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quinta-feira, 20 de dezembro de 2012

F. Hayek: O Uso do Conhecimento na Sociedade (1945)

Uma transcrição longa, mas altamente relevante:

Hayek, Friedrich A. (1899-1992)
"The Use of Knowledge in Society"
American Economic Review. XXXV, No. 4, September 1945, pp. 519-30. American Economic Association
Available at: Library of Economics and Liberty, link: http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw1.html

The Use of Knowledge in Society
AER, 1945
I
H.1
What is the problem we wish to solve when we try to construct a rational economic order? On certain familiar assumptions the answer is simple enough. If we possess all the relevant information, if we can start out from a given system of preferences, and if we command complete knowledge of available means, the problem which remains is purely one of logic. That is, the answer to the question of what is the best use of the available means is implicit in our assumptions. The conditions which the solution of this optimum problem must satisfy have been fully worked out and can be stated best in mathematical form: put at their briefest, they are that the marginal rates of substitution between any two commodities or factors must be the same in all their different uses.
H.2
This, however, is emphatically not the economic problem which society faces. And the economic calculus which we have developed to solve this logical problem, though an important step toward the solution of the economic problem of society, does not yet provide an answer to it. The reason for this is that the "data" from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society "given" to a single mind which could work out the implications and can never be so given.
H.3
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources—if "given" is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.
H.4
This character of the fundamental problem has, I am afraid, been obscured rather than illuminated by many of the recent refinements of economic theory, particularly by many of the uses made of mathematics. Though the problem with which I want primarily to deal in this paper is the problem of a rational economic organization, I shall in its course be led again and again to point to its close connections with certain methodological questions. Many of the points I wish to make are indeed conclusions toward which diverse paths of reasoning have unexpectedly converged. But, as I now see these problems, this is no accident. It seems to me that many of the current disputes with regard to both economic theory and economic policy have their common origin in a misconception about the nature of the economic problem of society. This misconception in turn is due to an erroneous transfer to social phenomena of the habits of thought we have developed in dealing with the phenomena of nature.
II
H.5
In ordinary language we describe by the word "planning" the complex of interrelated decisions about the allocation of our available resources. All economic activity is in this sense planning; and in any society in which many people collaborate, this planning, whoever does it, will in some measure have to be based on knowledge which, in the first instance, is not given to the planner but to somebody else, which somehow will have to be conveyed to the planner. The various ways in which the knowledge on which people base their plans is communicated to them is the crucial problem for any theory explaining the economic process, and the problem of what is the best way of utilizing knowledge initially dispersed among all the people is at least one of the main problems of economic policy—or of designing an efficient economic system.
H.6
The answer to this question is closely connected with that other question which arises here, that of who is to do the planning. It is about this question that all the dispute about "economic planning" centers. This is not a dispute about whether planning is to be done or not. It is a dispute as to whether planning is to be done centrally, by one authority for the whole economic system, or is to be divided among many individuals. Planning in the specific sense in which the term is used in contemporary controversy necessarily means central planning—direction of the whole economic system according to one unified plan. Competition, on the other hand, means decentralized planning by many separate persons. The halfway house between the two, about which many people talk but which few like when they see it, is the delegation of planning to organized industries, or, in other words, monopoly.
H.7
Which of these systems is likely to be more efficient depends mainly on the question under which of them we can expect that fuller use will be made of the existing knowledge. And this, in turn, depends on whether we are more likely to succeed in putting at the disposal of a single central authority all the knowledge which ought to be used but which is initially dispersed among many different individuals, or in conveying to the individuals such additional knowledge as they need in order to enable them to fit their plans with those of others.
III
H.8
It will at once be evident that on this point the position will be different with respect to different kinds of knowledge; and the answer to our question will therefore largely turn on the relative importance of the different kinds of knowledge; those more likely to be at the disposal of particular individuals and those which we should with greater confidence expect to find in the possession of an authority made up of suitably chosen experts. If it is today so widely assumed that the latter will be in a better position, this is because one kind of knowledge, namely, scientific knowledge, occupies now so prominent a place in public imagination that we tend to forget that it is not the only kind that is relevant. It may be admitted that, as far as scientific knowledge is concerned, a body of suitably chosen experts may be in the best position to command all the best knowledge available—though this is of course merely shifting the difficulty to the problem of selecting the experts. What I wish to point out is that, even assuming that this problem can be readily solved, it is only a small part of the wider problem.
H.9
Today it is almost heresy to suggest that scientific knowledge is not the sum of all knowledge. But a little reflection will show that there is beyond question a body of very important but unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be called scientific in the sense of knowledge of general rules: the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place. It is with respect to this that practically every individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or are made with his active coöperation. We need to remember only how much we have to learn in any occupation after we have completed our theoretical training, how big a part of our working life we spend learning particular jobs, and how valuable an asset in all walks of life is knowledge of people, of local conditions, and of special circumstances. To know of and put to use a machine not fully employed, or somebody's skill which could be better utilized, or to be aware of a surplus stock which can be drawn upon during an interruption of supplies, is socially quite as useful as the knowledge of better alternative techniques. And the shipper who earns his living from using otherwise empty or half-filled journeys of tramp-steamers, or the estate agent whose whole knowledge is almost exclusively one of temporary opportunities, or the arbitrageur who gains from local differences of commodity prices, are all performing eminently useful functions based on special knowledge of circumstances of the fleeting moment not known to others.
H.10
It is a curious fact that this sort of knowledge should today be generally regarded with a kind of contempt and that anyone who by such knowledge gains an advantage over somebody better equipped with theoretical or technical knowledge is thought to have acted almost disreputably. To gain an advantage from better knowledge of facilities of communication or transport is sometimes regarded as almost dishonest, although it is quite as important that society make use of the best opportunities in this respect as in using the latest scientific discoveries. This prejudice has in a considerable measure affected the attitude toward commerce in general compared with that toward production. Even economists who regard themselves as definitely immune to the crude materialist fallacies of the past constantly commit the same mistake where activities directed toward the acquisition of such practical knowledge are concerned—apparently because in their scheme of things all such knowledge is supposed to be "given." The common idea now seems to be that all such knowledge should as a matter of course be readily at the command of everybody, and the reproach of irrationality leveled against the existing economic order is frequently based on the fact that it is not so available. This view disregards the fact that the method by which such knowledge can be made as widely available as possible is precisely the problem to which we have to find an answer.
IV
H.11
If it is fashionable today to minimize the importance of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place, this is closely connected with the smaller importance which is now attached to change as such. Indeed, there are few points on which the assumptions made (usually only implicitly) by the "planners" differ from those of their opponents as much as with regard to the significance and frequency of changes which will make substantial alterations of production plans necessary. Of course, if detailed economic plans could be laid down for fairly long periods in advance and then closely adhered to, so that no further economic decisions of importance would be required, the task of drawing up a comprehensive plan governing all economic activity would be much less formidable.
H.12
It is, perhaps, worth stressing that economic problems arise always and only in consequence of change. So long as things continue as before, or at least as they were expected to, there arise no new problems requiring a decision, no need to form a new plan. The belief that changes, or at least day-to-day adjustments, have become less important in modern times implies the contention that economic problems also have become less important. This belief in the decreasing importance of change is, for that reason, usually held by the same people who argue that the importance of economic considerations has been driven into the background by the growing importance of technological knowledge.
H.13
Is it true that, with the elaborate apparatus of modern production, economic decisions are required only at long intervals, as when a new factory is to be erected or a new process to be introduced? Is it true that, once a plant has been built, the rest is all more or less mechanical, determined by the character of the plant, and leaving little to be changed in adapting to the ever-changing circumstances of the moment?
H.14
The fairly widespread belief in the affirmative is not, as far as I can ascertain, borne out by the practical experience of the businessman. In a competitive industry at any rate—and such an industry alone can serve as a test—the task of keeping cost from rising requires constant struggle, absorbing a great part of the energy of the manager. How easy it is for an inefficient manager to dissipate the differentials on which profitability rests, and that it is possible, with the same technical facilities, to produce with a great variety of costs, are among the commonplaces of business experience which do not seem to be equally familiar in the study of the economist. The very strength of the desire, constantly voiced by producers and engineers, to be allowed to proceed untrammeled by considerations of money costs, is eloquent testimony to the extent to which these factors enter into their daily work.
H.15
One reason why economists are increasingly apt to forget about the constant small changes which make up the whole economic picture is probably their growing preoccupation with statistical aggregates, which show a very much greater stability than the movements of the detail. The comparative stability of the aggregates cannot, however, be accounted for—as the statisticians occasionally seem to be inclined to do—by the "law of large numbers" or the mutual compensation of random changes. The number of elements with which we have to deal is not large enough for such accidental forces to produce stability. The continuous flow of goods and services is maintained by constant deliberate adjustments, by new dispositions made every day in the light of circumstances not known the day before, by B stepping in at once when A fails to deliver. Even the large and highly mechanized plant keeps going largely because of an environment upon which it can draw for all sorts of unexpected needs; tiles for its roof, stationery for its forms, and all the thousand and one kinds of equipment in which it cannot be self-contained and which the plans for the operation of the plant require to be readily available in the market.
H.16
This is, perhaps, also the point where I should briefly mention the fact that the sort of knowledge with which I have been concerned is knowledge of the kind which by its nature cannot enter into statistics and therefore cannot be conveyed to any central authority in statistical form. The statistics which such a central authority would have to use would have to be arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor differences between the things, by lumping together, as resources of one kind, items which differ as regards location, quality, and other particulars, in a way which may be very significant for the specific decision. It follows from this that central planning based on statistical information by its nature cannot take direct account of these circumstances of time and place and that the central planner will have to find some way or other in which the decisions depending on them can be left to the "man on the spot."
V
H.17
If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them. We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders. We must solve it by some form of decentralization. But this answers only part of our problem. We need decentralization because only thus can we insure that the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used. But the "man on the spot" cannot decide solely on the basis of his limited but intimate knowledge of the facts of his immediate surroundings. There still remains the problem of communicating to him such further information as he needs to fit his decisions into the whole pattern of changes of the larger economic system.
H.18
How much knowledge does he need to do so successfully? Which of the events which happen beyond the horizon of his immediate knowledge are of relevance to his immediate decision, and how much of them need he know?
