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sexta-feira, 11 de abril de 2014

Russia: a incrivel historia do pais que encolheu no seculo 20: 85 milhoes de pessoas "perdidas: (The Globalist)

Russia’s Miserable Century: 85 Million “Gone Missing”

What was the human cost of Russia’s 20th century trials and tribulations?
Early 20th century Russian peasants. Captured by Sergey Prokudin-Gorsky.
Early 20th century Russian peasants. Captured by Sergey Prokudin-Gorsky.

Takeaways


  • Russia's population of 143.6 million is well below projections (expected from natural growth) of 200 million.
  • An estimated 85 million people were never born in 20th century Russia due to war, famine, purges & unrest.
  • Russia's current population is 30% less now than it should be had it followed natural growth trends.

1.The Russian population is currently around 143.6 million — putting in in the top ten globally.
2.Some demographers believe that natural growth since 1913 should have put Russia’s population to almost 200 million (or even 225 million).
3.Two World Wars, fought by Russian commanders without regard for losses, two famines in the early 1920s and 1930s, purges and social ills brought about by communist mismanagement, including alcoholism, have left their mark on the size of Russia’s population.
4.This resulted in as many as 85 million Russians “going missing” – not being born at all.
5.This represents a reduction of Russia’s population from its natural growth of about 30%.
From How Russia Botched an Entire Century by Alexei Bayer (The Globalist)

1913-2013: How Russia Botched an Entire Century

Could Russia have been as successful as the United States?
public domain
Russian Tsar Nicholas II (r. 1894-1917)

Takeaways


  • A century ago, before the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Russia was on the verge of becoming the China of the day.
  • Pre-revolutionary Russia was developing into a major global economic power naturally and consistently.
  • Russia had abolished serfdom in 1861, 2 years before President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation in the US.
  • Russia still suffers from Soviet legacies. It is among the poorest & technologically backward European states.
  • In a serf-like state, Russia's raw material riches benefit small, kleptocratic elites, who shift assets abroad.
  • Russia has wasted its resources, especially human ones. It literally killed off many talented people.
  • Russia has been driven into the ground, but even now it has much unrealized potential and may yet rise up.
  • To meet its potential, Russia will need to change its Soviet-inherited kleptocratic political system.
One hundred years ago, shortly before the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, Russia was on the verge of becoming the China of the day. It had embarked on the path to industrial capitalism two or three decades after the United States and Germany.
By the start of World War I, it was developing dynamically enough to get on track to catch up with the leading industrial powers of the day.
The Russia of that era was an enormous country, even larger than the Soviet Union at its peak, because it included both Poland and Finland within its borders. It also boasted tremendous natural resources and a vast, diversified population.
Russia featured remarkably modern elements. For example, it abolished serfdom in 1861, two years before President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation in the United States.
In the countryside, a class of prosperous peasants was emerging. And in Russia’s southern provinces and in Ukraine, there were large, productive farms — similar to those later found in the American Midwest.
These farms made Russia the breadbasket of the world, accounting for around one-third of the global wheat trade before World War I. In fact, Russia’s early 20th century wheat traders were so sophisticated that they initiated hedging prices and used financial markets in London and New York for their crops.
In the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine, coal and steel production was expanding, also using British investment and knowhow.
The construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, inaugurated in 1890, linked European Russia with the Pacific Coast. This made the economic development and exploration of Siberia possible, a move from which even today’s Russia benefits most handsomely.

