The world according to Beijing - Kevin Rudd (Australia)

The Australian, Sydney – 12.7.2018

Xi Jinping’s Vision for Global Governance

Last month, the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded its Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, the second since Xi Jinping became China’s undisputed ruler in 2012. These meetings express how the leadership sees China’s place in the world, but they tell the world much about China as well.

Kevin Rudd

New York - The contrast between the disarray in the West, on open display at the NATO summit and at last month’s G7 meeting in Canada, and China’s mounting international self-confidence is growing clearer by the day. Last month, the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded its Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, the second since Xi Jinping became China’s undisputed ruler in 2012. These meetings are not everyday affairs. They are the clearest expression of how the leadership sees China’s place in the world, but they tell the world much about China as well.

The last such conference, in 2014, marked the funeral of Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “hide your strength, bide your time, never take the lead,” and heralded a new era of international activism. In part, this change reflected Xi’s centralization of control, Chinese leaders’ conclusion that American power is in relative decline, and their view that China had become an indispensable global economic player.

Since 2014, China has expanded and consolidated its military position in the South China Sea. It took the idea of the New Silk Road and turned it into a multi-trillion-dollar trade, investment, infrastructure, and wider geopolitical/geo-economic initiative, engaging 73 different countries across much of Eurasia, Africa and beyond. And China signed up most of the developed world to the first large-scale non-Bretton Woods multilateral development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

China has also launched diplomatic initiatives beyond its immediate sphere of strategic interest in East Asia, as well as actively participating in initiatives such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. It has developed naval bases in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti, and participates in naval exercises with Russia as far away as the Mediterranean and the Baltic. In March, China established its own international development agency.

The emergence of a coherent grand strategy (regardless of whether the West chooses to recognize it as such) is not all that has changed since 2014. For starters, the emphasis on the CPC’s role is much stronger than before. Xi, concerned that the party had become marginal to the country’s major policy debates, has reasserted party control over state institutions and given precedence to political ideology over technocratic policymaking. Xi is determined to defy the trend-line of Western history, to see off Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” culminating in the general triumph of liberal democratic capitalism, and preserve a Leninist state for the long term.

This approach – known as “Xi Jinping Thought” – now suffuses China’s foreign policy framework. In particular, Xi’s view that that there are identifiable immutable “laws” of historical development, both prescriptive and predictive, was particularly prominent at last month’s foreign policy conference. If this sounds like old-fashioned dialectical materialism, that’s because it is. Xi embraces the Marxist-Leninist tradition as his preferred intellectual framework.

Given its emphasis on iron laws of political and economic development, a dialectical-materialist worldview means that there is nothing random about world events. So, Xi argues, if Marx’s analytical framework is applied to the current period, it is clear that the global order is at a turning point, with the West’s relative decline coinciding with the fortuitous national and international circumstances enabling China’s rise. In Xi’s words, “China has been in the best period of development since modern times, while the world is undergoing the most profound and unprecedented changes in a century.” Of course, formidable obstacles lie ahead for China. But Xi has concluded that the obstacles facing the US and the West are greater.

How such thinking will now drive China’s concrete foreign policy is anyone’s guess. But how one-party states, particularly Marxist states, choose to “ideate” reality matters a great deal: it is how the system speaks to itself. And Xi’s message to China’s foreign policy elite is one of great confidence.

Specifically, the Central Conference called for the country’s international policy institutions and personnel to embrace Xi’s agenda. Here Xi seems to have the foreign ministry in his sights. There is a strong ideological flavor to Xi’s apparent frustration with the ministry’s glacial approach to policy innovation. China’s diplomats were urged to bear in mind that they are first and foremost “party cadres,” suggesting that Xi is likely to push the foreign policy apparatus toward greater activism, to give full effect to his emerging global vision.

The biggest change to emerge from last month’s conference concerns global governance. In 2014, Xi referred to an impending struggle for the future structure of the international order. While he did not elaborate, much work has since been devoted to three inter-related concepts: guoji zhixu (the international order); guoji xitong (the international system), and quanqiu zhili (global governance).

Of course, these terms have different and overlapping meanings in English, too. But, broadly speaking, in Chinese, the term “international order” refers to a combination of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the G20, and other multilateral institutions (which China accepts), as well as the US system of global alliances (which China does not). The term “international system” tends to refer to the first half of this international order: the complex web of multilateral institutions that operate under international treaty law and seek to govern the global commons on the basis of the principle of shared sovereignty. And “global governance” denotes the actual performance of the “international system” so defined.

What is startlingly new about Xi’s remarks at the Central Conference was his call for China now to “lead the reform of the global governance system with the concepts of fairness and justice.” This is by far the most direct statement of China’s intentions on this important question offered so far. The world should buckle up and get ready for a new wave of Chinese international policy activism.

Like much of the rest of the international community, China is acutely conscious of the dysfunctionality of much of the current multilateral system. So Xi’s wish to lead “reform of the global governance system” is no accident. It reflects growing diplomatic activism in multilateral institutions, in order to reorient them in a direction more compatible with what China regards as its “core national interests.”

Xi has reminded China’s international policy elite that the totality of China’s future foreign policy direction, including the reform of global governance, must be driven by these core national interests. In this context, China also wants a more “multipolar” international system. This is code for a world in which the role of the United States and the West is substantially reduced.

The challenge for the rest of the international community is to define what type of global order we now want. What do existing institutions like the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or the African Union want for the international rules-based system for the future? What exactly does the US want, with or without Trump? And how will we collectively preserve the global values embodied in the UN Charter, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

The future of the global order is in a state of flux. China has a clear script for the future. It’s time for the rest of the international community to develop one of its own.

Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia, is President of the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York and Chair of the Independent Commission on Multilateralism.

This is an edited version of an address delivered to the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore.

Madeleine Albright: uma grande entrevista com a grande dama da diplomacia americana

Der Spiegel, Hamburgo – 11.7.2018

Interview with Madeleine Albright'I Am an Optimist Who Worries A Lot'

Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 81, is concerned about the possibility of a new rise of fascism in the world. But she remains confident in the strength of liberal democracy and its institutions. 

Interview by Christoph Scheuermann

She could long-since have stopped working. At 81 years old, she can look back at a successful career in diplomacy, numerous books and a flourishing consulting firm. But Madeleine Albright is not the kind of person who can just disappear into retirement. She remains the Grande Dame of U.S. foreign policy, a career she began as UN ambassador in New York from 1997 to 2001 before becoming President Bill Clinton's secretary of state.

She focused on the Middle East conflict, the development of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and North Korea's nuclear program -- all issues that have not disappeared. Even today, she remains a keen observer of world events and takes a global view of trends and developments. The most important issue that is currently driving Albright is U.S. President Donald Trump, who has inflicted grave damaged to the trans-Atlantic relationship and has taken aim at the Western political order, an order that Albright helped create. In mid-July, her most recent book is appearing in German, the English title of which is "Fascism: A Warning."

She receives visitors in her office in Washington, D.C. In the corner is a stuffed tiger toy with a huge package of Toblerone chocolate on it, a gift from her students at Georgetown University. Albright points to a framed photo on the wall of an extract from the passenger list of the SS America, the ship on which she traveled to America from Europe following World War II.

Albright: You can see my name written over here, Marie Korbelova, 11 years old. Korbelova is my maiden name. I came to the U.S. on Nov. 11, 1948, on the SS America, together with my three siblings and my parents. Next to the passenger manifest you can see my commissions from former President Bill Clinton and the Medal of Freedom from ex-President Barack Obama. This is my life story if you will.

DER SPIEGEL: You were born in Prague, fled from the Nazis during World War II to London, and later escaped from communism to the U.S. How did this experience shape you in later life?

Albright: I saw what difference it makes when the United States is involved in global matters - and when not. The Munich Conference in 1938 is the watershed episode. It was an agreement made between the French and British with the Germans and Italians, without Czechoslovakia, and without the United States at the table. Hitler was allowed to take a part of Czechoslovakia. And when America came in, that made every difference. After 1945, as a result of the arrangements made during the war, Europe was divided into half and the country where I was born was behind the Iron Curtain for 40 years. So in my own case I can argue that when the U.S. is not involved then bad things happen. The U.S. needs to be a part of it.

DER SPIEGEL: If you look at the state of the West today, are you optimistic or pessimistic?

Albright: Well, I'm an optimist who worries a lot.

DER SPIEGEL: You write in your book that you fear a return to the international climate that prevailed in the 1920s and '30s. What do you mean by that?

Albright: When I wrote this book, I decided I needed to do something that was historical, not emotional. There are striking similarities between then and now that have to do with divisions in society, a sense that there are winners and losers in economic terms, and politicians that take advantage of these divisions. Instead of looking for common ground they do everything they can to exacerbate the divisions. I believe in patriotism, but I am concerned by nationalism. We've all benefitted from globalization, in many ways, but it also is a doubleedged sword, because people seem to have lost their identity, and a feeling of belonging.

DER SPIEGEL: The title of your book is "Fascism: A Warning." Isn't that a bit alarmist? Is there really a threat of falling back into fascism?

Albright: It is supposed to be alarmist. But I specifically made clear that I don't think President Donald Trump is a fascist. He is antidemocratic; he does not respect democratic institutions like the free press, which he calls "enemies of the people." At the end of the book I say: If people think I'm sounding alarmist, it's because of the times we live in.

DER SPIEGEL: A majority of Americans thinks Trump isn't doing a good job, his core base represents only around a third of the electorate. Aren't you over-estimating the power of populists?

Albright: Better to over-estimate than assume all is well when it is not. The fact is that Trump's approval ratings are rising, not falling.Republican politicians are afraid to oppose him. Week by week, he is changing the nature of political debate, and we need to pay attention to that. I think the best quote in the book is from Mussolini: "If you pluck the chicken one feather at a time people won't notice."

DER SPIEGEL: Do you think democracy is fading as a grand idea?

Albright: No. And just because I see signs of fascism, it's not necessarily the same fascism as we witnessed during the 20th century. The Third Reich won't reappear. Democracy goes back to the ancient Greeks and there are various ways that democracy has been practiced throughout history. In the end, liberal democracy prevailed. "Compromise" is a good word, it's the element of democracy. But there are those leaders who operate on the basis of exacerbating divisions in society for their own advantage. By doing so, they're destroying the possibility of finding common ground.

DER SPIEGEL: Why do you think so many people mistrust their elected governments?

Albright: There's always this argument as to what comes first -- political development or economic development. Because people want to vote for their representatives and they want to eat. The bottom line is, democracy has to deliver. And there has been a sense, in some places, that democracy has not really effectively addressed this growing division between the rich and the poor. Citizens demand jobs, a working healthcare system, education. Populists offer seemingly easy solutions, they say "I've got an easy answer for you," and that's what we're watching now.

DER SPIEGEL: Your own Democratic Party is struggling to deal with politicians like Donald Trump. Why is this?