H.19
There is hardly anything that happens anywhere in the world that might not have an effect on the decision he ought to make. But he need not know of these events as such, nor of all their effects. It does not matter for him why at the particular moment more screws of one size than of another are wanted, why paper bags are more readily available than canvas bags, or why skilled labor, or particular machine tools, have for the moment become more difficult to obtain. All that is significant for him is how much more or less difficult to procure they have become compared with other things with which he is also concerned, or how much more or less urgently wanted are the alternative things he produces or uses. It is always a question of the relative importance of the particular things with which he is concerned, and the causes which alter their relative importance are of no interest to him beyond the effect on those concrete things of his own environment.
H.20
It is in this connection that what I have called the "economic calculus" proper helps us, at least by analogy, to see how this problem can be solved, and in fact is being solved, by the price system. Even the single controlling mind, in possession of all the data for some small, self-contained economic system, would not—every time some small adjustment in the allocation of resources had to be made—go explicitly through all the relations between ends and means which might possibly be affected. It is indeed the great contribution of the pure logic of choice that it has demonstrated conclusively that even such a single mind could solve this kind of problem only by constructing and constantly using rates of equivalence (or "values," or "marginal rates of substitution"), i.e., by attaching to each kind of scarce resource a numerical index which cannot be derived from any property possessed by that particular thing, but which reflects, or in which is condensed, its significance in view of the whole means-end structure. In any small change he will have to consider only these quantitative indices (or "values") in which all the relevant information is concentrated; and, by adjusting the quantities one by one, he can appropriately rearrange his dispositions without having to solve the whole puzzle ab initio or without needing at any stage to survey it at once in all its ramifications.
H.21
Fundamentally, in a system in which the knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among many people, prices can act to coördinate the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coördinate the parts of his plan. It is worth contemplating for a moment a very simple and commonplace instance of the action of the price system to see what precisely it accomplishes. Assume that somewhere in the world a new opportunity for the use of some raw material, say, tin, has arisen, or that one of the sources of supply of tin has been eliminated. It does not matter for our purpose—and it is very significant that it does not matter—which of these two causes has made tin more scarce. All that the users of tin need to know is that some of the tin they used to consume is now more profitably employed elsewhere and that, in consequence, they must economize tin. There is no need for the great majority of them even to know where the more urgent need has arisen, or in favor of what other needs they ought to husband the supply. If only some of them know directly of the new demand, and switch resources over to it, and if the people who are aware of the new gap thus created in turn fill it from still other sources, the effect will rapidly spread throughout the whole economic system and influence not only all the uses of tin but also those of its substitutes and the substitutes of these substitutes, the supply of all the things made of tin, and their substitutes, and so on; and all this without the great majority of those instrumental in bringing about these substitutions knowing anything at all about the original cause of these changes. The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the whole field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all. The mere fact that there is one price for any commodity—or rather that local prices are connected in a manner determined by the cost of transport, etc.—brings about the solution which (it is just conceptually possible) might have been arrived at by one single mind possessing all the information which is in fact dispersed among all the people involved in the process.
VI
H.22
We must look at the price system as such a mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function—a function which, of course, it fulfils less perfectly as prices grow more rigid. (Even when quoted prices have become quite rigid, however, the forces which would operate through changes in price still operate to a considerable extent through changes in the other terms of the contract.) The most significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action. In abbreviated form, by a kind of symbol, only the most essential information is passed on and passed on only to those concerned. It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of machinery for registering change, or a system of telecommunications which enables individual producers to watch merely the movement of a few pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a few dials, in order to adjust their activities to changes of which they may never know more than is reflected in the price movement.
H.23
Of course, these adjustments are probably never "perfect" in the sense in which the economist conceives of them in his equilibrium analysis. But I fear that our theoretical habits of approaching the problem with the assumption of more or less perfect knowledge on the part of almost everyone has made us somewhat blind to the true function of the price mechanism and led us to apply rather misleading standards in judging its efficiency. The marvel is that in a case like that of a scarcity of one raw material, without an order being issued, without more than perhaps a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose identity could not be ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the material or its products more sparingly; i.e., they move in the right direction. This is enough of a marvel even if, in a constantly changing world, not all will hit it off so perfectly that their profit rates will always be maintained at the same constant or "normal" level.
H.24
I have deliberately used the word "marvel" to shock the reader out of the complacency with which we often take the working of this mechanism for granted. I am convinced that if it were the result of deliberate human design, and if the people guided by the price changes understood that their decisions have significance far beyond their immediate aim, this mechanism would have been acclaimed as one of the greatest triumphs of the human mind. Its misfortune is the double one that it is not the product of human design and that the people guided by it usually do not know why they are made to do what they do. But those who clamor for "conscious direction"—and who cannot believe that anything which has evolved without design (and even without our understanding it) should solve problems which we should not be able to solve consciously—should remember this: The problem is precisely how to extend the span of our utilization of resources beyond the span of the control of any one mind; and therefore, how to dispense with the need of conscious control, and how to provide inducements which will make the individuals do the desirable things without anyone having to tell them what to do.
H.25
The problem which we meet here is by no means peculiar to economics but arises in connection with nearly all truly social phenomena, with language and with most of our cultural inheritance, and constitutes really the central theoretical problem of all social science. As Alfred Whitehead has said in another connection, "It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them." This is of profound significance in the social field. We make constant use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not understand and through the use of which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we do not possess. We have developed these practices and institutions by building upon habits and institutions which have proved successful in their own sphere and which have in turn become the foundation of the civilization we have built up.
H.26
The price system is just one of those formations which man has learned to use (though he is still very far from having learned to make the best use of it) after he had stumbled upon it without understanding it. Through it not only a division of labor but also a coördinated utilization of resources based on an equally divided knowledge has become possible. The people who like to deride any suggestion that this may be so usually distort the argument by insinuating that it asserts that by some miracle just that sort of system has spontaneously grown up which is best suited to modern civilization. It is the other way round: man has been able to develop that division of labor on which our civilization is based because he happened to stumble upon a method which made it possible. Had he not done so, he might still have developed some other, altogether different, type of civilization, something like the "state" of the termite ants, or some other altogether unimaginable type. All that we can say is that nobody has yet succeeded in designing an alternative system in which certain features of the existing one can be preserved which are dear even to those who most violently assail it—such as particularly the extent to which the individual can choose his pursuits and consequently freely use his own knowledge and skill.
VII
H.27
It is in many ways fortunate that the dispute about the indispensability of the price system for any rational calculation in a complex society is now no longer conducted entirely between camps holding different political views. The thesis that without the price system we could not preserve a society based on such extensive division of labor as ours was greeted with a howl of derision when it was first advanced by von Mises twenty-five years ago. Today the difficulties which some still find in accepting it are no longer mainly political, and this makes for an atmosphere much more conducive to reasonable discussion. When we find Leon Trotsky arguing that "economic accounting is unthinkable without market relations"; when Professor Oscar Lange promises Professor von Mises a statue in the marble halls of the future Central Planning Board; and when Professor Abba P. Lerner rediscovers Adam Smith and emphasizes that the essential utility of the price system consists in inducing the individual, while seeking his own interest, to do what is in the general interest, the differences can indeed no longer be ascribed to political prejudice. The remaining dissent seems clearly to be due to purely intellectual, and more particularly methodological, differences.
H.28
A recent statement by Professor Joseph Schumpeter in his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy provides a clear illustration of one of the methodological differences which I have in mind. Its author is pre-eminent among those economists who approach economic phenomena in the light of a certain branch of positivism. To him these phenomena accordingly appear as objectively given quantities of commodities impinging directly upon each other, almost, it would seem, without any intervention of human minds. Only against this background can I account for the following (to me startling) pronouncement. Professor Schumpeter argues that the possibility of a rational calculation in the absence of markets for the factors of production follows for the theorist "from the elementary proposition that consumers in evaluating ('demanding') consumers' goods ipso facto also evaluate the means of production which enter into the production of these goods."*1
H.29
Taken literally, this statement is simply untrue. The consumers do nothing of the kind. What Professor Schumpeter's "ipso facto" presumably means is that the valuation of the factors of production is implied in, or follows necessarily from, the valuation of consumers' goods. But this, too, is not correct. Implication is a logical relationship which can be meaningfully asserted only of propositions simultaneously present to one and the same mind. It is evident, however, that the values of the factors of production do not depend solely on the valuation of the consumers' goods but also on the conditions of supply of the various factors of production. Only to a mind to which all these facts were simultaneously known would the answer necessarily follow from the facts given to it. The practical problem, however, arises precisely because these facts are never so given to a single mind, and because, in consequence, it is necessary that in the solution of the problem knowledge should be used that is dispersed among many people.
H.30
The problem is thus in no way solved if we can show that all the facts, if they were known to a single mind (as we hypothetically assume them to be given to the observing economist), would uniquely determine the solution; instead we must show how a solution is produced by the interactions of people each of whom possesses only partial knowledge. To assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind in the same manner in which we assume it to be given to us as the explaining economists is to assume the problem away and to disregard everything that is important and significant in the real world.
H.31
That an economist of Professor Schumpeter's standing should thus have fallen into a trap which the ambiguity of the term "datum" sets to the unwary can hardly be explained as a simple error. It suggests rather that there is something fundamentally wrong with an approach which habitually disregards an essential part of the phenomena with which we have to deal: the unavoidable imperfection of man's knowledge and the consequent need for a process by which knowledge is constantly communicated and acquired. Any approach, such as that of much of mathematical economics with its simultaneous equations, which in effect starts from the assumption that people's knowledge corresponds with the objective facts of the situation, systematically leaves out what is our main task to explain. I am far from denying that in our system equilibrium analysis has a useful function to perform. But when it comes to the point where it misleads some of our leading thinkers into believing that the situation which it describes has direct relevance to the solution of practical problems, it is high time that we remember that it does not deal with the social process at all and that it is no more than a useful preliminary to the study of the main problem.

