Recebi, da Associação Brasileira de Pesquisadores em História Econômica e de Empresas, da qual sou membro, estas referências que completam as que eu já tinha colocado neste mesmo espaço, neste link:
http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2015/11/uma-lagrima-para-douglass-north-o.html
Eis as novas:
Conjunto de textos em homenagem a Douglass North (1920-2015)
https://afinetheorem.wordpress.com/2015/11/24/douglass-north-an-economists-historian/
http://truthonthemarket.com/2015/11/24/douglass-c-north-1920-2015/
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/25/business/economy/douglass-c-north-nobel-laureate-economist-dies-at-95.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0
http://crookedtimber.org/2015/11/24/doug-north-has-died/
http://www.forbes.com/sites/artcarden/2015/11/24/he-helped-us-understand-the-process-of-economic-change-douglass-c-north-1920-2015/
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/11/big-questions
http://organizationsandmarkets.com/2015/11/25/john-nye-remembers-doug-north/
https://reason.com/archives/2015/11/25/douglass-cecil-north
http://www.voxeu.org/article/ideas-douglass-north
http://www.voxeu.org/article/douglass-north-economist-s-historian
Tenham bom proveito.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 1/12/2015
Mostrando postagens com marcador obituario. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador obituario. Mostrar todas as postagens
terça-feira, 1 de dezembro de 2015
quinta-feira, 26 de novembro de 2015
Uma lagrima para... Douglass North, o grande historiador economico institucionalista
[Forwarded from EH.net]
Douglass C. North passed away at the age of 95 at his home in Benzonia, Michigan. He was among the most important and influential economic historians and economists of the late 20th century. He will be deeply missed by his family, friends, colleagues, and students.
Douglass Cecil North was born on Nov. 5, 1920, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the youngest of three children. He attended the University of California-Berkeley, graduating in 1942. He received his PhD from Berkeley in 1952. He began teaching at the University of Washington Seattle in 1950, and in 1983 moved to Washington University in St. Louis, where he remained a professor for the rest of his career. He was co-recipient of the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Robert Fogel.
He is survived by his wife Elisabeth Case and his three sons Douglass, Christopher, and Malcom.
The following description of his intellectual accomplishments are taken from John Wallis “Persistence and Change: The Evolution of Douglass C. North,” in Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North.” Edited by Sebastian Galiani and Itai Sened. Cambridge University Press, 2014.
North long emphasized the importance of history and of neo-classical economics. He criticizes both disciplines for their complacency about the adequacy of the current conceptual and methodological consensus on how history or economics should be done. He always operated within a framework of individuals who act intentionally (neo-classical economics matters) and who perceive the world through cognitive lenses that are part inherited from their culture and part derived from their own experience (history matters). Individual actions are governed by interests shaped by relative prices, endowments, and constraints (institutions) as well as by perceptions of how the world around us works (cognition and beliefs). Social outcomes are the sum of individual actions, but the summation process is not a simple adding up, since interactions between individual decisions and beliefs critically influence the behavior of everyone.
The evolution of North’s thinking continuously shaped his willingness to pursue the interesting questions he was unable to address in his last book or paper, not by the what was currently hot in the profession. Testimony to the power of his insight is that the profession has followed him, for he certainly didn’t followed the profession. Nowhere is it easier to see this process than in his first book, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860. The introduction, page vii, states his conceptual approach:
This study is based on the proposition that U. S. growth was the evolution of a market economy where the behavior or prices of goods, services, and productive factors was the major element in any explanation of economic change. Institutions and political policies have certainly been influential. They have acted to accelerate or retard growth on many occasions in our past, primarily by affecting the behavior of the prices of goods, services, or productive factors either directly or indirectly. But they have modified rather than replaced the underlying forces of a market economy.
It is hard to imagine a conceptual statement that more inaccurately predicts the path that North’s research eventually followed.
Economic Growth was one of the first examples of quantitative economic history, or cliometrics, North’s first major contribution to economics and economic history. The book presented a very neo-classical theory of economic development that emphasized the importance of geographic specialization and division of labor, which led him to investigate the sources of falling transportation costs over the nineteenth century. His 1958 paper in the Journal of Economic History laid out a technology based neo-classical framework for thinking about declining freight rates, but ten years later, in his 1968 Journal of Political Economy paper, North concluded that: “The conclusion one draws is that the decline of piracy and privateering and the development of markets and international trade shared honors as primary factors in the growth of shipping efficiency over this two-and-a- half-century period.” (p. 967). Essentially, the costs of shipping were falling because costs other than the costs of operating ships were falling. Those cost reductions were the result of institutional change. The paper marks North’s turn toward both transaction costs and institutions as important elements of economic change over time.
