O presidente genocida - Ricardo Noblat

Enquanto o coronavírus mata, Bolsonaro conta piada, por Ricardo Noblat

No dia em que pela primeira vez o número de mortos com Covid-19 no Brasil passou de mil em 24 horas, o presidente da República, em entrevista virtual concedida a partir da biblioteca do Palácio da Alvorada, resolveu contar uma piada e ele mesmo riu muito dela: “Quem for de direita toma cloroquina. Quem é de esquerda toma Tubaína”.

Cloroquina é a droga receitada pelo presidente para tratar doentes com coronavírus. Não há comprovação científica de que ela funcione, mas ele mandou que o Exército a produzisse em larga escala. Tubaína é um refrigerante de baixo custo à base de guaraná. Jair Bolsonaro é o presidente mais estúpido e ignorante da história do Brasil.

O mundo em que ele vive não gira em torno do Sol. Não tem vida inteligente nem seres sensíveis. As espécies são as mais rudimentares. Chafurdam em pântanos que exalam odores apodrecidos e venenosos. Não sobrevivem por muito tempo. Mas enquanto duram, tentam capturar e destruir os seus semelhantes. O planeta da morte.

Em menos de dois meses, o número de brasileiros vítimas fatais do coronavírus ultrapassará, hoje, a casa dos 18 mil. E o de infectados poderá chegar a 300 mil. A soma dos mortos já é maior do que a população de mais da metade dos municípios do país. O Brasil é o terceiro país com mais casos confirmados da doença e avança célere para a vice-liderança.

O fato é que o Brasil perdeu a luta contra o Covid-19. Como poderia ganhar com um presidente da República que se recusou a lutar? Bolsonaro foi o maior aliado do vírus quando ele apareceu por aqui em meados de março último. E continua sendo aliado. Não parece possível que ao cabo da pandemia seja absolvido por crime tão monstruoso e premeditado.

Quantas vezes você já o ouviu dizer: “Fiquem em casa, se protejam, é uma doença perigosa”? Nunca disse. Parece absurdo, mas ele nunca disse. Quantas vezes você ouviu Bolsonaro lamentar as mortes? Duas ou três vezes, se tanto. E sempre de maneira apressada. Quantas vezes você o ouviu dizer: “Precisamos salvar a Economia”. Ah, dezenas!

São poucos no mundo os chefes de Estado que se comportam dessa maneira. Conta-se nos dedos de uma mão o número deles. Bolsonaro é um dos dedos. E é também o mais importante dado ao tamanho do país que preside, e ao tamanho de sua população. É por isso que o mundo olha para o Brasil com assombro e não quer acreditar no que vê.

Como foi possível a eleição de um tipo tão primitivo como é Bolsonaro? Como é possível que os militares batam continência para ele e o apoiem com entusiasmo depois de tê-lo afastado do Exército no passado por indisciplina e conduta antiética? Até quando esse sujeito se manterá no poder apesar de todo o mal que causa ao país?

O que ele fez de bom até aqui? Cite algo de bom destinado a ficar na história como uma marca do governo Bolsonaro. E não se diga que foi por falta de tempo. Quinhentos e poucos dias são suficientes para que se avalie o que um governante será capaz de fazer de bom ou de mal por seu país. Que boa herança se desenha no horizonte?

A força do absurdo é tal que acabamos nos acostumando com ele e não reagimos. Já não surpreende mais que, em plena pandemia, Bolsonaro se empenhe em sabotar medidas de isolamento social adotadas no resto do mundo. Não surpreende que vire garoto propaganda de uma droga – em troca do quê? Nem que esqueça o que prometeu antes de se eleger.

O país está à deriva em mar que não é de almirante. Ao invés de mais médicos, o governo abre as portas para mais militares – outros nove ganharam cargos no Ministério da Saúde. Imune ao coronavírus, é inconcebível que Bolsonaro permaneça a salvo do desastre que promove alegre e irresponsavelmente. A hora do basta faz tempo que passou.

Ricardo Noblat

The Future of Money - Aditi Kumar, Jeremy Ney

CHARTS

National Digital Currencies: The Future of Money?

