Relações EUA-China, quando os EUA tinham diplomacia (isso acabou) - Robert Zoellick em 2005

 https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm

Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?

Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State
Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
New York City
September 21, 2005

As Prepared for Delivery

Earlier this year, I had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of Mr. Zheng Bijian, Chair of the China Reform Forum, who over some decades has been a counselor to China’s leaders. We have spent many hours in Beijing and Washington discussing China’s course of development and Sino-American relations. It has been my good fortune to get to know such a thoughtful man who has helped influence, through the Central Party School, the outlook of many officials during a time of tremendous change for China.

This month, in anticipation of President Hu’s visit to the United States, Mr. Zheng published the lead article in Foreign Affairs, "China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status." This evening, I would like to give you a sense of the current dialogue between the United States and China by sharing my perspective.

Some 27 years ago, Chinese leaders took a hard look at their country and didn’t like what they saw. China was just emerging from the Cultural Revolution. It was desperately poor, deliberately isolated from the world economy, and opposed to nearly every international institution. Under Deng Xiaoping, as Mr. Zheng explains, China’s leaders reversed course and decided "to embrace globalization rather than detach themselves from it."

Seven U.S. presidents of both parties recognized this strategic shift and worked to integrate China as a full member of the international system. Since 1978, the United States has also encouraged China’s economic development through market reforms.

Our policy has succeeded remarkably well: the dragon emerged and joined the world. Today, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, from agreements on ozone depletion to pacts on nuclear weapons, China is a player at the table.

And China has experienced exceptional economic growth. Whether in commodities, clothing, computers, or capital markets, China’s presence is felt every day.

China is big, it is growing, and it will influence the world in the years ahead.

For the United States and the world, the essential question is – how will China use its influence?

To answer that question, it is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China’s membership into the international system: We need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.

China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success. In doing so, China could achieve the objective identified by Mr. Zheng: "to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge."

As Secretary Rice has stated, the United States welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China, one that appreciates that its growth and development depends on constructive connections with the rest of the world. Indeed, we hope to intensify work with a China that not only adjusts to the international rules developed over the last century, but also joins us and others to address the challenges of the new century.

From China’s perspective, it would seem that its national interest would be much better served by working with us to shape the future international system.

If it isn’t clear why the United States should suggest a cooperative relationship with China, consider the alternatives. Picture the wide range of global challenges we face in the years ahead – terrorism and extremists exploiting Islam, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, disease – and ask whether it would be easier or harder to handle those problems if the United States and China were cooperating or at odds.

For fifty years, our policy was to fence in the Soviet Union while its own internal contradictions undermined it. For thirty years, our policy has been to draw out the People’s Republic of China. As a result, the China of today is simply not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s:

It does not seek to spread radical, anti-American ideologies.

While not yet democratic, it does not see itself in a twilight conflict against democracy around the globe.

While at times mercantilist, it does not see itself in a death struggle with capitalism.

And most importantly, China does not believe that its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of the international system. In fact, quite the reverse: Chinese leaders have decided that their success depends on being networked with the modern world.

If the Cold War analogy does not apply, neither does the distant balance-of-power politics of 19^th Century Europe. The global economy of the 21^st Century is a tightly woven fabric. We are too interconnected to try to hold China at arm’s length, hoping to promote other powers in Asia at its expense. Nor would the other powers hold China at bay, initiating and terminating ties based on an old model of drawing-room diplomacy. The United States seeks constructive relations with all countries that do not threaten peace and security.

So if the templates of the past do not fit, how should we view China at the dawn of the 21^st Century?

On both sides, there is a gulf in perceptions. The overwhelming priority of China’s senior officials is to develop and modernize a China that still faces enormous internal challenges. While proud of their accomplishments, China’s leaders recognize their country’s perceived weaknesses, its rural poverty, and the challenges of political and social change. Two-thirds of China’s population – nearly 900 million people – are in poor rural areas, living mostly as subsistence farmers, and 200 million Chinese live on less than a dollar a day. In China, economic growth is seen as an internal imperative, not as a challenge to the United States.

Therefore, China clearly needs a benign international environment for its work at home. Of course, the Chinese expect to be treated with respect and will want to have their views and interests recognized. But China does not want a conflict with the United States.

Nevertheless, many Americans worry that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a fire-breather. There is a cauldron of anxiety about China.

The U.S. business community, which in the 1990s saw China as a land of opportunity, now has a more mixed assessment. Smaller companies worry about Chinese competition, rampant piracy, counterfeiting, and currency manipulation. Even larger U.S. businesses – once the backbone of support for economic engagement – are concerned that mercantilist Chinese policies will try to direct controlled markets instead of opening competitive markets. American workers wonder if they can compete.

China needs to recognize how its actions are perceived by others. China’s involvement with troublesome states indicates at best a blindness to consequences and at worst something more ominous. China’s actions – combined with a lack of transparency – can create risks. Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United States – and others as well – to hedge relations with China. Many countries hope China will pursue a "Peaceful Rise," but none will bet their future on it.

For example, China’s rapid military modernization and increases in capabilities raise questions about the purposes of this buildup and China’s lack of transparency. The recent report by the U.S. Department of Defense on China’s military posture was not confrontational, although China’s reaction to it was. The U.S. report described facts, including what we know about China’s military, and discussed alternative scenarios. If China wants to lessen anxieties, it should openly explain its defense spending, intentions, doctrine, and military exercises.

