Paradoxo: Alemanha cetica quanto a clausula investidor-Estado num possivel acordo EUA-UE de livre comercio

Realmente é um paradoxo: a Alemanha foi o país que deu à partida aos acordos bilaterais de promoção e de proteção aos investimentos estrangeiros, no final dos anos 1950, quando o acordo sobre a Organização Internacional de Comércio, saída da Carta de Havana (1948), e que tinha provisões sobre investimento, não tinha a menor perspectiva de ser aprovada, e que não havia nada para proteger investimentos diretos estrangeiros.
O Brasil, sempre atrasado nesse plano, nunca fez nenhum, e os poucos que foram feitos sob FHC e Itamar, inclusive com a assinatura do então chanceler, e futuro chanceler de Lula, foram obstados pelo PT e retirados do Congresso, deixando o Brasil sem qualquer proteção, inclusive para si mesmo. Não por outra razão, a Petrobras investiu na Bolívia através de sua holding registrada nos Países Baixos, país que tinha acordo de investimentos com a Bolívia.
Mas, quando da expropriação da Petrobras por Evo Morales em 2006, Lula IMPEDIU, sim impediu, a Petrobras de processar a Bolívia, como era seu direito, ao abrigo desse acordo. Conclusão, ela perdeu milhões, com a conivência companheira.
Agora, é estranho ver a Alemanha recuar diante desse tipo de cláusula, quando ela é feita para proteger suas empresas.
Este importante artigo explica um pouco as razões.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Columbia FDI Perspectives
Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues
No. 132   October 13, 2014
Editor-in-Chief: Karl P. Sauvant (Karl.Sauvant@law.columbia.edu)
Managing Editor: Adrian P. Torres (adrian.p.torres@gmail.com)
Germany, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and investment-dispute settlement: Observations on a paradox
by
Ralph Alexander Lorz*

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) currently being negotiated between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) could become the most comprehensive international agreement on free trade and investment protection. The negotiations have mostly been met with the usual criticism that accompanies attempts to expand free trade, despite overwhelming evidence that free trade fosters global economic development.

But the debate, especially in Germany, has taken a surprising and critical turn, focusing on the investor-state dispute-settlement (ISDS) provisions that are envisaged to give the TTIP procedural teeth. Various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) argue that TTIP would establish an extrajudicial mechanism for settling disputes that would subject Germany to the caprice of the US and its multinational enterprises, while undermining its political sovereignty.[i] This criticism has had an impact on the political scene. For example, the Federal Ministry of Justice has voiced grave concerns about the inclusion of ISDS provisions in TTIP, and the Federal Council has recently followed suit, pointing to the high risks allegedly associated with ISDS.[ii] Even agreements that seemed to be uncontroversial are called into question. For example, the EU-Canada free trade agreement (FTA), the wording of which was basically finalized in 2013 and which contains a progressive ISDS system designed to address critical issues discussed in the recent debate,[iii] is now the subject of reservations raised by Germany (a move that could jeopardize the agreement if Germany insists vis-à-vis the Commission that its final ratification requires the assent of the national parliaments of the EU member states[iv] - an issue the European Court of Justice would eventually have to decide).

Given Germany’s contribution to the development of ISDS, the country’s current stance belies its longstanding attitude toward ISDS. It was Germany that spearheaded bilateral investment treaties that form the basis of ISDS; it is Germany that has concluded more of these agreements than any other country—and with good reason: as an industrialized nation dependent on exports and, therefore, on the existence of free and legally-protected trade and investment, German investors, and thus Germany itself, would benefit most from the inclusion of ISDS provisions in the TTIP. Other EU countries would similarly benefit, as European claimants accounted for more than half of the investment arbitration cases registered between 2008-2012. The Loewen case[v] demonstrates that reliance on the US legal system alone is not a dependable safeguard for foreign investors there. On the other hand, the concern of a “regulatory chill” that would endanger European environmental and health protection standards seems exaggerated: notwithstanding the difficulty in assessing the impact of settled cases, only 31% of the almost 300 cases concluded so far have yielded an award in favor of the investor, with only a tiny fraction of these cases concerning legislative measures, as opposed to individual decisions by the executive.