Authors: 
• Aditi Kumar
 
• Jeremy Ney
 

| May 2020

 

China piloted a national digital currency in April 2020. The European Central Bank has convened a working group of major economies to coordinate digital currency research and development. The U.S. Federal Reserve said it was in the early stages of researching the digital dollar. Spurred by the potential to modernize domestic payments systems, or take a leading role in updating the global payments infrastructure that supports cross-border trade and remittances, nations around the globe are exploring the merits and risks of issuing a digital currency. While many are in the early stages of research, central banks representing one-fifth of the world's population say they are likely to issue a digital currency very soon.

The Belfer Center’s Economic Diplomacy Initiative, in collaboration with the Atlantic Council’s Global Business and Economics Program, is tracking the latest developments in central bank issued digital currencies.

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What is a Central Bank Digital Currency?

A Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), or national digital currency, is simply the digital form of a country’s fiat currency. Instead of printing paper bills and minting coins, the central bank issues electronic tokens, whose value is backed by the full faith and credit of the government.

 

But I haven't used cash in months. Isn't my money already digital?

True, deposits held in commercial banks today are already digital and can be moved around electronically using credit and debit cards and mobile payments apps. However, this form of digital money is the liability of private banks, who must maintain reserves and deposits. CBDCs are the liability of the government (like cash today), which means that the central bank would need to back them up.  

 

How is this different from bitcoin?

Digital currencies can also be issued by private institutions. These may be centralized, i.e., issued and regulated by a single authority (but not the government), for example Facebook’s Libra. Or, they can be decentralized, like bitcoin. Today, about 3,000 privately issued digital currencies have a total market value of over $250 billion. Of these, bitcoin ($170 billion market cap), ethereum ($20 billion), and Ripple ($13 billion) are the three largest.

Decentralized digital currencies like bitcoin are often referred to as cryptocurrencies because of the underlying technology. They generally use distributed ledgers, which means that in the absence of a central authority, many devices maintain independent records of transaction activity and use consensus models to decide which copy is correct. Cryptocurrencies also employ a number of algorithms and cryptographic techniques to ensure that they are secure.

 

Why might a country want a national digital currency?

Central banks are still in the early stages of exploring the use cases for national digital currencies. According to the IMF, a key reason that advanced economies may be considering them is to counter the growth of private forms of digital money. Essentially, as users demand the convenience and low-cost of digital payments, governments may be asking the question, ‘if not us, then who?’ As these economies become increasingly cashless, apps like Venmo, WeChat, and M-Pesa are facilitating greater payments volumes, raising concerns about consumer protection, data privacy, and operational risks. Recent proposals like Facebook’s Libra currency may further encourage policymakers to explore a solution before users adopt an alternative over which the government has limited control. China’s recent digital currency pilot has introduced an element of great power competition too, since an early lead in technology development could allow China to dictate how the global payments infrastructure, which facilitates cross-border trade and remittances, evolves. 

Meanwhile economists have argued that central bank digital currencies can improve market functioning. The BIS has stated that it can improve liquidity by allowing faster transaction speeds, while the Bank of England noted that it can boost GDP by up to 3% by lowering transaction costs. In many emerging economies, national digital currencies are primarily being considered as a means to increase financial inclusion, by allowing governments to include unbanked populations in the digital economy. 

 

What are the risks?

There are many. National digital currencies could  give governments the capability to surveil users – good for tracking criminals, but a concern for the privacy of ordinary citizens. There may be implications for financial stability; for example, business models for banks and payments platforms would need to change if people are using government-provided digital cash. And, central banks would need to significantly ramp up their operational capabilities to manage a digital currency, from managing reserves and deposits, to protecting user privacy, preventing digital counterfeiting, and mitigating cyber attacks and other operational risks.

 

What are the geopolitical implications?

When bitcoin first hit the scene, the novelty was that no one was in charge – through a complex system of distributed ledgers, consensus protocols, and cryptography, the currency could exist in a peer-to-peer network with no central administrator. Some of the most promising digital currency projects today are very different. The Chinese government will manage the digital yuan, and Facebook is at the helm of Libra. Wide adoption of these or similar digital currency projects would place a lot more power in the hands of the currency operators, and away from the U.S. government.