The turn towards transaction costs and institutions did not mean a turn away from neo-classical economics, however. The assumption of zero transaction costs and unchanging institutions could be relaxed within the context of neo-classical theory, as North argued in 1971: “What we need is a body of theory which encompasses the traditional models of the economist and both widens its scope and allows us to include an explanation of the formation, mutation and decay of organizational forms within which man cooperates or competes.” North was moving toward a neo-classical theory of institutions in which the form of institutions, or organizations, was itself determined by traditional neo-classical rationality and constraints:
Let us begin on a positive note. Briefly stated, the model specifies the process by which an action group (an individual or group) perceive that some new form of organization (institutional arrangement) will yield a stream of benefits which makes it profitable to undergo the costs of innovating this new organizational form. These new arrangements have typically been profitable to realize potential economies of scale, reduce information costs, spread risk, and internalize externalities. These institutional arrangements account for a vast array of the "economic institutions" with which economic historians have traditionally been concerned. However, the formation (and mutation and decay) of these organizational forms can now be an integral part of the economic analysis rather than a descriptive addition to the analysis. Moreover, since a great many were realizable without substantial redistribution of income, their formation is at least in principle predictable from the model. Perhaps even more significant than the ability to integrate economic analyses and institutional formation is the implication of this theoretical model for the study of productivity increase. Economic historians have focused on technological change as the source of growth but the development of institutional arrangements from the above mentioned sources are a major historical source of the improvement in the efficiency of product and factor markets. The development of more efficient economic organization is surely as important a part of the growth of the Western World as is the development of technology, and it is time it received equal attention. The few cases of which I am aware that have attempted to measure productivity change attributable to improving economic organization certainly support this contention. (1971, pp. 119-120)
The idea that neo-classical theory could be used to explain why institutions functioned as they did was a fundamental breakthrough and North’s second major conceptual contribution. The idea was implemented in a series of papers with Lance Davis and with Robert Paul Thomas, that led to two more books: Institutional Change and American Economic Growth, published in 1971 with Davis and The Rise of the Western Worldpublished in 1973 with Thomas. The heart of the argument in both books is that we can explain changes in the organization of human interaction (institutions) on the basis of the rational interests of individuals attempting to structure the world around them in ways that maximize net benefits. The classic application of the technique is North and Thomas’s explanation of how the rising price of labor in 14th century Europe as a result of the Black Death, led to the institution of wage labor in western Europe and a return to the institution of serfdom and slavery in eastern Europe. The same relative price shock led to two different, but both rational, institutional changes.
Two lines of thinking emerged from the idea of neo-classical institutions, and they were not entirely consistent with one another. In one line, institutional change occurs because of short-run variations in relative prices that create, at some point in time, the incentives to restructure human organizations. For some reason these changes persist. This led North to investigate both path dependence and transaction costs. Transaction costs play a key role, because they are both a reason to change institutions to reduce (or increase) transaction costs and because transaction costs subsequently can make it difficult to change institutions and so contribute to institutional persistence.
The other line of thinking was a growing dissatisfaction with neo-classical economics altogether as a way to understand the process of economic growth specifically, and more broadly to understand the process of economic change over time. His third significant breakthrough was the realization that neo-classical theory was not just inadequate, but unable to explain long term economic and institutional change in any society, growing or not.
He directed his first clear criticism at economic historians. While acknowledging the important contribution that economic theory and quantitative techniques made to advancing our understanding of historical processes, nonetheless:
From my quite subjective perspective, the new economic history has made a significant contribution to revitalizing the field and advancing the frontiers of knowledge. Yet I think it stops short -- far short – of what we should be accomplishing in the field. Our objective surely remains that of shedding light on man's economic past, conceived in the broadest sense of those words; and I submit to you that the new economic history as it has developed has imposed strictures on enquiry that narrowly limit its horizons-and that some of my former revolutionary compatriots show distressing signs of complacency with the new orthodoxy. (1974, p. 1)
His criticism of neo-classical theory in economic history, development, and growth would culminate inStructure and Change in Economic History, 1981, what many (including myself) believe is North’s best book. The introduction and a second chapter extend the argument that we must have more than a history of markets to understand economic change. The third chapter titled “A Neoclassical Theory of the State,” lays out a logical neo-classical argument for why, in the presence of transactions costs, political systems do not inevitably evolve institutions that promote economic growth. Indeed, as long-term economic history suggests, the tendency is for political systems to evolve that do not support growth. Chapters four and five argue that we need a theory of organizations as well as a theory of beliefs and ideology if we are to understand long run change, particularly long run change that does not inevitably produce growth and development.
The contradiction is clear in Structure and Change. On the one hand, there is a strong argument that neo-classical economics is incapable of delivering the full range of explanations necessary to understand economic change, particularly ideologies and beliefs. On the other hand, there is a strong argument that rational individual behavior is consistent with institutional choices that retard, rather than promote, economic growth. Is the question to be neo-classical or not be neo-classical?
The real question the book is trying to grapple with is: persistence or change? Going back to Rise of the Western World, institutions change when there are gains from doing so, but then persist because of the high transaction cost of changing them. In Structure and Change, beliefs and ideologies persist. Because beliefs (and norms and culture) are based on the cumulative experience of society passed down through culture and formed through repeated interaction of many people through norms of behavior, beliefs do not change quickly and it is extremely difficult to for social actors to manipulate beliefs in current time. As a result, beliefs are always a function of what happened in the past and can impede change in the present for good or ill. It is the persistence of beliefs and institutions from the past (culture) that explain why changes in the present often produce results that impede rather than promoting growth and development. The importance of beliefs in North’s framework plays a major role in Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (1990) and is the central focus of Understanding the Process of Economic Change (2005).
The Structure and Change framework includes two different time patterns of institutional change. One is episodic and discontinuous, like the move toward wage payments after the Black Death in western Europe. The other is continuous and marginal. Changes in beliefs and ideologies, in norms, and in informal and formal rules occur constantly and, while changes sometimes persist, they need not. Neither continuous or episodic institutional change is necessarily persistent.
Fleshing out these ideas in the 1990s produced a classic example of change during a crisis that persists: “Constitutions and Commitment” with Barry Weingast (1989). The paper’s emphasis on institutional mechanisms explains why particular institutions are self-enforcing and persist over time. At the same time North was writing Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Persistence plays a large role in Institutions, which regularly emphasizes that the function of an institution is to provide stability and predictability to human behavior. The big contribution of the book, however, is the definition of institutions that North calls the sports analogy. Institutions are the rules of the game and the means of enforcement, and organizations are the teams that play the game. The definition motivates three behavioral choices that organizations can make. 1) maximize under the rules; 2) devote resources to changing the rules; and/or 3) cheat. The alternatives are not mutually exclusive, and they comprise a framework for understanding the dynamics of institutional change.