Views about China are also shaped by its growing economic footprint. China has gained much from its membership in an open, rules-based international economic system, and the U.S. market is particularly important for China’s development strategy. Many gain from this trade, including millions of U.S. farmers and workers who produce the commodities, components, and capital goods that China is so voraciously consuming.

But no other country – certainly not those of the European Union or Japan – would accept a $162 billion bilateral trade deficit, contributing to a $665 billion global current account deficit. China – and others that sell to China – cannot take its access to the U.S. market for granted. Protectionist pressures are growing.

China has been more open than many developing countries, but there are increasing signs of mercantilism, with policies that seek to direct markets rather than opening them. The United States will not be able to sustain an open international economic system – or domestic U.S. support for such a system – without greater cooperation from China, as a stakeholder that shares responsibility on international economic issues.

For example, a responsible major global player shouldn’t tolerate rampant theft of intellectual property and counterfeiting, both of which strike at the heart of America’s knowledge economy. China’s pledges – including a statement just last week by President Hu in New York – to crack down on the criminals who ply this trade are welcome, but the results are not yet evident. China needs to fully live up to its commitments to markets where America has a strong competitive advantage, such as in services, agriculture, and certain manufactured goods. And while China’s exchange rate policy offered stability in the past, times have changed. China may have a global current account surplus this year of nearly $150 billion, among the highest in the world. This suggests that China’s recent policy adjustments are an initial step, but much more remains to be done to permit markets to adjust to imbalances. China also shares a strong interest with the United States in negotiating a successful WTO Doha agreement that opens markets and expands global growth.

China’s economic growth is driving its thirst for energy. In response, China is acting as if it can somehow "lock up" energy supplies around the world. This is not a sensible path to achieving energy security. Moreover, a mercantilist strategy leads to partnerships with regimes that hurt China’s reputation and lead others to question its intentions. In contrast, market strategies can lessen volatility, instability, and hoarding. China should work with the United States and others to develop diverse sources of energy, including through clean coal technology, nuclear, renewables, hydrogen, and biofuels. Our new Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate – as well as the bilateral dialogue conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy and China’s National Development and Reform Commission – offer practical mechanisms for this cooperation. We should also encourage the opening of oil and gas production in more places around the world. We can work on energy conservation and efficiency, including through standards for the many appliances made in China. Through the IEA we can strengthen the building and management of strategic reserves. We also have a common interest in secure transport routes and security in producing countries.

All nations conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests. Responsible stakeholders go further: They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system. In its foreign policy, China has many opportunities to be a responsible stakeholder.

The most pressing opportunity is North Korea. Since hosting the Six-Party Talks at their inception in 2003, China has played a constructive role. This week we achieved a Joint Statement of Principles, with an agreement on the goal of "verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner." But the hard work of implementation lies ahead, and China should share our interest in effective and comprehensive compliance.

Moreover, the North Korea problem is about more than just the spread of dangerous weapons. Without broad economic and political reform, North Korea poses a threat to itself and others. It is time to move beyond the half century-old armistice on the Korean peninsula to a true peace, with regional security and development. A Korean peninsula without nuclear weapons opens the door to this future. Some 30 years ago America ended its war in Viet Nam. Today Viet Nam looks to the United States to help integrate it into the world market economic system so Viet Nam can improve the lives of its people. By contrast, North Korea, with a 50 year-old cold armistice, just falls further behind.

Beijing also has a strong interest in working with us to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can deliver them. The proliferation of danger will undermine the benign security environment and healthy international economy that China needs for its development.

China’s actions on Iran’s nuclear program will reveal the seriousness of China’s commitment to non-proliferation. And while we welcome China’s efforts to police its own behavior through new export controls on sensitive technology, we still need to see tough legal punishments for violators.

China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism. Chinese citizens have been victims of terror attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. China can help destroy the supply lines of global terrorism. We have made a good start by working together at the UN and searching for terrorist money in Chinese banks, but can expand our cooperation further.

China pledged $150 million in assistance to Afghanistan, and $25 million to Iraq. These pledges were welcome, and we look forward to their full implementation. China would build stronger ties with both through follow-on pledges. Other countries are assisting the new Iraqi government with major debt forgiveness, focusing attention on the $7 billion in Iraqi debt still held by Chinese state companies.

On my early morning runs in Khartoum, I saw Chinese doing tai chi exercises. I suspect they were in Sudan for the oil business. But China should take more than oil from Sudan – it should take some responsibility for resolving Sudan’s human crisis. It could work with the United States, the UN, and others to support the African Union’s peacekeeping mission, to provide humanitarian relief to Darfur, and to promote a solution to Sudan’s conflicts.

In Asia, China is already playing a larger role. The United States respects China’s interests in the region, and recognizes the useful role of multilateral diplomacy in Asia. But concerns will grow if China seeks to maneuver toward a predominance of power. Instead, we should work together with ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and others for regional security and prosperity through the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

China’s choices about Taiwan will send an important message, too. We have made clear that our "one China" policy remains based on the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. It is important for China to resolve its differences with Taiwan peacefully.