What’s more, much of the global payments infrastructure today – like messaging, clearing, and settlement systems – are under the purview of U.S. authorities. If alternative systems were developed to support these digital currencies, the U.S. could lose the ability to monitor and regulate payments flows.

Here are just a few of the national security implications:

Sanctions: Few experts expect the U.S. dollar to lose its dominant status, but competing global currencies and payments infrastructure could reduce the impact of U.S. policies like economic sanctions, since adversaries could simply switch to a different currency.
Illicit activities: Most digital currency transactions are unlikely to be anonymous, but U.S. authorities would need to coordinate with the Chinese government, Facebook officials, or other currency operators to gather information on illicit transactions.
Data privacy: Digital currencies will ultimately generate a lot of data on how individuals spend their money, raising concerns about surveillance, data manipulation, and other privacy breaches.
Data security: Digital currencies face security vulnerabilities like any other technology. Cyberattacks and security breaches could lead to stolen currency and personal data, and even bring economic activity to a standstill.

For more information on this publication: Belfer Communications Office

For Academic Citation: “National Digital Currencies: The Future of Money?.” Infographic & Chart, May 2020.

The Authors

Aditi Kumar

• Executive Director
• Member of Board, Belfer Center

Expertise: 

• Economics & Global Affairs
 
• Economic Policy
 
• International Finance
 
• Monetary Policy
 
• Coronavirus

• Bio/Profile
• Media Inquiries
• Email
• More by this author

Jeremy Ney

• Bio/Profile
• More by this author

National Digital Currencies: The Future of Money? - Belfer Center (Harvard University)

National Digital Currencies: The Future of Money?

Tomorrow’s money will live in your smartphone, not your wallet. Spurred by the potential to modernize domestic payments systems or to take a leading role in updating the global payments infrastructure, nations around the globe are exploring whether to issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC), the digital form of a country’s fiat currency. China, for example, began piloting a national digital currency last month. The European Central Bank has convened a working group of major economies to coordinate digital currency research and development. The U.S. Federal Reserve said it was in the early stages of researching the digital dollar.  But what are the risks and rewards of this shift? And how might it impact the decades-long dominance of the U.S. dollar? A new project from the Belfer Center’s Economic Diplomacy Initiativeand the Atlantic Council’s Global Business and Economics Center will track the rise of digital currencies around the globe. A color-coded map provides a snapshot of where countries stand – research, development, pilot, and launched – in deploying a CBDC, along with an overview of national efforts. “Digital currencies could substantially reshuffle traditional instruments of economic diplomacy,” said Aditi Kumar, Executive Director of the Belfer Center. “Through this project, we’ll closely monitor digital currency developments and how countries position themselves in the evolving global economic environment.” This financial innovation carries significant legal, economic, and operational risks. National digital currencies could give governments the capability to surveil users – good for tracking criminals, but a concern for the privacy of ordinary citizens. Business models for banks and payments platforms would need to change if people are using government-provided digital cash. And central banks would need to ramp up their operational capabilities to manage a digital currency. “Central banks are not only regulators, as we have seen in the past months, they can drive economic growth and innovation,” said Josh Lipsky, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Global Economics program and a fellow at the Belfer Center’s Economic Diplomacy Initiative. “That spirit of innovation needs to come into play with CBDCs. The evolution of money is happening and it’s important for central banks to help lead the transformation.”

View the Project »

Brésil : la dangereuse fuite en avant de Bolsonaro - Le Monde

 Le Monde não é exatamente um amigo do Bolsonaro

Brésil : la dangereuse fuite en avant de Bolsonaro

ÉDITORIAL

Le Monde, 17/05/2020

Editorial. 

Malgré un bilan de plus en plus lourd, le président brésilien continue de nier la gravité de la pandémie de Covid-19 et entraîne son pays sur une voie extrêmement dangereuse.

Editorial du « Monde ». 