Albright: I believe the social contract that used to keep our societies together has broken. People gave up some of their individual rights in order to be protected by the state, and to have the state also provide a certain number of services to them. What has happened over the years is that neither side has kept its part of the bargain. The state has neglected its citizens, and the citizens evade taxes and are willing to be seduced by populists. I think now we have to figure out how to get the social contract back into some kind of genuine contract where both sides know what they're supposed to be doing. At the moment we are in that period where both the far-left and the far-right are taking advantage of the divisions and uncertainties to exacerbate them.

DER SPIEGEL: As secretary of state in the Clinton administration, you saw a fascist system from up close when you traveled to North Korea in 2000. You met Kim Jong Un's father and spoke with him for 12 hours. What did you learn in Pyongyang?

Albright: Well, first of all, we didn't know a lot, frankly, about that regime. I said repeatedly that the Kim dynasty really is one of fascists. What they developed there is, first of all, a narrative that they were being attacked by everybody in the world, and, therefore, they were able to use the propaganda to isolate and starve their people completely, while at the same time glorifying themselves. Kim Jong Il was smart, a fascinating character. He had kind of a colorful aspect to him in terms of wanting to be a movie director. He knew all about who won Oscars at the Academy Awards.

DER SPIEGEL: Kim Jong Il desperately wanted to meet President Clinton. Why did that never happen - contrary to the meeting between Trump and Kim?

Albright: President Clinton was deeply involved in the Middle East peace talks at the time. Ultimately, he wasn't successful, he ran out of time. But we had been dealing with North Korea over two presidential terms, between 1993 and 2000. Pyongyang threatened to leave the non-proliferation treaty, which they later did in fact. We negotiated a framework agreement to deal with North Korea's nuclear program; we had communication channels open on various levels. President Clinton said he would certainly travel to Pyongyang at some point.

DER SPIEGEL: Then George W. Bush was elected and included North Korea in the "axis of evil." Three years later, North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb.

Albright: But when we left office, there were no nuclear weapons. There was some fissile material -- we thought just enough to make one or two bombs -- and no ICBMs.

DER SPIEGEL: Kim Jong Un promised in the meeting with President Trump to end his nuclear program. Do you think North Korea is trustworthy?

Albright: There has to be an independent regime of verification, no matter what. We have to define "denuclearization" and what the parameters of the verification process should be. Which is why it's so crazy that President Trump tore apart the Iran nuclear deal, which has a very tough nuclear verification process.

DER SPIEGEL: Do you see a chance of rescuing the nuclear deal with Iran at all?

Albright: I hope it can be rescued. I've made very clear that I was supportive of the deal when it was negotiated, even though I knew that not everything could be dealt with all at once.

DER SPIEGEL: It didn't stop Iran from expanding its sphere of influence in the Middle East, though. Is Trump right when he says that we Europeans were naïve when it came to the intentions of Tehran?

Albright: I wouldn't say naïve. Iran is kind of putting its tentacles out in many directions, to Hamas in Palestine, to Hezbollah in Lebanon, to Yemen. There are some justified concerns about that. But us pulling out of the agreement makes dealing with the tentacles harder and more complicated.

DER SPIEGEL: The conflict surrounding the Iran agreement is not the only one between the Trump administration and Europe. Trump is waging a trade war against the EU. He speaks about friends as though they were enemies. Nothing seems to help to calm his anger down. Are we seeing the end of diplomacy?

Albright: No, I don't think so. We are all democratic countries, and just in the last days and weeks, some members of the House of Representatives and the Senate came forward to take action and limit the powers of the president in terms of some of the trade policies. We still do have checks and balances. But what worries me is that people will be deflected by those conflicts on the surface from actually trying to solve the underlying problems.

DER SPIEGEL: Trump attacks Germany and the German government on a regular basis. At the G-7 in Canada he reportedly threw Starbursts on Merkel's table and said: "Don't say I never gave you anything." What is a good strategy for dealing with a man like this?

Albright: Individual relationships at the top, between heads of state and government, obviously make a difference. But foreign policy shouldn't be based on personality. Even during the Cold War, there were people who really did talk about the fact that it was important to have relationships with the Soviet Union at other levels. The world is in disarray, but I think that there are mechanisms which help to foster a variety of discussions on a technical and diplomatic level.

DER SPIEGEL: But what can you do with a president who has such contempt for international institutions like the World Trade Organization or NATO?

Albright: Many people still believe U.S. foreign policy comes in fouryear segments. But it doesn't. We've had 70 years of good relations with Europe, not always exactly similar. We've had many highs and lows, and that's the way to look at the current administration. Under this president, trans-Atlantic relations are going through a difficult period, but I don't think we should give up on it. It will persist.

DER SPIEGEL: President Trump demands more commitment and more contributions from his European allies, while at the same time, he is cozying up to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Do you fear NATO is losing its relevance for European security?

Albright: Despite recent controversy, NATO remains the world's most potent and versatile institution of its type. Every Alliance member has agreed, in the past, to devote at least 2 percent of its GDP to defense spending. In urging support for this standard, President Trump is merely echoing past U.S. presidents, as well as NATO leaders. There is also nothing remarkable about American or European heads of government meeting with the president of Russia. It is vital, however, that leaders on both sides of the Atlantic reaffirm their commitment to a cooperative and productive partnership. The alliance is only as strong as the bonds of friendship and trust that exists between and among its members.