North’s fourth major contribution was to separate institutions and organizations. Since his earliest books, North always included a discussion of organizations as important, but organizations were treated as manifestations of institutions. Organizations usually disappeared from the conceptual framework, which was always neo-classical in its focus on individuals. By defining institutions as the rules of the game and means of enforcement and then separating the rules from the organizations that actually play the game, the possibility of a dynamic relationship between the interests and incentives facing the organizations and the structure of the rules became possible. The descriptive concept that comes out of the dynamics is ‘adaptive efficiency.’ In some societies, the interaction of institutions and organizations produces a series of institutional changes that get incrementally better, rather than a sequence that is sometimes good and sometimes bad for economic performance. This is North’s fourth fundamental contribution.
Rather than resolving (or integrating) the tension between the long and short term forces leading to institutional change, Institutions exacerbated it. The rules of the game included formal rules, informal rules, and norms of behavior. By stressing the function of institutions as providing stability and predictability, and emphasizing the importance of beliefs and norms, the book effectively claimed that the persistence of institutions was not a matter of real-time economic and political forces, but an outcome of the natural limits to human capacities for cognition and culture. North pressed farther down this road with his 2005 book,Understanding the Process of Economic Change. The interaction between organizations and institutions was a central point in his last book with John Wallis and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders in 2009.
Partial Bibliography
North, Douglass C. 1958. “Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development 1750–1913.” Journal of Economic History, 18(4): 537–555.
North, Douglass C. 1961. The Economic Growth of the United States 1790–1860. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
North, Douglass C. 1966. Growth and Welfare in the American Past. A New Economic History. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
North, Douglass C. 1968. “Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping, 1600–1850.” The Journal of Political Economy. 76(5): 953–970.
North, Douglass C. 1971. “Institutional Change and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic History, 31(1): 118–125.
Davis, Lance E., and Douglass C. North. 1971. Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. 1974. “Beyond the New Economic History.” Journal of Economic History, 34(1): 1–7.
North, Douglass C. 1978. “Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History.” Journal of Economic Literature, 16: 963–978.
North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” The Journal of Economic History, 49:4.
North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. 1986. “The New Institutional Economics.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 142(1): 230–237.
North, Douglass. C. 1990a. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. 1990b. “A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics.” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2(4): 355–367.
North, Douglass C. 1991. “Institutions.” In The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1): 97–112.
North, Douglass C. 1993. “Douglass C. North, the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1993: Autobiography.” Vol. 2010. The Nobel Foundation.
North, Douglass C. 1994. “Economic Performance through Time.” American Economic Review, 84: 359–368.
North, Douglass C. 1995. “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development,” in John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin M. Lewis, eds., The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, New York: Routledge.
North, Douglass C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
North, Douglass C., and Robert Thomas. 1973. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Human History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb, and Barry R. Weingast, ed. 2013. In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problem of Development. Cambridge University Press.
==========
Douglass C. North, 1920-2015
By Barry Weingast, one of Doug’s coauthors, and a noted Political Scientist, Economist, and Economic Historian in his own right.
With the passing of Doug North Monday night, the world lost one of the great economists of the last century. Doug was known for his intense curiosity and his relentless – and even mischievous – pursuit of new ideas. He was a great friend, colleague, and coauthor, and I’ll miss him terribly.
Doug was never satisfied with his ideas, always pushing to expand his understanding and knowledge.
Most academics are lucky if they participate in one revolution in their field. Doug was at the forefront of several.
His first book, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860 (1960), helped foster the revolution that came to be known as the “new economic history,” the application of frontier economics to the study problems of the past. He and Bob Fogel were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics (1993) largely for their leadership in this new research program.
But Doug understood that the neoclassical economics on which he was raised was inadequate to address the problems he sought to answer, namely, why are a few countries rich while most remain poor, some in dire poverty? Much of his best work addressed this question, including his next four books.
Doug launched his findings in a book with Lance Davis, Institutional Change and American Economic History (1971). With Robert Thomas, he wrote The Rise of the Western World (1973), which began his exploration of the role of rights and institutions in political-economics of development. Arguably his best book, Structure and Change in Economic History (1981), dug deeper into the problem of development, providing the beginning of the Northian approach to understanding institutions. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (1990) represents the culmination of this research path and remains the premier statement of the profound role played by institutions in economic, political, and social realms of action. This work has been cited more than 41,000 times in academic research. Twenty-five years later, economists, political scientists, and sociologists continue to mine this rich line of research.
The next research turn went to the heart of human action, focusing on the limits of the economists’ assumption of rational choice. In Understanding the Process of Economic Change (2005), Doug drew on recent developments in cognitive science to expand our understanding of human choice and action.
His last book, coauthored with John Wallis and myself, developed a new approach to thinking about the problem of development. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (2009), highlights the role of violence. Needless to say, I will leave it to others to evaluate the merits of this work.
I have a large range of personal memories of Doug as friend and scholar. He always wanted to learn more, and had a rare knack for listening to the ideas of others. He spent the academic year, 1987-88 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. During this period, we completed our first paper, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of the Institutions of Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England.” This paper proposed a new approach to thinking about the role of Constitutions in securing the role of government in promoting long-term economic growth.
Never a fan of the growing mathematization of economics, Doug told me when he arrived at Stanford in 1987 that he didn’t like all the game theory being used at Stanford to study economics, but since Stanford was known for it, he wanted to learn more. He asked me to set up some lunches where he and I met with some of the prominent game theorists. The two of us really hit it off with one, Paul Milgrom. Paul impressed Doug, not only for his brilliance, but for his attitude about economics and research more generally. In discussing the role of mathematics in economics, Paul said, “first we get the economics right, then we build the models.” This suited Doug’s philosophy, and he (and I) were seduced into a collaboration that produced our joint paper on the medieval “Law Merchant” (1990), a paper seeking to understand the role of law and judges prior to the rise of the nation state with an ability to enforce laws across a larger territory.