Lagging literacy

At the same time, Russia’s educational system was poor. Around 70% of the population was still illiterate at the start of the 20th century. However, the illiterate were mainly peasants. In cities, primary and secondary schools were being established, benefiting even the urban poor.
Russia also had very modern universities and a substantial scientific research establishment. Mathematician Nikolai Lobachevsky pioneered hyperbolic geometry and chemist Dmitri Mendeleev is credited with creating the first periodic table of elements, both in the 19th century.
Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov was the fourth winner of the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1904, followed by immunologist Ilya Mechnikov in 1908. No Russian has won the prize since.
Professional and technical education, too, was increasingly open to children of lower-ranking officials, workers and even peasants. The ranks of the Russian intelligentsia, the educated class, were swelling. By the start of World War I, the literacy rate rose to 40%.
Despite lagging behind in terms of literacy, Russia managed to develop world-class culture and arts. Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky were probably the most internationally famous and influential fiction writers of their time.
Chekhov’s plays shaped the development of theater throughout the 20th century and Gorky’s plays were performed all over Europe in the years before World War I.
Stanislavsky developed an acting method that is still widely used in Hollywood. The Actors’ Studio and Lee Strasberg, who trained some of the brightest stars of American theater and cinema in the middle of the 20th century, adapted it.
Meanwhile, Stravinsky, Prokofiev and Shostakovich were at the origins of modern classical music, and Diaghilev’s Ballet Russe created modern dance.
In 1913, the Armory Show became a major sensation in New York City. It brought the French post-impressionist art of Van Gogh, Gauguin and others to America for the first time. While Americans were just catching on to these trends, Russian artists had already moved beyond post-impressionism.
Just two years later, in 1915, Kazimir Malevich created his Black Square, the first abstract painting.

An economic boom

While it is hard to assess economic growth in the early 1900s — few institutions collected data back then, any available figures were notoriously unreliable and modern statistical tools had not yet been developed — there is evidence that Russia stormed into the modern era after 1905.
There was rapid urbanization, with men increasingly moving to towns in search of employment. The share of the agricultural sector fell from 58% of the economy in 1885 to 51% before World War I.
Meanwhile, industry, construction and transportation accounted for 32% of the Russian economy, up from 23% in 1885. The rail network increased from 2,000 km to 70,000 km.
Like all rapidly developing nations, including the United States shortly before, Russia was a huge user of foreign capital. In the final decades of the czars’ rule, foreign investment accounted for 40% of all industrial investment, and a substantial portion of agricultural investment as well.
Western Europe, notably England, France and Belgium, provided most of that capital. By the start of World War I, Russia accounted for 15% of all international debt.
Even though Russia was still an underdeveloped country by prevailing Western European standards, it was not as backward as it is commonly portrayed. Just look at Russia’s performance in World War I, when it confronted Europe’s leading industrial power, Germany.
At the start of the conflict, Russia was not only able to mobilize quickly. It also managed to deliver troops and supplies to the front fast enough to start an invasion of Galicia in September 1914.
In fact, Russia was able to help its Western allies by forcing Germany to divert forces out of France in order to use them to assist Austria-Hungary, which was reeling from Russia’s assault.
In World War I, Russians certainly were outmatched by German efficiency and military technology. But the czar’s troops held up a lot better than Stalin’s Red Army did in the summer of 1941.

