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Mostrando postagens com marcador Marine Le Pen. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Marine Le Pen. Mostrar todas as postagens

sábado, 23 de abril de 2022

Le Pen Closer Than Ever to the French Presidency (and to Putin) - Roger Cohen (NYT)

Nunca a extrema direita chegou tão perto do poder. A extrema-esquerda também.


Le Pen Closer Than Ever to the French Presidency (and to Putin)

As elections approach Sunday, the far-right candidate is linked to the Russian president by a web of financial ties and a history of support that has hardly dimmed despite the war in Ukraine.

By Roger Cohen

The New York Times, April 22, 2022



Marine Le Pen, left, the challenger for France’s presidency, and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia at the Kremlin in March 2017. She has supported his annexation of Crimea.Credit...

Pool photo by Mikhail Klimentyev

 


PARIS — When Europe’s far-right leaders gathered in Madrid in January, they had no problem finding unity on the issues they hold dear, whether cracking down on immigrants or upholding “European Christian ideals.” But as Russian troops massed on the Ukrainian border, they were divided on one issue: the threat posed by President Vladimir V. Putin.

Marine Le Pen, the extreme-right challenger for the French presidency, objected to a paragraph in the final statement calling for European solidarity to confront “Russian military actions on the eastern border of Europe.” Even in a gathering of illiberal nationalists, she was an outlier in her fealty to Mr. Putin.

Now, on her campaign website, the leaders’ statement appears with that paragraph cut in an unacknowledged change to the text. This little subterfuge is consistent with an embrace of Mr. Putin so complete that even his ravaging of Ukraine has hardly diminished it.

Over the past decade, Ms. Le Pen’s party, the National Rally, formerly the National Front, has borrowed millions from a Russian bank, and Ms. Le Pen has supported Mr. Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as his incendiary meddling that year in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, where just this week Russia redoubled its offensive.

Her support for Mr. Putin is one thing in a time of peace and another in a time of war. Russia, a nuclear power, has invaded a European state, and Ms. Le Pen is closer than ever to her cherished goal of becoming president of France, having narrowed the gap with President Emmanuel Macron before the decisive round of the election on Sunday.

With polls showing Ms. Le Pen gaining about 44.5 percent of the vote to Mr. Macron’s 55.5 percent, she is within range of the shocks that produced Brexit and Donald J. Trump’s victory in 2016. As in Britain and the United States, alienation and economic hardship have fed a French readiness to gamble on nationalist dreams.

If Ms. Le Pen wins, which is not likely but possible, her victory will almost certainly fracture the allied unity engineered by President Biden in an attempt to defeat Mr. Putin. It would hand Mr. Putin by far his most important ally in Europe, one he could leverage in his aims to divide Europe from the United States and fracture Europe’s decades-old project of unity.

France, a core member of the European Union and NATO, is suddenly the possible soft underbelly of the West.

Julien Nocetti, a Russia expert at the French Institute of International Relations, said there was “a complete ideological alignment between Putin and Le Pen” — one that would be deeply worrying to France’s American and European allies.

The Ukraine war has caused Ms. Le Pen to pivot a little by saying Mr. Putin crossed “a red line” with the invasion, but she still says her foreign-policy priority is a rapprochement with Russia once the fighting stops.

Since Ms. Le Pen, 53, took over the leadership of her party in 2011, she has only deepened its Putin predilection, making four trips to Moscow and one to Crimea. She would support sanctions against Russia, she says, but not cutting off imports of Russian oil and gas, which she has equated with economic death for France.

“We have to think of our people,” she said in a recent TV interview, a position consistent with the strong focus on pocketbook issues that has propelled her campaign. The majority of French people are more focused on getting to the end of the month than getting Russia out of Ukraine.

Certainly, Ms. Le Pen vaunted her connection with Mr. Putin until he went to war on Feb. 24. She included a photo of herself shaking hands with him in her election brochure as evidence of her “international stature.” This handout disappeared abruptly from view after the Russian invasion.

The photo was taken at the Kremlin on March 24, 2017. That was less than five weeks before the first round of the last presidential election, in which Mr. Macron defeated Ms. Le Pen by 66.1 percent to 33.9 percent. The National Rally leader said then that she would immediately review lifting “unjust” sanctions against Russia if elected.