DER SPIEGEL: European security and stability are being challenged on multiple fronts -- by Russia, by immigration, by the war in Syria; the list could go on. Is there a role for NATO in this scenario at all?

Albright: NATO's revised doctrine seeks to defend member states from security threats that are both direct and indirect, new and old. NATO has a clear role, therefore, in safeguarding members from potential aggression by Russia and in containing the threat posed by cyberattacks and international terrorism. However, as a military alliance, NATO does not infringe on civilian policy matters -- such as immigration -- that are rightfully the concern of national governments and the EU.

DER SPIEGEL: Do you think that the relationship between Trump and Putin is a danger for Europe?

Albright: I expect that, during the NATO summit in Brussels, President Trump and alliance leaders will have time to discuss a coordinated approach to various topics related to Russia. My hope is that they will agree to continue supporting the sovereignty of Ukraine, a negotiated end to the war in Syria, and opposition to Russian-sponsored interference in democratic elections.

DER SPIEGEL: You are friends with former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who says that we can't take the trans-Atlantic alliance for granted anymore. German Chancellor Angela Merkel says we can no longer rely on America. Aren't those signs that the trans-Atlantic relationship is already imploding?

Albright: The worst thing would be to give up now, wouldn't it? Joschka Fischer is one of my dearest friends and I admire him tremendously. It doesn't hurt to put out a warning of that kind, just the way my book is a warning, because I think that people need to be aware of the discontinuity and what is going on. But what is going on right now will not be solved by saying: "It's all over." The European Union, too, has internal issues, for example how Hungary and Poland are behaving, and what structures can be used to deal with that. Many Europeans were upset when Obama said that we were going to pivot to Asia, and I would say regularly, the U.S. is not monogamous. We are an Atlantic and a Pacific power.

DER SPIEGEL: Are you concerned that Trump insults even his closest allies like Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada, whom he called "very dishonest and weak?"

Albright: This can't possibly help. I was very distressed by that. I have never seen behavior like that from an American president. I was taking part in a conference at the time, which was run by Lloyd Axworthy, the former Foreign Minister of Canada. I was wearing a pin with a maple leaf on it -- the Canadian flag. For me, the Canadians are the best international citizens that exist. They have participated in peacekeeping operations, had done tremendous work at the International Criminal Court, fought against land mines, all kinds of things. They are remarkable, and the best allies. We have a 3,000mile border with them, and so I'm hoping that this will get worked out.

DER SPIEGEL: The whole situation seems to be getting more difficult and complex every day, and yet you don't seem fearful or desperate.

Albright: The world is in chaos, but from the perspective of a political scientist, it's a very interesting time. Western institutions, just like people at the age of 70, need a little refurbishing. Perhaps the time is now. What we need is the best minds to try to solve 21st century problems.

DER SPIEGEL: But do we have enough time left, considering the deterioration of the transAtlantic alliance and a rising China that is becoming ever more powerful?

Albright: I think it just requires all of our attention.

DER SPIEGEL: Will Trump be re-elected in 2020?

Albright: I know what I hope, but I have no idea.

FMI conclui exame do Brasil sob Artigo IV

International Monetary Fund, Washington DC – 11.7.2018

IMF Executive Board Concludes 2018 Article IV Consultation with Brazil

On July 9, 2018, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation [1] with Brazil.

A mild recovery supported by accommodative monetary and fiscal policies is currently underway. But the economy is underperforming relative to its potential, public debt is high and increasing, and, more importantly, medium-term growth prospects remain uninspiring, absent further reforms. Against the backdrop of tightening global financial conditions, placing Brazil on a path of strong, balanced and durable growth requires a committed pursuit of fiscal consolidation, ambitious structural reforms, and a strengthening of the financial sector architecture .

Following the severe recession in 2015-16, real GDP grew by 1 percent in 2017. Growth is projected to be 1.8 and 2.5 percent in 2018 and 2019, respectively, driven by a recovery in domestic consumption and investment. Even if federal expenditure remains constant in real terms at its 2016 level, as mandated by a constitutional rule, public debt is expected to rise further and peak in 2023 at above 90 percent of GDP. Fiscal consolidation is key to maintain confidence in debt sustainability. Brazil is also vulnerable to a tightening of global financial conditions and possible trade disruptions, even though trade diversion effects may attenuate the impact. These risks can be compounded if there is no continuity in the reform agenda.

The fiscal deficit has declined, but public debt is growing and deeper reforms are lagging. Non-financial public-sector debt rose from 78.3 percent of GDP to 84 percent between 2016 and 2017. The primary fiscal deficit declined to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2017, below the authorities’ target, reflecting under-execution of spending. The government aims to restore fiscal sustainability by faster fiscal consolidation than implied by the expenditure ceiling, depending on revenue performance. For 2018, they aim to bring the primary deficit down by keeping discretionary spending under control, containing wage increases, and optimizing social benefits eligibility, where possible.

Inflation has declined to record lows. During 2017, inflation decreased from 6.3 to 2.9 percent, just below the target range, owing largely to slack in the economy, a notable fall in food prices due to an exceptional harvest, and well-anchored expectations. Inflation is projected to increase towards the 4.25 midpoint of the inflation target in 2019, as the food price shock dissipates and the output gap narrows. Since the beginning of the easing cycle in September 2016, the Central Bank has lowered the policy rate by 775 bps to the record low level of 6.5 percent.

