O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

segunda-feira, 4 de novembro de 2024

The Next World War Starts Here (Japan, China, Koreas) - Matthew Kaminski (Politico)

 The Next World War Starts Here

An aggressive China and Russia’s war on Ukraine brought South Korea and Japan closer — with lots of American help. Keeping them together to deter Beijing will be one of the most important foreign policy tasks for Harris or Trump.

SEOUL — East Asia is the most serious threat to world peace. An eruption here is hotter and bigger than anything the Middle East or Europe would conceivably produce.

The Biden administration leaves behind a strong diplomatic legacy in Asia, in contrast to its failure in Afghanistan and mixed record in Ukraine and the Middle East. It built webs of security alliances across the region to deter China and forged what has proved elusive for decades — a rapprochement, if not warm friendship, between historical foes and America’s closest Asian allies, South Korea and Japan.

Huge challenges loom for Joe Biden’s successor here. The scale of the forces lining up against each other in the northern Pacific is terrifying. China is forging a deeper alliance of American adversaries in North Korea and Russia, making threats against Taiwan and staking stronger claims on territory in the South China Sea. America’s actions in other geopolitical theaters — above all Ukraine — will reverberate in East Asia.

As strange as it might seem in this moment, the next U.S. administration’s strategy is hamstrung by some old history. Japan and South Korea — which have powerful militaries, and in Japan’s case one that’s recently embarked on a major buildup — are haunted by long-running disputes from the previous century that make their entente feel fragile. It’s an open question whether it can last, even as the threats that are pulling them together grow more serious.

Over the hills that ring Seoul lies the most heavily militarized region in the world. The DMZ separates this vibrant capital from a nuclear-armed hermit state ruled by an unpredictable autocrat that weighs heavily on Korean minds.

The view from Tokyo, a quick flight across the Sea of Japan, is as unreassuring these days.

Russian military planes are breaching the country’s northwestern coastal airspace repeatedly, a reminder that Tokyo and Moscow have an unresolved, nearly 80-year-old territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands that leaves them technically in a state of war. China disputes Japan’s claim over the Senkaku Islands in the south. In the first ever known incursion, Chinese military aircraft flew through Japanese airspace in August. Chinese and Russian military ships together passed near Japanese waters in September during a joint exercise. North Korea openly considers Japan a foe and occasionally sends a missile over the country.

“Japan is now facing off against North Korea, Russia and China and that makes for a severe security environment,” Minoru Kihara, Japan’s defense minister until the government changed last month, told me in an interview in Tokyo. “We feel a strong sense of crisis considering that such incidents took place in a short period of time.”

The war in Ukraine shifted plates in Asia. After Vladimir Putin launched the invasion, Xi Jinping backed him strongly against a unified NATO — making that European conflict a test of China’s superpower ambitions. Japan is “paying close attention to China’s alliance with Russia,” Kihara added. Ukraine also brought Moscow and North Korea closer. Kim Jong Un sent thousands of his soldiers to fight there last month in return, presumably, for military technology and other goodies.

‘Drinking buddies’

The answer to this robust authoritarian axis à trois is the trilateral relationship with Seoul and Tokyo that Washington spent years trying to bring to life.

While both countries are protected by the U.S. through treaties going back over 70 years — and while both share common enemies — South Korea and Japan have long been estranged. During World War II, Japan occupied South Korea, enslaving Koreans to work in their factories and sexually service their soldiers. Japan has apologized and paid reparations to Koreans. But this remains an open nerve — and badly strained political and military ties.

During his time as the commodore of a squadron of guided missiles destroyers in the 1990s, retired Adm. Jim Stavridis recalled that during joint exercises the U.S. had to keep Japanese and South Korean vessels far away from each other — or “you’d get the on-the-sea version of ‘road rage’.” It is as if France and Germany had remained frosty after World War II. Under that scenario, Europe wouldn’t have NATO or the EU.

The Xi era in China changed Japanese attitudes about security. Ukraine is the more recent accelerant.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who stepped down this autumn, elaborated a line used by his foreign minister — “First Ukraine, then Taiwan” — to suggest the war could come here: “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” Russia’s biggest supporter China is the one power today openly challenging the U.S.-led order, and the only one with the ability potentially to do so.

Japan responded by unveiling plans to double defense spending — from 1 percent of its GDP to 2 percent by 2027. The budget has already gone up more than 40 percent since 2022. Under its constitution, Japan can only defend itself and had neglected the military. A previous Japanese leader, Shinzo Abe, started to change things in the 2010s. Japan built out a formidable navy and added modern weaponry. By the time the current expansion plans are in place, Japan is expected to be the world’s third-largest spender on defense, after the U.S. and China. Germany, by contrast, is reversing plans to boost defense spending.

Even for all that spending, “China is outpacing Japan’s increase of defense budget and they have four times more than we do,” said Kihara, the former defense minister. “It is difficult for us to face China on our own.”