As for Mr. Putin, he said with a knowing smirk that Russia did “not want to influence events in any way.”

Jean-Maurice Ripert, the French ambassador in Moscow from 2013 to 2017, said in an interview that a fellow European ambassador, a close friend, had asked the Russian leader after the French election why he had backed Ms. Le Pen.

“Because I had been told she was going to win,” Mr. Putin said.

Certainly that is what he wanted. Ms. Le Pen, committed to “equidistance” between great powers and hostile to “America’s protectorate on European soil,” sees in Mr. Putin the defender of the nation-state, family and Christianity against border-eroding multilateralism and irreligious cultural decay.

“It’s all about sovereignty,” said Marlène Laruelle, the French director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian studies at George Washington University. “The sovereign state against international organizations; the sovereign traditional family against L.G.B.T.Q. rights.”

Then there is the money. Unable to get a loan from French banks, Ms. Le Pen and several of her top aides scrambled for cash in Russia, accepting a 9.4 million euro loan, then $12.2 million, at a 6 percent interest rate, from the First Czech-Russian Bank in September 2014. It was supposed to be repaid by 2019.

Wallerand de Saint-Just, who was long the National Rally’s treasurer before leaving the position last year, negotiated the deal in Moscow. In a written answer to a question as to why French banks had refused any loan to the National Rally, he said “My experience with the six big French banking groups is that they obey orders from the political executive.”

But given the lack of transparency and accountability in Russia’s financial sector — and Mr. Putin’s sway over it in his pay-to-play system — the sum has long raised hard questions of just how beholden Ms. Le Pen actually is to the Russian president, and whether some of her outspoken backing for him has been a consequence.

I asked Ms. Le Pen this month at a news conference whether the outstanding loan did not create at least the impression of dependence on Russia, a liability for any future president?

“Absolutely not,” she said. “I am totally independent of any link to any power.”

In her current campaign, again unable to get a loan from a French bank, Ms. Le Pen turned to Hungary, where Viktor Orban, the anti-immigrant Hungarian prime minister, has been in power for 12 years. A Hungarian bank has now lent the National Rally another $11.4 million, so if she were to win she would be indebted to both Mr. Putin and Mr. Orban.

Already her backing of Mr. Putin has been borderline fawning. Ms. Le Pen visited Moscow and Crimea in June 2013; Moscow in April 2014; and Moscow again in May 2015. She was received by the president of the Duma, the lower chamber of Russia’s Parliament, during the first of these visits, and sprinkled her Russian sojourns with pro-Putin remarks.

In 2013, she blamed the European Union for a new “Cold War on Russia.” In 2015, also while in Moscow, she criticized France’s pro-American stance and suggested this would change “in 2017 with Marine Le Pen as president.” In 2021, she recommended Russia’s uncertain Sputnik vaccine for the coronavirus, saying “our anti-Russian ideology should not ruin our capacity to vaccinate our fellow citizens.”

The 2014 visit came at a particularly delicate moment, given the Crimea annexation. It was one of several demonstrations of support for Mr. Putin from prominent members of Ms. Le Pen’s party who visited Crimea that year, and the Donbas, the Ukrainian region where clashes kindled by Moscow had begun.

Among them was Aymeric Chauprade, her former top diplomatic adviser, who went to Crimea to observe the dubious March 2014 referendum that massively backed the Russian annexation. A United Nations General Assembly resolution declared the vote invalid.

“It was the West that began changing European borders with Kosovo’s independence in 2008,” Mr. Chauprade, who has since left the National Rally, said in an interview. “There was an openness to accepting invitations from Russia, a good atmosphere.”

Russian troops guarded a Ukrainian marine base in Crimea as Mr. Putin moved to annex the peninsula in March 2014. Le Pen has visited Moscow and Crimea and made remarks that were supportive of Russia. 

Mediapart, a French investigative news website, was the first to expose the Russian loan to the National Rally in September 2014. In an earlier interview with Mediapart, Mr. Chauprade said visits to the Donbas that year and in 2015 by Jean-Luc Schaffhauser, a former National Rally member of the European Parliament, had been a “quid pro quo” for the loan.


“Going to the Donbas amounted to strong support for Russia,” he said.

Mr. Schaffhauser did not respond to a request for comment.

I asked Mr. Chauprade whether the loan was indeed a “quid pro quo.” He said that while there was an “inclination to help,” there was “no conditionality.”