Il y a, à n’en pas douter, quelque chose de pourri au royaume du Brésil, où le président, Jair Bolsonaro, peut affirmer sans barguigner que le coronavirus est une « grippette » ou une « hystérie » née de l’« imagination » des médias. Quelque chose de pourri, lorsqu’il prend des bains de foule, exhorte les autorités locales à abandonner les restrictions et prétend que l’épidémie « commence à s’en aller », alors que les cimetières du pays enregistrent un nombre record d’enterrements. Quand son ministre des affaires étrangères, Ernesto Araujo, pourfend le « comunavirus », affirmant que la pandémie est le résultat d’un complot communiste. Quand le ministre de la santé, Nelson Teich, démissionne le 15 mai, quatre semaines après sa nomination à ce portefeuille crucial, pour « divergences de vues », le jour où le pays atteint 240 000 cas confirmés et plus de 16 000 morts.

Pour beaucoup, les heures sombres que traverse le Brésil, désormais cinquième nation la plus touchée par la pandémie, rappellent celles de la dictature militaire, quand le pays était soumis à la peur et à l’arbitraire. Avec une différence de taille : alors que les généraux revendiquaient la défense d’une démocratie attaquée, selon eux, par le communisme, le Brésil de Bolsonaro habite un monde parallèle, un théâtre de l’absurde où les faits et la réalité n’existent plus. Dans cet univers sous tension, nourri de calomnies, d’incohérences et de provocations mortifères, l’opinion se polarise sur une nuée d’idées simples mais fausses.

Le déni entretenu par le pouvoir dissuade la moitié de la population de se confiner, tandis que les appels à la distanciation physique lancés par les professionnels de santé, les gouverneurs et les maires ne sont que modérément suivis. L’activité économique doit continuer à tout prix, affirme Bolsonaro, qui peine surtout à prendre la mesure de la pandémie tout en faisant un calcul politique insensé : les effets dévastateurs de la crise seront attribués à ses opposants, espère-t-il.

Chaos sanitaire

Officier subalterne exclu de l’armée et obscur député d’extrême droite, raillé par ses pairs pendant trois décennies, Bolsonaro n’avait rien d’un homme d’Etat. Arrivé au pouvoir, rongé par la rancœur et la nostalgie brune, l’ex-capitaine de ­réserve n’a cessé de sonner la charge contre le « système » honni. Une posture qui, en période de pandémie aiguë, provoque le chaos sanitaire et sème la mort.

A force de tricher avec les faits, les gouvernants populistes finissent par croire à leurs propres mensonges. On le voit ailleurs dans le monde. Mais ici, dans ce pays sorti voici à peine vingt-cinq ans de la dictature, où la démocratie reste fragile, voire dysfonctionnelle, le fait de politiser ainsi une crise sanitaire à outrance est totalement irresponsable.

Avec un socle de 25 % d’électeurs, Bolsonaro sait que sa marge de manœuvre est étroite. Certains évoquent aujourd’hui le scénario d’un coup de force institutionnel. Devant la foule venue le soutenir à Brasilia, le président a d’ailleurs clairement laissé entendre, le 3 mai, que, en cas d’enquête de la Cour suprême contre lui ou ses proches, il ne respecterait pas la décision des juges. Après avoir pratiqué le négationnisme historique en vantant la dictature, nié l’existence des incendies en Amazonie et la gravité de la pandémie de Covid-19, Bolsonaro et sa tentation autoritaire risquent d’entraîner le pays dans une dangereuse fuite en avant.

Why the pandemic could eventually lower inequality - The Economist

Free exchangeWhy the pandemic could eventually lower inequality

History suggests it could precipitate shifts towards a more equal income distribution

The Economist, May 16, 2020
For america’s poor, the covid-19 pandemic has delivered a swift and brutal reversal of fortune. At the start of the year unemployment was plumbing new lows. Years of wage growth for low-income workers had healed some of the scars left by the global financial crisis. Already by 2016, the most recent year for which figures are available, the economic expansion had produced a smaller rise in American income inequality, after taxes and transfers, than any expansion since the early 1980s. Between 2016 and 2019 the weekly earnings of low- and middle-income workers grew at an annual average pace of 3.8%. Since covid-19 struck, however, a host of economic statistics—and legions of pundits—have pointed to a resurgence in inequality. Yet if history is a guide, the pandemic could eventually render the distribution of income more egalitarian.

