Números, como sempre, são apenas uma parte da realidade.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
OPINION
The Facts About American 'Decline'
By CHARLES WOLF JR.
The Wall Street Journal, April 13, 2011
In absolute terms, the U.S. increased its GDP, population and military spending from 2000 to 2010. In relative terms, the story is not always as good, especially in GDP.
Between the inclines and declines are other data to be considered.
It's fashionable among academics and pundits to proclaim that the U.S. is in decline and no longer No. 1 in the world. The declinists say they are realists. In fact, their alarm is unrealistic.
Early declinists like Yale historian Paul Kennedy focused in the 1980s on the allegedly debilitating effects of America's "imperial overstretch." More recently, historians Niall Ferguson and Martin Jacques focus on the weakening of the economy. Among pundits, Paul Krugman and Michael Kinsley on the left and Mark Helprin on the right sound the alarm.
The debate involves issues of absolute versus relative decline and concepts like "resilience" and "passivity." Some issues are measurable, like gross domestic product (GDP), military power and demographics. Others are not measurable or less measurable.
In absolute terms, the U.S. enjoyed an incline this past decade. Between 2000 and 2010, U.S. GDP increased 21% in constant dollars, despite the shattering setbacks of the Great Recession in 2008-09 and the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001. In 2010, U.S. military spending ($697 billion) was 55% higher than in 2000. And in 2010, the U.S. population was 310 million, an increase of 10% since 2000.
The notion that demography is destiny may be a stretch, but demographics are important when, as in the U.S., population increase—due to higher birth and immigration rates than other developed countries—cushions the impact of an aging population.
But there were also some important declines relative to the rest of the world. In 2000, U.S. GDP was 61% of the combined GDPs of the other G-20 countries. By 2010, that number dropped to 42%. In 2000, U.S. GDP was slightly more than eight times that of China, but it fell to slightly less than three times in 2010. Japan is a contrasting case: U.S. GDP was twice as large as Japan's in 2000 but 2.6 times as large in 2010, before the tsunami and nuclear disasters of 2011.
In absolute terms, the U.S. increased its GDP, population and military spending from 2000 to 2010. In relative terms, the story is not always as good, especially in GDP.
U.S. military spending inclined substantially to more than twice that spent by all non-U.S. NATO members in 2010 from 1.7 times in 2000; to 17 times Russian spending in 2010 from six times in 2000; and to nine times Chinese spending in 2010 from seven times in 2000.
Demographically, the U.S. population in 2000 (282 million) was 4.6% of the global population; by 2010, the U.S. population (310 million) had risen to 4.9% of the global figure. The U.S. population was 59% as large as that of the 15-member European Union in 2000; that figure increased to 78% by 2010 (counting only 2000's 15 members) and 62% if we count the 12 new EU members added between 2004 and 2007.
The U.S. population grew by 10% more than that of Japan and 13% more than that of Russia between 2000 and 2010. Relative to the huge populations of China and India (1.3 billion and 1.2 billion, respectively), the U.S. population during the past decade increased slightly (0.16%) compared to China and decreased by a similar margin compared to India.
What matters more than absolute numbers is the population's composition of prime working-age people versus dependents. Compared to most developed economies and China, the U.S. demographic composition is relatively favorable.
So what do all these numbers tell us about decline or incline?
Despite the Great Recession, the three crude indicators—GDP, military spending and population growth—show that the U.S. inclined in absolute terms.
But in relative terms, the picture is more complicated. Although U.S. GDP grew substantially in real terms during the decade, relative to the G-20 countries as a group U.S. GDP declined by 19%. Relative to China, the U.S. decline was even larger.
As noted, military spending by the U.S. increased across the board relative to NATO, China and Russia. Whether this suggests the U.S. is allocating too much, or other countries too little, is not evident from numbers alone. And numbers also don't indicate whether high military outlays have a positive or negative effect on economic growth.
As for demography, there was a small U.S. increase relative to global population, a moderate increase relative to the EU, large increases relative to Japan and Russia, and slight and opposite changes relative to China and India.
And there you have it: Some numbers show inclines, some show declines and some numbers are mixed. What the numbers omit is as significant as what they convey. Omissions include the societal and systemic factors that stimulate or impede creativity, innovation, entrepreneurship and new ventures.