Beginning in the early 1990s, Doug and his wife, Elisabeth, began spending the winters at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. This gave us a period of close contact every year, allowing us to enjoy one another’s company and to pursue our collaboration.
Doug was at Stanford Hospital, for a problem in 2013. I sat with him talking and joking when one of the Hospital’s chaplains walked in. He introduced himself and said to Doug that he was here to see that Doug was “on the mend,” on the “up and up,” and so on. Doug said nothing for a while, just staring at the Chaplain who continued to spout platitudes, and, I thought, wondering whether Doug was sentient. At some point Doug said in an authoritative voice, “Listen, Bub, there’s only one way out of this life.” The chaplain was clearly taken aback, saying, “oh, I see, oh, I see -- well yes – oh, I see,” and then left.
Douglass C. North passed away at the age of 95 at his home in Benzonia, Michigan. He was among the most important and influential economic historians and economists of the late 20th century. He will be deeply missed by his family, friends, colleagues, and students.
Douglass Cecil North was born on Nov. 5, 1920, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, the youngest of three children. He attended the University of California-Berkeley, graduating in 1942. He received his PhD from Berkeley in 1952. He began teaching at the University of Washington Seattle in 1950, and in 1983 moved to Washington University in St. Louis, where he remained a professor for the rest of his career. He was co-recipient of the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Robert Fogel.
He is survived by his wife Elisabeth Case and his three sons Douglass, Christopher, and Malcom.
The following description of his intellectual accomplishments are taken from John Wallis “Persistence and Change: The Evolution of Douglass C. North,” in Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North.” Edited by Sebastian Galiani and Itai Sened. Cambridge University Press, 2014.
North long emphasized the importance of history and of neo-classical economics. He criticizes both disciplines for their complacency about the adequacy of the current conceptual and methodological consensus on how history or economics should be done. He always operated within a framework of individuals who act intentionally (neo-classical economics matters) and who perceive the world through cognitive lenses that are part inherited from their culture and part derived from their own experience (history matters). Individual actions are governed by interests shaped by relative prices, endowments, and constraints (institutions) as well as by perceptions of how the world around us works (cognition and beliefs). Social outcomes are the sum of individual actions, but the summation process is not a simple adding up, since interactions between individual decisions and beliefs critically influence the behavior of everyone.
The evolution of North’s thinking continuously shaped his willingness to pursue the interesting questions he was unable to address in his last book or paper, not by the what was currently hot in the profession. Testimony to the power of his insight is that the profession has followed him, for he certainly didn’t followed the profession. Nowhere is it easier to see this process than in his first book, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860. The introduction, page vii, states his conceptual approach:
This study is based on the proposition that U. S. growth was the evolution of a market economy where the behavior or prices of goods, services, and productive factors was the major element in any explanation of economic change. Institutions and political policies have certainly been influential. They have acted to accelerate or retard growth on many occasions in our past, primarily by affecting the behavior of the prices of goods, services, or productive factors either directly or indirectly. But they have modified rather than replaced the underlying forces of a market economy.
It is hard to imagine a conceptual statement that more inaccurately predicts the path that North’s research eventually followed.
Economic Growth was one of the first examples of quantitative economic history, or cliometrics, North’s first major contribution to economics and economic history. The book presented a very neo-classical theory of economic development that emphasized the importance of geographic specialization and division of labor, which led him to investigate the sources of falling transportation costs over the nineteenth century. His 1958 paper in the Journal of Economic History laid out a technology based neo-classical framework for thinking about declining freight rates, but ten years later, in his 1968 Journal of Political Economy paper, North concluded that: “The conclusion one draws is that the decline of piracy and privateering and the development of markets and international trade shared honors as primary factors in the growth of shipping efficiency over this two-and-a- half-century period.” (p. 967). Essentially, the costs of shipping were falling because costs other than the costs of operating ships were falling. Those cost reductions were the result of institutional change. The paper marks North’s turn toward both transaction costs and institutions as important elements of economic change over time.
The turn towards transaction costs and institutions did not mean a turn away from neo-classical economics, however. The assumption of zero transaction costs and unchanging institutions could be relaxed within the context of neo-classical theory, as North argued in 1971: “What we need is a body of theory which encompasses the traditional models of the economist and both widens its scope and allows us to include an explanation of the formation, mutation and decay of organizational forms within which man cooperates or competes.” North was moving toward a neo-classical theory of institutions in which the form of institutions, or organizations, was itself determined by traditional neo-classical rationality and constraints:
Let us begin on a positive note. Briefly stated, the model specifies the process by which an action group (an individual or group) perceive that some new form of organization (institutional arrangement) will yield a stream of benefits which makes it profitable to undergo the costs of innovating this new organizational form. These new arrangements have typically been profitable to realize potential economies of scale, reduce information costs, spread risk, and internalize externalities. These institutional arrangements account for a vast array of the "economic institutions" with which economic historians have traditionally been concerned. However, the formation (and mutation and decay) of these organizational forms can now be an integral part of the economic analysis rather than a descriptive addition to the analysis. Moreover, since a great many were realizable without substantial redistribution of income, their formation is at least in principle predictable from the model. Perhaps even more significant than the ability to integrate economic analyses and institutional formation is the implication of this theoretical model for the study of productivity increase. Economic historians have focused on technological change as the source of growth but the development of institutional arrangements from the above mentioned sources are a major historical source of the improvement in the efficiency of product and factor markets. The development of more efficient economic organization is surely as important a part of the growth of the Western World as is the development of technology, and it is time it received equal attention. The few cases of which I am aware that have attempted to measure productivity change attributable to improving economic organization certainly support this contention. (1971, pp. 119-120)
The idea that neo-classical theory could be used to explain why institutions functioned as they did was a fundamental breakthrough and North’s second major conceptual contribution. The idea was implemented in a series of papers with Lance Davis and with Robert Paul Thomas, that led to two more books: Institutional Change and American Economic Growth, published in 1971 with Davis and The Rise of the Western Worldpublished in 1973 with Thomas. The heart of the argument in both books is that we can explain changes in the organization of human interaction (institutions) on the basis of the rational interests of individuals attempting to structure the world around them in ways that maximize net benefits. The classic application of the technique is North and Thomas’s explanation of how the rising price of labor in 14th century Europe as a result of the Black Death, led to the institution of wage labor in western Europe and a return to the institution of serfdom and slavery in eastern Europe. The same relative price shock led to two different, but both rational, institutional changes.