South Korea is an obvious ally for Japan. Kishida was open to closer relations, believing Japan needed friends to resist China. What made that possible was the presidential election in March of 2022, a month after the invasion of Ukraine, that brought Yoon Suk Yeol to the presidential palace in Seoul.


The left and right swap power every five or 10 years here. The left tends to seek reconciliation with North Korea and dislike Japan. A man of the right, Yoon brought more hawkish views and something else: a genuine affection for Japan going back to his father’s time studying and teaching there.

He had his first chance to meet Kishida at the Madrid NATO summit in July of that year. “Yoon hugged him,” recalled a former Korean official who was there. Kishida was taken aback. Yoon is outgoing, Kishida circumspect. “Asian leaders don’t do hugs, unless they are communists.”

From that awkward beginning came a relationship that this former official described as “drinking buddies.”

The U.S. had been looking for an opening like this for years. Kurt Campbell, the deputy secretary of State, pushed a rapprochement strategy from Washington. Dozens of trilateral meetings followed where the U.S. did “the thing that’s unusual for America — step back and let everyone else talk,” said Rahm Emanuel, America’s ambassador in Tokyo.

Little was straightforward. Korean and Japanese ministers rarely meet each other one-on-one. Korea’s defense minister hadn’t come to Tokyo for 15 years before this July. If the Japanese defense chief goes to Seoul next year, as planned, that would be the first time in nine years. The U.S. has to play mediator and counselor to both sides.

“History is history, brother,” Emanuel said. “It has a pull on emotions and it has a pull on psychology.

“The U.S. plays an important role in keeping the plates spinning,” he added.

When Japan was hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima in May of 2023, Washington pressed to have Korea invited. During the meeting, Yoon and Kishida went together with their spouses to pay respects at a memorial to the Korean victims of the 1945 atomic bombing of the city. It was a first of sorts and created a lasting image.

The culmination of the courtship was the Camp David summit in August last year. Yoon, Kishida and Biden hailed a new era and announced various agreements, including on sharing data about missiles and a major exercise. “This is an all hands on deck moment in the region,” said a senior administration official in Washington, who asked for anonymity.

“When you have trust in us and in the president, you don’t do the bare minimum,” Emanuel said. “They went beyond their comfort zone. In a world consumed by war and grievance, history can catch up to the present and shape it. Camp David showed dialogue and diplomacy shaped the future.

“Now,” Emanuel continued, “the goal is to institutionalize it in the DNA of governments.”

‘Not allies’

The fact is this rapprochement is far from a done deal. Leaders in Seoul and Tokyo sound at best cautionary notes.

“I’m very pessimistic,” said a senior Japanese official who was granted anonymity to discuss the matter. The Koreans “swing from one extreme to the other.” Yoon’s opponents have called him a sellout to Japan, riding him hard on the rapprochement.

Another foreign ministry official in Tokyo recalled working visits to Seoul during the lead-up to the Camp David summit. “They would yell at us during negotiations over what happened in the war and when the meeting’s over, they say, ‘no hard feelings, let’s go out for drinks’,” this official said. “The next day they yell at us some more. It’s due to the domestic political pressure they’re under.”

In Korea, this issue isn’t purely a matter of partisan politics. Distrust crosses generations and goes deep.

While Korea has agreed to joint naval and aerial exercises, Japanese forces aren’t welcome on Korean soil. “We prefer to have them somewhere else,” deadpanned a senior Korean official.

Asked whether Japan was now an ally, this official paused and said, “Don’t think so. Partner is enough.”

The recurring pain points involve Korean demands for reparations and more apologies. The Japanese reply that these demands were settled already — and want to stay away from Korea’s messy internal politics.

Yes and no. Korea’s enthusiasm for the rapprochement may pass with President’s Yoon’s departure from office. Yet Japan’s own politics are tortured by history as well, which hinders its ability to build deeper relationships with Korea and other nations across Asia that fear China’s rise.

Japan’s 21st century awakening on defense contrasts with its former wartime ally in Germany. There is another contrast with Germany that is less complimentary. “The curious thing,” Ian Buruma wrote in his book Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan, “much of what attracted [the] Japanese to Germany before the war — Prussian authoritarianism, romantic nationalism, pseudo-scientific racialism — had lingered in Japan while becoming distinctly unfashionable in Germany.”

No Japanese politician, Buruma continued, has “ever gone down on his knees, as Willy Brandt did in the old Warsaw ghetto, to apologize for historical crimes.”

The Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled Japan for all but four years since 1955 and will almost certainly continue to despite losing its majority in the past weekend’s elections, has a vocal nationalist right wing. Many mornings outside LDP headquarters, trucks with loudspeakers and flags blare nationalist speeches.

These historical issues might have been settled long ago. The U.S. can share some blame, deciding, in order to get a peace deal done, to let the Japanese emperor stay as head of state but give up his divine right to rule. Japan’s military kept its flags and symbols. Germany was wiped clean of the Nazi regime and its vestiges.

“We didn’t really grow up,” said one foreign ministry official that I spoke to in Tokyo.