Numbers also ignore the effects of culture, property rights, law and political freedom in the near and long terms. Nor do the numbers foretell how China's so-called "Red Capitalism" will fare in long-term competition with the multi-hued U.S. prototype. As for comparing and forecasting the resilience of countries and regions, the numbers ignore more than they convey.
The overall picture is far more complex than the simple one portrayed by declinists. The real world is complicated, so a portrait in one dimension distorts rather than reflects reality.
Mr. Wolf holds the distinguished corporate chair in international economics at the RAND Corporation, and is a senior research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.
Mostrando postagens com marcador poder imperial. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador poder imperial. Mostrar todas as postagens
quarta-feira, 13 de abril de 2011
segunda-feira, 14 de fevereiro de 2011
Imperio Americano: a velha historia do declinio - Joseph Nye
Tem que gente que esfrega as mãos de contente, quando ouve falar do "declínio", ou da "decadência", do "império" americano, enquanto outros nem aceitam a ideia de império (por isso as aspas da dúvida). Eu não tenho dúvidas quanto ao império, embora tenha, também, quanto ao pretenso (suposto, diriam os jornalistas) declínio.
Seja como for, rumores a este respeito parecer ser altamente exagerados como diria Mark Twain, e como também acredita Joseph Nye.
Um bom artigo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
OPINION
The Misleading Metaphor of Decline
Joseph Nye
The Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2011
Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee of Roman power.
Is the United States in decline? Many Americans think so, and they are not alone. A recent Pew poll showed that pluralities in 13 of 25 countriesbelieve that China will replace the U.S. as theworld's leading superpower. But describing thefuture of power as inevitable American decline isboth misleading and dangerous if it encourages China to engage in adventurous policies or the U.S. to overreact out of fear.
How would we know if the declinists are correct ornot? First, one must beware of misleading metaphors of organic decline. Nations are not like humans with predictable life spans.
After Britain lost its American colonies at theend of the 18th century, Horace Walpole lamented Britain's reduction to "as insignificant a countryas Denmark or Sardinia." He failed to foresee that the industrial revolution would give Britain a second century of even greater ascendancy. Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee of Roman power.
It is also chastening to remember how wildly exaggerated were American estimates of Soviet power in the 1970s and of Japanese power in the 1980s. Today some confidently predict the 21st century will see China replace the U.S. as the world's leading state, while others equally confidently argue that the 21st century will be the American century. A fair assessment is difficult because there is always a range of possible futures.
On American power relative to China, much will depend on the often underestimated uncertainties of future political change in China. China's size and high rate of economic growth will almost certainly increase its relative strength vis-a-vis the U.S. This will bring it closer to the U.S. in power resources, but doesn't necessarily mean that it will surpass the U.S. as the most powerful country.
Even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, many current projections are based simply on GDP growth. They ignore U.S. military and soft-power advantages, as well as China's geopolitical disadvantages in Asia. America is more likely to enjoy favorable relations with its neighbors, allies like Europe and Japan, as well as India and others.
My best estimate is that, among the range of possible futures, the more likely is one described by Lee Kuan Yew as China giving the U.S. "a run for its money," but not passing it in overall power in the first half of this century.
Looking back at history, the British strategist Lawrence Freedman notes two features that distinguish the U.S. from the dominant great powers of the past: American power is based on alliances rather than colonies, and it is associated with an ideology that is flexible and to which America can return even after it has overextended itself. Looking to the future, Anne-Marie Slaughter of Princeton argues that America's culture of openness and innovation will keep it central in an information age when networks supplement, if not fully replace, hierarchical power.
On the question of absolute rather than relative American decline, the U.S. faces serious problems in areas like debt, secondary education and political gridlock. But solutions exist. Among the possible negative futures are ones in which the U.S. overreacts to terrorist attacks by closing inwards and thus cuts itself off from the strength that it obtains from openness.
But there are answers to major American problems that preoccupy us today, such as long-term debt (see the recommendations of recent deficit commissions) and political gridlock (for example, changes in redistricting procedures to reduce gerrymandering). Such solutions may remain forever out of reach, but it is important to distinguish situations where there are no solutions from those that could in principle be solved.
America is likely to remain more powerful than any single state in the coming decades. At the same time, we will certainly face a rise in the power resources of many others — both states and nonstate actors. We will also face an increasing number of issues to which solutions will require power with others as well as power over others. Our capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will bean important dimension of our hard and soft power.