Two lines of thinking emerged from the idea of neo-classical institutions, and they were not entirely consistent with one another. In one line, institutional change occurs because of short-run variations in relative prices that create, at some point in time, the incentives to restructure human organizations. For some reason these changes persist. This led North to investigate both path dependence and transaction costs. Transaction costs play a key role, because they are both a reason to change institutions to reduce (or increase) transaction costs and because transaction costs subsequently can make it difficult to change institutions and so contribute to institutional persistence.
The other line of thinking was a growing dissatisfaction with neo-classical economics altogether as a way to understand the process of economic growth specifically, and more broadly to understand the process of economic change over time. His third significant breakthrough was the realization that neo-classical theory was not just inadequate, but unable to explain long term economic and institutional change in any society, growing or not.
He directed his first clear criticism at economic historians. While acknowledging the important contribution that economic theory and quantitative techniques made to advancing our understanding of historical processes, nonetheless:
From my quite subjective perspective, the new economic history has made a significant contribution to revitalizing the field and advancing the frontiers of knowledge. Yet I think it stops short -- far short – of what we should be accomplishing in the field. Our objective surely remains that of shedding light on man's economic past, conceived in the broadest sense of those words; and I submit to you that the new economic history as it has developed has imposed strictures on enquiry that narrowly limit its horizons-and that some of my former revolutionary compatriots show distressing signs of complacency with the new orthodoxy. (1974, p. 1)
His criticism of neo-classical theory in economic history, development, and growth would culminate inStructure and Change in Economic History, 1981, what many (including myself) believe is North’s best book. The introduction and a second chapter extend the argument that we must have more than a history of markets to understand economic change. The third chapter titled “A Neoclassical Theory of the State,” lays out a logical neo-classical argument for why, in the presence of transactions costs, political systems do not inevitably evolve institutions that promote economic growth. Indeed, as long-term economic history suggests, the tendency is for political systems to evolve that do not support growth. Chapters four and five argue that we need a theory of organizations as well as a theory of beliefs and ideology if we are to understand long run change, particularly long run change that does not inevitably produce growth and development.
The contradiction is clear in Structure and Change. On the one hand, there is a strong argument that neo-classical economics is incapable of delivering the full range of explanations necessary to understand economic change, particularly ideologies and beliefs. On the other hand, there is a strong argument that rational individual behavior is consistent with institutional choices that retard, rather than promote, economic growth. Is the question to be neo-classical or not be neo-classical?
The real question the book is trying to grapple with is: persistence or change? Going back to Rise of the Western World, institutions change when there are gains from doing so, but then persist because of the high transaction cost of changing them. In Structure and Change, beliefs and ideologies persist. Because beliefs (and norms and culture) are based on the cumulative experience of society passed down through culture and formed through repeated interaction of many people through norms of behavior, beliefs do not change quickly and it is extremely difficult to for social actors to manipulate beliefs in current time. As a result, beliefs are always a function of what happened in the past and can impede change in the present for good or ill. It is the persistence of beliefs and institutions from the past (culture) that explain why changes in the present often produce results that impede rather than promoting growth and development. The importance of beliefs in North’s framework plays a major role in Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (1990) and is the central focus of Understanding the Process of Economic Change (2005).
The Structure and Change framework includes two different time patterns of institutional change. One is episodic and discontinuous, like the move toward wage payments after the Black Death in western Europe. The other is continuous and marginal. Changes in beliefs and ideologies, in norms, and in informal and formal rules occur constantly and, while changes sometimes persist, they need not. Neither continuous or episodic institutional change is necessarily persistent.
Fleshing out these ideas in the 1990s produced a classic example of change during a crisis that persists: “Constitutions and Commitment” with Barry Weingast (1989). The paper’s emphasis on institutional mechanisms explains why particular institutions are self-enforcing and persist over time. At the same time North was writing Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Persistence plays a large role in Institutions, which regularly emphasizes that the function of an institution is to provide stability and predictability to human behavior. The big contribution of the book, however, is the definition of institutions that North calls the sports analogy. Institutions are the rules of the game and the means of enforcement, and organizations are the teams that play the game. The definition motivates three behavioral choices that organizations can make. 1) maximize under the rules; 2) devote resources to changing the rules; and/or 3) cheat. The alternatives are not mutually exclusive, and they comprise a framework for understanding the dynamics of institutional change.
North’s fourth major contribution was to separate institutions and organizations. Since his earliest books, North always included a discussion of organizations as important, but organizations were treated as manifestations of institutions. Organizations usually disappeared from the conceptual framework, which was always neo-classical in its focus on individuals. By defining institutions as the rules of the game and means of enforcement and then separating the rules from the organizations that actually play the game, the possibility of a dynamic relationship between the interests and incentives facing the organizations and the structure of the rules became possible. The descriptive concept that comes out of the dynamics is ‘adaptive efficiency.’ In some societies, the interaction of institutions and organizations produces a series of institutional changes that get incrementally better, rather than a sequence that is sometimes good and sometimes bad for economic performance. This is North’s fourth fundamental contribution.