Yasukuni Shrine is a large complex in central Tokyo near the imperial palace. The shrine honors Japan’s war dead, among whom are 14 war criminals who committed atrocities in World War II. A large museum on the site treats Japan’s wartime histories with reverence. Models of a kamikaze plane and submarine are displayed. Exhibits for the last war suggest the Japanese were fighting Western imperialism in Asia. It’s as if a museum in Berlin displayed Nazi flags and honored Nazi leaders.

Whenever an LDP politician visits Yasukuni, Koreans and Chinese have an excuse to complain. Kihara, the defense minister, went on Aug. 15, the 79th anniversary of Japan’s surrender. He was unapologetic, saying that “those who had sacrificed should be given tribute” and that his own relatives worship there. “It is unfortunate that this has been politicized,” he said.

Just don’t call it Asian NATO

These two awkward neighbors need each other and America needs them to get along to marshal a credible response to the China-led threesome.

The security anxieties in the region are bound to grow. If Beijing acts on its threats and succeeds, the fall of Taiwan would be a huge economic and political blow to the U.S. It would also put the rest of Asia in play, so to speak. Add to that the reemergence of Russia in the region and the heightening of the North Korean threat. The war in Ukraine is sputtering along, and the outcome there might hang on what happens in the U.S. Tuesday.

The Biden diplomatic push of the past couple years in East Asia is intended to build out enough military muscle and overlapping alliances to create a kind of NATO for the region — with China in the role of the old Soviet Union. You just can’t call it NATO. The South Koreans and others don’t want to be formally allied with Japan. To be more like Germany, Japan would also become an equal partner to America and others.

The U.S. isn’t ready to reopen the postwar security deal that keeps Japan in a kind of arrested development. The current Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba used to muse about an Asian NATO and reopening the status of forces agreement between the U.S. and Japan. He had to disavow the idea minutes after winning power in late September.

Those political issues are a distraction, U.S. officials say. In practical terms, however, a lot has already changed. The region is arming up, passing Europe in terms of defense expenditures a decade ago. As they spend more, Japan’s terrible demographics limit their ability to add manpower. The money is going to buy hundreds of American long-range Tomahawk missiles, integrated antimissile systems and unmanned defenses. Japan’s navy could be “the swing vote on effective deterrence” over Taiwan, said Matt Pottinger, deputy national security adviser in the Trump White House. Japan wants to develop weapons with the U.S. and train its troops there.

Earlier this year, the U.S. upgraded the commander of forces in Japan from a two-star to a three-star general officer and pledged to build a new command and control center — which Emanuel called “the largest change in our force structure” and “the most important thing we have done here in 60 years.”

Other baby steps are planned. The trio is talking about putting in place some institutional roots. Perhaps a secretariat for the trilateral relationship — that’s not exactly a second coming of NATO. 

The wartime history in East Asia feels far more alive and relevant to the future than in Europe. Beijing, naturally, exploits it. The Chinese government has managed to transfer animosity toward Japan to the next generation. A 10-year-old Japanese boy was stabbed to death in September while walking to school in Shanghai on the anniversary of Japan’s invasion of China, the latest in a string of attacks on Japanese in the country.

Beijing has another card to play against both South Korea and Japan. Both countries are deeply integrated with China economically, which Beijing has used to pressure them.

As much as the U.S. wants their friendship to build, Japan and South Korea will look primarily to Washington for reassurances about American power and its commitment to them individually.

“Beijing wants to send a signal that the U.S. is unable to support treaty allies in the region, and to send a signal to Taiwan, to portray us as hollow allies,” Pottinger said. “Xi has led himself into believing that America is in irrevocable decline and that China and its allies will paper the world in chaos.”


domingo, 3 de novembro de 2024

O que muda na política externa e na diplomacia lulopetista depois de Kazan e do conflito com a Venezuela - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

 O que muda na política externa e na diplomacia lulopetista depois de Kazan e do conflito com a Venezuela

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida, diplomata, professor.

Nota sobre uma possível conjuntura história de transformação na postura diplomática do governo Lula 3.

 

        Durante quase 20 anos – quarenta se contarmos dos primeiros anos da existência do PT e da elaboração das suas primeiras posturas na área externa – a “política externa” e a “diplomacia” do PT, moldada não por Lula, mas pelos gramscianos que se incorporaram aos sindicalistas “alternativos” que fundaram o partido, permaneceu invariavelmente as mesmas, com as inevitáveis mudanças tópicas ou conceituais que surgiram ou se impuseram a partir do momento em que Lula e o PT assumiram o poder político federal pela primeira vez, em 2002-2003 (da eleição à posse, passando pela transição civilizada organizada pelo governo de FHC, com base em lei aprovada em meados de 2002). Desculpem as muitas aspas, mas elas são necessárias para denotar o caráter peculiar dos termos “aspeados” vis-à-vis o sentido que os termos assumem em seu uso normal no ambiente acadêmico; espero que me entendam.

