atingisse as dimensões do leito. O termo serve para metaforizar o ato de se tentar ajustar arbitrariamente a realidade a um sistema ou teoria previamente concebidos. (N.T.)
[2] J.L. Hammond and Barbara Hammond, The Skilled Labourer, 1760-1832, 2. ed., Londres, 1920, p. 4.

[3] Na guerra dos Sete Anos, 1.512 marinheiros ingleses morreram em combate, enquanto 133.708 morreram de doenças ou desapareceram. Ver W.L.Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763, Nova York, 1940, p.114.

[4] No sistema feudal inglês, a maior parte da área rural constituía-se de campos e florestas. Grande parte dessas áreas era utilizada para o cultivo de grãos e criação de gado para consumo próprio. Com o advento da produção agrícola para o mercado e não para o senhor feudal, essas terras começaram a ser cercadas e apropriadas.  Diversos atos do Parlamento, no século XVIII e parte do século XIX, endossaram esse movimento, que tinha oposição das classes inferiores.  Tal situação resultou num aumento da produção agrícola e na criação de um proletariado rural, que veio a se tornar a força de trabalho usada pelas fábricas inglesas na "Revolução Industrial".

[5] J.L. Hammond e Barbara Hammond, op. cit.

[6] F.C. Dietz, An Economic History of England, Nova York, 1942, p. 279 e 392.

Ludwig von Mises  foi o reconhecido líder da Escola Austríaca de pensamento econômico, um prodigioso originador na teoria econômica e um autor prolífico.  Os escritos e palestras de Mises abarcavam teoria econômica, história, epistemologia, governo e filosofia política.  Suas contribuições à teoria econômica incluem elucidações importantes sobre a teoria quantitativa de moeda, a teoria dos ciclos econômicos, a integração da teoria monetária à teoria econômica geral, e uma demonstração de que o socialismo necessariamente é insustentável, pois é incapaz de resolver o problema do cálculo econômico.  Mises foi o primeiro estudioso a reconhecer que a economia faz parte de uma ciência maior dentro da ação humana, uma ciência que Mises chamou de "praxeologia".

sexta-feira, 22 de janeiro de 2016

Quando a Argentina absorvia as licoes de Mises (1959) - Dan Sanchez (Mises Daily)

Velhos tempos: a Argentina ainda não tinha decaído tudo o que ela podia, e que efetivamente decaiu depois disso.
Concretamente ela começou antes do Brasil, desde os tempos de Perón, ou talvez mesmo antes. Desde 1930 quando os militares derrubaram Hirigoyen e começou a "década infame". Foi para essa década que foi composto o tango Cambalache: "El mundo es una porqueria ya lo se... Todo es igual...", música que ficou proibida durante muito tempo.
Aí vieram os oficiais do GOU, um bando de fascistas, seguidos pelo inefável Perón, o cadaver que mantém os argentinos refens do seu fascismo desde então, junto com o outro cadáver, o de sua mulher (não chorem pelos dois que eles não merecem).
Depois vieram muitos outros presidentes e muitos generais, e todos eles fizeram a Argentina decair continuamente. Não se improvisa facilmente 80 anos de decadência, é preciso ser gênio na arte de acabar com um país que, um século atrás, tinha 70% da renda per capita americana (hoje eles não devem alcançar 30%).
Bem, depois de tantos desastres parece que os argentinos se cansaram de decair, e resolveram dar uma chance à racionalidade.
Agora é a vez do Brasil decair, mas não sei se vai demorar 80 anos: já dura 13 e promete durar mais...
Enfim, vamos deixar os argentinos com Mises novamente.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasilia, 22/01/2016

Mises in Four Easy Pieces
Dan Sanchez
Mises Daily, JANUARY 22, 2016

One day in 1959, hundreds of students, educators, and grandees filled the enormous lecture hall of the University of Buenos Aires to capacity, overflowing into two neighboring rooms. Argentina was still reeling from the reign of populist president, Juan Perón, who had been ousted four years before. Perón’s economic policies were supposed to empower and uplift the people, but only created poverty and chaos. Perhaps the men and women in that auditorium were ready for a different message. They certainly got one.