The Russian loan, whatever the strings, has had a convoluted history.

Shortly after the First Czech-Russian bank collapsed in 2016, the National Rally loan was acquired by Aviazapchast, a private Russian company that in Soviet times was part of the aviation ministry, supporting Soviet aircraft operating abroad.

On its website, Aviazapchast describes its main activities as “supply of aviation technical equipment and civil and dual-use material as well as repair of aircraft.”

Its general director is listed as Dzheruk V. Ivanovic, who served in the Russian armed forces from 1983 to 1996. A former deputy general director, Yevgeny N. Barmyantsev, worked as a Soviet spy in the United States, before he was expelled in 1983.

New York Times account at the time said he was “caught in the act of retrieving what he thought were stolen American military secrets from the base of a tree in rural Maryland.”

Odd company, on the face of it, for a French presidential candidate’s party to keep.

Mr. Saint-Just, in his written answer, said that Aviazapchast’s “holding of the loan has been entirely approved by the court of appeal in Moscow.”

“This is a very obvious and clear case of dependence on Russia,” Mr. Nocetti, the Russia expert, said. “The company holding the loan has an organic link with the Russian government through its military origins.”

Mr. Macron, in an electoral debate on Wednesday with Ms. Le Pen, said, “When you speak to Russia, you speak to your banker.” She insisted that she was “a totally free woman.”

Ms. Le Pen, in answer to my question, said she was ready for any French or American bank to take over the loan. “We continue to reimburse the loan. That is the only obligation of my movement,” she said.

It is possible that the exercise of power, if she is elected, would attenuate Ms. Le Pen’s long-held pro-Putin, anti-NATO positions, especially if Mr. Putin prosecutes the war in Ukraine with relentless brutality.

Last week, however, she said that she would withdraw France from the integrated military command of NATO, a technical step with powerful symbolism at a moment when NATO’s original mission to defend a free Europe against Moscow has been revived.

America’s alliance with France, one of its oldest, has been put to many tests over the centuries. But all the evidence suggests that a France governed by Ms. Le Pen would pose enormous problems for President Biden just when he needs his nuclear-armed ally most.

One core issue is how free Ms. Le Pen would really be when it comes to Russia. “If Ms. Le Pen is still reimbursing, she is not free, she’s dependent,” said Sylvie Bermann, who succeeded Mr. Ripert as French ambassador to Russia in 2017.

Mr. Saint-Just, the former National Rally treasurer, had another explanation of Ms. Le Pen’s Russia policy. “She believes in balance and equidistance. She has always had in her head a phrase of General de Gaulle: ‘In foreign affairs, France has no friends, only interests.’ 


Adèle Cordonnier contributed reporting.

 

What to Know About France’s Presidential Election 

Heading to a runoff. In the first round of the election, French citizens voted to advance President Emmanuel Macron and the far-right leader Marine Le Pen to the second round on April 24. This runoff, which polls predict could be close, will hinge to a large extent on perceptions of the economy. Here’s a look at the race:

The incumbent. Mr. Macron, an inveterate political gambler, who in 2017 became the nation’s youngest elected leader, announced his re-election bid just a day before the deadline, against the background of the war in Ukraine. After a lackluster campaign, Mr. Macron is trying to tap into the country’s large pool of voters worried about the environment with ambitious promises.

The far-right veteran. Ms. Le Pen, a nationalist with an anti-immigrant agenda, is making her third attempt to become president of France and is facing Mr. Macron for a second time after losing to him in the 2017 runoff. Though she has sought to sanitize her image, her proposal to ban Muslim women from wearing head scarves is controversial.


What comes next? At 8 p.m. in France on April 24, the French news media will work with pollsters to publish projected results based on preliminary vote counts, though projections might not become clear until later if the race is close. Read more about the runoff here.


sexta-feira, 22 de abril de 2022

French Elections: Is Marine Le Pen a Fascist? - Robert Zaretsky (Foreign Policy)

  Uma análise do campo da direita na França, persistente e cada vez mais radical.

Analysis

Is Marine Le Pen a Fascist?

The French presidential contender’s reliance on referenda suggests she is more of a Bonapartist.

