Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.
terça-feira, 1 de setembro de 2015
Voto "destituinte" (recall), uma solucao 'a crise atual? - Jorio Dauster
sábado, 30 de agosto de 2014
Eleicoes 2014: a politica externa de Marina Silva - Oliver Stuenkel
What Would a Marina Presidency Mean for Brazilian Foreign Policy?
Marina Silva and her advisers faced a formidable challenge. After Eduardo Campos' tragic death on August 13, Marina Silva, Campos' running mate, suddenly turned into the best placed candidate to defeat President Dilma Rousseff in the upcoming elections. While other candidates had months to hone their arguments, Marina's team had merely days to finalize the document that lists her policy proposals. Contrary to 2010, when she was seen as a protest candidate, she has now turned into a serious contender, and the first option for many of those who are dissatisfied with the way the country is goverrned.
International issues will not be decisive in this election, of course. Voters care most issues such as health care, education, public transport, public security, the fight against corruption and the economy. And yet, compared to previous elections, foreign policy issues are set to play a more important role in weeks leading up to the election on October 5, underlining a growing notion among voters that the way Brazil relates to the world directly impacts their well-being. While security issues such as the Crimean Crisis are unlikely to matter much, candidates will have to explain their proposals on topics around Mercosur, possible trade agreements with the EU and the US and the rise of China. The more likely a victory by Marina seems, the more will people seek to understand her ideas about Brazil's foreign policy.
The 12 pages of her program dedicated to foreign policy (pp.28-40) provide interesting insights, some of which are analyzed below.
Trade
As big regional negotiations such as one between the EU and United States advance, one cannot but notice the prospect of a world divided into trade blocs. Brazil will have to make up its mind about which strategy to pursue. In the case of the negotiations with the EU, this involves making a decision about whether to take a highly protectionist and rather unpredictable Argentina along or whether to pursue a two-speed solution, temporarily leaving Argentina behind. According to her program, Marina would opt for the latter option of the "two-speed Mercosur" to facilitate the conclusion of trade negotiations with the European Union, among others. She argues that focusing on the WTO is fully compatible with seeking other regional and bilaratal trade deals. That seems reasonable, and even Brazil's current government has been increasingly open about its willingness to negotiate without Argentina. Marina Silva is also supportive of the ongoing process to fully liberalize trade between the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur, and calls for Brazil to make regional integration its top priority.
Regional leadership
Similar to her arguments made during the campaign four years ago, when Marina Silva said that Brazil had a "key role in mediating between the different regional interests" through exercising "respectful and supportive leadership" in the region, the 2014 program reads as a commitment to play a more active role in the neighborhood. While she frequently mentions defending human rights and democracy in South America, her program does not suggest a reckless idealistic position that may endanger strategic interests. Over the coming days and weeks, she will certainly have to say how she would deal with the ongoing political crisis in Venezuela.
Global governance
Contrary to critics who argue that Marina Silva would radically change course, there are signs that she could seek to reemphasize the importance of foreign policy after a relatively lacklustre performance under Dilma Rousseff. Notably, she stresses that both Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula contributed to strengthening Brazil's international projection, and has repeatedly argued, since 2010, in favor of reforming the international system - such as the UN Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank - to increase its legitimacy and provide Brazil with more responsibility. Furthermore, as globally recognized environmental leader, Marina Silva has repeatedly argued that Brazil had the potential to assume international leadership in the debate about environmental sustainability. It is in this context that her proposals are most innovative - ranging from engaging with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and strengthening the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO). A more sophisticated strategy in the Amazon will also please nationalists, many of whom worry about Brazil's limited capacity to control its Western borders.
Despite expressing her desire to improve ties to the United States, Marina's proposals do not imply weakening Brazil's ties to the Global South - to the contrary, the explicitly refers to the BRICS grouping and the importance of Brazil-Africa ties. That will make it difficult for supporters of Lula's foreign policy to attack her approach. Nothing suggests that Marina would seek to undo his notable achievements (or, for that matter, Dilma's main achievement, Brazil's laudable internet governance initiative).
Her proposal to promote Brazilian culture more systematically on a global scale - she mentions learning from European institutions such as the Alliance Française, the British Council and the Goethe Institute - deserve attention and hint to a welcome willingness to introduce new ideas to strengthen Brazil's international visibility. In the same way, she suggests modernizing the Rio Branco Institute, Brazil's diplomatic academy, and further strengthening the dialogue between Itamaraty and civil society.
Putting foreign policy back at the center?
Finally, and most importantly, Marina Silva argues that Dilma Rousseff did not sufficiently value Brazil's Foreign Ministry. And indeed, under no other Brazilian leader in recent history has the Foreign Ministry - historically above the political fray - been so secondary. As a result, Brazil's foreign policy under Rousseff has been far more hesitant and passive than during the presidencies of Cardoso and Lula.