A dignified old man stepped before them, and delivered a bold, bracing message: what truly empowers and uplifts the people is capitalism, the much-maligned economic system that emerges from private ownership of the means of production.

This man, Ludwig von Mises, had been the world’s leading champion of capitalism for half a century, so his message was finely honed. Not only a creative genius, but a superb educator, he boiled down capitalism to the essential features that he believed every citizen needed to know. As his wife Margit recollected, the effect on the crowd was invigorating. Having spent years in an intellectual atmosphere of stale, stagnant ideas: “The audience reacted as if a window had been opened and fresh air allowed to breeze through the rooms.”

This lecture was the first in a series, the transcriptions of which are collected in the book Economic Policy: Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow, edited by Margit.

Life (and Death) Before Capitalism
To demonstrate in his lecture how revolutionary the advent of capitalism was in world history, Mises contrasted it with what he called the feudalistic principles of production during Europe’s earlier ages.

The feudal system was characterized by productive rigidity. Power, law, and custom prohibited individuals from leaving their station in the economic system and from entering another. Peasant serfs were irrevocably tied to the land they tilled, which in turn was inalienably tied to their noble lords. Princes and urban guilds strictly limited entry into whole industries, and precluded the emergence of new ones. Almost every productive role in society was a caste. This productive rigidity translated into socio-economic rigidity, or “social immobility.” As Mises reminded his Argentine audience:

a man’s social status was fixed from the beginning to the end of his life; he inherited it from his ancestors, and it never changed. If he was born poor, he always remained poor, and if he was born rich  —  a lord or a duke  —  he kept his dukedom and the property that went with it for the rest of his life.
Over 90 percent of the population was consigned to food production, so as to precariously eke out sustenance for their own families and contribute to the banquets of their domineering, parasitic suzerains. They also had to make their own clothing and other consumers’ goods at home. So, production was largely autarkic and nonspecialized. As Mises highlighted, the small amount of specialized manufacturing that existed in the towns was devoted largely to the production of luxury goods for the elite.

From the High Middle Ages onward, production in Western Europe was higher, and the average person much less likely to be a chattel slave, than during antiquity and the Dark Ages. But the economic system was still fixed and moribund; the common man had no hope of progressing beyond a life teetering between bare subsistence and starvation.

And in the eighteenth century, in the Netherlands and England, said Mises, multitudes were about to go over the ledge, because the population had grown beyond the land then available to employ and sustain them.

It was then and there that capitalism entered the scene, saving the lives of millions, and vastly improving the lives of millions more.

Four key distinguishing features of capitalism can be gleaned from Mises’s lecture. What follows is an exposition of those features, which can be thought of as, to paraphrase Richard Feynman, “Mises in four easy pieces.”

It is important to note that, as Mises fully noted elsewhere, what emerged in the eighteenth century and developed subsequently was never a purely free market. So, the following characteristics have never been universal. But these features did come into play far more extensively in this period than ever before.

One: Dynamic Production
Under what Mises called “capitalistic principles of production,” feudal productive rigidity is replaced by productive flexibility and free entry. There are no legal privileges protecting anyone’s place in the system of production. Lords and guilds cannot exclude new entrants and innovations. And an upstart enterpriser’s capital, products, and proceeds are secure from the cupidity of princes and the jealousy of incumbents.

Of course free entry amounts to very little without the corresponding right of free exit. With capitalism, peasants are free to leave their fields and former masters for opportunities in the towns. And proprietors are free to sell or hire out their plots of land and other resources to the highest bidder. (Although, during the transition between feudal and capitalist production, it really should have been the peasants doing the selling and hiring out, as they were owed restitution never delivered for their past serfdom and expropriation.)

Free entry/exit is the logical corollary of liberty: inviolate self-ownership and private property. It is the freedom of an individual to put his labor and earnings to whatever productive use he finds advantageous, irrespective of the pretenses to privilege of vested interests.

Under capitalism, no longer can nobles rely on a captive labor force and “customer” base, or enjoy the impossibility of having resources bid away by more efficient producers. No longer can these robber barons turned landed barons rest on such laurels of past armed conquest.