Notes for this chapter
1.
J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York; Harper, 1942), p. 175. Professor Schumpeter is, I believe, also the original author of the myth that Pareto and Barone have "solved" the problem of socialist calculation. What they, and many others, did was merely to state the conditions which a rational allocation of resources would have to satisfy and to point out that these were essentially the same as the conditions of equilibrium of a competitive market. This is something altogether different from knowing how the allocation of resources satisfying these conditions can be found in practice. Pareto himself (from whom Barone has taken practically everything he has to say), far from claiming to have solved the practical problem, in fact explicitly denies that it can be solved without the help of the market. See his Manuel d'économie pure (2d ed., 1927), pp. 233-34. The relevant passage is quoted in an English translation at the beginning of my article on "Socialist Calculation: The Competitive 'Solution,' " in Economica, New Series, Vol. VIII, No. 26 (May, 1940), p. 125.

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MLA Style
Hayek, Friedrich A., "The Use of Knowledge in Society." 1945. Library of Economics and Liberty. 20 December 2012. <http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html>.

APA Style
Hayek, Friedrich A. "The Use of Knowledge in Society." 1945. Library of Economics and Liberty. Retrieved December 20, 2012 from the World Wide Web: http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html

Turabian Style
Hayek, Friedrich A. "The Use of Knowledge in Society." American Economic Review. XXXV, No. 4. pp. 519-30. American Economic Association. 1945. Library of Economics and Liberty [Online] available from http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw.html; accessed 20 December 2012; Internet.

A indigencia teorica dos companheiros dos companheiros - Carlos Alberto Sardenberg

O título acima é meu, não do conhecido jornalista da Globo e da CBN, e articulista do jornal O Globo.
Não se trata nem de "roubar a favor do povo", mas de construir um sistema totalitário com base na falcatrua, na corrupção, na mentira, na fraude, no roubo explícito, enfim em toda sorte de crimes, inclusive os mais escabrosos, como eliminação de recalcitrantes e "desviantes".
Companheiros de viagem tentam emprestar sua indigência intelectual ao que é apenas crime.
Só se pode sentir asco dessa gente, de todos, os que cometem crimes e os que tentam justificar.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Roubar pelo povo
Carlos Alberto Sardenberg
O Globo, 20/12/2012

Intelectuais ligados ao PT estão flertando com uma nova tese para lidar com o mensalão e outros episódios do tipo: seria inevitável, e até mesmo necessário, roubar para fazer um bom governo popular.

Trata-se de uma clara resposta ao peso dos fatos. Tirante os condenados, seus amigos dedicados e os xiitas, ninguém com um mínimo de tirocínio sente-se confortável com aquela história da  ”farsa da mídia e do Judiciário”.

Se, ao contrário, está provado que o dinheiro público foi roubado      e que apoios políticos foram comprados, com dinheiro público, restam duas opções: ou desembarcar de um projeto heroico que virou bandidagem ou, bem, aderir  à tese de que todo governo rouba, mas os de esquerda roubam menos e o fazem para incluir os pobres.

Vimos duas manifestações recentes dessa suposta nova teoria. Na Folha, Fernanda Torres, em defesa de José  Dirceu,  buscou inspiração em Shakespeare para especular: talvez seja impossível governar sem violar a lei.

No Valor, Renato Janine Ribeiro escreveu duas colunas para concluir: comunistas revolucionários não roubam; esquerdistas reformistas roubam quando chegam ao governo, mas “talvez” tenham de fazer isso para garantir as políticas de inclusão social.

Tirante a falsa sofisticação teórica, trata-se da atualização de coisa muito velha. Sim, o leitor adivinhou: o pessoal está recuperando o “rouba mas faz”, criado pelos ademaristas  nos anos 50. Agora é o “rouba mas distribui”.

Nem é tão surpreendente assim. Ainda no período eleitoral recente, Marilena Chauí havia colocado Maluf no rol dos prefeitos paulistanos realizadores de obras, no grupo de Faria Lima, e fora da turma dos ladrões.