The United States, Japan, and China will need to cooperate effectively together on both regional and global challenges. Given China’s terrible losses in World War II, I appreciate the sensitivity of historical issues with Japan. But as I have told my Chinese colleagues, I have observed some sizeable gaps in China’s telling of history, too. When I visited the "918" museum at the site of the 1931 "Manchurian Incident," I noted that the chronological account jumped from 1941 to the Soviet offensive against Japan in August 1945, overlooking the United States involvement in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945! Perhaps we could start to ease some misapprehensions by opening a three-way dialogue among historians.

Clearly, there are many common interests and opportunities for cooperation. But some say America’s commitment to democracy will preclude long-term cooperation with China. Let me suggest why this need not be so.

Freedom lies at the heart of what America is… as a nation, we stand for what President Bush calls the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. As I have seen over the 25 years since I lived in Hong Kong, Asians have also pressed for more freedom and built many more democracies. Indeed, President Hu and Premier Wen are talking about the importance of China strengthening the rule of law and developing democratic institutions.

We do not urge the cause of freedom to weaken China. To the contrary, President Bush has stressed that the terrible experience of 9/11 has driven home that in the absence of freedom, unhealthy societies will breed deadly cancers. In his Second Inaugural, President Bush recognized that democratic institutions must reflect the values and culture of diverse societies. As he said, "Our goal… is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way."

Being born ethnically Chinese does not predispose people against democracy – just look at Taiwan’s vibrant politics. Japan and South Korea have successfully blended a Confucian heritage with modern democratic principles.

Closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society. It is simply not sustainable – as economic growth continues, better-off Chinese will want a greater say in their future, and pressure builds for political reform:

China has one umbrella labor union, but waves of strikes.

A party that came to power as a movement of peasants now confronts violent rural protests, especially against corruption.

A government with massive police powers cannot control spreading crime.

Some in China believe they can secure the Communist Party’s monopoly on power through emphasizing economic growth and heightened nationalism. This is risky and mistaken.

China needs a peaceful political transition to make its government responsible and accountable to its people. Village and grassroots elections are a start. They might be expanded – perhaps to counties and provinces – as a next step. China needs to reform its judiciary. It should open government processes to the involvement of civil society and stop harassing journalists who point out problems. China should also expand religious freedom and make real the guarantees of rights that exist on paper – but not in practice.

Ladies and Gentlemen: How we deal with China’s rising power is a central question in American foreign policy.

In China and the United States, Mr. Zheng’s idea of a "peaceful rise" will spur vibrant debate. The world will look to the evidence of actions.

Tonight I have suggested that the U.S. response should be to help foster constructive action by transforming our thirty-year policy of integration: We now need to encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. As a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member – it would work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.

Cooperation as stakeholders will not mean the absence of differences – we will have disputes that we need to manage. But that management can take place within a larger framework where the parties recognize a shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems that provide common benefits.

To achieve this transformation of the Sino-American relationship, this Administration – and those that follow it – will need to build the foundation of support at home. That’s particularly why I wanted to join you tonight. You hear the voices that perceive China solely through the lens of fear. But America succeeds when we look to the future as an opportunity, not when we fear what the future might bring. To succeed now, we will need all of you to press both the Chinese and your fellow citizens.

When President Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, our relationship with China was defined by what we were both against. Now we have the opportunity to define our relationship by what are both for.

We have many common interests with China. But relationships built only on a coincidence of interests have shallow roots. Relationships built on shared interests and shared values are deep and lasting. We can cooperate with the emerging China of today, even as we work for the democratic China of tomorrow.

Released on September 21, 2005

Celso Lafer: Negacionismo na política externa (OESP)

Opinião

Diplomacia e conhecimento

O negacionismo nos isola no mundo e compromete a nossa inserção internacional.

Celso Lafer

O Estado de S.Paulo, 18 de outubro de 2020 | 03h00

https://opiniao.estadao.com.br/noticias/espaco-aberto,diplomacia-e-conhecimento,70003478204

 

Robert Zoellick, ex-presidente do Banco Mundial, acaba de publicar o livro America in the World. Nele, com conhecimento e experiência diplomática, examina o papel da política externa na construção do poderio dos Estados Unidos no mundo. Um capítulo é dedicado a Vannevar Bush, por ele qualificado como o “inventor do futuro”.

Bush dirigiu o Escritório de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento nos governos Roosevelt e Truman. Escreveu Science: The Endless Frontier, excepcional documento de 1945, que inspirou a criação da Fapesp. A Vannevar Bush se deve a concepção do sistema americano de ciência e tecnologia após a 2.ª Guerra Mundial, levando em conta a interdependência da ciência básica e aplicada e da complementariedade entre os distintos papéis do governo, de uma comunidade científica e universitária livre e independente, da indústria e dos empresários privados. 

A implementação das concepções de Bush criou um modelo de inovação que eclipsou o sistema soviético, estatal. Esse é um dos dados do sucesso americano na dinâmica da bipolaridade Leste/Oeste. O desafio do presente é a competição entre o modelo de pesquisa e inovação dos EUA e o que vem sendo construído com apreciável sucesso pela China.

Bush antecipou a velocidade com que a cultura científica da pesquisa expande vertiginosamente as fronteiras do conhecimento e vem trazendo mudanças significativas em todas as esferas e dimensões, alterando as condições da vida em escala planetária e impactando a dinâmica da ordem mundial. Henry Kissinger observou que a era digital colonizou o espaço físico e permitiu a ubiquidade do funcionamento das redes que operam na instantaneidade dos tempos. Isso vem induzindo grandes transformações, até na maneira de conduzir a política externa e de atuar no campo diplomático.