The current account deficit shrank from 4.2 percent of GDP in 2014 to 0.5 in 2017 as imports contracted with the collapse of private investment. As the recovery gains strength, the rebound in investment will offset the effects of fiscal consolidation and lead to a deterioration of the current account to about ‑2 percent of GDP over the medium term. On average in 2017, the external position was broadly consistent with medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies. Brazil has continued to attract sizeable capital inflows, especially foreign direct investment.

Banks have been broadly resilient. Despite large losses during the 2015-16 recession, the recent FSAP found the banks to be well capitalized, profitable, and liquid, in large part reflecting high interest margins and fees. The economic recovery led to a decline in loan losses, which boosted profits. Capital ratios are above regulatory minima. The FSAP systemic risk analysis suggests that bank solvency and liquidity are broadly resilient to further severe macro-financial shocks.

Executive Board Assessment

Executive Directors concurred that Brazil’s economic recovery is under way but remains subject to significant downside risks stemming from uncertainty regarding the continuity of reforms and the ongoing tightening of global financial conditions. Directors encouraged the authorities to continue their efforts to ensure fiscal sustainability and remove structural impediments to strong and durable growth.

Directors underscored that, given the high level of public debt, continued fiscal consolidation is of paramount importance. They regretted that some measures for the 2018 budget could not be passed, but noted positively the authorities’ commitment to save any revenue overperformance. Directors agreed that pension reform is imperative to ensure the sustainability of the system and improve equity. Additional expenditure measures could include decisive efforts to contain the public wage bill while protecting public investment and social programs. Reforms to simplify taxes should be considered and the fiscal framework should continue to be strengthened.

Directors welcomed the reduction in inflation and the anchoring of inflation expectations. They agreed that the current monetary policy stance is appropriate and should remain accommodative to help close the output gap but should be vigilant to domestic and external sources of inflationary pressures.

Directors underscored that the floating exchange rate regime and the large reserve buffers are important cornerstones of the policy framework and should be preserved. They recommended that intervention in the foreign exchange market be limited to addressing disorderly conditions. Monetary policy should respond to movements in the exchange rate only insofar as there are risks for inflation expectations. In this context, Directors underscored the importance of central bank independence.

Directors concurred that the financial system is broadly resilient. Nonetheless, they agreed with the FSAP recommendation that further action is needed to strengthen the microprudential, macroprudential, and safety net frameworks. Directors underscored the importance of improving the efficiency of the financial system, especially by reducing the high intermediation costs.

Directors welcomed the recent reforms to the labor market and subsidized credit. Nonetheless, they urged the authorities to proceed with additional prioritized structural reforms, which are essential to raise productivity and potential growth. Reforms should focus on reducing state intervention in credit markets, enhancing trade integration, and improving public infrastructure. Directors underscored that the ongoing efforts to combat corruption and money laundering are vital to secure strong and inclusive growth.

Sun Tzu para diplomatas: uma estrategia não belicosa - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Um amigo destes espaços cibernéticos enviou-me o excelente livro de Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: classical strategic thought (3rd edition, revised, expanded), o que me fez lembrar de um divertissement que eu tinha feito alguns anos atrás.
Fui buscar, justamente parodiando o mestre da estratégia militar desde a mais remota antiguidade.
Ei-lo.

Formação de uma estratégia diplomática

Relendo Sun Tzu para fins menos belicosos

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

(www.pralmeida.org;http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Resumo: Releitura introdutória do clássico Arte da Guerra, de Sun Tzu, adaptando seus argumentos para o objetivo de formulação de uma estratégia diplomática, necessariamente distinta da concepção militar que presidiu à sua elaboração.

Palavras-chave: Sun Tzu. Arte da Guerra. Estratégia diplomática.

Os argumentos constantes do presente ensaio analítico se inserem num conjunto de trabalhos – já feitos ou em preparação – que podem ser enfeixados na categoria dos “clássicos revisitados”, entre os quais um Manifesto Comunista adaptado a estes tempos de globalização,[1]e um Moderno Príncipe,[2]que pretende aproveitar os conceitos do florentino para a política atual. Da mesma forma, pode-se reler Sun Tzu e aproveitar os ensinamentos contido na Arte da Guerra[3]para uma reflexão de caráter conceitual sobre a estratégia diplomática – referida simplesmente como ED – no contexto das relações internacionais contemporâneas. A esse título, não se trata de refazer, obviamente, uma “arte da guerra para diplomatas”, e sim tão somente de tecer considerações sobre uma (e não a) estratégia diplomática, com base nos argumentos basicamente filosóficos – e, claro, muitas regras práticas – presumivelmente redigidos pelo conhecido mestre chinês, legitimamente considerado o “pai da estratégia” (no seu caso, militar).

Da diplomacia como um instrumento do Estado

A diplomacia é de vital importância para o Estado. Talvez não tão crucial quanto a defesa do Estado por suas forças armadas, pois destas depende a própria sobrevivência física do Estado. Este pode, teoricamente sobreviver sem manter intensas relações internacionais, ou sem exercer uma diplomacia ativa. Mas ele dificilmente teria vida longa, ou conseguiria preservar seus interesses vitais, sem uma capacitação adequada em matéria de instrumentos defensivos (que são, igualmente, mecanismos ofensivos, credíveis, tanto para a dissuasão quanto para o ataque).