So what explains Germany’s about-face on ISDS? The easiest explanation is the change in government. Whereas the negotiations on TTIP were initiated by the old coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals, Chancellor Merkel now governs with the Social Democrats; practically all the voices cited above come from Social Democrats, who control the Ministry of Justice, as well as the Ministry for the Economy and the Federal Council. But the roots of this change go much deeper, as the Social Democrats themselves have reversed their stance on FTA’s since they last held the Chancellorship ten years ago. Accordingly, Germany’s current stance appears to be infused by a contentious mix of anti-American sentiment, most recently fueled by the NSA affair;[vi] a general aversion against globalization and international capitalism, also as a result of public perception of the US; and the confident, albeit misguided, feeling that Germany is sufficiently well-off so as not to need an agreement like TTIP. In sum, these sentiments foster indifference toward strengthening international economic relationships in general and with the US in particular -- a hazard that must be addressed seriously. Otherwise, the further build-up of a consistent international investment law regime, and perhaps the liberalization of world trade -- for which TTIP is a cornerstone -- could grind to a halt. If it becomes necessary for negotiators to abandon ISDS to save the material contents of TTIP, this would only produce a second-best solution, if any at all.

* Ralph Alexander Lorz, LL.M. (Harvard), Attorney-at-Law (New York), is Professor of Law at Heinrich Heine University in Duesseldorf (Germany); he is currently serving as Secretary of Public Education in the State Government of Hesse (Germany). The author is grateful to Andrea Bjorklund, Marc Bungenberg and Federico Ortino for their helpful peer reviews. The views expressed by the author of this Perspective are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Columbia University or its partners and supporters. Columbia FDI Perspectives (ISSN 2158-3579) is a peer-reviewed series.
[i] See, for instance, most recently the dossier published by LabourNet Germany on August 20, 2014, available at http://www.labournet.de/politik/eu-politik/wipo-eu/freihandelsabkommen-mit-den-usa-tafta.
[ii] BR-Drs. 295/14, Resolution of July 11, 2014, available at http://www.bundesrat.de/SharedDocs/drucksachen/2014/0201-0300/295-14(B).pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1.
[iii] See, European Commission, “Investment provisions in the EU-Canada free trade agreement”, December 3, 2013, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf.
[iv] See “European Commission denies reports that Germany is derailing CETA”, International Business Times, September 23, 2014, available at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/european-commission-denies-reports-that-germany-derailing-ceta-1466862. ndanger the  address theitical pfor more than half of the globally registered investment arbitration cases from 2008-2012. treat
[v] Loewen Group v. USA, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, award of June 26, 2003.
[vi] The latest survey by the Allensbach Institute shows a so-called “cross pressure” of conflicting loyalties in many Germans when assessing the US. The US appears more than ever like the big brother, triggering aversions by his rudeness but representing the only reliable force when bad boys surface along the way. See “Der Groll ueber den grossen Bruder”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 17, 2014, p. 8.
The material in this Perspective may be reprinted if accompanied by the following acknowledgment: “Ralph Alexander Lorz, ‘Germany, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and investment-dispute settlement: Observations on a paradox,’ Columbia FDI Perspectives, No. 132, October 13, 2014. Reprinted with permission from the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (www.ccsi.columbia.edu).” A copy should kindly be sent to the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment at ccsi@law.columbia.edu.
For further information, including information regarding submission to the Perspectives, please contact: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Adrian Torres, adrian.p.torres@gmail.com or adrian.torres@law.columbia.edu.

Most recent Columbia FDI Perspectives
No. 131, Kenneth P. Thomas, “How to deal with the growing incentives competition,” September 29, 2014.
No. 130, Catherine Kessedjian, “Good governance of third party funding,” September 15, 2014.
No. 129, Armand de Mestral, “The Canada-China BIT 2012: Perspectives and implications,” September 2, 2014.
All previous FDI Perspectives are available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/publications/columbia-fdi-perspectives/.