        O PT surgiu como típico partido esquerdista latino-americano – socialista, na linha do socialismo latino-americano –, mas com bastante influência da experiência histórica da revolução cubana e da produção intelectual dos acadêmicos que se juntaram ao partido desde os primeiros anos, geralmente os esquerdistas que lutaram (vários morreram), foram presos e torturados, partiram para o exílio ou foram anistiados a partir de 1979, e que se juntaram à pela reconstrução da democracia no Brasil nos últimos anos do regime militar. Com base nesse tipo de origem, o PT desenvolveu um pensamento e propostas para a ação identificados com o socialismo estatizante, anti-imperialista (ou seja, antiamericano), voltados para a implantação de um regime socialista vagamente assemelhado ao modelo cubano, mais do que ao planejamento totalmente centralizado do modelo soviético. Nos primeiros vinte anos, ou seja, dos anos 1980 ao final do século, o PT, o Sindicato dos Metalúrgicos, a CUT e seus “derivados” (nos meios acadêmicos e sindicais, sobretudo) receberam fortes apoios do exterior, começando pelo governo de Fidel Castro – daí a fidelidade integral aos cubanos, permanente –, por sindicatos e partidos socialistas do mundo ocidental, a exemplo da DGB e do SPD alemães, da CGT, da CFDT e do PS francês, dos socialistas espanhóis, e até da AFL-CIO, as duas centrais unificadas dos trabalhadores sindicalizados dos Estados Unidos, passando até, muito possivelmente, até por movimentos guerrilheiros esquerdistas da região. Essa ajuda nem sempre foi transparente ou reconhecida oficialmente pelo PT ou pela CUT.

        Nessas condições, não se poderia esperar nenhuma proposta na área internacional que não fosse identificada com o socialismo estatizante, e até em suas vertentes mais radicais, retiradas do itinerário e do estilo cubano de fazer política interna e externa. A adesão de suas lideranças e de suas principais lideranças políticas (no sentido estrito, ou seja, de preferência às lideranças puramente sindicais) a esse universo limitado aos casos emblemáticos da própria região latino-americana, fez com que o PT passasse incólume de processo de mudanças e transformações profundas que afetaram os partidos e movimentos políticos da vertente socialista na Europa e em alguns outros lugares, como por exemplo, a tendência eurocomunista, que afastou as esquerdas europeias do socialismo estatizante de simpatia à União Soviética, em direção de propostas reformistas dentro do capitalismo democrático.

Já tinha sido o caso do SPD alemão desde o congresso de Bad Godesberg, no final dos anos 1950, fazendo o partido abandonar a linha marxista tradicional em favor de uma ação dentro do capitalismo matizado pelo ordo-liberalismo. O mesmo ocorreu com os partidos comunistas italiano, francês, espanhol e os socialistas nesses países com mais ênfase, a despeito do atraso do Labour nessa modernização doutrinal e programática. O PT, seguindo fielmente o PC de Cuba, resistiu às mudanças, e até organizou, a pedido dos cubanos, o Foro de São Paulo, quando da implosão do socialismo soviético e do início da grande transição ao capitalismo em quase todos os países submetidos até então ao controle da URSS. O Foro de São Paulo é uma espécie de Cominform cubano, similarmente ao papel que o Cominform criado por Stalin em 1947, no controle da ação e das políticas dos partidos tradicionalmente afiliados anteriormente à III Internacional, extinta pelo próprio Stalin em 1943, no momento da aliança com as democracias burguesas durante a guerra contra o nazifascismo.

        Quando o PT assume o poder em 2003, houve certa acomodação na área econômica, por necessidade ditada pelo pragmatismo, mas a política externa oficial e a diplomacia do Itamaraty passaram a ser fortemente influenciadas pelas diretrizes do PT, administradas pelo próprio conselheiro presidencial para assuntos internacionais no Palácio do Planalto, junto a Lula e em estreito contato com os diplomatas escolhidos para chefiar o Itamaraty, um velho e conhecido acadêmico e militante, aparatchik do PT desde a sua origem, e encarregado desde sempre de suas relações internacionais (por ter andado pelo exterior, nos tempos mais duros do regime militar e ter conhecimento de rudimentos de línguas estrangeiras, basicamente espanhol e francês). Marco Aurélio Garcia guiou algumas grandes decisões da política externa e da diplomacia dos governos Lula 1 e 2 (2003-2010) e continuou de exercendo sob Dilma, de 2011 até o final, em 2016. Em torno dele, do chanceler Celso Amorim e do SG-Itamaraty Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães gravitavam vários ideólogos do PT, militantes da causa ou acadêmicos gramscianos, que forneciam o essencial da “expertise” ao presidente na frente externa. 