Fica assim, pois: José Dirceu não é corrupto, nem quadrilheiro – mas participou da corrupção e da quadrilha porque, se não o fizesse, não haveria como aplicar o programa popular do PT.

Como se chega a esse incrível quebra-galho teórico? Fernanda Torres oferece uma pista quando comenta que o PT se toma como o partido do povo brasileiro. Ora, segue-se, se as elites são um bando de ladrões agindo contra o povo, qual o problema de roubar “a favor do povo”?

Renato Janine Ribeiro trabalha na mesma tese, acrescentando casos de governos de esquerda bem sucedidos, e corruptos. Não fica claro se são bem sucedidos “apesar” de corruptos ou, ao contrário, por serem corruptos. Mas é para esta ultima tese que o autor se inclina.

Não faz sentido, claro. Começa que não é verdade que todo governo conservador é contra o povo e corrupto. Thatcher e Reagan, exemplos máximos da direita, não roubavam e trouxeram grande prosperidade e bem estar a seus povos. Aqui entre nós, e para ir fundo, Castello Branco e Médici também não roubavam e suas administrações trouxeram crescimento e renda.

Por outro lado, o PT não é o povo. Representa parte do povo, a majoritária nas últimas três eleições presidenciais. Mas, atenção, nunca ganhou no primeiro turno e  os adversários sempre fizeram ao menos 40%. E no primeiro turno de 2010, Serra e Marina fizeram 53% dos votos.

Por isso, nas democracias  o governo não pode tudo, tem que respeitar a minoria e isso se faz pelo respeito às leis, que incluem a proibição de roubar. E pelo respeito à opinião pública, expressa, entre outros meios, pela imprensa livre.

Por não tolerar essas limitações, os partidos autoritários, à direita e à esquerda, impõem ou tentam impor ditaduras, explícitas ou disfarçadas. Acham que, por serem a expressão legítima do povo, podem tudo.

Assim, caímos de novo em velha tese: os fins justificam os meios, roubar e assassinar.

Renato Janine Ribeiro diz que os regimes comunistas cometeram o pecado da extrema violência física, eliminando milhões de pessoas. Mas eram eticamente puros, sustenta: gostavam de limusines e dachas, mas não colocavam dinheiro público no bolso. (A propósito, anotem aí: isto é uma prévia para uma eventual defesa de Lula, quando começam a aparecer sinais de que o ex-presidente e sua família abusaram de mordomias mais do que se sabe).

Quanto aos comunistas, dizemos nós, não eram “puros” por virtude, mas por impossibilidade. Não havia propriedade privada, de maneira que os corruptos não tinham como construir patrimônios pessoais. Roubavam dinheiro de bolso e se reservavam parte do aparelho do estado, enquanto o povo que representavam passava fome. Puros?

Reparem: na China, misto de comunismo e capitalismo, os líderes e suas famílias amealharam, sim, grandes fortunas pessoais.

Voltando ao nosso caso brasileiro, vamos falar francamente: ninguém precisa ser ladrão de dinheiro público para distribuir Bolsa Família e aumentar o salário mínimo.

Educacao: criacao de riqueza diminui; deficit publico aumenta...

Existem carreiras e profissões que produzem riquezas e renda, como as engenharias em geral, as científicas, por exemplo. E existem aquelas que produzem aumento do déficit público. Adivinhe de que lado está o Brasil?
Do lado da "pedagogia" de Paulo Freire, claro...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Ciências Sociais lidera preferência no ensino superior

Educação aumenta participação entre os cursos universitários

Uma pesquisa do Censo 2010 sobre a distribuição das pessoas com pelo menos nível superior, por áreas gerais de formação, mostra que, seguindo a tendência do levantamento de 2000, a maioria (37,8%) se formou na área geral de Ciências Sociais, Negócios e Direito. Os dados revelam ainda um aumento de 74,1% na participação na área de Educação e uma queda de 20% em Engenharia, produção e construção em relação ao último recenseamento.
Segundo os novos números do IBGE, a formação em Engenharia abrange 7,6% das pessoas com nível superior concluído, na frente apenas dos ramos de Serviços (2%) e Agricultura e Veterinária (1,9%). No Censo de 2000, a participação na área era de 9,6%.
Dados de outra pesquisa, o Censo da Educação Superior do MEC, mostram quadro diferente. Pelos dados do MEC, houve aumento de 161% no número de concluintes em cursos de Engenharia no Brasil de 2001 a 2011. No entanto, como todo o ensino superior cresceu no país, os formados em cursos de Engenharia continuam representando, tanto em 2001 quanto em 2011, apenas 7% do total dos que concluem o ensino superior no Brasil.
falta de planejamento
Para Luís Testa, diretor de Marketing da Catho - empresa de vagas online -, o resultado reflete, sobretudo, a falta de incentivo do governo na criação de mão de obra nacional qualificada na área. Segundo ele, muitas vezes as vagas acabam preenchidas por trabalhadores de outros países.
- O que aconteceu foi que a demanda desses profissionais cresceu muito, mas a formação na área não acompanhou. A Engenharia é um campo em que é preciso antever a necessidade de pessoal, porque o ciclo de desenvolvimento e capacitação é longo, de no mínimo cinco anos. Não adianta chegar de uma hora para outra e dizer que está precisando de engenheiro para ontem. Se hoje existem muitos investimentos na área, já houve o tempo em que esse era um mercado limitado. Era preciso ter pensado um plano de estímulo antes - afirma.
A vice-diretora da Faculdade de Educação da Uerj, Rosana de Oliveira, acredita que o déficit de engenheiros é formado ainda na educação básica.
- A Matemática ainda é temida pela maioria dos nossos estudantes, e a impressão que se passa é que os cursos da área de Engenharia são muito difíceis. Consequentemente, menos pessoas acabam buscando essa formação no nível superior. É uma coisa também de tradição - diz Rosana.

Minhas Previsões Imprevisíveis para 2013 - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

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Minhas Previsões Imprevisíveis para 2013
(não custa continuar tentando, para ver se em algum ano dá certo...)