Ciência e conhecimento são dados de base do cenário mundial do século 21, o que confere realce especial à afirmação de Bacon “conhecimento é poder”, nela se incluindo o poder da sociedade de dar rumos aos seus caminhos. 

Desde o Renascimento a ciência é uma atividade internacional que se alimenta do intercâmbio de ideias e descobertas. Daí as atividades internacionais das academias científicas, incluída a brasileira, no exercício de uma diplomacia da ciência. 

As formas como a ciência se insere na pauta internacional e interna levaram a Royal Society inglesa a elaborar novas formulações que vão além da tradicional diplomacia da ciência. Daí o destaque dado à ciência na diplomacia e nas políticas públicas em geral e da ciência em prol da diplomacia. Essas vertentes são ingredientes de grande relevo para um juízo diplomático apropriado para identificar as necessidades internas do País e avaliar possibilidades de melhor inserção internacional.

Dois itens da pauta interna e internacional são reveladores de um negacionismo do papel da ciência e do conhecimento nas políticas públicas e na diplomacia do governo Bolsonaro. O primeiro diz respeito à sua postura no enfrentamento da crise da covid-19, que fez aflorarem novos riscos para a saúde do mundo. A gestão desses riscos requer conhecimento e cooperação internacionais. Demanda as pontes de um multilateralismo permeado pela ciência na diplomacia. Não está no horizonte de uma diplomacia de confronto, que rejeita o acervo de realizações da tradição da política externa brasileira e se alinha aos muros dos unilateralismos excludentes.

O segundo diz respeito ao meio ambiente, tema global, transversal, que permeia a vida internacional. Foi o conhecimento que identificou os riscos que põem em questão a integridade dos ecossistemas, que, no seu conjunto, sustentam a vida na Terra. Foi o aprofundamento do conhecimento que ampliou o escopo operativo da gestão de riscos nessa matéria.

O paradigma do desenvolvimento sustentável consagrado na Rio-92 assinala a presença internacional ativa do Brasil nesse campo e é um exemplo da ciência na diplomacia. O desenvolvimento sustentável é o caminho para lidar, com o apoio do conhecimento, com a interligação economia e meio ambiente.

O desabrido negacionismo do governo Bolsonaro, por atos e palavras, em relação ao tema do meio ambiente é uma denegação do prévio acervo de realizações das políticas públicas brasileiras e de suas instituições de conhecimento. Corrói a credibilidade internacional do Brasil. Põe em questão a nossa capacidade, como país, de lidar criativa e construtivamente, pelo conhecimento, com a riqueza da nossa natureza e com o nosso potencial de crescimento econômico.

Em síntese, como diz o provérbio, “pior cego é o que não quer ver e pior surdo, o que não quer ouvir”, manifestado neste governo por um duplo e interconectado negacionismo: a denegação da importância dos fatos que a ciência e o conhecimento revelam e a recusa do papel da ciência e do conhecimento como o caminho para o seu deslinde. É o que nos isola no mundo e compromete a nossa inserção internacional.

* PROFESSOR EMÉRITO DA USP, EX-PRESIDENTE DA FAPESP (2007-2015), EX-MINISTRO DE RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES (1992 E 2001-2002), É MEMBRO DA ACADEMIA BRASILEIRA DE CIÊNCIAS.

 

Relações China-EUA: finalmente uma postura equilibrada - Robert Zoellick

Can America and China Be Stakeholders?

This is adapted from a from a speech given by former World Bank President, and Carnegie Endowment Trustee Robert B. Zoellick at the U.S. – China Business Council on December 4, 2019.

The daily news about China reports deals on and off, sales off and on, more and steeper tariffs on and off…and who knows what’s next?

It’s not easy to tell what’s going on—although costs are mounting and real results are missing. America has been wasting time and squandering international capital.

In describing effective diplomacy, Alexander Hamilton once counseled, “mildness in the manner, firmness in the thing.” “Strut is good for nothing,” advised America’s first practitioner of economic statecraft. Instead, Hamilton recommended “combin[ing] energy with moderation.” Or as James Baker, my former boss at Treasury, the State Department, and the White House would say, “Pick your shots” and “Get things done.”

This evening, I’ll step back from today’s tactics to offer a wider-lens perspective on U.S.-China relations.

Fourteen years ago, I gave a speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations titled: “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” That title included a question mark.

The speech grew out of the first of the 21st Century strategic dialogues, which I conducted with Mr. Dai Bingguo, who rose to become China’s State Councillor for foreign relations. I was replying to a seminal article in Foreign Affairs, “China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status,” by Mr. Zheng Bijian, a senior adviser to China’s leaders, beginning with Deng Xiaoping.

By the time of my speech, seven U.S. Presidents of both parties had worked for over 30 years to integrate a poor and economically isolated China into the international system that America had designed and led.

By 2005, I pointed out, China had emerged from seclusion and joined the world—including the United Nations Security Council, the WTO, IMF, and World Bank. From agreements on ozone depletion to nuclear weapons, China had become a player at the table.

China’s leaders and its hard-working people had pursued an incredible modernization within an international system that had enabled China’s success.

But having largely accomplished the aim of integrating China, the question for the United States, I explained back then, concerned Beijing’s conduct: “How will China use its influence?”

I urged China to look beyond membership in the international system— “to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.”