        Acompanhei a “política externa” do PT, e sua forte influência sobre a diplomacia oficial desde o início, em artigos e livros que seguiram as principais etapas e tomadas de posição desde os anos 1980 até o período recente. Posso referir-me, por exemplo, sendo sintético, a este artigo síntese da fase pré-presidencial: “A política internacional do Partido dos Trabalhadores: da fundação do partido à diplomacia do governo Lula” (Sociologia e Política (n. 20 jun. 2003, p. 87-102; disponível: https://www.scielo.br/j/rsocp/a/4nshwsp5XKC3k8rvSpxvykx/?format=html). As análises subsequentes foram consolidadas em três livros que seguiram a “política externa” do PT até uma data recente: Nunca Antes na Diplomacia…: a política externa brasileira em tempos não convencionais (Curitiba: Editora Appris, 2014); Contra a corrente: Ensaios contrarianistas sobre as relações internacionais do Brasil (2014-2018) (Curitiba: Appris, 2019) e Apogeu e demolição da política externa: itinerários da diplomacia brasileira (Curitiba: Appris, 2021).

Entre o final de 2022 e a atualidade, escrevi e publiquei diversos artigos, ou notas, acompanhando as principais tomadas de posição do governo Lula na área externa, que não são, ou até aqui não foram muito diferentes, pelo menos em intenção, das velhas propostas de políticas (bilaterais, regional e multilateral) que foram sendo explicitadas e implementadas desde o início dos anos 2000 até recentemente. 

        As novidades principais, naquele período de grande sucesso externo, foram as iniciativas regionais (Unasul e outras) e no âmbito do chamado Sul Global: primeiro o IBAS, depois o BRIC, ainda que este último não se enquadre perfeitamente nesse conceito geográfico, mas se encaixa totalmente ao espírito e à letra do antiamericanismo persistente no PT e em suas principais lideranças, sobretudo em Lula. 

        Pois foi exatamente no âmbito do BRICS ampliado que começaram a tomar forma desenvolvimentos que passaram a impactar as concepções do PT quanto à direção a ser imprimida à diplomacia brasileira no futuro de curto e médio prazo, paralelamente ao mais recente processo “eleitoral” na Venezuela chavista, ambos fenômenos que podem indicar uma tímida mudança nos cálculos de Lula e seus principais assessores no tocante às prioridades diplomáticas futuramente. Esses dois processos recentíssimos ainda não deixaram marcas decisivas nas grandes orientações doutrinas e políticas da diplomacia governamental, mas podem e promete fazê-lo de maneira ainda não muito clara, dependendo de como Lula e o PT, assim como suas forças “auxiliares” reagirão aos desafios do presente e do futuro breve. Dispenso-me de adentrar, na presente nota, nos detalhes desses processos paralelos, conectados de forma indireta, mas de maneira clara, reduzindo-a ao essencial dos fatos.

        O BRIC original e o Brics dos primeiros anos se situavam no universo conceitual que estiveram na origem de sua formação, como plataforma política com algum embasamento econômico e pretensões à consolidação como foro diplomático alternativo ao domínio do G7 e outros avatares ocidentais (Bretton Woods, OCDE, OTAN, UE, entre outros). Desde meados da década anterior, o agravamento das tensões entre China e, principalmente, Rússia de Putin contra a “hegemonia ocidental” sobre as principais organizações da governança global levou a que essas duas potências conduzissem o bloco do Brics e seus outros três membros a uma postura fortemente antiocidental, consoante uma aliança política, econômica, diplomática e militar entre ambas, o que passou a moldar os desenvolvimentos recentes do grupo, em especial sua ampliação no formato Brics+, com a adesão de novos membros – decididos na reunião de cúpula de Joanesburgo, em 2023 – e a “associação de mais de uma dezena de outros, na cúpula de Kazan, terminada ao final de outubro de 2024. 

        O outro processo que pode determinar mudanças nas posturas (não apenas regionais) do PT e do governo Lula na área externa tem a ver com a Venezuela e o aprofundamento de sua ditadura iniciada no início do século sob a liderança de Hugo Chávez. Observadores mais atentos já poderiam prever, com base no comportamento dos líderes chavistas, presididos por Nicolás Maduro, essa caminhada para uma ditadura aberta desde as eleições fraudadas de 2018, agora repetidas em grande escala em julho de 2024 e nos meses seguintes. O PT até chegou, igualmente de forma fraudulenta, a “atestar” a vitória do ditador chavista nessas últimas eleições, gesto “ousado” que sequer Lula e seus assessores chegaram a repetir, com base em acertos anteriores (acordo de Barbados de 2023) quanto à transparência, correção e um mínimo de confiabilidade nas eleições presidenciais. 

        O episódio do chamado “veto” brasileiro ao ingresso da Venezuela no Brics+ serviu de gatilho a uma rápida deterioração das relações entre Lula e Maduro, daí para a contaminação das relações diplomáticas e um “rompimento” entre os dois países para todos os efeitos práticos. Concorrentemente a outros episódios que já tinham marcado a diplomacia antiocidental de Lula e do governo brasileiro – guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia e o agravamento do conflito entre grupos terroristas pró-palestinos e Israel –, o conflito entre o governo Lula e a ditadura chavista da Venezuela pode resultar numa revisão parcial da política externa do governo e da diplomacia brasileira com respeito às relações com as duas grandes potências eurasianas e alguns regimes esquerdistas da América Latina. 