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Como faço a cada ano (salvo nos bissextos), vou continuar meu tresloucado exercício de fazer previsões ao contrário, isto é, minhas expectativas para o que não tem nenhuma chance de acontecer no ano que pronto se iniciará. É claro que, dada a múltipla natureza bizarra, sempre inovadora, criadora, simpática e decepcionante, e até mesmo surpreendente deste país surrealista que se chama Brasil, corremos o sério risco de sermos desmentidos, e sairmos humilhados, pela absolutamente inacreditável realização de algumas dessas previsões malucas. As surpresas podem ocorrer, especialmente as vindas de certas esferas da alta política, previsíveis na sua imprevisibilidade, e que costumam confirmar aquela máxima do Barão de Itararé: de onde menos se espera é que não sai nada mesmo. Mas isso fica pela conta do seguro contra acidentes não previstos, que renovo a cada ano nessa época, para evitar, justamente, ser processado por algum leitor, e aí cair naquela previsão ainda mais imprevisível de ter o caso julgado por um “auto” tribunal em menos de 20 anos, o que atrapalharia sobremaneira minha aposentadoria.
Sem mais delongas e tergiversações, vamos pois à lista atualizada das previsões imprevisíveis para 2013. Se algumas delas se realizar, os leitores podem me cobrar a conta, mas apenas em 2014, quando terei um estoque inteiramente novo de ofertas do impossível.
Começo pelo mais comum, frequente e corriqueiro: corrupção. Se não sobrevier o fim do mundo antes, vamos ficar inteiramente livres de qualquer novo caso de “malfeitos” em 2013. Tendo aprendido com sua própria experiência, na carne, por assim dizer, os companheiros vão inaugurar uma tecnologia inteiramente nova de combate à corrupção, pela simples razão de que – como a nova nota fiscal que já declara os impostos – a corrupção já virá integrada a todos os negócios públicos. O Partido dos Companheiros está criando uma Secretaria Especial de Negócios Não-Contabilizados, aqui se antecipando ao financiamento público das campanhas eleitorais, o que vai facilitar tremendamente as coisas. Transpondo a tecnologia para o nível estatal, vai ser possível nos livrarmos inteiramente da corrupção, em virtude do expediente já referido de sua integração oficial, formal e carimbada, em todas as transações que envolvem instituições e agentes públicos. Vai ser assim uma espécie de CPMF destinada inteiramente ao caixa 2, mas de forma explícita. Resolvido o problema, não é mesmo?
Fim do Mundo: parece que não deu certo desta vez, mas não custa apostar mais um pouco, inclusive porque esta catástrofe natural – ou dos deuses? – vai resolver todos os outros problemas, inclusive a obrigação deste escriba ficar perdendo tempo neste tipo de besteirol. As apostas ficaram um pouco mais caras, dada a frustração com as últimas cinco previsões e meia. Também: os maias têm aquela escrita complicada, impossível de ler, e números que não são em base decimal. Mais passons...
 Economia: depois do insucesso dos quinze últimos pacotes de estímulo à economia, o governo promete que não vai mais fazer pacotinhos de estímulo à economia; pode ser um pacotão, de tempos em tempos, mas essa coisa de a presidente e o ministro da Fazenda anunciarem, a cada semana, que “estão tomando medidas para estimular a economia” vai finalmente sair de moda. E não tem mais essa coisa de improvisações setoriais; doravante só terão direito a pacotes de estímulos, pacotões, na verdade, os setores minoritários, que já gozam de várias cotas de favor. Isso muda! Os afrodescendentes, por exemplo: com base na auto-declaração, eles já são mais de 55% da população brasileira. Todos os pacotes de favor serão agora para setores minoritários e prejudicados nas políticas dos últimos anos, como os loiros de olhos azuis, coitados.
 Política: o Congresso proclama sua independência, enfim! Só vai trabalhar para o governo nas quartas-feiras, quando o expediente é total. Nas terças e quintas, e só em regime de meio expediente, trabalhará para ele mesmo, que ninguém é de ferro. Estão abolindo o 14o. e o 15o. salários, mas vão criar a semana de expediente ainda mais reduzido. E já avisaram; só vão cassar companheiros legisladores em anos bissextos. O Stalin Sem Gulag, aliás, aproveita para mandar dizer que a luta continua, agora dentro da cadeia, com o apoio do PCC, que é um partido quase alinhado com suas teses.
Justiça: o Supremo diz vai parar de se meter na vida dos demais poderes; mas já avisou que não quer nenhum parlamentar se metendo na fixação dos seus próprios salários, que devem ser proporcionais aos quatro milhões de casos “a julgar”, parados há mais de oito anos nos escaninhos dessas varas que já viraram palácios de papel. Também vão modernizar o figurino: aquelas togas incomodas ficam sempre caindo e atrapalhando o movimento dos braços; vão adotar um simples avental, com os dizeres mais do que atuais: A justiça é cega...
Esporte: a Seleção de futebol da França se exila por completo na Bélgica, por razões fiscais. Os integrantes da seleção da Bélgica, por sua vez, fazem greve para não ter de pagar imposto de renda e ameaçam se exilar no vizinho Luxemburgo. A seleção brasileira adota um uniforme mais largo e mais comprido, daqueles antigos, para acomodar todas as mensagens publicitárias que a CBF negociou com importantes empresas multinacionais e várias estatais tupiniquins. Alguns jogadores vão negociar tatuagens publicitárias na barriga e no bum-bum (este mais caro). Mas, na copa das confederações, a seleção brasileira perde da seleção do Burundi por 1 a 0. Pano...
Economia mundial: a gangorra continua. Depois que o Brasil perdeu a condição de sexta economia mundial, para se converter na oitava economia, o governo reagiu e, via flutuação cambial do Banco Central, conseguiu trazê-la de volta para a sétima posição; os mercados reagem, fazem dois ataques especulativos e levam o Brasil à nona posição, mas o governo faz novo pacote e consegue trazer a economia para a oitava posição outra vez; os mercados, só de birra, provocam fuga de capitais e arrastam o Brasil para a décima-segunda posição; governo, emburrado e amuado desiste de brincar de gangorra cambial. Enquanto isso, a China e os Estados Unidos criam um programa conjunto de manipulações cambiais: pronto, era o que faltava para o governo brasileiro se enfurecer de vez; mas o seu tsunami financeiro não passa de uma marolinha...
Economia doméstica: o Ministério do Planejamento cria o PAC-III, com taxa de realização pré-programada em 35,7% dos recursos empenhados (incluídos restos a pagar...); o TCU também criou um software novo, de embargo preventivo das obras suspeitas de irregularidades: ele também vem pré-programado para embargar metade das obras, inclusive retroativamente, do PAC-I e do PAC-II, mas aí se descobre que as obras paradas são mais do que 75% do total dos volumes empenhados;
Economia sentimental: o governo cria o plano Brasil Amoroso, para distribuir beijos e abraços a quem vive sem companhia; Senadores mais sentimentais que outros, como Suplicy e Buarque, pensam instituir uma Bolsa Carinho, de meio salário de senador, para os contemplados no programa; executivo reage e cria o vale-beijo.
Cultura: as editoras brasileiras pedem proteção contra a Amazon, e querem taxa especial sobre o livro eletrônico, para compensar os custos que tem de estocar um monte de papel impresso que não vende; a Amazon resolve diversificar suas operações nacionais e começa a vender tapioca express-delivery. Deputado Aldo Rebelo reage, e diz que só pode se estiver escrito em língua nacional.
Política Externa: Cuba decide ingressar no Mercosul, antes do Paraguai voltar, e diz que tem direito a receber metade das verbas do Fundo de Recuperação e Apoio à Correção das Assimetrias Sociais Socialistas (FRACASSO), criado na cúpula do meio do ano. Guiana e Suriname reagem e dizem que também querem entrar no Mercosul para se beneficiar do maná brasileiro, à razão de 70% do total. Ministros decidem então criar uma Casa da Moeda do Mercosul (CMM), o mais novo órgão do vasto empreendimento integracionista, que não cessa de se ampliar no continente e surpreender o mundo pela sua criatividade e versatilidade. Obama diz que EUA consideram se tornar membro associado do Mercosul. É a apoteose...
Fim do Mundo, outra vez: guru de Cabrobó da Serra diz que ele descobriu um erro de cálculo no calendário maia, e atrasa do fim do mundo para meados de 2014, o que permite passar o fim de ano sem maiores preocupações com seguro de vida.
Bom ano a todos...

Brasília, 20 de dezembro de 2012.

quarta-feira, 19 de dezembro de 2012

Uma breve historia do fim do mundo - The Economist


The end of the world

A brief history

Why do end-of-time beliefs endure?

 The shape of things to comeBridgeman
A VERICHIP is a tiny, implantable microchip with a unique identification number that connects a patient to his medical records. When America's Food and Drug Administration recently approved it for medical use in humans, the news provoked familiar worries in the press about privacy-threatening technologies. But on the notice boards of raptureready.com, the talk was about a drawback that the FDA and the media seemed to have overlooked. Was the VeriChip the “mark of the beast”?
Raptureready.com runs an online service for the millions of born-again Christians in America who believe that an event called the Rapture is coming soon. During the Rapture, Christ will return and whisk believers away to join the righteous dead in heaven. From there, they will have the best seats in the house as the unsaved perish in a series of spectacular fires, wars, plagues and earthquakes. (Raptureready.com advises the soon-to-depart to stick a note on the fridge to brief those left behind—husbands, wives and in-laws—about the horrors in store for them.)
Furnished with apocalyptic tracts from the Bible, believers scour news dispatches for clues that the Rapture is approaching. Some think implantable chips are a sign. The Book of Revelation features a “mark” that the Antichrist makes everybody wear “in their right hand, or in their foreheads”. Rapturists have more than a hobbyist's idle interest in identifying this mark. Anyone who accepts it spends eternity roasting in the sulphurs of hell. (And, incidentally, the European Union may be “the matrix out of which the Antichrist's kingdom could grow.”)
Christians have kept faith with the idea that the world is just about to end since the beginnings of their religion. Jesus Himself hinted more than once that His second coming would happen during the lifetime of His followers. In its original form, the Lord's Prayer, taught by Jesus to his disciples, may have implored God to “keep us from the ordeal”.
Men have been making the same appeal ever since. In 156AD, a fellow called Montanus, pronouncing himself to be the incarnation of the Holy Spirit, declared that the New Jerusalem was about to come crashing down from the heavens and land in Phrygia—which, conveniently, was where he lived. Before long, Asia Minor, Rome, Africa and Gaul were jammed with wandering ecstatics, bitterly repenting their sins and fasting and whipping themselves in hungry anticipation of the world's end. A bit more than a thousand years later, the authorities in Germany were stamping out an outbreak of apocalyptic mayhem among a self-abusing sect called the secret flagellants of Thuringia. The disciples of William Miller, a 19th-century evangelical American, clung ecstatically to the same belief as the Montanists and the Thuringians. A thick strand of Christian history connects them all, and countless other movements.