A diplomacia é, todavia, crescentemente relevante não apenas para a defesa dos interesses fundamentais de um Estado, mas sobretudo para se alcançar os objetivos nacionais relevantes de uma nação no contexto contemporâneo, partindo do pressuposto que a sociedade humana e a comunidade das nações se afastam, cada vez mais, do direito da força para aderir à força do direito. O mundo contemporâneo abandonou, progressivamente, os esquemas restritos dos arranjos interimperiais – embora a última instância da política internacional permaneça com as grandes potências – para adentrar no multilateralismo dos esquemas de segurança coletiva consolidados nos instrumentos onusianos. Da diplomacia depende – paralelamente ao exercício potencial do poder militar – a preservação de um ambiente de paz e de estabilidade, tanto quanto de cooperação nos planos bilateral, regional ou multilateral a que aspira todo Estado que privilegia a solução de controvérsias pela via das negociações. Esta é uma condição essencial, hoje indispensável, para o crescimento econômico sustentado, os avanços tecnológicos, o progresso social, a preservação do meio ambiente, enfim, para a prosperidade comum.

Adaptando nossa releitura de Sun Tzu ao contexto diplomático, poderíamos dizer que a arte da diplomacia implica cinco fatores principais, que devem ser objeto de nossa contínua reflexão, com vistas a aperfeiçoá-los e incorporá-los cada vez mais às nossas práticas de servidores do Estado no campo da política externa. Estes cinco fatores são: a doutrina, a interação entre a conjuntura e a estrutura, os condicionantes econômicos e geopolíticos da ação diplomática, o comando e a disciplina. A partir desses cinco fatores é possível elaborar uma “estratégia diplomática”, que será objeto da segunda seção deste ensaio introdutório.

A doutrina tem a ver com a concepção mesma da diplomacia, a sua razão de ser. Ela diz respeito aos princípios inspiradores da diplomacia, aos valores que fundamentam a sua ação, às diretrizes que guiam essa ação na prática. Ela também se refere a uma noção clara dos interesses nacionais e aos instrumentos indispensáveis à implementação dos objetivos fundamentais do Estado, cujo pressuposto básico  é, obviamente, o ato de dispor de uma doutrina básica para sua atuação diplomática – sem esquecer uma estratégia militar --  no cenário internacional.

A interação entre a conjuntura e a estrutura pode ser vista como o equivalente funcional daquilo que Sun Tzu chamava de tempo. Essa interação supõe a combinação da sincronia e da diacronia – ou seja, o momento presente e a flecha do tempo –, que constituem os dois vetores de atuação diplomática ao longo de um determinado período. Toda diplomacia lida com o aquie o agora, mas ela o faz tendo em vista as consequências futuras das ações adotadas na presente conjuntura e levando em consideração a herança recebida do passado recente, que imprime sua marca sobre a mente dos diplomatas e determina, em grande medida, a forma como eles vão agir no presente.

Os condicionantes econômicos e geopolíticos representam o fator que Sun Tzu chamava de espaço, isto é, o ambiente concreto no qual devem se movimentar os “exércitos” diplomáticos, em busca da materialização dos objetivos nacionais.

O comando atende aos mesmos critérios estabelecidos pelo mestre chinês da arte da guerra para esse conceito. Ele tem a ver com a capacidade exibida pelas lideranças diplomáticas – o estadista, o chanceler, os altos responsáveis pela formulação da doutrina e pela definição das principais diretrizes diplomáticas – de indicar claramente aos membros da comunidade diplomática nacional quais são os objetivos pelos quais eles devem se bater.

Sun Tzu considerava que o comando deveria ter as seguintes qualidades: sabedoria, sinceridade, benevolência, coragem e disciplina. Dessas cinco qualidades, a primeira é certamente necessária ao comandante, assim como a quarta, embora esta deva pertencer mais ao comandante militar do que propriamente ao chefe da diplomacia. Maquiavel certamente descartaria a segunda e a terceira, ou seja, a sinceridade e a benevolência, embora considerasse esta última como um recurso a que o condotierpoderia apelar quando estivesse em situação de força, justamente. Quanto à ultima, deve ser considerada mais como uma variante do rigor consigo mesmo do que o exercício da disciplina “contra” seus próprios subordinados, que é o objeto do último fator da arte da diplomacia.

A disciplina, no plano da diplomacia, tem a ver com organização e métodos, ou seja, a construção de uma ferramenta burocrática que seja, ao mesmo tempo, eficiente e inovadora, prudente e ousada, preparada no plano da informação e do conhecimento e apta a seguir instruções de forma ordenada e coerente, atuando como uma agência homogênea e uniforme. Isto é possível quando o estamento burocrático-diplomático possui processos de socialização e de construção de um pensamento relativamente unificado e convergente.

Com base nesses cinco fatores, as autoridades diplomáticas de um Estado podem planejar seus objetivos externos – a que chamaremos de “estratégia diplomática – a partir de um conjunto adicional de fatores instrumentais que têm a ver, essencialmente, com a implementação prática desses objetivos, quaisquer que sejam eles. Entre esses fatores figuram os seguintes: a capacidade dos dirigentes diplomáticos em formular metas realistas e adequadas para a mobilização efetiva do estamento profissional diplomático; a avaliação correta dos limites e possibilidades oferecidas pelo sistema internacional para que aqueles objetivos possam ser alcançados; o uso eficiente de todos os mecanismos e instrumentos do sistema internacional – instituições formais, grupos informais, coalizões temporárias de interesse, combinação de iniciativas bilaterais, coordenação regional e exploração dos canais multilaterais – segundo a natureza de algum objetivo específico; coordenação interna das agencias públicas que detêm alguma interface internacional e instruções claras aos agentes diplomáticos nas diversas frentes negociadoras para se alcançar eficácia máxima nas iniciativas diplomáticas desse Estado.