Rather than resolving (or integrating) the tension between the long and short term forces leading to institutional change, Institutions exacerbated it. The rules of the game included formal rules, informal rules, and norms of behavior. By stressing the function of institutions as providing stability and predictability, and emphasizing the importance of beliefs and norms, the book effectively claimed that the persistence of institutions was not a matter of real-time economic and political forces, but an outcome of the natural limits to human capacities for cognition and culture. North pressed farther down this road with his 2005 book,Understanding the Process of Economic Change. The interaction between organizations and institutions was a central point in his last book with John Wallis and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders in 2009.
Partial Bibliography
North, Douglass C. 1958. “Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development 1750–1913.” Journal of Economic History, 18(4): 537–555.
North, Douglass C. 1961. The Economic Growth of the United States 1790–1860. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
North, Douglass C. 1966. Growth and Welfare in the American Past. A New Economic History. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
North, Douglass C. 1968. “Sources of Productivity Change in Ocean Shipping, 1600–1850.” The Journal of Political Economy. 76(5): 953–970.
North, Douglass C. 1971. “Institutional Change and Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic History, 31(1): 118–125.
Davis, Lance E., and Douglass C. North. 1971. Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. 1974. “Beyond the New Economic History.” Journal of Economic History, 34(1): 1–7.
North, Douglass C. 1978. “Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History.” Journal of Economic Literature, 16: 963–978.
North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” The Journal of Economic History, 49:4.
North, Douglass C. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. 1986. “The New Institutional Economics.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 142(1): 230–237.
North, Douglass. C. 1990a. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. 1990b. “A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics.” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2(4): 355–367.
North, Douglass C. 1991. “Institutions.” In The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1): 97–112.
North, Douglass C. 1993. “Douglass C. North, the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1993: Autobiography.” Vol. 2010. The Nobel Foundation.
North, Douglass C. 1994. “Economic Performance through Time.” American Economic Review, 84: 359–368.
North, Douglass C. 1995. “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development,” in John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin M. Lewis, eds., The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, New York: Routledge.
North, Douglass C. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
North, Douglass C., and Robert Thomas. 1973. The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Human History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb, and Barry R. Weingast, ed. 2013. In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problem of Development. Cambridge University Press.
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Douglass C. North, 1920-2015
By Barry Weingast, one of Doug’s coauthors, and a noted Political Scientist, Economist, and Economic Historian in his own right.
With the passing of Doug North Monday night, the world lost one of the great economists of the last century. Doug was known for his intense curiosity and his relentless – and even mischievous – pursuit of new ideas. He was a great friend, colleague, and coauthor, and I’ll miss him terribly.
Doug was never satisfied with his ideas, always pushing to expand his understanding and knowledge.
Most academics are lucky if they participate in one revolution in their field. Doug was at the forefront of several.
His first book, The Economic Growth of the United States, 1790-1860 (1960), helped foster the revolution that came to be known as the “new economic history,” the application of frontier economics to the study problems of the past. He and Bob Fogel were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics (1993) largely for their leadership in this new research program.
But Doug understood that the neoclassical economics on which he was raised was inadequate to address the problems he sought to answer, namely, why are a few countries rich while most remain poor, some in dire poverty? Much of his best work addressed this question, including his next four books.
Doug launched his findings in a book with Lance Davis, Institutional Change and American Economic History (1971). With Robert Thomas, he wrote The Rise of the Western World (1973), which began his exploration of the role of rights and institutions in political-economics of development. Arguably his best book, Structure and Change in Economic History (1981), dug deeper into the problem of development, providing the beginning of the Northian approach to understanding institutions. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (1990) represents the culmination of this research path and remains the premier statement of the profound role played by institutions in economic, political, and social realms of action. This work has been cited more than 41,000 times in academic research. Twenty-five years later, economists, political scientists, and sociologists continue to mine this rich line of research.
The next research turn went to the heart of human action, focusing on the limits of the economists’ assumption of rational choice. In Understanding the Process of Economic Change (2005), Doug drew on recent developments in cognitive science to expand our understanding of human choice and action.
His last book, coauthored with John Wallis and myself, developed a new approach to thinking about the problem of development. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (2009), highlights the role of violence. Needless to say, I will leave it to others to evaluate the merits of this work.
I have a large range of personal memories of Doug as friend and scholar. He always wanted to learn more, and had a rare knack for listening to the ideas of others. He spent the academic year, 1987-88 at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. During this period, we completed our first paper, “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of the Institutions of Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England.” This paper proposed a new approach to thinking about the role of Constitutions in securing the role of government in promoting long-term economic growth.
Never a fan of the growing mathematization of economics, Doug told me when he arrived at Stanford in 1987 that he didn’t like all the game theory being used at Stanford to study economics, but since Stanford was known for it, he wanted to learn more. He asked me to set up some lunches where he and I met with some of the prominent game theorists. The two of us really hit it off with one, Paul Milgrom. Paul impressed Doug, not only for his brilliance, but for his attitude about economics and research more generally. In discussing the role of mathematics in economics, Paul said, “first we get the economics right, then we build the models.” This suited Doug’s philosophy, and he (and I) were seduced into a collaboration that produced our joint paper on the medieval “Law Merchant” (1990), a paper seeking to understand the role of law and judges prior to the rise of the nation state with an ability to enforce laws across a larger territory.
Beginning in the early 1990s, Doug and his wife, Elisabeth, began spending the winters at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. This gave us a period of close contact every year, allowing us to enjoy one another’s company and to pursue our collaboration.