Don't get left behind

Apocalyptic belief renews itself in ingenious ways. Belief in the Rapture, which enlivens the familiar end-of-time narrative with a compellingly dramatic twist, appears to be a modern phenomenon: John Nelson Darby, a 19th-century British evangelical preacher, was perhaps the first to popularise the idea. (Darby's inspiration was a passage in St Paul's letter to the Thessalonians, which talks about the Christian dead and true believers being “caught up together” in the clouds.) It is not easy to say how many Americans believe in Darby's concept of Rapture. But a dozen novels that dramatise the event and its gripping aftermath—the “Left Behind” series—have sold more than 40m copies.
New apocalyptic creeds have even sprung from those sticky moments when the world has failed to end on schedule. (Social scientists call this “disconfirmation”.) When the resurrected Christ failed to show up for Miller's disciples on the night of October 22nd 1844, press scribblers mocked the “Great Disappointment” mercilessly. But even as they jeered, a farmer called Hiram Edson snuck away from the vigil to pray in a barn, where he duly received word of what had happened. There had been a great event after all—but in heaven, not on Earth. This happening was that Jesus had begun an “investigative judgment of the dead” in preparation for his return. Thus was born the Church of Seventh-day Adventists. They were not the only ones to rise above apparent setbacks to the prophesies by which they set such store: the Jehovah's Witnesses of the persistently apocalyptic Watchtower sect survived no fewer than nine disconfirmations every few years between 1874 and 1975.
 Getting ready in 1967Getty Images


Which way to Armageddon?

Why do end-of-time beliefs endure? Social scientists love to set about this question with earnest study of the people who subscribe to such ideas. As part of his investigation into the “apocalyptic genre” in modern America, Paul Boyer of the University of Wisconsin asks why so many of his fellow Americans are “susceptible” to televangelists and other “popularisers”. From time to time, sophisticated Americans indulge the thrillingly terrifying thought that nutty, apocalyptic, born-again Texans are guiding not just conservative social policies at home, but America's agenda in the Middle East as well, as they round up reluctant compatriots for the last battle at Armageddon. (It's a bit south of the Lake of Galilee in the plain of Jezreel.)
Behind these attitudes sits the assumption that apocalyptic thought belongs—or had better belong—to the extremities of human experience. On closer inspection, though, that is by no means true.
Properly, the apocalypse is both an end and a new beginning. In Christian tradition, the world is created perfect. There is then a fall, followed by a long, rather enjoyable (for some) period of moral degeneration. This culminates in a decisive final battle between good (the returned Christ) and evil (the Antichrist). Good wins and establishes the New Jerusalem and with it the 1,000-year reign of King Jesus on Earth.
This is the glorious millennium that millenarians await so eagerly. Millenarians tend to place history at a moment just before the decisive final showdown. The apocalyptic mind looks through the surface reality of the world and sees history's epic, true nature: “apocalypse” comes from the Greek word meaning to uncover, or disclose.
Norman Cohn, a British historian, places the origin of apocalyptic thought with Zoroaster (or Zarathustra), a Persian prophet who probably lived between 1500 and 1200BC. The Vedic Indians, ancient Egyptians and some earlier civilisations had seen history as a cycle, which was for ever returning to its beginning. Zoroaster embellished this tepid plot. He added goodies (Ahura Mazda, the maker and guardian of the ordered world), baddies (the spirit of destruction, Angra Mainyu) and a happy ending (a glorious consummation of order over disorder, known as the “making wonderful”, in which “all things would be made perfect, once and for all”). In due course Zoroaster's theatrical talents came to Christians via the Jews.
 Raelians don't dig GodAFP
This basic drama shapes all apocalyptic thought, from the tenets of tribal cargo cults to the beliefs of UFO sects. In 1973, Claude Vorilhon, a correspondent for a French racing-car magazine, claimed to have been whisked away in a flying saucer, in which he had spent six days with a green chap who spoke fluent French. The alien told Mr Vorilhon that the Frenchman's real name was Rael, that humans had misread the Bible and that, properly translated, the Hebrew word Elohim (singular: Eloha) did not mean God, as Jews had long supposed, but “those who came from the sky”.
 ...they dig Rael, aka, Vorilhon, back from the skyCorbis
The alien then revealed that his species had created everything on Earth in a space laboratory, and that the aliens wanted to return to give humans their advanced technology, which would transform the world utterly. First, however, Rael needed financial contributions to build the aliens an embassy in Jerusalem, because otherwise they would not feel welcome (a bit lame, this explanation). Although the Israeli government has not yet given its consent, the Raelians—those persuaded by Rael's account—continue to welcome donations in anticipation of a change of heart.
The Raelians' claim to be atheists who belong to the secular world must come as no surprise to Mr Cohn, who has long detected patterns of religious apocalyptic thought in what is supposedly rational, secular belief. He has traced “egalitarian and communistic fantasies” to the ancient-world idea of an ideal state of nature, in which all men are genuinely equal and none is persecuted. As Mr Cohn has put it, “The old religious idiom has been replaced by a secular one, and this tends to obscure what otherwise would be obvious. For it is the simple truth that, stripped of their original supernatural sanction, revolutionary millenarianism and mystical anarchism are with us still.”
 It's this or redemptionBridgeman
Nicholas Campion, a British historian and astrologer, has expanded on Mr Cohn's ideas. In his book, “The Great Year”, Mr Campion draws parallels between the “scientific” historical materialism of Marx and the religious apocalyptic experience. Thus primitive communism is the Garden of Eden, the emergence of private property and the class system is the fall, the final gasps of capitalism are the last days, the proletariat are the chosen people and the socialist revolution is the second coming and the New Jerusalem.
Hegel saw history as an evolution of ideas that would culminate in the ideal liberal-democratic state. Since liberal democracy satisfies the basic need for recognition that animates political struggle, thought Hegel, its advent heralds a sort of end of history—another suspiciously apocalyptic claim. More recently, Francis Fukuyama has echoed Hegel's theme. Mr Fukuyama began his book, “The End of History”, with a claim that the world had arrived at “the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy”. Mr Fukuyama's pulpit oratory suited the spirit of the 1990s, with its transformative “new economy” and free-world triumphs. In the disorientating disconfirmation of September 11th and the coincident stockmarket collapse, however, his religion has lost favour.
The apocalyptic narrative may have helped to start the motor of capitalism. A drama in which the end returns interminably to the beginning leaves little room for the sense of progress which, according to the 19th-century social theories of Max Weber, provides the religious licence for material self-improvement. Without the last days, in other words, the world might never have had 65-inch flat-screen televisions. For that matter, the whole American project has more than a touch of the apocalypse about it. The Pilgrim Fathers thought they had reached the New Israel. The “manifest destiny” of America to spread its providential liberty and self-government throughout the North American continent (not to mention the Middle East) smacks of the millennium and the New Jerusalem.
Science treasures its own apocalypses. The modern environmental movement appears to have borrowed only half of the apocalyptic narrative. There is a Garden of Eden (unspoilt nature), a fall (economic development), the usual moral degeneracy (it's all man's fault) and the pressing sense that the world is enjoying its final days (time is running out: please donate now!). So far, however, the green lobby does not appear to have realised it is missing the standard happy ending. Perhaps, until it does, environmentalism is destined to remain in the political margins. Everyone needs redemption.