Mises identified resentment of this fact as a prime source of anti-capitalism, which thus originated, not with the proletariat, but with the landed aristocracy. He cited the consternation of the Prussian Junkers of Germany over the Landflucht or ”flight from the countryside” of their peasant underlings. And he related a colorful story of how Otto von Bismarck, that prince of Junkers who founded the welfare state (with the express purpose of co-opting the masses), grumbled about a worker who left Bismarck’s estate for the higher wages and pleasant Biergartens of Berlin.

Under capitalism, no longer can tradesmen idle in old methods and old markets. To do so is impossible in a world in which any man with savings and gumption is a potential underseller and overbidder. Industry incumbents also loathe the competition, so their special pleading is another major source of anti-capitalist rhetoric.

Free entry/exit imposes the stimulus and discipline of competition on producers, impelling them to strive to outdo each other in satisfying potential customers. As Mises announced in Buenos Aires: “The development of capitalism consists in everyone’s having the right to serve the customer better and/or more cheaply.”

Production, formerly adrift in the standing water of feudalistic stagnation, sets sail under capitalistic dynamism, driven by the bracing winds of competition.

Two: Consumer Sovereignty
When producers vie with each other to better serve customers, they unavoidably act more and more like devoted servants of those customers. This is true of even the biggest and wealthiest producers. As Mises brilliantly expressed it:

In talking about modern captains of industry and leaders of big business … they call a man a “chocolate king” or a “cotton king” or an “automobile king.” Their use of such terminology implies that they see practically no difference between the modern heads of industry and those feudal kings, dukes or lords of earlier days. But the difference is in fact very great, for a chocolate king does not rule at all, he serves. He does not reign over conquered territory, independent of the market, independent of his customers. The chocolate king  —  or the steel king or the automobile king or any other king of modern industry  —  depends on the industry he operates and on the customers he serves. This “king” must stay in the good graces of his subjects, the consumers; he loses his “kingdom” as soon as he is no longer in a position to give his customers better service and provide it at lower cost than others with whom he must compete.
With capitalism, just as producers play the role of servant, customers play the role of master or sovereign: in a figurative sense, of course. It is their wishes that hold sway, as producers strive to grant them. And strive they must, if they want to succeed in business. For, just as a sovereign of the ancien régime was free to withhold favor from one courtier and bestow it upon another, the “sovereign” customer is free to take his business elsewhere.

This relation is even expressed in the language we use to describe commerce. Customers are patrons who patronize shops and other sellers. These sellers say, “thank you for your business” or patronage, and insist that, “the customer is always right.” The polite, respectful deference formerly given by the ancient Roman cliens (client) to his patronus (patron) is now instead given by the producer to his customer/patron, except generally in a much more self-respecting and less groveling manner.

If the customer is himself also a producer on the market, he must pay forward that same solicitousness and deference to his own customers, lest he lose their business to competitors. Thus, his desires for goods from his eagerly attentive suppliers are shaped by his own eagerness to fulfill the desires of his own customers. Therefore, the higher order producer, by striving to make his customer happy, indirectly strives to make his customer’s customers happy as well.

This series terminates with the customers who have no customers: namely, the consumers, who are therefore the “engine” of this “train” of final causation. Thus, with capitalism, it is the consumers who hold ultimate sway over all production. Mises referred to this fundamental characteristic of capitalism as, speaking figuratively, consumer sovereignty.

Again, this is constrained to the extent that state intervention hampers capitalism. “Leaders of big business” can and often do use the state to acquire powers and privileges that enable them to flout the wishes of consumers and acquire wealth through domination instead of service. In fact, one of the most clear recent instances of this involved a real life person actually nicknamed, as in Mises’s example, the “chocolate king”: a confectionary tycoon named Petro Poroshenko who parlayed his business success into a political career which recently culminated in his election as president of the US-sponsored junta now ruling Ukraine.

Three: Mass Production for the Masses
In the first lecture of his online course “Why Capitalism,” David Gordon drew from his limitless reservoir of scholarly anecdotes to relate that Maurice Dobb, a British economist and communist, replied to Mises’s point about consumer sovereignty by averring that this feature of capitalism hardly does the common man any good, since the most significant consumers are the wealthiest. Dobb’s mistake, of course, is to neglect the fact that the relative importance of single consumers is not the issue here. The combined purchasing power of the preponderance of typically wealthy consumers vastly outstrips that of the atypically wealthy.