By Robert Zaretsky, a professor of history at the University of Houston’s Honors College and the author of Victories Never Last: Reading and Caregiving in a Time of Plague

 

Foreign PolicyApril 21, 2022 

https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/21/france-election-le-pen-ideology/?utm_source=PostUp&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Editors%20Picks%20OC&utm_term=41624&tpcc=Editors%20Picks%20OC


Ever since its publication in 1954, historian René Remond’s classic work Les Droites en France has framed and, at times, enflamed how French historians discuss the political right. A growing number of scholars have, of late, insisted that Remond’s analysis is obsolete, superseded by events over the past few decades. Yet, the event that now rivets our attention—the faceoff between candidate Marine Le Pen, a figure often described in France as a “facho,” or fascist, and French President Emmanuel Macron in the second round of France’s presidential election on Sunday—suggests that Remond is more relevant than ever.
With the French Revolution, not only was the political left born but so too was the right. Although historians tend to focus on the former —1789 was, after all, all about liberty, equality, and fraternity—Remond turned to the latter. The funny thing about the right, he observed, was there was not one but three rights—triplets that, to varying degrees, resented the event that had heaved them into the world.
The first to appear was the Legitimist, fanatical about reversing the revolution and restoring the Bourbons. Then came the Orléanist, dedicated to the parliamentary legacy of the revolution but determined to keep out the people. The oddest offspring, however, was the romantic Bonapartists, dedicated to a ruler who, by channeling the will of the people, guaranteed their equality, glorified their fraternity, and garroted their liberty.
In 1851, the first (and last president) of the Second Republic, Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, used two tricks from the repertoire of his uncle, Napoléon Bonaparte. First, he overthrew the republic by a coup; second, he offered a plebiscite—a vote by French citizens—to legitimize the coup. Just as the elder Napoleon employed a plebiscite to ratify his self-promotion from first consul to emperor, the younger Napoleon harnessed it to transform himself from former president to future emperor. What had been, under the Roman Republic, a device of democracy had become, under the Bonapartes, an accomplice of autocracy.
In this campaign, Le Pen has emphasized the issue of pouvoir d’achat (“purchasing power”) over her more traditional focus on immigration. Although some of Le Pen’s aides worried that this move would repel her base, it has proven to be a canny move. With the war in Ukraine stoking inflationary pressures in France, Le Pen appears to some voters as not just prescient but also presidential. Last week, a Le Figaro poll revealed that a clear majority of French—54 percent—believe that she, not Macron, is more sympathetic to their lot and more capable to help them make ends meet.
But a different kind of pouvoir has always been Le Pen’s real focus. This became clear at a tense press conference last week. Sitting behind a wall of microphones, she declared that France faced an “unprecedented democratic crisis” and that referendums were its cure. After becoming president, Le Pen vowed that she would “organize a referendum on the essential questions of the control of immigration, the protection of the French identity, and the primacy of national rights.” In the referendum, the French would vote up or down on “la priorité nationale”: a proposal blocking noncitizens living in France from seeking employment, housing, health care, and social benefits. A yes from the people would make “national priority” the law of the land.