        Ainda é cedo para determinar características e consequências dessa revisão talvez conceitual, mas mais provavelmente puramente operacional, em algumas vertentes, apenas, da interface externa do governo de Lula 3, com um impacto limitado sobre a diplomacia profissional, encarregada de administrar as ações levadas a efeito nos planos bilateral, regional e multilateral. Outro evento de consequências ainda indeterminadas é representado pelas eleições americanas de 5 de novembro de 2024, cujos resultados podem ser impactantes, se por acaso o candidato populista autoritário for o vencedor, uma vez que a continuidade da liderança dos Democratas não redundará em rupturas tão dramáticas quanto as eventualmente derivadas de um segundo mandato para o candidato republicano. Uma nova reflexão prospectiva será necessária para acompanhar os desenvolvimentos derivados dos três processos aqui comentados brevemente.


Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4778, 3 novembro 2024, 5 p.


Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Sete Teses Equivocadas sobre o Desenvolvimento Latino-americano (1965) - Trabalho de Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Rodolfo Stavenhagen foi um grande sociólogo mexicano, cuja cobra eu conheci na Europa, publicada em francês, entre outras as Sete Teses Equivocadas sobre o Desenvolvimento Latino-americano. Por isso, quando vi o anúncio de um seminário para comemorar meio século da publicação dessa importante obra, eu logo me inscrevi. Depois enviei meu trabalho, mas ele não foi publicado neste livro. Abaixo os registros relativos ao mau trabalho. PRA (3/11/2024)

2768. “Siete Tesis Equivocadas sobre Brasil en el contexto latinoamericano: una relectura de las tesis de Stavenhagen aplicadas a Brasil”, Hartford, 9 fevereiro 2015, 2 p. Propuesta de presentación de articulo y de exposición para seminario de los 50 años de la publicación de “Siete Tesis Equivocadas sobre América Latina” de Rodolfo Stavenhagen; “Nuevas Miradas Tras Medio Siglo de La Publicación de Siete Tesis Equivocadas sobre América Latina”; Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Sociológicos (http://ces.colmex.mx/convocatoria-siete-tesis; e-mail: seminario7tesis@colmex.mx); Resumen: 27/02/2015; Artículo hasta: 30/04/2015; Confirmada recepción de los documentos el 19/02/2015 (seminario7tesis@colmex.mx).


2795. “Sete teses equivocadas sobre o Brasil no contexto latino-americano: uma releitura das teses de Stavenhagen aplicadas ao Brasil”, Hartford, 24 março 2015, 22 p. Paper preparado para o Seminário: Nuevas Miradas Tras Medio Siglo de La Publicação Sete Teses Equivocadas sobre América Latina (Colegio de México; 25-26 junio 2015). ; enviar em espanhol, para o e-mail: seminario7teses@colmex.mx; Seminário: http://ces.colmex.mx/convocatoria-sete-teses. 


2827. “Siete Tesis Equivocadas sobre Brasil en el contexto latinoamericano: una relectura de las tesis de Stavenhagen aplicadas a Brasil”, Brasília, 26 maio 2015, 26 p. Paper em Espanhol, com base no esquema n. 2768, escrito originalmente em Português, a partir do trabalho n. 2795, para o Seminário: Nuevas Miradas Tras Medio Siglo de la Publicación de Siete Teses Equivocadas sobre América Latina (Colegio de México; 25-26 junio 2015). Revisto por Sabrina Duque em 29/05/2015. Enviado em 30/05/2015, para o e-mail: seminario7teses@colmex.mx; Seminário: http://ces.colmex.mx/convocatoria-sete-teses. Enviado também por carta ao Diretor do Centro de Estudios Sociológicos do Colegio de Mexico, Dr. Arturo Alvarado Mendoza, com pedido de desculpas por ter ultrapassado as 20 páginas do ensaio. Revisão geral em Anápolis, em 3/06/2015, para inclusão de bibliografia. Correspondência recebida em 21/06/2015, de Serena Chew Plascencia (schewp@colmex.mx) para confirmar presença. Feito resumo do trabalho em 10 p., para ser lido, e feita carta informando sobre não comparecimento (22/06/2015). Revisão final, Hartford, 9/08/2015 (enviado a: schewp@colmex.mx). Texto original e completo disponibilizado na plataforma Academia.edu (20/08/2016; link: https://www.academia.edu/s/da95137307/siete-tesis-equivocadas-sobre-brasil-en-el-contexto-latinoamericano-una-relectura-de-las-tesis-de-stavenhagen-aplicadas-a-brasil-2015). Resumo postado no blog Diplomatizzando (20/08/2016; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/08/siete-tesis-equivocadas-sobre-al-de.html). Recebida comunicação em 23/11/2016, da revista Latin American Perspectives, transmitindo parecer negativo quanto à publicação nessa revista da California, mas indicando que ele seria publicado pelo Colégio de México, em volume em homenagem a Stavenhagen. Escrito em 27/11/2016 a Serena Schew. Comentários ao parecer negativo da LAP enviados a Ronald Chilcote.