Therefore, as Mises pointed out, the capitalist’s main route to becoming one of those few wealthy consumers of extraordinary means is through mass producing wares that cater to the masses of consumers of ordinary means. Even a small per-unit profit margin, if multiplied millions or billions of times, adds up to some serious dough. Boutique enterprises catering only to the elite, as feudal era manufacturers did, simply cannot compare. And that is why, as Mises informed the stunned Perónistas:

Big business, the target of the most fanatic attacks by the so-called leftists, produces almost exclusively to satisfy the wants of the masses. Enterprises producing luxury goods solely for the well-to-do can never attain the magnitude of big businesses.

That is why, as Mises never tired of saying, capitalism is a system of mass production for the masses. It is overwhelmingly the masses of “regular folk” who are the sovereign consumers whose wishes are the guiding stars of capitalist production.

Capitalism flipped feudalism on its head. With feudalism, it was the elite (the landed aristocracy) whose will dominated the masses (the enserfed peasants). With capitalism, it is the wishes of the masses (ordinary consumers) that hold sway over the productive activity of the entrepreneurial elite, from retail giants to dot-com millionaires.

As Mises’s address implied, the yearned-for “people power” always promised by demagogues like Perón, but which invariably turns to ashes in the mouths of the masses, as it did with the Argentines, is the natural result of capitalism, a system so often derided as “economic royalism.”

Imagine his audience’s surprise!
But the full truth that Mises was imparting was even more surprising than that. Not only does capitalism fulfill the broken promises of economic populism, but, as Gordon brilliantly remarked in his lecture, it also follows through on the more specific promise offered by syndicalists and Marxian socialists: worker control over the means of production. That is because, as Mises stressed in his lecture, the vast majority of the masses of ordinary “sovereign” consumers are also workers.

With capitalism, the working people really do hold ultimate sway over the means of production. They just don’t do it in their role as workers, but in their role as consumers. They exert their sway in checkout aisles and website shopping carts, and not in the halls of labor unions, syndicates, soviets (revolutionary councils of workers), or a “dictatorship of the proletariat” that reigns in their name while it rides on their backs.

Capitalism has the charming arrangement of empowering the working person, while still preserving economic sanity by placing means (factors of production, like labor) at the service of ends (consumer demand), instead of the insanity of doing the opposite, as the labor fetish of syndicalism does.

Four: Prosperity for the People
Capitalism not only empowers the working person, but uplifts him.

Capitalism, as its name implies, is characterized by capital investment, which was the solution to the crisis of how the marginal millions of eighteenth-century England and the Netherlands were to integrate into the economy and survive.

Labor alone cannot produce; it needs to be applied to complementary material resources. If, with given production techniques, there is not enough land in the economy to employ all hands, then those hands must be placed upon capital goods, if the connected mouths are to eat. During the Industrial Revolution, such capital goods were lifelines that the owners of new factories threw to countless economic castaways and that pulled them from the abyss and back into the division of labor that kept their lives afloat.

Knowing this truth of the matter, Mises was rightly appalled at the anti-capitalist agitators who “falsified history” (Gordon identified Thomas Carlyle and Friedrich Engels as among the worst offenders) to spread the now dominant myth that capitalism was a bane to the working poor. He set the issue right with passion:

Of course, from our viewpoint, the workers’ standard of living was extremely low; conditions under early capitalism were absolutely shocking, but not because the newly developed capitalistic industries had harmed the workers. The people hired to work in factories had already been existing at a virtually subhuman level.

The famous old story, repeated hundreds of times, that the factories employed women and children and that these women and children, before they were working in factories, had lived under satisfactory conditions, is one of the greatest falsehoods of history. The mothers who worked in the factories had nothing to cook with; they did not leave their homes and their kitchens to go into the factories, they went into factories because they had no kitchens, and if they had a kitchen they had no food to cook in those kitchens. And the children did not come from comfortable nurseries. They were starving and dying. And all the talk about the so-called unspeakable horror of early capitalism can be refuted by a single statistic: precisely in these years in which British capitalism developed, precisely in the age called the Industrial Revolution in England, in the years from 1760 to 1830, precisely in those years the population of England doubled, which means that hundreds or thousands of children  —  who would have died in preceding times  —  survived and grew to become men and women.