There are many reasons why the well-heeled might suffer less in the pandemic. Much of the plunge in asset prices that occurred in March has since been retraced. In places like New York City and Los Angeles, covid-19 seems to have hit poorer neighbourhoods harder. Low-wage earners are often less able to work from home or maintain social distancing. Interruptions to schooling widen the gaps in achievement between children from richer backgrounds and those from poorer families.

Meanwhile, workers on the lower rungs of the income ladder have borne the brunt of job losses. America’s unemployment rate rose by roughly ten percentage points, to 14.7%, in April—the highest since the Depression. The jobless rate for workers with a college education went up by nearly six percentage points, to 8.4%; that for workers without a high-school diploma leapt by just over 14 percentage points, to 21.2%. A new paper published by the Becker Friedman Institute at the University of Chicago reinforces the point. Between February and April, find its authors, employment among workers in the top fifth of the income distribution dropped by 9%. In the bottom fifth, by contrast, it plunged by 35%.

Were the crisis of unemployment to end as swiftly as it began, the effects of these uneven job losses on inequality would be limited, and fleeting. Many jobless workers are earning more in unemployment benefits than they did on the job, thanks to a top-up of $600 per week enacted by Congress in March. Of the more than 20m Americans who were out of work in April, 78% were reported to be temporarily laid off. But the danger is that temporary job losses become permanent. The authors of the Becker Friedman paper calculate that active employment—or the number of workers counted on payrolls—declined by 14% between February and April. About 40% of that fall occurred at firms that had ceased operations, at least temporarily. Not all will reopen. A new working paper by Jose Maria Barrero of Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, Nicholas Bloom of Stanford University and Steven Davis of the University of Chicago is similarly gloomy, concluding that 42% of pandemic-related job losses will be permanent. Meanwhile, the crush of claimants has overwhelmed some state governments and slowed the flow of unemployment aid. Top-up benefits are due to expire in July, when millions will still be jobless.

The most vulnerable workers are therefore likely to be squeezed hard by the recession. But if history is a guide, those at the top of the income distribution could yet face a reckoning. Disruptive global events have often precipitated shifts towards a more equal distribution of income and wealth. In his influential book, “Capital in the Twenty-First Century”, Thomas Piketty points out that high levels of inequality in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were reduced by the calamitous events of the period from 1914 to 1945. In that time the share of income earned by America’s top 1%, for instance, dropped from 19% to 14%. The combination of depression, war, inflation and taxes compressed incomes and laid waste to vast fortunes. Walter Scheidel, a historian, goes further still in his book on long-run inequality, “The Great Leveller”. Since antiquity, he argues, only four forces have ever managed to reduce inequality in a sustained way: war, revolution, state failure and pandemic. (The troubles often coincide: a pandemic contributed to the failure of the Roman empire; another coincided with the end of the first world war.)

Past crises are a far cry from today’s difficulties. The Black Death compressed income gaps by dramatically reducing the ratio of workers to arable land. Even in the worst possible case, covid-19 will kill far fewer than the 30-60% of Europeans felled by bubonic plague. Stockmarkets could plunge again, but it is very unlikely that they will match the collapse of nearly 90% that took place between 1929 and 1932. Yet some comparisons can still be made. The debts racked up by governments during this pandemic will in some cases reach heights last seen during the world wars. When governments eventually balance the books—and especially if they reduce debt burdens via taxation, financial repression or debt restructuring—the wealthy could find themselves footing the bill.

Time for a redeal

Furthermore, the crisis could have indirect effects that influence the trajectory of inequality. In a critique of Mr Piketty’s arguments published in 2017 Marshall Steinbaum, now of the University of Utah, argued that the wars and the Depression of the 20th century mainly led to greater egalitarianism by discrediting ruling elites and the regressive policies that had enabled the rises in inequality in the first place. That created space for social democracy to bloom. Inequality fell not only because of higher taxes but also because of extensions to the welfare state.