Rather than succumb to self-fulfilling prophecies of inevitable decline, we need a vision that combines domestic reforms with smart strategies for the international deployment of our power in an information age.
Mr. Nye is a professor at Harvard and author of "The Future of Power" (Public Affairs, 2011).
Copyright 2011 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Seja como for, rumores a este respeito parecer ser altamente exagerados como diria Mark Twain, e como também acredita Joseph Nye.
Um bom artigo.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
OPINION
The Misleading Metaphor of Decline
Joseph Nye
The Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2011
Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee of Roman power.
Is the United States in decline? Many Americans think so, and they are not alone. A recent Pew poll showed that pluralities in 13 of 25 countriesbelieve that China will replace the U.S. as theworld's leading superpower. But describing thefuture of power as inevitable American decline isboth misleading and dangerous if it encourages China to engage in adventurous policies or the U.S. to overreact out of fear.
How would we know if the declinists are correct ornot? First, one must beware of misleading metaphors of organic decline. Nations are not like humans with predictable life spans.
After Britain lost its American colonies at theend of the 18th century, Horace Walpole lamented Britain's reduction to "as insignificant a countryas Denmark or Sardinia." He failed to foresee that the industrial revolution would give Britain a second century of even greater ascendancy. Rome remained dominant for more than three centuries after the apogee of Roman power.
It is also chastening to remember how wildly exaggerated were American estimates of Soviet power in the 1970s and of Japanese power in the 1980s. Today some confidently predict the 21st century will see China replace the U.S. as the world's leading state, while others equally confidently argue that the 21st century will be the American century. A fair assessment is difficult because there is always a range of possible futures.
On American power relative to China, much will depend on the often underestimated uncertainties of future political change in China. China's size and high rate of economic growth will almost certainly increase its relative strength vis-a-vis the U.S. This will bring it closer to the U.S. in power resources, but doesn't necessarily mean that it will surpass the U.S. as the most powerful country.
Even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, many current projections are based simply on GDP growth. They ignore U.S. military and soft-power advantages, as well as China's geopolitical disadvantages in Asia. America is more likely to enjoy favorable relations with its neighbors, allies like Europe and Japan, as well as India and others.
My best estimate is that, among the range of possible futures, the more likely is one described by Lee Kuan Yew as China giving the U.S. "a run for its money," but not passing it in overall power in the first half of this century.
Looking back at history, the British strategist Lawrence Freedman notes two features that distinguish the U.S. from the dominant great powers of the past: American power is based on alliances rather than colonies, and it is associated with an ideology that is flexible and to which America can return even after it has overextended itself. Looking to the future, Anne-Marie Slaughter of Princeton argues that America's culture of openness and innovation will keep it central in an information age when networks supplement, if not fully replace, hierarchical power.
On the question of absolute rather than relative American decline, the U.S. faces serious problems in areas like debt, secondary education and political gridlock. But solutions exist. Among the possible negative futures are ones in which the U.S. overreacts to terrorist attacks by closing inwards and thus cuts itself off from the strength that it obtains from openness.
But there are answers to major American problems that preoccupy us today, such as long-term debt (see the recommendations of recent deficit commissions) and political gridlock (for example, changes in redistricting procedures to reduce gerrymandering). Such solutions may remain forever out of reach, but it is important to distinguish situations where there are no solutions from those that could in principle be solved.
America is likely to remain more powerful than any single state in the coming decades. At the same time, we will certainly face a rise in the power resources of many others — both states and nonstate actors. We will also face an increasing number of issues to which solutions will require power with others as well as power over others. Our capacity to maintain alliances and create networks will bean important dimension of our hard and soft power.
Rather than succumb to self-fulfilling prophecies of inevitable decline, we need a vision that combines domestic reforms with smart strategies for the international deployment of our power in an information age.
Mr. Nye is a professor at Harvard and author of "The Future of Power" (Public Affairs, 2011).
Copyright 2011 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
domingo, 5 de setembro de 2010
Um imperio sem um tostao... - Tom Friedman
...ou quase.
Como alerta Tom Friedman, se os "anti-imperialistas" de carteirinha - e temos muitos representantes dessa espécie no Brasil -- não gostam de um mundo dominado pelo imperialismo americano, eles provavelmente vão gostar menos ainda de um mundo fragmentado entre candidatos a potência muito mais erráticos e prejudiciais aos interesses da comunidade internacional do que o velho imperialismo americano.