The speech stressed the “norms,” not just the “forms,” of international integration.

I pointed out that many countries hoped China would pursue a “Peaceful Rise,” but that none would bet their future on it. I warned that the United States would not be able to sustain the open international economic order—and domestic support for that regime—unless China cooperated in sharing responsibilities and using its power constructively.

Some commentators later treated my call as some kind of a concession—though it’s hard to understand why the United States wouldn’t have wanted China to assume more responsibilities within a U.S.-led system, especially with the implicit signal that the United States would be the umpire of China’s choices.

I suspect that some didn’t like that I combined my urging of responsible action with a tone of respect for China. And my idea opened the door to Chinese views and suggestions for addressing common challenges.

My choice of words also led to an amusing irony: It turned out that the Chinese struggled to translate the term “stakeholder.” The uncertainty about the diplomatic implications of the word prompted a useful debate within China about the meaning of the U.S. idea—and stirring debate is a result dear to all speechwriters.

Now to make such a policy effective, U.S. officials needed to remain in close touch with developments in China and the wider region—with the help of allies and all of you in the business community. American policy needed to work the details as well as discuss strategy.

We used to call this diplomacy.

Today’s logic of constant confrontation with China rejects the approach I had outlined.

It rejects the idea that China can play a constructive role within the system that America constructed.

It rejects the idea that China can make contributions.

It even rejects the idea that China can, or even would, act in ways that complement U.S. interests.

Be aware: If U.S. policy assumes China cannot do any of those things within the system America designed, then the United States will, in effect, be prodding China into championing a parallel, separate system, with very different rules.

I understand many of today’s complaints, but we are at serious risk of losing sight of American aims and how best to achieve them.

One of the founding principles of constant confrontation is an assumption that cooperation with China failed. This is the premise that underpins the Administration’s National Security Strategy paper of 2017.

Let’s test that assumption.

China was once an outright enemy of the United States, sponsoring revolutions, spreading chaos, and backing proxies, such as North Korea and North Vietnam, which were at war with America. Today, we are strategic competitors, but China moderated and modified dangerous behaviors as Beijing worked to take part in the U.S.-order.

Consider the world’s most dangerous weapons.

Until the late 1980’s, China was the world’s leading proliferator of nuclear weapons and missiles—for example, to Pakistan and across the Middle East. Then China started to adjust to global norms governing exports of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. It ceased nuclear tests in the 1990s and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—while waiting for U.S. action before ratifying. China joined the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. China now abides by the Missile Technology Control Regime as well.

Although China once had been a partner of Iran, it worked with the United States to sanction and halt Iran’s nuclear program.

Although China fought against the United States in the Korean War, it has worked with Washington to press North Korea to freeze and reverse Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

Between 2000 and 2018, China supported 182 of 190 UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on states violating international rules, prodded by vigorous U.S. efforts.

China is the second largest funder of the UN and UN peacekeeping missions; it has deployed 2500 peacekeepers, more than all the other Perm Five Security Council members combined. As Tom Christensen detailed in his book, The China Challenge, the United States spurred China to help end the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, a cause I identified in the 2005 speech.

China is the largest contributor to global growth. China cut its global current account surplus from about 10 percent of GDP to around zero—meaning that its demand has fueled worldwide expansion.

For the past 15 years, China has been the fastest growing destination for U.S. exports—until the Trump Administration embraced protectionism and sparked worldwide retaliation.

China no longer undervalues its exchange rate. It reduced reserves by about $1 trillion.

During the global financial crisis, China had the largest and quickest stimulus to counteract what could have been another Depression.

As former Secretary of the Treasury Hank Paulson related, when Russia allegedly approached China in 2008 about dumping dollars to harm the United States, China did not think this was a good idea.

Of course, many of these steps were in China’s self-interest, but they were helpful to others around the world, too. That’s what effective economic integration has accomplished.

When I served at the World Bank, China cooperated closely with us. It made early repayments and contributions to the Bank’s International Development Association, which funds the poorest countries. China supported our initiatives—ranging from support for the rule of law and fighting corruption to Open Data systems and plans for Climate Change.

China advanced extra monies to add to the IMF’s financial capacity. China’s new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has embraced global standards for governance, procurement, and environmental practices; the AIIB co-finances World Bank and Asian Development Bank projects. My friends at Mercy Corps have worked with humanitarian counterparts in China to help victims of disasters.

Even the story of China in the WTO warrants balanced treatment. China’s commitments in 2001 lowered its barriers considerably below those of other major developing countries, such as India and Brazil. The United States was also able to add Taiwan to the WTO when Beijing joined.

China fairly implemented numerical commitments such as tariffs and quotas. But its record for duties that are harder to measure—such as forced technology transfer, IPR enforcement, regulatory reforms, and trade-distorting subsidies—is spotty.

The main problem is that current WTO rules don’t cover many U.S. needs. China’s Ambassador to the United States has acknowledged that his country’s suit of WTO clothes from 2001 no longer fits, and China is discussing WTO reforms with others—although haltingly-- to meet various objections.

Some Chinese reformers looked to the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s provisions for guidance—but then the United States abandoned the TPP, and China’s internal reform advocates lost ground. Still, China has lowered its average tariff for others to 6.7 percent, although many U.S. exports face retaliatory tariffs. The new Chinese IPR courts have ruled in favor of the vast majority of international complaints, although penalties are insufficient.