Watch this spacesuit

Noting an exponential acceleration in the pace of technological change, futurologists like Hans Moravec and Ray Kurzweil think the world inhabits the “knee of the curve”—a sort of last-days set of circumstances in which, in the near future, the pace of technological change runs quickly away towards an infinite “singularity” as intelligent machines learn to build themselves. From this point, thinks Mr Moravec, transformative “mind fire” will spread in a flash across the cosmos. Britain's astronomer royal, Sir Martin Rees, relegates Mr Kurzweil and those like him to the “visionary fringe”. But Mr Rees's own darkly apocalyptic book, “Our Final Hour”, outdoes the most colourful of America's televangelists in earthquakes, plagues and other sorts of fire and brimstone.
 Introducing “manifest destiny”Bridgeman
So there you have it. The apocalypse is the locomotive of capitalism, the inspiration for revolutionary socialism, the bedrock of America's manifest destiny and the undeclared religion of all those pseudo-rationalists who, like The Economist, champion the progress of liberal democracy. Perhaps, deep down, there is something inside everyone which yearns for the New Jerusalem, a place where, as a beautiful bit of Revelation puts it:
God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away.
Yes, perhaps. But, to be sure, not everyone agrees that salvation, when it comes, will appear clothed in a shiny silver spacesuit.

Livro: História e Energia: Memória, informação e sociedade

Acaba de ser publicado o livro “História e Energia - Memória, informação e energia”, organizado por Gildo Magalhães. Este livro conta com um Capítulo escrito por Fernanda das Graças Corrêa e pelo Dr. Leonam dos Santos Guimarães, cujo título é “Marcos históricos da geração elétrica nuclear no Brasil”.

O livro contou com financiamento da FAPESP, foi publicado pela editora Alameda e lançado no último dia 11 de dezembro. A obra é resultado das apresentações de historiadores e especialistas em Energia, que participaram do 3º Seminário Internacional História e Energia. Memória, informação e sociedade, ocorrido entre os dias 1° e 4 de setembro de 2010, em São Paulo.

Segue link da editora Alameda:
http://www.alamedaeditorial.com.br/historia-e-energia-memoria/

Sobre o organizador: Gildo Magalhães é formado em engenharia eletrônica pela Escola Politécnica e é doutor em História Social pela USP, onde atualmente é professor livre-docente de história das ciências e técnicas. Realizou pós-doutorado no Instituto Smithsonian (EUA) e é pesquisador do Centro de História da Ciência da USP e do centro de Filosofia das Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa. Publicou diversos livros, ente eles estão: Força e Luz e Introdução à Metodologia da Pesquisa, além de diversos artigos em revistas nacionais e estrangeiras. É responsável pela coordenação de história geral do Projeto Eletromemória.

RELEASE

História e Energia: Memória, informação e sociedade

Nos dias de hoje, existe um consenso mundial de estamos vivendo um momento decisivo no se refere às escolhas das fontes de energia que fazem a economia e nossa vida cotidiana funcionarem. Neste livro, essas escolhas são debatidas por profissionais de várias áreas, coordenados por um dos mais experientes pesquisadores sobre o assunto do país, Gildo Magalhães. Nos artigos que compõe o volume, mais até que os debates calorosos sobre a reordenação das finanças e das economias globais, o que o tema da energia põe em perspectiva é a própria sobrevivência e o destino da humanidade. Nenhuma outra pauta é mais candente, grave e urgente.

Difundiu-se em ampla escala uma consciência dos limites estreitos das fontes energéticas não renováveis. Contudo, o que esteve longe do limiar da percepção pública durante o apogeu do boom econômico do pós-segunda guerra mundial, durante o qual se consolidou um modelo da sociedade marcado pelo grande consumo energético. Nos anos 1950 e 1960, o estilo de vida norte-americano consolidou-se como um modelo, com seus os subúrbios de casas climatizadas cheias de eletrodomésticos, conectadas por automóveis e vias expressas à uma vasta rede de entretenimentos, supermercados e shopping centers. Porém, desde a crise do petróleo, em meados da década de 1970, foi ficando cada vez mais claro que esse modelo se esgotava tão rápido quanto os recursos que ele avidamente dilapidava.

Foi nesse contexto que os historiadores começaram a voltar sua atenção para a questão crucial dos sistemas energéticos e seu papel singular tanto na organização do trabalho quanto na sobrevivência e do padrão de vida coletivo. Este livro, com seus diferentes pontos de vista, discute essas questões de maneira aprofundada e, principalmente, atual.

Educational cliff in Brazil: alo, alo decadencia, aqui estamos nos...

Abismo na educação

19 de dezembro de 2012 | 2h 07
Editorial O Estado de S.Paulo
O fracasso das políticas públicas para o ensino médio no Brasil ficou ainda mais evidente pelos resultados, por escola, do Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio (Enem) de 2011. Nesta edição, o Ministério da Educação deixou de fora escolas que tiveram participação de menos de 50% de seus alunos - a inscrição no exame não é obrigatória. Com isso, foram excluídos da lista vários colégios particulares tradicionais que haviam obtido boas notas na edição anterior, em 2010, mas cujos alunos não se interessam pelo Enem como forma de ingressar na universidade. Mesmo assim, das 100 escolas de melhor desempenho, apenas 10 são públicas, e quase todas são ligadas a instituições militares, a universidades federais e ao ensino técnico - cujo processo de ingresso de estudantes é tão disputado quanto o das melhores faculdades. Considerando-se que as escolas privadas respondem por somente 12,2% do total de matrículas no ensino médio no Brasil, o quadro é devastador.
Formalmente, o exame não se presta a medir a qualidade das escolas, e sim a competência dos alunos, razão pela qual é usado como meio de seleção para universidades. No entanto, os resultados deixam claro não só que as escolas particulares continuam mais bem preparadas para ensinar as disciplinas exigidas no processo de seleção, como também que as escolas públicas não conseguiram acompanhar as mudanças do Enem. Resultado: o número de escolas da rede pública entre as 100 que obtiveram os melhores resultados caiu de 13 para 10 entre 2010 e 2011; já entre as 50 mais bem colocadas, o total recuou de 6 para 3.
A crise no ensino médio fica ainda mais evidente quando se constata que 92% das escolas estaduais, onde está a maioria dos alunos, obtiveram pontuação abaixo da média geral na prova objetiva. No ranking, a primeira escola, ligada à Universidade Estadual do Rio, aparece somente na 60.ª colocação. A primeira escola estadual sem nenhum vínculo com universidades ou com ensino técnico surge num distante 248.º lugar. O Rio, Estado de melhor desempenho na rede pública estadual, teve apenas 18% das escolas com notas acima da média geral. Em São Paulo, foram 14%. No Ceará, apenas 2%.
O ministro da Educação, Aloizio Mercadante, torturou os números para extrair conclusões positivas dos resultados. Ele afirmou que a média da pontuação dos 37,5 mil alunos de escolas públicas mais bem colocados - isto é, dos estudantes que teriam direito a cotas nas universidades federais - foi de 630,4, contra os 569,2 obtidos, em média, pelo total de estudantes das escolas particulares. Logo, segundo Mercadante, os alunos de escolas públicas não farão feio ao ingressar nas universidades por meio das cotas. Nem é o caso de notar que se trata de comparar bananas com abacaxis - afinal, essa elite das escolas públicas, festejada pelo ministro, vai disputar vagas em universidades não com a média geral dos alunos das escolas privadas, mas com a elite dessas escolas, cujo desempenho é significativamente melhor.
Ademais, é o caso de perguntar ao ministro por que razão ele defende as cotas se os alunos das escolas públicas parecem, em sua opinião, tão bem preparados para enfrentar o vestibular e a concorrência das escolas privadas. A realidade, essa madrasta, mostra porém que a aposta nas cotas é o que resta a um governo que não investe na melhoria do ensino público, cujos resultados pioram a cada ano. A conta dessa distorção não tardará a ser cobrada. Em 2015 haverá reserva de 50% de vagas universitárias federais para alunos da rede pública, ou 150 mil matrículas. Segundo os números do Enem de 2011, a média dos 150 mil melhores alunos das escolas públicas, que teriam direito às cotas em 2015, foi de 582,2 pontos, bem abaixo do desempenho dos alunos da rede particular. E mesmo excluídas do cálculo as notas da prova de redação, que normalmente pioram o resultado dos alunos de escolas públicas, a média geral da rede pública foi de 474,2 pontos, muito distante dos 569,2 pontos obtidos nas escolas privadas. São fatos que a demagogia das cotas não corrigirá.