O mundo vai se tornar um lugar mais imprevisível e conflituoso do que o era com essa potência arrogante, já que os alternativos, ou substitutos constituem alternativas muito piores do que o original.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Superbroke, Superfrugal, Superpower?
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The New York Times, September 4, 2010
In recent years, I have often said to European friends: So, you didn’t like a world of too much American power? See how you like a world of too little American power — because it is coming to a geopolitical theater near you. Yes, America has gone from being the supreme victor of World War II, with guns and butter for all, to one of two superpowers during the cold war, to the indispensable nation after winning the cold war, to “The Frugal Superpower” of today. Get used to it. That’s our new nickname. American pacifists need not worry any more about “wars of choice.” We’re not doing that again. We can’t afford to invade Grenada today.
Ever since the onset of the Great Recession of 2008, it has been clear that the nature of being a leader — political or corporate — was changing in America. During most of the post-World War II era, being a leader meant, on balance, giving things away to people. Today, and for the next decade at least, being a leader in America will mean, on balance, taking things away from people.
And there is simply no way that America’s leaders, as they have to take more things away from their own voters, are not going to look to save money on foreign policy and foreign wars. Foreign and defense policy is a lagging indicator. A lot of other things get cut first. But the cuts are coming — you can already hear the warnings from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. And a frugal American superpower is sure to have ripple effects around the globe.
“The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era” is actually the title of a very timely new book by my tutor and friend Michael Mandelbaum, the Johns Hopkins University foreign policy expert. “In 2008,” Mandelbaum notes, “all forms of government-supplied pensions and health care (including Medicaid) constituted about 4 percent of total American output.” At present rates, and with the baby boomers soon starting to draw on Social Security and Medicare, by 2050 “they will account for a full 18 percent of everything the United States produces.”
This — on top of all the costs of bailing ourselves out of this recession — “will fundamentally transform the public life of the United States and therefore the country’s foreign policy.” For the past seven decades, in both foreign affairs and domestic policy, our defining watchword was “more,” argues Mandelbaum. “The defining fact of foreign policy in the second decade of the 21st century and beyond will be ‘less.’ ”
When the world’s only superpower gets weighed down with this much debt — to itself and other nations — everyone will feel it. How? Hard to predict. But all I know is that the most unique and important feature of U.S. foreign policy over the last century has been the degree to which America’s diplomats and naval, air and ground forces provided global public goods — from open seas to open trade and from containment to counterterrorism — that benefited many others besides us. U.S. power has been the key force maintaining global stability, and providing global governance, for the last 70 years. That role will not disappear, but it will almost certainly shrink.
Great powers have retrenched before: Britain for instance. But, as Mandelbaum notes, “When Britain could no longer provide global governance, the United States stepped in to replace it. No country now stands ready to replace the United States, so the loss to international peace and prosperity has the potential to be greater as America pulls back than when Britain did.”
After all, Europe is rich but wimpy. China is rich nationally but still dirt poor on a per capita basis and, therefore, will be compelled to remain focused inwardly and regionally. Russia, drunk on oil, can cause trouble but not project power. “Therefore, the world will be a more disorderly and dangerous place,” Mandelbaum predicts.
How to mitigate this trend? Mandelbaum argues for three things: First, we need to get ourselves back on a sustainable path to economic growth and reindustrialization, with whatever sacrifices, hard work and political consensus that requires. Second, we need to set priorities. We have enjoyed a century in which we could have, in foreign policy terms, both what is vital and what is desirable. For instance, I presume that with infinite men and money we can succeed in Afghanistan. But is it vital? I am sure it is desirable, but vital? Finally, we need to shore up our balance sheet and weaken that of our enemies, and the best way to do that in one move is with a much higher gasoline tax.
America is about to learn a very hard lesson: You can borrow your way to prosperity over the short run but not to geopolitical power over the long run. That requires a real and growing economic engine. And, for us, the short run is now over. There was a time when thinking seriously about American foreign policy did not require thinking seriously about economic policy. That time is also over.
An America in hock will have no hawks — or at least none that anyone will take seriously.