Naturally, in the coming weeks Marina Silva will have to explain how some of her ideas would play out in practice. And yet, her program suggests that Marina would pursue an activist foreign policy, built on the notion that established countries' dominance in the global conversation is highly counterproductive and unlikely to produce sustainable solutions to the world's most pressing issues such as climate change, financial volatility, human rights and nuclear proliferation.
More than ever before, Brazil's stronger voice - be it in the UN Security Council, during climate change negotiations, as a mediator in Venezuela, as a defender of democracy in Guinea Bissau, or as an agenda setter on internet governance - is needed to create a richer and more balanced global debate. That requires a President unafraid of taking courageous decisions and occasionally generating international controversy.
Read also:
Marina’s foreign policy
What would Aécio do?
Brazil’s top 10 foreign policy challenges in 2014
Oliver Stuenkel
Oliver Stuenkel is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in São Paulo, where he coordinates the São Paulo branch of the School of History and Social Science (CPDOC) and the executive program in International Relations. He is also a non-resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin and a member of the Carnegie Rising Democracies Network. His research focuses on rising powers; specifically on Brazil’s, India’s and China's foreign policy and on their impact on global governance. He is the author of the forthcoming IBSA: The rise of the Global South? (2014, Routledge Global Institutions) and BRICS and the Future of Global Order (2014, Lexington).
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sábado, 23 de junho de 2012
O Paraguai e o Protocolo de Ushuaia II - libelo acusatorio
Entre os elementos, quase todos eles essencialmente paraguaios (salvo que as invasões de terras também se fizeram contra proprietários brasileiros, o que deve ter sido informado pelo Itamaraty), existe um curioso, que é o Protocolo de Ushuaia II, também assinado pela presidente, na reunião do Mercosul em dezembro de 2011, em Montevidéu, e que supostamente se destina a reforçar a cláusula democrática do Mercosul, ao sancionar o país que enfrentar uma ruptura democrática (alegadamente a derrubada violenta de um presidente).
O Parlamento paraguaio já tinha criticado violentamente esse instrumento, como informado aqui também (podem buscar no link de pesquisa).
Ou seja, existe um elemento que interessa à política externa brasileira, ou talvez dois: além da oposição dos congressistas paraguaios ao dito Protocolo, que segundo eles viola os direitos soberanos do seu país, há a questão pendente do ingresso da Venezuela no Mercosul.
Talvez um dia agradeçam ao Paraguai ter evitado dois equívocos, tanto no plano diplomático, quanto na esfera política e quiçá na econômica.
ANEXO
El Líbelo Acusatorio contra el Presidente de la República Fernando Lugo Méndez , se funda en las consideraciones de hecho y de derecho que pasamos seguidamente a exponer:
En el año 2009, con autorización del Presidente Lugo, se realizó una concentración política de jóvenes en el Comando de Ingeniería de las Fuerzas Armadas, el que fue financiado por instituciones del Estado, incluyendo a la Entidad Binacional Yacyreta. Fernando Lugoreconoció que la Entidad Binacional Yacyretá financió el encuentro de jóvenes socialistas de la región, llevado a cabo en el Comando de Ingeniería de las Fuerzas Armadas.
Fue el Gobierno del Presidente Lugo el único responsable como instigador y facilitador de las recientes invasiones de tierras en la zona de Ñacunday. La falta de respuesta de las fuerzas policiales ante las invasiones de supuestos carperos y sin tierras a bienes del dominio privado, solo han sido parte de esa conducta cómplice.
El Presidente Lugo ha sido absolutamente incapaz de desarrollar una política y programas que tiendan a disminuir la creciente inseguridad ciudadana.
Ha quedado demostrado con los hechos acaecidos en los Campos Morombi, Curuguaty, Departamento de Canindeyú, la patente inoperancia, negligencia, ineptitud e improvisación de este gobierno liderado por Presidente Fernando Lugo Méndez, que amerita la acusación de la Cámara de Diputados por mal desempeño de funciones ante la Cámara de Senadores.
Todas las causales mencionadas más arriba, son de pública notoriedad, motivo por el cual no necesitan ser probadas, conforme a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico vigente.
El Presidente de la Republica Fernando Lugo Méndez ha incurrido en mal desempeño de sus funciones en razón de haber ejercido el cargo que ostenta de una manera impropia, negligente e irresponsable, trayendo el caos y la inestabilidad política en toda la Republica, generando así la constante confrontación y lucha de clases sociales, que como resultado final trajo la masacre entre compatriotas, hecho inédito en los anales de la historia desde de nuestra independencia nacional hasta la fecha, en tiempo de paz .
Se funda la presente acusación por mal desempeño de funciones de conformidad a lo establecido en el Articulo 225 de la Constitución Nacional.
6.1.- Definitivamente, la gestión del presidente Fernando Armindo Lugo Méndez ha perjudicado enormemente los intereses supremos de la Nación, que de continuar, apeligra gravemente la convivencia pacífica del pueblo paraguayo y la vigencia de los derechos