Soviet failures

After the Bolshevik revolution, the introduction of the command economy did manage to mobilize the Soviet Union. Later on, by channeling much of the country’s immense resources into the military-industrial complex, the communists were able to defeat Nazi Germany. Thereafter, they were able to come close to matching American military prowess for around half a century.
But such a gigantic effort could not be sustained. To get close, the Soviet government wasted and destroyed much of the resources on which Russia’s economic success relied.
First and foremost, it squandered Russia’s human resources. Russia’s population is currently around 140 million. Some demographers believe that natural growth since 1913 should have put its population to almost 200 million or even 225 million.
Two World Wars, fought by Russian commanders without regard for losses, two famines in the early 1920s and the 1930s, purges and social ills brought about by communist mismanagement have resulted in as many as 85 million in today’s Russia “going missing” — not being born at all.
The communists did create a good educational system and achieved nearly 100% literacy, but they managed to waste human capital in other ways. Peasants were herded into collective farms, effectively reintroducing serfdom.
Life expectancy for men in Russia now is an extremely low 64.3 years — on a par with or less than in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Chronic illnesses and alcoholism that often precede an early death rob society of the most productive years of its males.
Moreover, the economic system that prohibited private enterprise kept several generations of Russians from fulfilling their potential and benefiting society as a whole.
While pre-revolutionary Russia was developing into a major global economic power naturally and consistently, the USSR was a colossus with feet of clay.
Today’s Russia still suffers from the disastrous legacy of the Soviet era. Instead of co-leading the world, as its potential suggested at the start of the 20th century, it is, on average, one of the poorest and technologically backward countries in Europe.
In a 19th century kind of way, Russia produces little and survives by selling its vast array of raw materials to the world’s leading industrial nations.
With that as economic strategy, the country itself exists in a serf-like state. The raw material riches benefit small, kleptocratic elites, who shift their assets abroad. Considerable parts of the country’s infrastructure are as if they dated back to the medieval era. Social services are rudimentary and the quality of life is extremely poor.
The United States has spent much of the past 100 years relentlessly developing, perfecting its industrial base and its technological infrastructure and investing into human capital. It has focused on creating optimal conditions for individuals to achieve their potential.
Despite various mistakes and setbacks, the United States still sets the direction of technological innovation and its culture dominates the world.
Russia, in contrast, has wasted its resources, especially human ones. It literally killed off many talented people. Others were able to escape in time and achieved fame in Europe and, especially, in the United States, thus contributing notably to America’s economy and culture.
Choreographer George Balanchine, writer Vladimir Nabokov and, most recently, Google founder Sergei Brin are just a few examples among many.
Russia’s political economy has not moved forward much over the past 100 years. Despite mind-boggling mistakes, mismanagement and crimes of its leaders, Russia even now has much unrealized potential.
Russians may yet rise up and fulfill their human potential. But for that to happen, they will need to change the country’s kleptocratic political system and end their own serf-like mentality. Both are, in so many ways, the direct descendants of the Soviet era.
Alexei Bayer is a contributing editor of The Globalist. His debut novel, Murder at the Dacha, which is set in 1960s Moscow, was published in May.

quinta-feira, 10 de abril de 2014

Russia-Ucrania-Ocidente: quem quer enfrentar Putin? - Tom Friedman

Ninguém, na verdade.
Ninguém, no Ocidente, tem coragem (ou outra coisa) para enfrentar o novo czar de todas as Rússias.
E na Ucrânia, coitados, eles não podem, mesmo que quisessem: vão ficar sem gás, já, já!
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 