Brevíssima história econômica mundial - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brevíssima história econômica mundial

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

A Grã-Bretanha liderou a economia mundial entre a primeira e a segunda revoluções industriais, inclusive na dominância financeira e monetária. Os EUA assumiram esse lugar desde a segunda até a quarta, seguidos de perto pela Alemanha e Japão, que eles generosamente incorporaram à ordem econômica mundial (e às democracias de mercado) que a nação hegemônica moldou ao final da IIGM. 

A China, que perdeu todas essas revoluções industriais, só engatou na quarta, graças a Deng Xiaoping e já caminha aceleradamente pela quinta revolução industrial. O Brasil mal se encaixou na terceira e se arrasta penosamente para ficar na lista. Mas continua líder nas commodities, o que não deixa de ser uma vantagem comparativa.

Se Trump for eleito, os EUA recuarão para o mercantilismo, e arrastarão o mundo nesse inacreditável retrocesso histórico. 

Esse é o risco de se eleger um tosco capitalista trambiqueiro, totalmente ignorante em matéria econômica e politicamente autoritário.

Os EUA vão declinar apenas relativamente, mas os efeitos econômicos e políticos para o mundo seriam graves.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 3/11/2024


sábado, 2 de novembro de 2024

Venezuela acusa Brasil de se “passar por vítima” e violar Carta da ONU - Tiago Tortella (CNN Brasil)

Venezuela acusa Brasil de se “passar por vítima” e violar Carta da ONU 

Comunicado do governo Maduro afirma que Itamaraty tenta enganar a comunidade internacional 

Tiago Tortellada CNN , em São Paulo 

Xi Jinping’s Axis of Losers - Stephen Hadley (Foreign Affairs)

Xi Jinping’s Axis of Losers

The Right Way to Thwart the New Autocratic Convergence

By Stephen Hadley | Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2024

The United States is contending with the most challenging international environment it has faced since at least the Cold War and perhaps since World War II. One of the most disconcerting features of this environment is the burgeoning cooperation among China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Some policymakers and commentators see in this cooperation the beginnings of a twenty-first-century axis, one that, like the German-Italian-Japanese axis of the twentieth century, will plunge the world into a global war. Others foresee not World War III but a slew of separate conflicts scattered around the globe. Either way, the result is a world at war—the situation is that serious.

What should be done about this cooperation is another matter. Some strategists argue for ruthless prioritization, focusing on the members of the axis that represent the greatest threats. Others believe that only a comprehensive effort will succeed. But the best strategy would borrow elements of both approaches, acknowledging that China is the primary long-term concern for U.S. national security strategy—“the pacing threat,” in the U.S. Defense Department’s framing—but also a different kind of global actor than its rogue-state partners. Accordingly, Washington’s aim should be to make clear to Chinese President Xi Jinping how counterproductive and costly to Beijing’s interests these new relationships will turn out to be. That means effectively countering Iran, North Korea, and Russia in their own regions, thereby demonstrating to China that tethering itself to a bunch of losers is hardly a path to global influence.

BROTHERS IN ARMS

Cooperation among the members of this twenty-first-century axis has been heavily centered on military, industrial, and economic support for Russia in its war on Ukraine, which could not be sustained without such help. The resulting defense industrial cooperation and incipient integration is likely to go well beyond what existed among the twentieth-century axis partners. North Korea is providing artillery shells, other munitions, military personnel, and industrial workers to Russia and getting oil and missile and space technology in return. Iran is providing missiles and drones produced in its defense plants as well helping build such plants in Russia itself, and getting assistance with its own missile, drone, and space programs and perhaps with civil nuclear power as well. China is so far providing everything short of actual weapons: dramatically increased trade and purchases of oil, gas, and other natural resources; dual-use technology that is being integrated into Russian air-defense, electronic-warfare, drone, and other weapons and communications systems; and as of recently, actual components for Russian weapons. There is even talk of producing drone and weapons systems for Russia in Chinese factories. What China is getting in return is not fully clear at this point, aside from discounted energy—and potentially unrivaled influence over Russia. Beyond the war in Ukraine, China and Russia and their axis partners have increased joint training and operations, including with bombers, ships, and even ground forces.

The axis partners have also accelerated their diplomatic coordination, with Beijing and Moscow using their veto power in the UN Security Council to protect each other and Tehran and Pyongyang from adverse resolutions. Reciprocal high-level visits by leaders and top officials have yielded a series of agreements to cooperate in economic, technological, and other fields

This twenty-first-century axis may not be a formal alliance, but it nonetheless represents an increasingly close, highly functional, and flexible alignment of interests that does not need to become an alliance to advance its members’ aims or undermine the interests of the United States and its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Even without real ideological affinity, there is a shared anti-Westernism, opposition to democracy, and embrace of authoritarian alternatives. What truly binds the axis is not ideology but a common opposition to U.S. power and the international system it sustains—fueled by a belief that this power represents a mortal threat to their regimes’ interests, aspirations, and even survival.