Mesmo sob condições democráticas, e portanto transparentes, a eficiência e a eficácia na ação diplomática de um Estado depende, em parte, do tratamento discreto que possa atribuir a determinados temas de seu interesse crucial na frente externa. Toda negociação diplomática é, por definição, uma barganha entre interesses por vezes convergentes, mas em certa medida contraditórios, quando não divergentes ou opostos (na medida que todo e qualquer acordo sempre implica em custos políticos e econômicos, a começar pela perda relativa de soberania, o que se deve limitar o máximo possível). Daí a necessidade de se encaminhar um determinado tema com base em argumentos de utilidade geral e de benefício recíproco que podem oferecer a base para um entendimento mais próximo dos interesses nacionais.

Esta questão implica também que o trabalho de avaliação deve envolver não apenas os interesses próprios do Estado em questão, mas igualmente os interesses do Estado, ou dos Estados com os quais se negocia, de maneira a permitir as acomodações necessárias. Dito isto, caberia, portanto, passar aos argumentos principais, que têm a ver com a elaboração e a implementação de uma estratégia diplomática (ED). 

Da estratégia diplomática como uma das artes especializadas do Estado

Analogamente a seu equivalente militar, mas nisso talvez destoando um pouco de Sun Tzu, poderíamos dizer que a ED consiste na mobilização de instrumentos políticos, econômicos emilitares – ponderados com base numa avaliação comparada e em análises conceituais e factuais sobre as intenções dos demais participantes do jogo diplomático – com vistas à consecução de objetivos nacionais bem definidos, mas sem o recurso à, ou a ameaça do uso da, força militar ou à guerra. Nesse sentido, a ED se opõe à, ou se distingue da, estratégia militar, que pressupõe, de sua parte, o uso ou a ameaça de uso da força bruta, segundo linhas que já foram suficientemente discutidas ao longo da história, desde Sun Tzu até os modernos estrategistas militares, passando por Clausewitz, Henry Kissinger ou Raymond Aron.

No plano puramente conceitual, a formulação de uma ED implica a análise dos fatores contingentes, de obstáculos conjunturais e de barreiras de caráter estrutural que dificultam – em alguns casos até obstaculizam – o atingimento dos objetivos nacionais, tais como definidos pelos estrategistas de um determinado Estado, uma comunidade variada que pode envolver desde estadistas até burocratas do planejamento governamental, passando por representantes da cidadania e consultores independentes (membros da academia, especialistas setoriais, etc.). No plano operacional, a ED pressupõe a mobilização de todos os instrumentos à disposição desse Estado para o atingimento daqueles objetivos, o que implica o uso dos meios propriamente diplomáticos, mas também o apoio das forças armadas e da comunidade econômica do país. 

Todo Estado moderno, atuante, inserido na comunidade internacional, normalmente dotado de órgãos executivos e de planejamento, possui, ou deveria possuir, uma ED. Não se deve, evidentemente, superestimar uma ED: não se trata de algo fixo ou rígido, estruturalmente determinado, mas de uma concepção determinada por fatores conjunturais e até contingentes, concomitante às iniciativas dos Estados e às ações humanas.

Uma ED realista e flexível deve submeter-se, desde logo, a constantes revisões, tantos são os fatores de mudança conjuntural e as alterações no cenário político internacional que influenciam ou impactam os objetivos nacionais de um Estado. Ela deve estar, portanto, sujeita a avaliações regulares por parte de um staffespecialmente preparado para essa finalidade e dedicado funcionalmente a esse tipo de tarefa. Não conviria, aliás, que o órgão encarregado da elaboração de uma ED fosse exclusivo e excludente, ou seja, trabalhando unicamente em torno da ED, e sim que ele seja aberto a insumos externos e à colaboração de especialistas e consultores alheios ao próprio órgão, de forma a manter uma atmosfera aberta inovadora, permitindo até revisões radicais da “velha” ED (ou seja, indo temporariamente num sentido contrário à “razão de Estado”). 

Uma ED, ainda que elaborada por um governo determinado, não é, ou não deveria ser, uma concepção e uma ação de um governo, e sim uma iniciativa e uma postura de Estado, ou seja, interessando antes à Nação do que aos partidos e personalidades ocupando temporariamente o poder. Como atividade típica de Estado, a ED deve estar sujeita ao escrutínio de todas as forças, movimentos e grupos de opinião representativos da Nação, ser objeto de discussão e de avaliação quanto a seus fundamentos concretos, seus instrumentos operacionais, seus objetivos explícitos e suas metas implícitas. Normalmente é isso que ocorre em sistemas democráticos, tanto mais intensamente quanto mais abertos e transparentes são os elementos centrais que definem e ajudam a implementar uma ED.

Os processos de concepção, elaboração e de revisão da ED se dão no corpo do Estado, envolvendo as agências voltadas para as relações exteriores, os órgãos de defesa e o governo central, ademais das instâncias voltadas precipuamente para planejamento de políticas e de análises aplicadas; eles passam pelo parlamento e alcançam a sociedade, por meio da opinião pública, devidamente informada pelos órgãos de informação. 

O planejamento de uma ED implica, antes de qualquer outra ação, tratar dos meios próprios a uma organização diplomática: de nada serve ter uma ED sem a ferramenta que a implementará. Estamos falando aqui de funcionários, equipamentos, recursos, organização, enfim, todos os meios com os quais todo e qualquer Estado leva sua ED da fase de concepção à de aplicação no terreno. Na diplomacia, como na guerra, nada existe estaticamente, ou de forma puramente passiva, mas, sim, compõe-se de interações dinâmicas; os meios precisam ser sempre mantidos, aperfeiçoados, substituídos, instruídos e monitorados.