Feliz 2014! - Rolf Kuntz

Ops, me antecipei.
Mas não muito.
A continuar essa política econômica de improvisações, puxadinhos, medidas setoriais que não alcançam sequer um setor inteiro, esse arbítrio nas decisões, essa falta de visão completa sobre o que fazer para melhorar a competitividade das empresas brasileiras, parece que 2013 não vai ser brilhante.
Portanto, feliz 2014...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

É bom olhar além de 2013

19 de dezembro de 2012 | 2h 09
Rolf Kuntz - O Estado de S.Paulo
A economia brasileira vai melhorar no próximo ano, mas a exportação continuará em marcha lenta, segundo as primeiras projeções oficiais das contas externas de 2013, divulgadas na terça-feira pelo Banco Central (BC). O superávit comercial deverá diminuir de US$ 19 bilhões neste ano para US$ 17 bilhões em 2013, porque o valor importado ainda crescerá mais velozmente que a receita das vendas ao exterior. Mesmo sem detalhes, o recado parece claro: o aumento da demanda interna será em boa parte coberto por produtores de fora, embora o mercado brasileiro ainda seja um dos mais fechados do mundo. A indústria nacional crescerá, mas em ritmo ainda moderado e com muita dificuldade para enfrentar a concorrência estrangeira. O otimismo exibido pelos dirigentes do BC, em suas manifestações públicas, fica um tanto murcho quando se examinam as novas projeções do balanço de pagamentos publicadas pela instituição.
Os economistas do BC elevaram de US$ 18 bilhões para US$ 19 bilhões o superávit comercial estimado para este ano. O valor previsto para as exportações foi reduzido de US$ 248 bilhões para US$ 245 bilhões. No caso das importações, o corte foi um pouco maior, de US$ 230 bilhões para US$ 226 bilhões. A revisão parece compatível com as últimas informações do Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior. De janeiro até a segunda semana de dezembro, o País exportou US$ 233,1 bilhões e importou US$ 215,1 bilhões.
Se os búzios, cartas e bolas de cristal do BC estiverem bem regulados, o valor exportado pelo Brasil neste ano será 4,3% menor que o de 2011. O valor da importação praticamente se repetirá. No próximo ano, a receita será 9,4% maior que a deste ano e apenas 4,7% superior à de 2011. A despesa será 11,1% maior que a de 2012. O superávit encolherá 10,5% em 2013, depois de já ter diminuído 36,2% neste ano.
Faltam, na tabela do BC, detalhes sobre a evolução das vendas de produtos básicos e de manufaturados. De toda forma, os autores das projeções parecem pouco ou nada otimistas quanto aos efeitos da depreciação cambial. Nos 12 meses terminados em outubro, houve um ajuste de 11,9% na taxa de câmbio real efetiva (ponderada pela participação dos 15 maiores parceiros nas exportações brasileiras). Em relação ao dólar americano, a depreciação da moeda brasileira chegou a 11%. Os empresários industriais aplaudem o ajuste cambial realizado até agora, mas defendem uma desvalorização maior. Segundo o presidente da Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp), Paulo Skaf, a cotação de equilíbrio deve estar na faixa de R$ 2,30 a R$ 2,40 por dólar.
Enquanto isso, o BC intervém no mercado para manter a taxa abaixo de R$ 2,10 e eleva de US$ 1 bilhão para US$ 3 bilhões o limite das posições vendidas dos bancos. Superado o teto, passa a valer o depósito compulsório de 60%. O objetivo, também nesse caso, é conter a alta do dólar. Falta ver como será a política depois de encerradas as pressões da virada de ano. Mas o pessoal do BC parece disposto, pelas indicações dos últimos dias, a tomar cuidado para evitar mais pressões inflacionárias. Isso deve restringir tanto o afrouxamento monetário quanto a depreciação cambial. O presidente do BC, Alexandre Tombini, também mencionou, num encontro com jornalistas em Brasília, na segunda-feira, as perspectivas de moderação nos aumentos salariais e na expansão do crédito nos próximos meses.
Se essas condições forem confirmadas, os estímulos à expansão do consumo privado serão menos intensos do que foram até este ano, mas a preservação de um bom nível de emprego ainda poderá proporcionar às famílias a segurança necessária para ir às compras. De toda forma, será indispensável uma taxa maior de investimento para garantir um crescimento mais veloz, provavelmente no intervalo de 3% a 4%.
Se governo e setor privado investirem o equivalente a uns 20% do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB), 2013 estará quase certamente salvo. Mas será preciso mais que isso para impulsionar uma expansão na faixa de 4% a 5% por vários anos. Além disso, será necessário cuidar da eficiência e da qualidade do investimento, dois itens amplamente negligenciados no setor público. Não basta, por exemplo, gastar bilhões de dólares numa refinaria mal planejada, num petroleiro lançado muito antes de ter condições de navegar ou em instalações de geração de energia sem linhas de transmissão. A médio e a longo prazos, são esses os detalhes realmente importantes, muito mais que a taxa de câmbio. Moeda depreciada e barreiras protecionistas nunca serão suficientes para compensar as ineficiências do sistema produtivo. Curiosamente, alguns empresários e economistas parecem acreditar nisso.
* JORNALISTA

A deploravel (nao-, ou ma'-)educacao na America Latina - Jorge Grunberg

Um excelente texto, de um ano atrás (mas a situação só pode ter piorado desde então), sobre a deseducação na América Latina, no Brasil em particular...
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

El fatalismo es fatal: Algunas reflexiones sobre la decepción latinoamericanaDr. Jorge Grunberg
Rector de la Universidad ORT Uruguay
Conferencia dictada en la B´nai B´rith 2011 Policy Conference
Radisson Victoria Plaza Hotel, Montevideo, Uruguay
(Versión editada) 4 de diciembre de 2011

Hoy voy a compartir con Uds. algunas opiniones, datos para apoyar esas opiniones y una conclusión a modo de alerta. Esa conclusión es que el fatalismo está resultando fatal para América Latina. La cultura latinoamericana está afectada por una alta dosis de fatalismo que intenta explicar nuestros retrasos actuales exclusivamente por acciones de una variedad de enemigos externos, quitándonos todo libre albedrío y responsabilidad a los latinoamericanos y dejando muy pocas alternativas de cambiar positivamente nuestro rumbo y destino en base a nuestro esfuerzo. (...)
La demanda por materias primas y la crisis de los países desarrollados han creado una sensación de euforia en muchos latinoamericanos. Por ejemplo la señora del Presidente uruguayo dijo la semana pasada en Buenos Aires que América Latina tiene “muchas lecciones para dictar a los países desarrollados”. El Presidente de Méjico, anteayer dijo en una de las tantas cumbres de Presidentes, que estaba seguro que esta es “la década de Latinoamérica”. Esta euforia no es infundada.
Los resultados económicos de los últimos años de la década de 2000 fueron los mejores para América Latina en mucho tiempo, como se puede ver en la figura 1. Si la región continúa con este ritmo, en 2025 el promedio del PBI per cápita de América Latina va a ser el que hoy tiene España. Pero, ¿está justificada esta euforia?, ¿es sostenible este éxito económico?

Ler a íntegra, neste link:
http://www.ort.edu.uy/home/rectorado/pdf/rectorortbnaibrith041211.pdf