Because Le Pen also wants to ditch the principle of jus soli, which confers citizenship of those born on French soil, the number of noncitizens would increase dramatically. Moreover, as most constitutional scholars insist, such a law would violate the principle of equality embedded in every constitution France has enacted, stretching from the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” to the constitution of the Fifth Republic. Passage of this law, declared constitutional expert Dominique Rousseau, would “be like a coup d’état.”
During her initial campaign, Le Pen had sought, with some success, to soften her abrasive and aloof image by distancing herself from her father’s persona. Yet the press conference revealed that she had no more changed than her party did when its name changed from the National Front—bequeathed to her by her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen—to the gentler Rassemblement National, or National Rally.
Little distinguishes Marine’s notion of “national priority” from “national preference,” the term employed by her father during his time as leader of the National Front. Similarly, the daughter’s use of phrases like “unprecedented democratic crisis” is bland shorthand for her father’s earlier and earthier claims that France’s political class, though mouthing republican and democratic pieties, was nothing more than “a cosmopolitan, totalitarian, and corrupt oligarchy.”
Since the elite firmly controls the levers of institutional power, the solution both Le Pens have offered is a referendum. In the 2002 presidential election, when he stunned the world by reaching the second round, Jean-Marie attacked what he called “creeping totalitarianism under the mask of democracy.” Hence, he called for the “establishment of a national and popular republic based on the use of referendums.” This would return to the people, Jean-Marie declared, the voice they had lost.
Jean-Marie’s appeal fell on deaf ears: He was trounced by Jacques Chirac, who won more than 80 percent of the vote in the second round. But Marine believes the promise of a plebiscitary democracy is a winning proposition. Along with a referendum on national priority, she would encourage further referenda on what she calls citizen initiatives. They could, she has said, address “every subject,” including the death penalty and abortion, and require just 500,000 signatures to be launched. (Such referendums are possible even now, but crucially, they require 4 million, not 500,000, signatures to reach critical institutional mass.)
Marine Le Pen has marinated too long in her father’s ideological stew to forget the referendum as an essential ingredient. But does its presence in the Le Pen stew make it taste more like Bonapartism than fascism? In the final edition of Remond’s book, published in 1982, the historian argued this was the case. He noted that the National Rally party, like its earlier iterations, from the Boulangist movement in the 1880s to the Poujadist movement of the 1950s, issued not from the left—which is the case of fascism—but from the right; that it sought to conserve, not destroy, traditional social structures; and that it aspired to authoritarian, not totalitarian control. In effect, whereas fascism denies the legitimacy and legacy of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, Bonapartism accepts aspects of both.
Moreover, Bonapartism, unlike totalitarianism, bases itself on plebiscitary principle. Both Napoléons turned to the people, not their representatives, to legitimize their coups against the republics they once led. While Le Pen is not planning an actual coup, her promise to hold a referendum nevertheless smacks of the Bonapartist tradition. One hitch: There is no legal means for Le Pen to either enact or act upon such a referendum. Although two articles allow for changes in the constitution through referendums, they are very clear on the whys and whens. In the case of Article 89, the constitution can be revised only after the most rigorous process. If each of the two legislative chambers—the National Assembly and the Senate—pass the proposed change, they must then meet in a joint session, where the bill requires a three-fifths majority to pass. Only then can voters decide its fate in the form of a referendum.
Not surprisingly, only once has a constitutional change—shortening the presidential term of office from seven to five years in 2000—managed to jump through all of these hoops. No less important, Le Pen knows that even if there was a majority in the National Assembly to support her proposal, the Senate, which is not facing elections, would prevent it from going any further.
This leaves Article 11, which allows the president to submit a referendum on the “organization of the public authorities” or with “economic or social policy … [or] public services.” According to legal experts, the constitutional change Le Pen seeks does not qualify under any of these rubrics. In 1962, this did not stop then-French President Charles de Gaulle, who famously used this article to change the constitution to allow the direct election of the president by popular suffrage. De Gaulle’s gamble paid off: More than 60 percent of voters marked “oui” on their ballots and, quite suddenly, the already awesome powers of the presidency were dramatically reinforced.
Inevitably, Le Pen made this Gaullist connection not only during her press conference but also at the end of last night’s debate against Macron, when she trumpeted her plan to hatch “une renaissance démocratique.” To hasten this rebirth, Le Pen again promised to enable citizens to launch referenda. More important, she cited de Gaulle when she pledged to offer a referendum on adding “national priority” to the constitution. “Let me be clear: I will use Article 11, as did General de Gaulle in 1962.”
Perhaps if she had made this claim earlier in the debate, Macron would have replied that de Gaulle’s use of the referendum was, at the time, widely seen as an extra-constitutional act. It sparked a political firestorm, enraging not just the left and center but also former Gaullists like the Senate’s then-leader, Gaston Monnerville.
He might have added two other crucial elements to this story. First, the 1962 referendum spurred the Constitutional Council to make clear that Article 11 cannot be used to do the very thing Le Pen seeks to do—namely, alter the fundamental text of the constitution. Second, in 1969, de Gaulle again used the referendum, this time to reform the Senate. Unlike the earlier referendum, this one fell flat, and almost immediately, de Gaulle announced he would resign from office.
This decision reflected, at least for de Gaulle, the plebiscitary nature of referendums. He understood it was a vote less against the proposed law than against his own person. Yet when Le Pen was asked if she would step down should her referendum fail, she replied she would not. It would mean, she explained, a political, not personal, failure. Whether this, too, is Bonapartist is an open question. What does seem clear, though, is that whether it is Bonapartist or fascist, a Le Pen government will seek to radically change France not for the better but for the worse.