China, the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, now accepts that it must join in efforts to limit climate change. However, China’s plans for coal-fueled generating plants belie its interests. Melting in the Himalayas would devastate the country. On the plus side, China is a leading innovator in non-fossil fuel technology.

Conservationists applaud China’s ban on elephant ivory sales, and China’s netizens campaigned effectively against shark-fin soup. Yet China’s tiger farms and illegal traffic of tiger parts may lead to the extinction of those iconic cats in the wild.

In the late 1950’s, China shelled Taiwan’s islands. When President Richard Nixon and Secretary Henry Kissinger opened ties almost 50 years ago, the United States suggested that “history will take care of the problem.” The success of Taiwan’s democracy shines as an example of a transition from authoritarianism to freedom. The United States contributed through military deterrence and an assurance not to support independence. To best safeguard Taiwan, the United States would be wise not to take Beijing’s restraint for granted, especially after the apparent breakdown of the “one country, two systems” model of Hong Kong.

My point is definitely not that all is well with China. I will turn to serious U.S. complaints in a moment.

But those who blithely assume that U.S. cooperation with China didn’t produce results in America’s interest are flat wrong.

Those who assume that China has not acted constructively within the U.S.-guided system—who assume that China is only a disrupter—are misleading themselves, and self-deception is dangerous in diplomacy.

Results should be the aim of our diplomacy.

Furthermore, the record warns not to take benefits for granted.

We are now witnessing just the vanguard of woes for America, China—and the world—if the two major powers slide into mutual animosity and zero-sum calculations.

We need to be clear-eyed about the real strategic challenges that China presents and disciplined not to distract with blanket blasts that will likely lead to misjudgments and mistakes.

Evan Feigenbaum of the Carnegie Endowment has pointed out recently that China is in fact pursuing a two-track approach toward the changing international order.

As a member of international organizations, China seeks to nudge those regimes toward Chinese preferences and norms.

Does this really surprise us?

What is surprising is that the United States has made China’s work easier by subverting the international economic and security system that America built over 70 years.

Is this really in America’s interest?

I hope you are aware, for example, that the United States will paralyze the WTO’s dispute resolution system this month. Two of the remaining three members of the WTO appeals body have reached the end of their terms, and the Administration has blocked the appointments of any successors. The Reagan, George H.W. Bush , and Clinton Administrations fought for and negotiated to create the WTO to give U.S. companies a fair, legal process to counter trade law violations; the Trump Administration prefers to break rules and institutions.

As Feigenbaum has explained, however, China is pursuing a second, alternative track as well: China’s Belt and Road presents another international model, a modern adaptation of China’s long-standing preference for tributary ties. This effort offers economic benefits to those who join China, combined with warnings for states that fail to accommodate Beijing.

We need to compete with China within international institutions and country-by-country. Because it’s hard to beat something with nothing.

We need to compete with China by promoting better ideas and practices and through attractive partnerships, instead of by retreating and bullying.

Too often, we just seem to behave belligerently. Not just with China—but we bludgeon NATO allies, Japan and South Korea, Canada and Mexico, and democratic partners around the world. The Administration is wasting diplomatic capital built up over generations.

We also need to ask why Sino- American relations have tumbled into constant confrontation.

I believe six developments have converged.

First, frustrations boiled over for U.S. businesses on market access: a lack of reciprocal trade and investment openings; forced technology transfers; intellectual property rights (IPR) violations; regulatory hurdles and arbitrary actions; and restrictions on exports, such as rare earth minerals.

I believe the United States could address many of these items through calibrated, continuous pressure and negotiations.

Many countries—developed and developing—share U.S. concerns. They would be willing to work with us, but not as part of a campaign to disengage and decouple from China. Many are wary because they are too busy defending themselves from Administration assaults on everyone’s trade. Pick your shots.

There are also parties within China that want to fix many of these problems in order to boost reforms, support domestic innovation, improve competitive opportunities, and retain access to U.S. and other international markets. For example, China’s opening of the asset management business recognizes the need for deeper and more liquid financial and savings markets. An aging China needs better pension systems.

Of course, China’s fixes need to extend beyond words on paper.

To take another example, ending requirements for joint ventures would reduce Chinese temptations and opportunities for forced technology transfers.

The United States is most likely to get results if it works with other countries and combines arguments about China’s self-interest with targeted, not haphazard, threats of penalties or retaliations.

Second, Americans question whether China’s state capitalism permits fair competition.

President Xi Jinping has recommitted China to privileges for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), granting them a dominant role, even though SOEs impede China’s economic potential. Nick Lardy of the Peterson Institute of International Economics pointed out in his recent book, The State Strikes Back, that about 40 percent of China’s SOEs are money-losers. Yet SOE assets are growing four times faster than those of private firms, even though SOE returns are much worse. China’s private sector is complaining about its disadvantages, inability to compete, and even intrusions on corporate governance.

There are at least two ways the United States could discipline China’s state capitalism productively.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership and the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement imposed competition policy requirements that compelled state enterprises to compete like private, profit-making firms. In addition, as Chad Bown (also of the Peterson Institute for International Economics) has written, the United States could work with others in the WTO to tighten subsidy rules, subjecting them to trade penalties. But we should be aware that other countries will point to large, direct U.S. subsidies—for example, to farmers—and to indirect support through U.S. government R&D and contracts.