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Shortly before the Sochi Olympics, Russian President Vladimir Putin played in an exhibition hockey game there. In retrospect, he was clearly warming up for his takeover of Crimea. Putin doesn’t strike me as a chess player, in geopolitical terms. He prefers hockey, without a referee, so elbowing, tripping and cross-checking are all permitted. Never go to a hockey game with Putin and expect to play by the rules of touch football. The struggle over Ukraine is a hockey game, with no referee. If we’re going to play — we, the Europeans and the pro-Western Ukrainians need to be serious. If we’re not, we need to tell the Ukrainians now: Cut the best deal with Putin that you can.
Are we serious? It depends on the meaning of the word “serious.” It starts with recognizing what a huge lift it will be to help those Ukrainians who want to break free of Russia’s orbit. Are we and our allies ready — through the International Monetary Fund — to finance Ukraine’s massive rebuilding and fuel needs, roughly $14 billion for starters, knowing that this money is going to a Ukrainian government that, before the overthrow of the previous president, ranked 144 out of 177 on the Transparency International list of most corrupt countries in the world, equal with Nigeria?
Moreover, we can’t help Ukraine unless we and the European Union have a serious renewable energy and economic sanctions strategy — which requires us to sacrifice — to undermine Putin and Putinism, because Ukraine will never have self-determination as long as Putin and Putinism thrive. Putin’s foreign policy and domestic policy are inextricably linked: His domestic policy of looting Russia and keeping himself permanently in power with oil and gas revenue, despite a weakening economy, seems to require adventures like Ukraine that gin up nationalism and anti-Westernism to distract the Russian public. And are we ready to play dirty, too? Putin is busy using pro-Russian Ukrainian proxies to take over government buildings in Eastern Ukraine — to lay the predicate either for a Russian invasion there or de facto control there by Russia’s allies.
Finally, being serious about Russia means being serious about learning from our big mistake after the Berlin Wall fell. And that was thinking that we could expand NATO — when Russia was at its weakest and most democratic — and Russians wouldn’t care. It was thinking we could treat a democratic Russia like an enemy, as if the Cold War were still on, and expect Russia to cooperate with us as if the Cold War were over — and not produce an anti-Western backlash like Putinism.
As the historian Walter Russell Mead put it in a blog post: “The Big Blini that the West has never faced up to [is]: What is our Russia policy? Where does the West see Russia fitting into the international system? Ever since the decisions to expand NATO and the E.U. were taken in the Clinton administration, Western policy towards Russia ... had two grand projects for the post-Soviet space: NATO and the E.U. would expand into the Warsaw Pact areas and into the former Soviet Union, but Russia itself was barred from both. ... As many people pointed out in the 1990s, this strategy was asking for trouble.”
One of those pointing that out was George Kennan, the architect of containment and opponent of NATO expansion. I interviewed him about it in this column on May 2, 1998, right after the Senate ratified NATO expansion. Kennan was 94. He had been a U.S. ambassador in Moscow. He knew we were not being serious.
“I think it is the beginning of a new Cold War,” Kennan said to me of NATO expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the founding fathers of this country turn over in their graves. We have signed up to protect a whole series of countries, even though we have neither the resources nor the intention to do so in any serious way. [NATO expansion] was simply a lighthearted action by a Senate that has no real interest in foreign affairs.”
“What bothers me is how superficial and ill informed the whole Senate debate was,” added Kennan. “I was particularly bothered by the references to Russia as a country dying to attack Western Europe. Don’t people understand? Our differences in the Cold War were with the Soviet Communist regime. And now we are turning our backs on the very people who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history to remove that Soviet regime. And Russia’s democracy is as far advanced, if not farther, as any of these countries we’ve just signed up to defend from Russia. It shows so little understanding of Russian history and Soviet history. Of course, there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are — but this is just wrong.”
We need a strategy to help Ukraine and to undermine Putinism today — and to reintegrate Russia tomorrow. It’s a big, big lift. So let’s be honest with ourselves and with the Ukrainians. If Putin’s playing hockey and we’re not, Ukrainians need to know that now.

sábado, 22 de março de 2014

Russia, Ukraine, and the West: the Cold War that wasn't - Victor Sebenstein (NYT)