Robert Zaretsky is a professor of history at the University of Houston’s Honors College and the author of Victories Never Last: Reading and Caregiving in a Time of Plague.

 

quarta-feira, 20 de abril de 2022

Alex Navalny, prisioneiro político de Putin, se dirige aos eleitores franceses às vésperas do 2do turno de Macron contra Le Pen, uma serviçal de Putin

Mensagem de Alex Navalny aos eleitores franceses: 

20/04/2022 

 

Alexey Navalny; @navalny

 

1/18 Je me rends compte de l'ironie de la situation : un prisonnier politique russe s'adresse aux électeurs français. Mais techniquement, je suis en prison à cause d’une plainte déposée par une entreprise française.

 

2/18 J’ai étudié le à l'université, et quand je viens à Paris, je porte une écharpe par tous les temps. Donc, ce pays m’est proche, et je vais essayer.

 

3/18 C’est sans hésitation aucune que j'appelle les Français à voter pour @EmmanuelMacron le 24 avril, mais je voudrais m’adresser à ceux qui n'excluent pas de voter pour @MLP_officiel. Je voudrais vous parler de la corruption et du conservatisme.

 

4/18 Avant tout, mes collègues et moi menons des enquêtes sur la corruption en Russie et j'en sais plus que les autres.

 

5/18 Et, en plus, j'ai passé de nombreuses années à créer une coalition politique anti-Poutine composée non seulement de libéraux, mais aussi de conservateurs de droite qui voyaient justement

@MLP_officiel

comme un exemple à suivre.

 

6/18 On m’a beaucoup critiqué pour ça, mais je crois que ma capacité de parler avec des personnes aux opinions politiques différentes est mon avantage et je ne pense pas que tous ceux avec qui je suis en désaccord doivent être effacés de l’arène politique.

 

7/18 La corruption. J'ai été choqué d’apprendre que la partie @MLP_officiel a obtenu un prêt de 9 millions d'euros auprès de la banque FRCB. Croyez-moi, il ne s'agit pas d'une simple «affaire douteuse».

 

8/18 Cette banque est une agence de blanchiment d'argent bien connue qui a été créée à l'instigation de Poutine. Ça vous plairait si un politicien français obtenait un prêt auprès de la Cosa Nostra? Bon, ça, c'est pareil.

 

9/18 Je ne doute pas un seul instant que leurs négociations avec ces gens et leurs transactions avec eux comportent un accord politique secret. C'est de la corruption. Et c'est une vente de l'influence politique à Poutine.

 

10/18 Le conservatisme. À chaque fois que la droite européenne témoigne de la sympathie pour le «conservatisme» de Poutine, ça me laisse perplexe.

 

11/18 Poutine et son élite politique sont complètement immoraux, ils méprisent les valeurs familiales : avoir une deuxième et même une troisième famille, des amantes et des yachts, c'est la norme pour eux.

 

12/18 Ce sont des hypocrites. Tout récemment, ils emprisonnaient des gens pour la Bible, et maintenant, ils se signent dans des églises. Ils détestent la classe moyenne et traitent les travailleurs avec mépris. En Russie, ceux qui travaillent sont très pauvres.

 

13/18 Poutine a mis en œuvre une politique migratoire complètement insensée dans laquelle l'entrée libre de migrants de l'Asie centrale coïncide avec la transformation de ces migrants en esclaves privés de leurs droits.

14/18 Enfin, Poutine a créé et il soutient et profite d'un véritable État terroriste en Tchétchénie où des meurtres, des enlèvements et des intimidations sont devenus la norme.


 

15/18 C’est pour ça que tous ceux qui se disent « conservateurs » et qui sympathisent avec Poutine ne sont que des hypocrites sans scrupule.

 

16/18 Les élections, c’est toujours difficile. Mais il faut absolument y aller, au moins pour voter contre.

 

17/18Le 24 avril,je ne pourrai pas mettre d’écharpe en signe de solidarité avec les Français. Ça constitue une «violation du code vestimentaire» ici,ils peuvent même me mettre en cellule disciplinaire. Mais je soutiendrai quand même la France, les Français et 

@EmmanuelMacron

 

18/18 Vous pouvez en savoir plus sur notre travail et nous soutenir ici :

 https://t.co/C0YGJxCpML