Como alerta Tom Friedman, se os "anti-imperialistas" de carteirinha - e temos muitos representantes dessa espécie no Brasil -- não gostam de um mundo dominado pelo imperialismo americano, eles provavelmente vão gostar menos ainda de um mundo fragmentado entre candidatos a potência muito mais erráticos e prejudiciais aos interesses da comunidade internacional do que o velho imperialismo americano.
O mundo vai se tornar um lugar mais imprevisível e conflituoso do que o era com essa potência arrogante, já que os alternativos, ou substitutos constituem alternativas muito piores do que o original.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Superbroke, Superfrugal, Superpower?
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
The New York Times, September 4, 2010
In recent years, I have often said to European friends: So, you didn’t like a world of too much American power? See how you like a world of too little American power — because it is coming to a geopolitical theater near you. Yes, America has gone from being the supreme victor of World War II, with guns and butter for all, to one of two superpowers during the cold war, to the indispensable nation after winning the cold war, to “The Frugal Superpower” of today. Get used to it. That’s our new nickname. American pacifists need not worry any more about “wars of choice.” We’re not doing that again. We can’t afford to invade Grenada today.
Ever since the onset of the Great Recession of 2008, it has been clear that the nature of being a leader — political or corporate — was changing in America. During most of the post-World War II era, being a leader meant, on balance, giving things away to people. Today, and for the next decade at least, being a leader in America will mean, on balance, taking things away from people.
And there is simply no way that America’s leaders, as they have to take more things away from their own voters, are not going to look to save money on foreign policy and foreign wars. Foreign and defense policy is a lagging indicator. A lot of other things get cut first. But the cuts are coming — you can already hear the warnings from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. And a frugal American superpower is sure to have ripple effects around the globe.
“The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era” is actually the title of a very timely new book by my tutor and friend Michael Mandelbaum, the Johns Hopkins University foreign policy expert. “In 2008,” Mandelbaum notes, “all forms of government-supplied pensions and health care (including Medicaid) constituted about 4 percent of total American output.” At present rates, and with the baby boomers soon starting to draw on Social Security and Medicare, by 2050 “they will account for a full 18 percent of everything the United States produces.”
This — on top of all the costs of bailing ourselves out of this recession — “will fundamentally transform the public life of the United States and therefore the country’s foreign policy.” For the past seven decades, in both foreign affairs and domestic policy, our defining watchword was “more,” argues Mandelbaum. “The defining fact of foreign policy in the second decade of the 21st century and beyond will be ‘less.’ ”
When the world’s only superpower gets weighed down with this much debt — to itself and other nations — everyone will feel it. How? Hard to predict. But all I know is that the most unique and important feature of U.S. foreign policy over the last century has been the degree to which America’s diplomats and naval, air and ground forces provided global public goods — from open seas to open trade and from containment to counterterrorism — that benefited many others besides us. U.S. power has been the key force maintaining global stability, and providing global governance, for the last 70 years. That role will not disappear, but it will almost certainly shrink.
Great powers have retrenched before: Britain for instance. But, as Mandelbaum notes, “When Britain could no longer provide global governance, the United States stepped in to replace it. No country now stands ready to replace the United States, so the loss to international peace and prosperity has the potential to be greater as America pulls back than when Britain did.”
After all, Europe is rich but wimpy. China is rich nationally but still dirt poor on a per capita basis and, therefore, will be compelled to remain focused inwardly and regionally. Russia, drunk on oil, can cause trouble but not project power. “Therefore, the world will be a more disorderly and dangerous place,” Mandelbaum predicts.
How to mitigate this trend? Mandelbaum argues for three things: First, we need to get ourselves back on a sustainable path to economic growth and reindustrialization, with whatever sacrifices, hard work and political consensus that requires. Second, we need to set priorities. We have enjoyed a century in which we could have, in foreign policy terms, both what is vital and what is desirable. For instance, I presume that with infinite men and money we can succeed in Afghanistan. But is it vital? I am sure it is desirable, but vital? Finally, we need to shore up our balance sheet and weaken that of our enemies, and the best way to do that in one move is with a much higher gasoline tax.
America is about to learn a very hard lesson: You can borrow your way to prosperity over the short run but not to geopolitical power over the long run. That requires a real and growing economic engine. And, for us, the short run is now over. There was a time when thinking seriously about American foreign policy did not require thinking seriously about economic policy. That time is also over.
An America in hock will have no hawks — or at least none that anyone will take seriously.
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