History need not repeat itself. Governments and economic systems of all kinds have struggled to manage the pandemic effectively and equitably. But it does not take much imagination to see that if politicians allow the costs of the pandemic to be borne unequally they could sow the seeds of a transformative populist backlash. They would do well to heed the lessons of the past. ■

Dig deeper:
For our latest coverage of the covid-19 pandemic, register for The Economist Today, our daily newsletter, or visit our coronavirus tracker and story hub.

Página do Oliver Stuenkel, com artigos e entrevistas

Post-Western World
Oliver Stuenkel

NEWS

1. O que o golpe de Fujimori em 1992 ensina ao Brasil de 2020 (EL PAÍS)
Apoio da população peruana ao fechamento do Congresso só foi possível porque Fujimori promoveu uma sensação de medo necessária para justificar medidas excepcionais. LER MAIS

2. Entrevista: ‘Ataques fragilizam Brasil e ajudam China a obter concessões’ (Folha de São Paulo)
Falar mal da China tem um custo. Ataques como o do deputado federal Eduardo Bolsonaro e do ministro da Educação, Abraham Weintraub, deixam o Brasil em posição frágil e ajudam o governo chinês a conseguir concessões do Brasil em negociações. LER MAIS

3. Pandemia revela que mundo pós-ocidental já chegou (EL PAÍS)
Resposta confusa dos EUA ao novo coronavírus sugere que época marcada pela liderança global de Washington chegou ao fim. LER MAIS

4. Com Trump acuado, Brasil precisa de Plano B (Valor Econômico)
“Acredito piamente na reeleição de Donald Trump”, anunciou Jair Bolsonaro durante sua primeira visita à Casa Branca, em março de 2019. Em viagem recente à Flórida, o chanceler brasileiro, Ernesto Araújo, afirmou que a reeleição de Trump garantiria a continuidade da relação bilateral, peça-chave da estratégia de política externa do governo Bolsonaro.  LER MAIS

5. China’s Diplomats Are Going on the Offensive in Brazil (Foreign Policy)
Pro-Bolsonaro groups on WhatsApp are teeming with xenophobic, anti-China & anti-communist rhetoric, and radical Bolsonaro supporters commonly describe the coronavirus as a Chinese plot. Abandoning its subtle approach, Beijing has now decided to fight back. READ MORE

6. Latin America Must Act – Or Brace for Political Instability (Americas Quarterly)
People who joined Latin America’s new middle class during the 2000s’ commodity boom, and slid back into poverty during the 2010s, now realize that both they and their children are unlikely to escape poverty for years to come. A global recession, a wave of unemployment and limited government capacity to mitigate the crisis could thus lead to increased political instability — which would in turn make economic recovery far more difficult. READ MORE

7. Bolsonaro Faces His Biggest Crisis – And Is Struggling (Americas Quarterly)
There is no doubt Bolsonaro’s strategy to handle the pandemic has gotten off to a catastrophic start, costing the president valuable political capital and putting countless lives at risk. As Brazil heads into the storm, he is facing the greatest crisis of his turbulent presidency. READ MORE

8. Wanted: South America’s Participation in Global Geopolitics (Americas Quarterly)
Yet again, South America was largely absent from this year’s Munich Security Conference, which every year convenes heads of state and ministers from around the world to discuss urgent geopolitical challenges. Of the world’s top ten economies, Brazil was the only one without a single policy maker in Munich. READ MORE

9. Is Regional Cooperation Dead in Latin America? (Americas Quarterly)
With Latin America politically fragmented and convulsed, intra-regional dialogue is getting more difficult. READ MORE

10. Argentina y Brasil: la alianza necesaria (Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica)
La relación entre Argentina y Brasil enfrenta la peor crisis de su historia, pero, sin una relación bilateral estable y productiva, la región corre el riesgo de perder estabilidad y tendrá más dificultades para enfrentar de manera coordinada sus múltiples problemas. READ MORE