And as Mises further explained, capitalism not only saves lives, but it vastly improves them. That is because capitalism is also characterized by capital accumulation (which is why Mises embraced the term, in spite of it originating from its enemies as an epithet), which is the result of cumulative saving and perpetual reinvestment being unleashed by greater security of property from meddlesome laws as well as grasping princes and parliaments. Capital accumulation means ever growing labor productivity, which in turn means ever rising real wages for the worker.

These higher wages are the conduits through which workers acquire the purchasing power that crowns them with consumer sovereignty. And they are no petty sovereigns either. Thanks to his capital-enhanced high productivity, a modern worker’s wage-powered consumer demand guides the deployment of a globe-spanning, dizzying plethora of sophisticated machines, factories, vehicles, raw materials, and other resources, as well as the voluntary labor of the other workers who use them, all of which conspire to churn out a cornucopia of quality household staples, marvelous devices, amazing experiences, and other consumers’ goods and services for the worker to choose from for his delectation. Purchasing such goods with his higher wages is how the worker claims his portion of the greater abundance, which approximates to his own capital-enhanced contribution to it.

And higher wages are not the only way that the average working person can enrich himself through capitalism. Especially since the advent of investment funds, he can supplement, and upon retirement, even replace his wage income with interest and profit by putting his high-wage-fed savings to work and partaking in capital investment himself.

Because of these characteristics, as Mises proclaimed to those assembled: “[Capitalism] has, within a comparatively short time, transformed the whole world. It has made possible an unprecedented increase in world population.”

He returned to the subject of England for one of the more paradigmatic examples of this:

In 18th-century England, the land could support only 6 million people at a very low standard of living. Today more than 50 million people enjoy a much higher standard of living than even the rich enjoyed during the 18th-century. And today’s standard of living in England would probably be still higher, had not a great deal of the energy of the British been wasted in what were, from various points of view, avoidable political and military “adventures.”
In one of those wonderful flashes of dry wit that would illuminate his discourse from time to time, Mises urged his auditors that, should they ever meet an anti-capitalist hailing from England, they should ask him: “… how do you know that you are the one out of ten who would have lived in the absence of capitalism? The mere fact that you are living today is proof that capitalism has succeeded, whether or not you consider your own life very valuable.”

Mises furthermore cited the more general and clearly evident fact that: “There is no Western, capitalistic country in which the conditions of the masses have not improved in an unprecedented way.”

And in the decades following his speech, the conditions of the masses improved incredibly in non-Western countries (like China) who partially opened up to capitalism as well.

Mises concluded his talk by urging his Argentine fellows to seize the day and strive for the economic liberation that would unleash the wonderworks of capitalism, and not to sit and wait for an economic miracle:

But you have to remember that, in economic policies, there are no miracles. You have read in many newspapers and speeches, about the so-called German economic miracle  —  the recovery of Germany after its defeat and destruction in the Second World War. But this was no miracle. It was the application of the principles of the free market economy, of the methods of capitalism, even though they were not applied completely in all respects. Every country can experience the same “miracle” of economic recovery, although I must insist that economic recovery does not come from a miracle; it comes from the adoption of  —  and is the result of  —  sound economic policies.

Conclusion
If the subsequent policies adopted in Argentina, South America, and the world are any indication, Mises’s message, as lucid and affecting as it was, did not propagate far beyond the auditorium walls that day. Perhaps in the age of camera phones, YouTube, and social media, it would have. But his brilliant encapsulation of the beneficence and beauty of capitalism did not dissipate vainly into the Argentine air. Thanks to his Margit and to his institutional namesake, his message was preserved for the ages, and is now only a mouse click away for billions.

Ludwig von Mises can still save the world by posthumously teaching its people the unknown truth about the inherently populist nature of capitalism in a way which speaks to their hopes and longings: that private property means dynamic production, which means a competitive, consumer-steered economy, which means a production system geared toward improving the lives of the masses, which first means widespread succor and ultimately ever-rising prosperity for the people of the world.