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LONDON — If one is to believe the newspaper headlines and TV talking heads, we are in the midst of “a new Cold War” as a result of Russia’s decision to seize Crimea. Perhaps for many people on both sides of the Atlantic the comparison is comforting: After all, the real Cold War was the last war that America and the West “won,” or seemed to have won. But it is seriously misleading.
This is not a new Cold War. The world is not heading for a clash of civilizations between two fundamentally different ways of ordering society.
It is a tragedy for Russia, and for its near neighbors, that after the Soviet Union collapsed the state was stolen by the likes of Vladimir V. Putin and so many of the state’s assets were filched by his cronies. One-party rule has turned into one-clique rule by Mr. Putin’s erstwhile K.G.B. colleagues, Kremlin fixers and assorted kleptocrats.
But there is no “Putinism” that can be exported far outside Russia’s borderlands. Old-fashioned Russian nationalism and gangster capitalism offer no alternative view of the world, no vision and no universalist value system.
Whatever its flaws and the brutality it bred, communism was a Big Idea, almost a religion, that for decades satisfied the minds of brilliant if misguided people and inspired hope of “salvation” to millions throughout the world. It is very unlikely that Mr. Putin will inspire ideals in anybody apart from the crowds cheering him in Moscow on Tuesday after his fiery speech lambasting the West — and perhaps some ethnic Russians in Crimea and elsewhere in Russia’s “near abroad.”
It is fanciful to imagine there will be leaders of peasants in South America, Asia and Africa fighting for a revolutionary creed preached from Moscow, as they did in the Cold War. “Workers of the World Unite ... for Gazprom Profits!” isn’t an appealing slogan.
For most of the Cold War, the threat to liberal democracy and freedom was not the Red Army or the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal, but an ideology that for a long time seemed to offer an alternative to capitalism and to Western values. It was an illusion, but one many people in the West shared. There is no prospect today that the residents of European capitals will one morning wake up to find that commissars have nationalized the means of production.
If there is a threat, it is geographical, not ideological, and it is to a confined area on Russia’s periphery. Despite bloodcurdling talk from a few officials in Moscow and some armchair warriors on Fox News, there is no global military challenge, no clash of a cultural or economic kind. If anything, it’s the reverse. During much of the Cold War, there were few economic or business links between East and West. Now trade is interconnected as never before. Russia exports its gas in huge amounts — and its millionaires. On the day after Russia took effective control of Crimea, the Moscow stock exchange fell by nearly 10 percent, though it has since rallied. Throughout most of the Cold War, Moscow didn’t even have a stock exchange.
In one depressing way, though, the Cold War is echoing loud and clear. The rhetoric already sounds eerily familiar. The United States Secretary of State, John F. Kerry, says democracy would “never be stolen by bullets or invasion,” the kind of thing which his predecessors might have said in the 1960s and 1970s. A cautious Democratic president stands widely accused at home of being soft on dictators. Mr. Putin talks of rescuing Russians in Ukraine from a “neo-fascist coup” — an old script the major players must have dredged up from deep in their memories.
If the script from the past is followed, the rhetoric will get louder and sharper the clearer it becomes that in reality there is little the West will do against a Russian fait accompli in Crimea, and if the Russians are determined to carve Ukraine in two.
During the Cold War, American leaders talked of “rolling back communism” and “liberating the captive people behind the Iron Curtain,” but did nothing that would risk armed conflict, certainly not after the Cuban Missile crisis.
The hot wars were fought by proxy, with an unwritten agreement that the superpowers would not confront each other anywhere near the Iron Curtain itself. When the Soviets committed some atrocity, in Hungary in 1956 or in Prague in 1968, American presidents and British prime ministers described it as “unacceptable” — and then accepted it.
These were entirely reasonable judgment calls: Nobody in the West was prepared to go to war for Budapest. It was the overblown rhetoric, the implied promises unkept, that left a bitter taste of hypocrisy. And when the critical moment came, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet empire collapsed, it was Eastern Europeans who liberated themselves; outsiders had little to do with it, despite the triumphalism in the West.
Now America and Europe have ruled out any military response in the Crimea crisis. The bigger European countries are opposed to any serious sanctions, which is reasonable given the possible costs at a time of great economic fragility on the Continent.
What is unreasonable is to keep ratcheting up the rhetoric about freedom and democracy, which achieved little in the Cold War and will most likely achieve very little now.
It is no time for hyperbole and hypocrisy. The honest thing for Western leaders to do would be to tell Ukraine that it is on its own, that there is little that in reality they are prepared to do, and admit that their power is limited and circumscribed. That would be the honest thing to tell Western voters, too.
Victor Sebestyen is the author of “Twelve Days, The Story of the Hungarian Uprising,” and “Revolution 1989: The Fall of the Soviet Empire.” A version of this op-ed appears in print on March 22, 2014, in The International New York Times.