Doug was at Stanford Hospital, for a problem in 2013. I sat with him talking and joking when one of the Hospital’s chaplains walked in. He introduced himself and said to Doug that he was here to see that Doug was “on the mend,” on the “up and up,” and so on. Doug said nothing for a while, just staring at the Chaplain who continued to spout platitudes, and, I thought, wondering whether Doug was sentient. At some point Doug said in an authoritative voice, “Listen, Bub, there’s only one way out of this life.” The chaplain was clearly taken aback, saying, “oh, I see, oh, I see -- well yes – oh, I see,” and then left.
segunda-feira, 5 de maio de 2014
Gary Becker: a morte de um brilhante economista - Pedro Teixeira
Dear Colleagues, [of the Societies for the History of Economics]
you may be aware that Gary Becker has passed away on May 3.
Becker was an leading figure in the expansion of economics' boundaries from the 1950s onwards, and the application of neoclassical economics to non-market behavior, notably through his work on human capital, discrimination, family and population, and addiction. His work was both influential and controversial, being one of the most cited economists of the last decades of the twentieth century.
He did his BA at Princeton (1951) (with Jacob Viner apparently having said that he was the most brilliant student he had ever had - a statement that apparently did not go down well with several of the luminaries that has been taught by Viner...) and his PHD at Chicago (1955), where he would start his career (with his mentors being Milton Friedman, H. Gregg Lewis and T. W. Schultz).
During most of the 1960s he was at Columbia University and at the NBER (then in NYC), developing important work in collaboration with Jacob Mincer and with several young economists that played a crucial role in the development of neoclassical labour economics. With the turmoil of the late 1960s, he would return to UChicago, where he would spend the rest of his long and prolific career.
He was awarded the John Bates Clark Medal in 1967 and the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 1992.
In recent decades he became more of a public intellectual with some regular collaborations with the media and in blogs and his work became increasingly noted in other social sciences, not the least due to the influence of rational choice theory.
For the announcement by the University of Chicago, please see the following link:
Kind regards,
Pedro Teixeira
Pedro Nuno Teixeira
Director - CIPES, Centre for Research in Higher Education Policies - www.cipes.up.pt
Associate Professor - Faculty of Economics, University of Porto - www.fep.up.pt
domingo, 8 de setembro de 2013
David Landes, historiador econômico (1924-2013)
David S. Landes, Historian and Author, Is Dead at 89
David S. Landes, a distinguished Harvard scholar of economic history, saw tidal movements in the rise of seemingly small things. He suggested that the development of eyeglasses made precision tools possible. Maybe, he said, using chopsticks helped Asian workers gain the manual dexterity needed to make microprocessors.
In his 482-page “Revolution in Time: Clocks and the Making of the Modern World” (1983), Professor Landes, who died last month at 89, examined the growth of the industrial age through the history of timepieces, tracing their origin to medieval European monasteries; monks, he wrote, needed something to tell them when to gather for a regular round of group prayer.
To Professor Landes, the development of timepieces — more than steamships — drove the industrial age by molding the very culture of capitalism. Factory owners, for example, awarded watches to punctual workers, while workers bought watches to make sure they were not being misused by the factory clock.
Professor Landes was preoccupied by the importance of culture in shaping economic and social progress or stagnation. His most influential work, “The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor” (1998), answered the question posed in its title (a play on that of Adam Smith’s classic work) by pointing to the importance of the Protestant work ethic and European attitudes toward science and technology.
Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential nominee in 2012, acknowledged Professor Landes as an influence. “There are superior cultures and ours is one of them,” Mr. Romney wrote in his 2010 book, “No Apology: The Case for American Greatness.” “As David Landes observed, ‘Culture makes all the difference.’ ”
Professor Landes’s views lay behind a controversial remark Mr. Romney made in July 2012 at a campaign fund-raiser in Jerusalem. In a speech in which he mentioned “The Wealth and Poverty of Nations,” Mr. Romney suggested that a superior culture explains why Israelis are more economically successful than Palestinians. Palestinians called the remark racist and criticized Mr. Romney for not acknowledging the trade restrictions that Israel has imposed on them.
But in a joint statement issued to The Boston Globe, Professor Landes and his son, Richard, a historian at Boston University, expressed support for Mr. Romney and approved of his remarks about Israeli culture.
The statement also sought to pay Palestinians a compliment by lauding their culture and praising their economic success in comparison with that of other Arab peoples. “Much of that comes from their close association with the Zionists,” the statement said of Palestinians.
Professor Landes was often lumped with the branch of academia and politics known as neoconservativism, partly for his praise of the European model of development over those of other cultures. But his positions were not always predictable.
He split from conservative economists by questioning their view that free trade is always good for development. And even though he thought colonialism was not to blame for the stagnation of former colonies in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere, he compared Columbus’s atrocities against indigenous people in the New World to Hitler’s Holocaust.
Richard Landes said that his father died on Aug. 17 in Haverford, Pa., where he lived, and that his health had failed since his wife, the former Sonia Tarnopol, died in April. Besides his son, survivors include two daughters, Jane Foster and Alison Fiekowsky; eight grandchildren; and nine great-grandchildren.
David Saul Landes was born on April 29, 1924, on the kitchen table of his parents’ home in the Seagate neighborhood of Coney Island in Brooklyn. His father, Harry, was a real estate investor.
As a youth, David built an immense vocabulary by religiously reading the dictionary. He skipped four grades on his way to the City College of New York, from which he graduated in 1942. The next year he earned a master’s degree in history from Harvard and was drafted into the Army.
As it happened, he had been taking mail-order courses in cryptanalysis, and so he was assigned to the Signal Corps. He worked on deciphering Japanese messages about the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. He later worked on a history of German preparations for the invasion of Normandy.
After being honorably discharged, he returned to Harvard to work on his doctorate. His dissertation became his first book, “Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt.” He received his Ph.D. in history from Harvard in 1953.