Diferentemente da guerra, porém, não é preciso ter um planejamento logístico destinado a concentrar forças e operações ofensivas num espaço de tempo delimitado e num terreno previamente estudado. Em outros termos, as ações diplomáticas não necessitam de uma “concentração de fogo” para se lograr alguma vantagem decisiva no calor da batalha. A dinâmica diplomática é mais cumulativa, do que “destrutiva”, e as operações podem ser delongadas em função de uma avaliação contínua e mutável das condições do “terreno”, em função da interação com o “adversário”, que, no ambiente diplomático, não significa uma atitude de confrontação como na guerra e nas demais operações militares. A ED é bem mais intangível do que a EM, baseada no planejamento, certamente, mas em última instância na força bruta. 

Diferente da guerra, também, a conduta diplomática se baseia menos em meios materiais, ou equipamentos “pesados”, e mais em negociações diretas, quase pessoais, entre os atores. Não se trata de “aniquilar” o inimigo, mas sim de convencer e compor com um parceiro, mais que um adversário. A guerra desgasta, se mantida durante muito tempo, ao passo que a diplomacia avança, com a composição de interesses. A “logística” da diplomacia possui uma lógica própria, baseada – aliás, como no caso das operações militares – na presença sobre o “terreno” e na interação constante com o “adversário”; diferentemente, porém, não se trata de vencê-lo, mas de compor com ele um novo terreno de interações e de cooperação. 

Essa presença tem um “preço”, que é o custo da manutenção de representantes diretos – os “agentes avançados” dos serviços de inteligência militar – e do envio de missões temporárias e permanentes, assim como o engajamento pleno em negociações em nível bilateral, regional ou multilateral. Esse preço pode ser o equivalente funcional da manutenção, bastante custosa no âmbito militar, de equipamentos pesados que se destinam, na verdade, a não serem usados, mas que servem basicamente para dissuasão. No caso da diplomacia, a “dissuasão” é na verdade o diálogo e o entendimento, se possível no mais alto nível (mas de ordinário mantida pelo representante permanente, normalmente chamado de embaixador). 

A condução da diplomacia será, evidentemente, diferente, segundo o Estado ostenta um regime político centralizado ou unitário, próximo do autoritarismo, ou se esse Estado exibe características claras de descentralização, com dispersão relativa dos centros de poder e participação de vários atores políticos e sociais. O Estado do mestre chinês da arte da guerra, não obstante a descontinuidade ocasional trazida por uma sucessão extraordinária de dinastias, invasões e de reconstruções sucessivas do sistema político, exibiu notável continuidade na centralização imperial, no limite do despotismo “hidráulico”. Nesse tipo de regime, a condução da diplomacia obedece, simplesmente, à vontade do soberano, com alguma participação dos cortesãos e membros do aparato estatal restrito (antigos mandarins, modernos aparatchiks).

A condução da diplomacia nas modernas condições democráticas se faz sob forte pressão de forças sociais suscetíveis de expressar posições distintas e de influenciar o processo de tomada de decisão no plano externo. A despeito da legitimidade que possam exibir essas demandas, seria conveniente que o Estado, em especial seu aparelho diplomático, preservasse sua latitude de ação e ampla margem de opções, de maneira a escolher as melhores vias – que envolvem alianças ocasionais, coordenações formais e até iniciativas individuais – para alcançar os objetivos nacionais desse Estado. Pode-se inclusive conceber certa autonomia de iniciativa e de ações atribuída ao negociador principal, da mesma forma como se concede pleno poder de comando ao general em seu campo de batalha. Em momentos decisivos, essa autonomia deve ser plena, posto que a autoridade responsável pelo sucesso (ou fracasso) de uma negociação ou iniciativa diplomática é o próprio agente no terreno, não o soberano em sua capital distante.

Em todas essas questões, Sun Tzu tem muito a ensinar aos diplomatas profissionais (e até aos iniciantes). 

Brasília, 5 março 2011.

2251. “Formação de uma estratégia diplomática: relendo Sun Tzu para fins menos belicosos”, Brasília, 5 março 2011, 8 p. Sun Tzu revisitado com o objetivo de traçar uma estratégia diplomática. Publicado na Espaço Acadêmico(ano 10, n. 118, março 2011, p. 155-161; ISSN: 1519-6186; link: http://www.periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/EspacoAcademico/article/view/12696/6714). Republicado em Mundorama(7/03/2011; link: http://mundorama.net/2011/03/07/formacao-de-uma-estrategia-diplomatica-relendo-sun-tzu-para-fins-menos-belicosos-por-paulo-roberto-de-almeida/). Postado no blog Diplomatizzando(09/08/2016; link: http://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com.br/2016/08/sun-tzu-tem-algo-ensinar-aos-diplomatas.html)

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[1]Ver Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Velhos e novos manifestos: o socialismo na era da globalização (São Paulo: Juarez Oliveira, 1999).

[2]Cf. Paulo Roberto de Almeida, O Moderno Príncipe: Maquiavel revisitado(Brasília: Senado Federal, 2010). 

[3]O clássico de Sun Tzu pode ser encontrado facilmente na internet, numa infinidade de edições eletrônicas, em várias línguas e nas mais diferentes traduções e adaptações para o Português, voltadas tanto para o contexto militar quanto para o mundo dos negócios.