Controle de capitais: economistas dos EUA a favor

Uma carta dirigida ao Secretário do Tesouro, o Secretário do Comércio e à Secretária de Estado defende a adoção de medidas defensivas contra fluxos excessivos de capitais, pregando a mudança dos acordos de investimentos e de liberalização de comércio:

January 31, 2011

Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Secretary Timothy Geithner
Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20220

Ambassador Ron Kirk
Office of the United States Trade Representative
600 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20508

Dear Secretary Clinton, Secretary Geithner, and Ambassador Kirk:

We, the undersigned economists, write to alert you to important new developments in the economics literature pertaining to prudential financial regulations, and to express particular concern regarding the extent to which capital controls are restricted in U.S. trade and investment treaties.
Authoritative research recently published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, the International Monetary Fund, and elsewhere has found that limits on the inflow of short-term capital into developing nations can stem the development of dangerous asset bubbles and currency appreciations and generally grant nations more autonomy in monetary policy-making.i
Given the severity of the global financial crisis and its aftermath, nations will need all the possible tools at their disposal to prevent and mitigate financial crises. While capital account regulations are no panacea, this new research points to an emerging consensus that capital management techniques should be included among the “carefully designed macro-prudential measures” supported by G-20 leaders at the Seoul Summit.ii Indeed, in recent months, a number of countries, from Thailand to Brazil, have responded to surging hot money flows by adopting various forms of capital regulations.
We also write to express our concern that many U.S. free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties contain provisions that strictly limit the ability of our trading partners to deploy capital controls. The “capital transfers” provisions of such agreements require governments to permit all transfers relating to a covered investment to be made “freely and without delay into and out of its territory.”
Under these agreements, private foreign investors have the power to effectively sue governments in international tribunals over alleged violations of these provisions. A few recent U.S. trade agreements put some limits on the amount of damages foreign investors may receive as compensation for certain capital control measures and require an extended “cooling off” period before investors may file their claims.iii However, these minor reforms do not go far enough to ensure that governments have the authority to use such legitimate policy tools. The trade and investment agreements of other major capital-exporting nations allow for more flexibility.
We recommend that future U.S. FTAs and BITs permit governments to deploy capital controls without being subject to investor claims, as part of a broader menu of policy options to prevent and mitigate financial crises.
Sincerely,

Initial Signatories:
1. Ricardo Hausmann, Director, Harvard University Center for International Development
2. Dani Rodrik, Rafiq Hariri Professor of International Political Economy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
3. Joseph Stiglitz, University Professor, Columbia University, Nobel laureate
4. Arvind Subramanian, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics, and Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development
5. Nancy Birdsall, President, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC
6. Olivier Jeanne, Professor of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, and Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics
7. Pranab Bardhan, Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
8. Lance Taylor, Department of Economics, New School for Social Research
9. Jose Antonio Ocampo, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
10. Stephany Griffith-Jones, Initiative for Policy Dialogue, Columbia University
11. Ethan Kaplan, IIES, Stockholm University and Columbia University
12. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President, The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
13. Ilene Grabel, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver
14. Alice Amsden, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT
15. Gerald Epstein, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst
16. Kevin P. Gallagher, Department of International Relations, Boston University
17. Sarah Anderson, Global Economy Project Director, Institute for Policy Studies
18. Arindrajit Dube, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts-Amherst
19. William Miles, Department of Economics, Wichita State University
20. Adam Hersh, Center for American Progress
21. James K. Galbraith, Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr. Chair in Government/Business Relations and Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin
22. Paul Blustein, Nonresident Fellow, the Brookings Institution, and Senior Visiting Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation
23. Anton Korinek, Department of Economics, University of Maryland