He also pursued his studies at Columbia University and taught there from 1952 to 1958. While there, he was a member of the Society of Fellows, which supported interdisciplinary studies, and in 1957-58 he was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. He then joined the faculty at the University of California, Berkeley, where he was a professor of history and economics until 1964.
That year he wrote a letter to The New York Times criticizing the protests known as the free speech movement, which he called “the most serious assault on academic freedom in America since the McCarthy era.”
He joined Harvard in 1964 as a professor of history and went on to hold appointments in political science and economics as well. Since 1987 he had been a senior fellow of Harvard’s Society of Fellows, which was created as an alternative to the Ph.D. degree for exceptionally qualified candidates. At his retirement, in 1996, he was Coolidge Professor of History and an emeritus professor of economics.
In more than a half-dozen books and scores of articles, Professor Landes’s writing was often as light as his subjects were heavy. Reviewing his 2006 book, “Dynasties: Fortunes and Misfortunes of the World’s Great Family Businesses,” for The Times of London, Christopher Silvester described the writing as pithy, thoughtful and sprightly. The book offers 13 sketches of tycoons, including Henry Ford, John D. Rockefeller and Armand Peugeot.
In one scene Nathan Rothschild, of the legendary financial family, is hard at work at his desk in London. A peer of the realm is brought in. Rothschild, intent on his ledgers, invites him to take a seat. Offended, the visitor blusters about his high standing. “Take two seats,” Rothschild says.
quinta-feira, 5 de setembro de 2013
Long live Ronald Coase: the man of the transaction costs - The Economist
The economics of companies
The man who showed why firms exist
Anyone who cares about capitalism and economics should mourn the death of Ronald Coase
Sep 7th 2013 |From the print edition/The Economist
THE job of clever people is to ask difficult questions. The job of very clever people is to ask deceptively simple ones. Eighty years ago a young British economist wondered: why do companies exist? The answer that he gave remains as fascinating today as it was back then.
Ronald Coase lived an extraordinarily long and productive life (see Free exchange). In awarding him the Nobel prize for economics in 1991 the Swedish Academy singled out two papers for particular praise, one published in 1937 and based on a lecture which he gave in 1932 when he was only 21 years old, and one published in 1961. He published his last book, “How China Became Capitalist”, last year at the age of 101. Not bad for a London boy whose parents both left school at 12 and who was consigned to a special-needs school because he wore leg braces (it was only the timely intervention of a phrenologist who detected “considerable mental vigour” in the bumps on his head that redirected him to grammar school and thence to the London School of Economics).
But it is his work on the firm that marked him out for greatness. Most economists had been content to treat firms as black boxes. Mr Coase wondered what the black boxes were doing there in the first place. He used a scholarship that he won as an undergraduate to visit leading American firms such as Ford and General Motors. He summed up his thinking in his 1937 essay, “The Nature of the Firm”, which at first attracted no attention whatsoever, but continues to be cited to this day.
Mr Coase argued that firms make economic sense because they can reduce or eliminate the “transaction cost” of going to the market by doing things in-house. It is easier to co-ordinate decisions. At the time, when communications were poor and economies of scale could be vast, this justified keeping a lot of things inside a big firm, so carmakers often owned engine-makers and other suppliers.
Coase is dead, long live the firm
Mr Coase’s theory of the firm would suggest that firms ought to be in retreat at the moment, because technology is lowering transaction costs: why go to the bother of organising things under one roof when the internet lowers the cost of going to the market? And it is true that companies are rising and falling at a faster rate than ever. Back in 1958, companies in the S&P 500 had typically stayed in the index for 61 years; today the average is just 18 years. Nokia produced a quarter of the world’s handsets in 2000. This week it decided to focus on making telecoms equipment and sold its handset business to Microsoft, which is also a shadow of its former self (see article).
But far from bringing an end to big companies, the internet is producing Goliaths of its own. Google accounts for about 40% of the world’s internet traffic, and Amazon is experimenting with vertical integration by investing in content as well as distribution. That could be because transaction costs, although lower than they used to be, are still a significant part of doing business: it is still easier to work on complex ideas, designs, deals and projects face to face.
Or it could be because firms do other jobs that Mr Coase did not acknowledge: they can develop intellectual resources, for instance, from company-specific knowledge to specialised skills that cannot be developed by individuals acting on their own or working through the market. That even applies to the murky arts of journalism. For instance, 170 years ago this week, a newspaper appeared, often written largely by one man, James Wilson. To the relief of its now slightly larger but obviously no less industrious workforce,The Economist survives.
Whatever happens to this particular transaction-costs-reduction device, Mr Coase’s work should remain close to the heart of anyone who cares about capitalism. He taught economists that they should not just pore over numbers but look inside the organisations that produce wealth. And he set a test that every boss still has to answer: what does their firm do that cannot be done more efficiently elsewhere?
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Book: How China became Capitalist
Palgrave MacMillan, United Kingdom, 2013
How China Became Capitalist details the extraordinary, and often unanticipated, journey that China has taken over the past thirty five years in transforming itself from a closed agrarian socialist economy to an indomitable economic force in the international arena. The authors revitalise the debate around the rise of the Chinese economy through the use of primary sources, persuasively arguing that the reforms implemented by the Chinese leaders did not represent a concerted attempt to create a capitalist economy, and that it was 'marginal revolutions' that introduced the market and entrepreneurship back to China.
Lessons from the West were guided by the traditional Chinese principle of 'seeking truth from facts'. By turning to capitalism, China re-embraced her own cultural roots. How China Became Capitalist challenges received wisdom about the future of the Chinese economy, warning that while China has enormous potential for further growth, the future is clouded by the government's monopoly of ideas and power.
Coase and Wang argue that the development of a market for ideas - which has a long and revered tradition in China - would be integral in bringing about the Chinese dream of social harmony.
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