The link between China and Russia is especially important. It is built on the strong personal relationship between Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, forged in more than 60 meetings during their time in office. There are, of course, both historical and contemporary sources of tension between China and Russia: a long common border with lots of empty space on the Russian side and a large population on the Chinese side; Beijing’s suspicion of Moscow’s revived relationship with North Korea, and Moscow’s suspicion of Beijing’s growing economic influence in Central Asia; and considerable xenophobia in both countries. But these tensions, although real, are unlikely to be allowed to disrupt the relationship between the two governments as long as Putin and Xi are in charge

THE CHINA CARD

Although some commentators have recommended trying to pull the members of the axis apart, former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice leans in the opposite direction, proposing that policymakers seek to “slam them together and make them deal with the consequences of the fact they don’t actually have all that much in common.” There is much to be said for this approach. Any effort to pry Putin away from the axis will most certainly fail; he is too dependent on these partners for support in Ukraine. To try to separate North Korea or Iran from the axis would require concessions that no U.S. administration is likely to be willing to make.

But China may be a different matter. Unlike its axis partners, China is integrated into the global economy. The prospect of broad secondary sanctions—which have been limited and targeted to date—in the event that China crosses Western redlines by providing weapons to Russia could threaten to exact real economic costs. Meanwhile, the war on Israel being waged by Iran and its proxies threatens to disrupt China’s critical oil supplies and other trade with the Middle East. And North Korea’s increasingly bellicose attitude toward its neighbors has roiled China’s diplomatic and economic relations with South Korea and Japan.

More fundamentally, China has made its prestige hostage to the success of its axis partners. If they should be seen to be failing in their respective efforts to impose their will on their neighbors by force, it would become clear to the world that Beijing has cast its lot with losers. That would not only undermine China’s effort to project itself as the global leader of a new kind of international order; it would also damage Xi’s personal standing, at home and abroad.

Washington should demonstrate to China that tethering itself to a bunch of losers is hardly a path to global influence.

How might this goal be accomplished? With respect to Russia, it means preventing Putin from achieving his strategic objectives in Ukraine. This will require enough sustained Western diplomatic, economic, and military support to enable Ukrainian forces to stop the current Russian advance and, if not win back occupied territory, at least establish a stable line of contact between Ukrainian and Russian forces. Such an outcome would allow Kyiv to get on with the job of building a sovereign, prosperous, noncorrupt, and democratic state increasingly integrated with European economic and security institutions.

With respect to Iran, it means quashing Tehran’s hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East. In part, this can be done by supporting Israel in delivering strong blows against both Iran and its proxies—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and more—to reestablish deterrence and open the way to a more stable Middle East. Stability will allow continued reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the beginning of a more promising future for the Palestinians, and the chance for the people of Lebanon to free their country from domination by Hezbollah.

And with respect to North Korea, it means demonstrating that Pyongyang’s fixation on nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them will not bring the country security or leverage over its neighbors. That will require strengthening the diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities of Australia, Japan, South Korea, and other regional allies and partners to work with the United States to deter North Korea and defend against any military action it might undertake—all with the aim of continued progress toward a free, open, and peaceful Indo-Pacific.

EXISTENTIAL RECONSIDERATIONS

Each of these steps would advance the interests of the United States and its friends and allies, leaving aside the message they would send China. But if pursued successfully, they could cause Beijing to limit and ultimately reduce its commitment to the failing adventurism of its renegade partners.

There is good reason to think such a reconsideration is possible, since Xi has adjusted course under pressure before. Faced with street demonstrations and other clear expressions of public dissatisfaction, he abruptly abandoned his “zero COVID” policy. In response to the China strategy forged over the course of the Trump and Biden administrations, he changed his approach to the United States. Early in his tenure, Xi seemed to have concluded that the United States and the West more generally were in terminal decline, presenting an opportunity for China to assert itself on the global stage; a strong U.S. response backed by a clear bipartisan consensus, real strategic investment, and a common front with friends and allies prompted Xi to reconsider. The result was a decision to reengage with the United States, including by meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco last November, in an attempt to arrest the decline in U.S.-Chinese relations.

By decisively curbing the adventurism of Xi’s axis partners, Washington could cause him to change course once again. It would surely be in his interest to do so. For if the recklessness of his partners brings sustained global instability and conflict, Xi himself would bear much of the blame for preventing the Communist Party from fulfilling its pledges to make China a “moderately developed economy” by 2035 and a “strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and modern socialist country” by 2049. The right U.S. strategy could make Xi understand that he can best serve his own interests by breaking with the axis of losers.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

STEPHEN HADLEY is a Principal at the international consulting firm Rice, Hadley, Gates, & Manuel and served as U.S. National Security Adviser from 2005 to 2009.