Third, Americans fear that China will dominate the technologies of the future. This critique targets the “Made in China 2025” plan, although Party leaders have downplayed that plan’s influence.

Not surprisingly, China wants to move up the value chain. With a declining labor force, the planners seek higher value-added businesses, increased productivity, and higher wages.

Some steps, such as better and more enforceable IPR protection, if applied to all, could be mutually beneficial. More open research and higher standards for publication in China could help, too. But other actions, ranging from stealing to protecting markets, cause big headaches.

We are already in the age of the “splinternet.” I expect to see decoupling in telecom, internet and information and communication technology (ICT) services, and 5G systems.

We will all be worse off, however, if blanket bans and barriers supplant risk assessments. For example, anxieties over the use of Big Data could lead to ending cooperative and competitive innovation in the life sciences and other cutting-edge, beneficial sectors.

The best U.S. response to China’s innovation agenda is to strengthen our own capabilities and to draw the world’s talent, ideas, entrepreneurs, and venture capital to our shores. We will succeed by facing up to our own flaws, not by blaming others.

Fourth, I pointed out in China last year that no one had explained the motivation for Belt and Road: Was it a geopolitical move? A plan to employ excess Chinese capacity to build infrastructure? A development project? My guess is all of the above. The idea that China could build out Eurasia with Chinese-style transport corridors may well be building debts, not sustainable development.

I suggested that China should apply higher standard and the global principles adopted by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to Belt and Road: transparency; anti-corruption; open procurement; careful environmental practices; and debt sustainability for partner countries. At this year’s Belt and Road Forum, President Xi seemed to begin embracing these ideas.

The U.S. and other governments, as well as groups like the U.S.-China Business Council, should follow up so that good intentions become better practices.

Fifth, China’s foreign and security policy has clearly moved beyond Deng Xiaoping’s adage of “Hide your strength, bide your time.”

China wants military primacy in the Western Pacific and perhaps across more-distant seas.

These goals, while disconcerting, should not be surprising. They merit a strategic, well-resourced, and consistent response.

The United States needs closer ties with allies and partners and investments in our own capabilities.

America also needs to identify its key interests—such as freedom of navigation in principal sea-lanes and the ability to defend allies. The United States should calculate means and ends more carefully than it has done in recent decades, when Americans could operate with domain dominance all around the world.

Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing about American strategy in the Asia-Pacific at the dawn of the 20th Century, expected power in the region to remain “debated and debatable.” In other words, the United States would need to compete, maneuver, and balance power with others. We could benefit from Mahan’s historical and geopolitical perspective in the 21st Century.

Mahan also wanted to boost U.S. trade with Asia. Tariffs, he wrote, were like “a modern ironclad that has heavy armor, but inferior engines and guns; mighty for defense, weak for offense.” Why have we adopted an ironclad trade policy?

The corollary of careful calculation of military missions and capabilities is a need for disciplined diplomacy.

Even during a highpoint of U.S. power at the end of the Cold War, President George H.W. Bush and Secretary James Baker mobilized allies, built coalitions, negotiated with partners, and communicated a restrained power that was all the more effective because others did not want to test America’s will.

Finally, my sixth point is that Xi Jinping’s leadership has prioritized the Communist Party and restricted openness and debate in China.

When Xi assumed office in 2012, he commissioned a documentary film about the end of the Soviet Union—to be shown to all Party cadres. A similar film in Europe would have hailed Mikhail Gorbachev as a hero who helped end the Cold War. Not so for the Chinese version: Gorbachev was the fool who abandoned the Communist Party, ruined his country, and led to the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The not-so-subtle message was, “It won’t happen here.” The Soviet collapse continues to haunt China’s Communist leaders.

Having first met President Xi in 2006 when he was a provincial party secretary and having worked at the World Bank on China’s economic strategies, I had an opportunity to ask about Xi’s development priorities when he rose to the top. He answered, “the 86.68 million members of the Communist Party.” Xi’s reply was revealing about the man and the regime he leads: For Xi, China’s development depends on the strengthened leadership of the Party.

At the Central Committee’s recent Fourth Plenum in October, the public message revived the language of the Cultural Revolution: “Party, government, civilian, student—east, west, south, north, and center—the Party leads in all things.” That about sums it up.

The use of technology to control society—such as through facial recognition and social credit scores—strikes Americans as, to put it bluntly-- creepy.

Crackdowns in Tibet and Xiajiang add to a wider sense of internal oppression.

China hurts itself by forging a role model for dystopian societies of intrusive technologies and reeducation camps.

The rule of law and openness upon which Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” model rests may topple or be trampled. If China crushes Hong Kong, China will wound itself—economically and psychologically—for a long time.

Americans have had a long tradition of missionary work in China—religious, educational, medical, and political. We have wanted the Chinese to be like us—through Christianity, commercialism, and republicanism. When the Chinese rejected our appeals—during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the victory of the Communists in 1949, the Korean War of 1950 to 53, and the violent suppression in 1989—Americans pulled back with shock and anger.

I suggest that this time we stay steady without yielding our beliefs.

Ronald Reagan championed a contest of ideas with the Soviet Union even as he sought cooperation to make the world safer.

The foundation of America’s appeal is our own story. We need to work on the America of the world’s imagination and aspiration.

I am saddened when our leaders fail to appreciate that America’s practices should be examples and models, a founding principle dating back to America’s Revolutionary generation and then Abraham Lincoln.