Other US-Based
24. Rania Antonopoulos, Director, Gender Equality and the Economy Program, Levy Economics Institute
25. Eileen Appelbaum, Center for Economic and Policy Research
(...)
127. Steven Topik, Department of History, University of California
(...)
139. Silverio Zebral, Chief-Economist, Organization of American States (OAS)
International
(...)
159. Ha-Joon Chang, Department of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK
(...)
174. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Professor, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Chile, Chile
(...)
177. Roberto Frenkel, Professor and Principal Research Associate, University of Buenos Aires and CEDES, Argentina
(...)
210. André Nassif, Professor, Department of Economics, Universidade Federal Fluminense Brazil and The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), Brazil
(...)
229. Gilson Schwartz, Professor, University of São Paulo, Brazil
(...)
239. Eduardo Strachman, Coordinator of Post Graduate Studies in Economics, São Paulo State University, (Unesp), Araraquara, São Paulo, Brazil

Organizations listed for identification purposes only.

i For some of the most important recent studies see: Ostry JD, Ghosh AR, Habermeier K, Chamon M, Qureshi MS and Reinhardt DBS (2010). Capital Inflows. The Role of Controls. IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/10/04. Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund. Magud N and Reinhart CM (2006). Capital Controls: An Evaluation. NBER Working Paper 11973. Cambridge, MA, National Bureau of Economic Research. Further studies are available upon request.
ii “Seoul Summit Document,” Nov. 12, 2010.
iii See, for example, Annex 10-E of the U.S.-Peru FTA.

Acordos de investimento: que falta faz um na Bolívia

No início dos anos 1990, o Brasil assinou diversos acordos de promoção e proteção recíproca de investimentos (APPIs), alguns deles assinados pelo então chanceler de Itamar Franco, que seria também chanceler do presidente "nunca antes".
Pois bem: nunca antes na história deste país, acordos internacionais negociados pelo Executivo sofreram barragem tão explícita, e desonesta intelectualmente, como os APPIs enfrentaram no Congresso nacional, oposição articulada sobretudo pelo PT.
Essa oposição e recusa de acordos de investimento continuou durante todo o governo do "nunca antes", mesmo numa época em que o Brasil já se tinha tornado um grande investidor na América do Sul e esses acordos protegeriam, pelo menos um pouco, nossos ativos e interesses na região (como depois se viu no infeliz caso da nacionalização dos hidrocarburantes na Bolívia, aliás de forma ilegal, mas sem a proteção de um acordo bilateral de investimentos, o que acarretou prejuizos à Petrobras).
A mesma história se repete hoje, no mesmo país, como revela abaixo esta matéria da coluna diária de Cesar Maia.
Infelizes investidores brasileiros: reclamem deste governo que está aí.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

INVESTIDORES BRASILEIROS NA BOLÍVIA E INSEGURANÇA JURÍDICA!
Cesar Maia, 21/01/2011

1. Empresários brasileiros na Bolívia -em Santa Cruz de La Sierra- têm três linhas de investimentos. Na soja, cujo capital investido (seus ativos) já alcança 1 bilhão de dólares. Exportam soja e óleo de soja. E é soja orgânica. Na pecuária, em gado nelore principalmente. E, finalmente, em mineração.

2. A complexa legislação boliviana termina criando um quadro de insegurança jurídica. Nos últimos meses, com o diesel (usado no refino de cocaína) sendo contingenciado, as compras para tratores, máquinas e caminhões passaram a servir de pretexto para constranger os produtores.

3. As mineradoras nas regiões próximas a fronteira com o Brasil tiveram suas atividades suspensas até nova ordem, acarretando desemprego e imobilização dos investimentos. Um investimento de 80 milhões de dólares em forno, do empresário Eike Batista, foi bloqueado por concorrente. Agora, o governo e o concorrente querem comprar por 5 milhões de dólares.

4. O regime de tributação do Brasil para empresários brasileiros no exterior não leva em conta a tributação já ocorrida na Bolívia. Com isso, as aplicações financeiras dos empresários brasileiros têm que ser feitas nos EUA e não no Brasil, como preferem.

5. Já está na hora das autoridades brasileiras se reunirem com os empresários brasileiros que vivem na Bolívia e depois com o governo boliviano, para dar segurança jurídica aos investidores. E a comissão de relações exteriores de senado se aproximar do problema. E o ministério da agricultura se aprofundar em questão tão delicada.