We would be foolish to close off America to students, dreamers, immigrants, and ideas.

We would be foolish to place all Chinese students who come to America, or even Chinese-Americans, our fellow countrymen and women, under a veil of suspicion.

The United States will not win a competition by becoming more like China.

Which brings me back to where I began, with the “Responsible Stakeholder” speech of 2005.

I closed those remarks by explaining that, “Freedom lies at the heart of what America is…” guided by our call for the “non-negotiable demands of dignity.”

I pointed out that our purpose in championing ideas and ideals was not “to weaken China.” Our goal, as President George W. Bush then stated it, has been “to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, make their own way.”

Then and now, I believe that “Closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society.”

The close observer might perceive that China, like the Communist systems that preceded it, shows signs of stagnation. Its hesitations on market reforms and a more open society signal weakness, not strength.

China’s future chapters are still to be written.

The challenges of U.S.-China relations, as I’ve outlined them tonight, fit poorly with bombast and tariff barrages.

Frankly, the Administration itself seems divided.

The principal negotiators are pressing for sales to China and greater openness; if successful, they would further economic integration.

Others in the Administration issue diplomatic indictments that can only lead to decoupling with China, even if officials eschew the word.

Many in Congress and opposing candidates in our elections are eager to show they’ll be tough and will confront China, too.

“Toughness” alone fails as policy if unconnected to objectives.

The speeches of Administration principals herald rivalry, but with no sense that the United States can shape China’s international behavior—whether through diplomacy, negotiation, competition, building coalitions to pressure Beijing, or deterrence.

The Chinese have listened. President Xi has reportedly told his politburo colleagues in closed sessions that they need to prepare for 30 years of sustained struggle with the United States. “Struggle” is China’s new watchword of strategy. China will reduce its vulnerabilities by taking steps to insulate China from American pressure and by building new partnerships around the world, even as Beijing increases national self-reliance, an old Chinese tradition.

Note how China just agreed to the new Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, including with many Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation countries. I worked with Secretary Baker in 1989 to launch APEC to give the United States an economic edge in the Asia-Pacific. Now America abandons the field, with serious consequences for U.S. relations with Southeast Asia, a dynamic region that will factor importantly in the 21st Century.

As time passes, the United States loses friends and trust around the world. China maneuvers tactically with America and watches, probably with wry satisfaction, as the United States dissipates the international strengths built up over many decades.

Ask yourself: Can the United States really expect to deny China a place in the international system, with influence over rule-making?

If we acknowledge China’s role as a power at the table, shouldn’t we urge China to assume responsibilities as a systemic stakeholder?

As Jeff Bader, a U.S.-Asia expert with decades of experience observed recently, the U.S. challenge of influencing China’s behavior is no doubt harder than it was when I suggested the stakeholder approach in 2005. China is bigger, stronger, has had a good run, and sees less need to accede to standards of a West in disarray. We will have to face views we don’t like.

Nevertheless, Bader added, our diplomacy should work out a global framework within which China can make adjustments to support systemic interests—instead of leaving China to break the international system or to pursue the risky cause of trying to create a conflicting international order.

The United States is a stakeholder with interests, too. Some 250,000 Americans died in Asia in the 20th Century. To paraphrase Napoleon, the borders of a nation’s influence are marked by the graves of its soldiers.

We should not abandon our stake for shaky, short-term trade announcements or by degrading alliances into ties of convenience based upon shady accountings of troops, tribute, and trade.

I’ll conclude with a direct observation for all of you, leaders in America’s business community: The ground is shifting under your feet.

Your own concerns with China led many of you, perhaps understandably, to pull back.

You then stepped cautiously to avoid President Trump’s wrath—not to mention China’s.

The stakes are higher now. Be alert to greater risks of miscalculations and unintended consequences.

Kevin Rudd—former Prime Minister of Australia, a good friend of the United States, and a close student of China—recently warned: “A fully ‘decoupled world’ would be a deeply destabilizing place, undermining the global growth assumptions of the last 40 years, heralding the return of an iron curtain between East and West and the beginning of a new conventional and nuclear arms race with all its attendant strategic instability and risk.”

Are you ready for this?

A slide into Sino-American conflict—whether intentionally or by accident—would lead to incalculable costs and dangers. The 20th Century painted a shocking picture of industrial age destruction; do not assume that the cyber era of the 21st Century is immune to crack-ups or catastrophes of equal or even greater scale.

You need to decide whether you think the United States can still cooperate with China to mutual benefit while managing differences-- and if so, how.

You need to decide whether U.S. influence can be enhanced through long-term partnerships with allies and partners.

You need to decide whether we should save, update, and even expand the international trading system of openness, rules, and fair settlements of disputes.

You need to decide whether you wish to represent America abroad as purveyors of principles, as well as commerce, treating people from other lands with dignity and respect.

Then you need to make your case—not just with the Administration, but with Congress, Governors, and Mayors; with your employees, customers, and suppliers; with the media and opinion leaders.

When I selected the word “stakeholder” in 2005, I had in mind that stakeholders have interests in a shared enterprise. That interest is worth work, even perseverance, to preserve, adapt, and grow. Only the foolish or faint-hearted just yield or abandon the enterprise.

Cooperation as stakeholders does not mean the absence of differences. Stakeholders compete, too. The management of their differences should take place within a larger framework that offers common benefits.

This can be done.

But only with your support and activism.