11. Entrevista: ‘Esta podría ser la peor crisis económica que América Latina ha tenido en su historia’ (BBC Mundo)
Mientras América Latina se prepara para enfrentar un aumento del número de contagios en las próximas semanas, la crisis económica ha comenzado a golpear duramente a las empresas y las familias más vulnerables. El debate ha estado centrado en cómo evitar un colapso en los hospitales y una escalada en el número de muertes, y cómo mitigar los efectos de una caída sin precedentes en el nivel de empleo, en medio de una crisis económica catalogada como “la peor desde la Gran Depresión de 1929”. Pero más allá de la emergencia, nos preguntamos cuáles serán las consecuencias políticas y económicas que la pandemia provocará en Latinoamérica y cómo cambiará el panorama regional en la era post-coronavirus. READ MORE

Missed the last Post-Western World Briefing? Check it out here.

Quais são os próximos ministros que podem cair? - Revista Veja

Quem será o próximo a cair?

Revista Veja / by Thomas Traumann / 1h

A queda de Nelson Teich do Ministério da Saúde com menos de um mês de governo revela a instabilidade da equipe do presidente Bolsonaro. Acompanhe quais os ministros e assessores importantes que também balançam no cargo:

– Paulo Guedes, ministro da Economia – Ele não quer sair, nem Bolsonaro quer que saia agora, mas os militares acham que seu receituário liberal perdeu prazo de validade. Os generais com cargo no Palácio do Planalto querem na economia um ministro que fale mais de crescimento econômico e menos de ajuste fiscal. Se dependesse apenas deles, indicariam como novo ministro da Economia o ministro Rogério Marinho, mas aceitam um nome palatável ao mercado como o presidente do BC, Roberto Campos Neto. 

– Rogério Marinho, ministro do Desenvolvimento Regional – Paulo Guedes só se refere ao antigo auxiliar com o adjetivo “desleal”.

– Mansueto Almeida, secretário do Tesouro – Na virada do ano, o secretário pediu para sair, depois de receber boa proposta financeira do mercado privado. Paulo Guedes o convenceu a ficar para criar o Conselho Fiscal da República, que agora ninguém sabe se existirá. Mansueto tem relação agastada com a turma que Guedes trouxe para o ministério, Adolfo Sachsida (secretário de Política Econômica), Carlos da Costa (Produtividade) e Salim Mattar (Desestatização).

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– General Edson Pujol, comandante do Exército – É a principal barreira militar para os arroubos autoritários do presidente. Foi contra a nomeação dos generais Ramos e Braga Neto no ministério por considerar que elas fragilizam a independência do Exército em relação ao governo. Bolsonaro já pensou em trocá-lo pelo general Ramos, mas teme a reação da caserna.

– General Luiz Ramos, responsável pela articulação política – O presidente acha que o general cede demais nas negociações com o Congresso e segue se queixando da falta de uma base de apoio. Ramos culpa o líder do governo Vitor Hugo.

– Deputado Vitor Hugo, líder do Governo na Câmara – É um Highlander. Sobreviveu aos ataques de Onyx Lorenzoni, Joice Hasselmann (quando esta era próxima do Planalto) e chegou a ser extraoficialmente destituído da liderança do governo quando Osmar Terra voltou para a Câmara. Agora, enfrenta Ramos.

As cenas de terror nos hospitais públicos brasileiros e as saídas possíveis para mitigar a crise. Leia nesta edição.Reprodução/VEJA

– Abraham Weintraub, ministro da Educação – O ministro chama mais atenção pelos seus tuítes do que pelas formulações pedagógicas, mas passou do limite na agora famosa reunião ministerial de 22 de abril, quando pediu a prisão dos ministros do STF. A AGU considera que a saída de Weintraub poderia melhorar o desgastado clima do governo com o Supremo.

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– Tereza Cristina, ministra da Agricultura – A competente ministra é atacada nas redes bolsonaristas por defender melhores relações com a China, maior parceiro comercial brasileiro. É inusitado alguém poder perder o emprego por suas qualidades, mas é isso mesmo. 

– Regina Duarte, secretaria da Cultura – A atriz conseguiu uma sobrevida ao defender o regime militar (“ah, sempre houve tortura”), mas ainda é por não enfrentar a esquerda e propor um projeto cultural inspirado ao escritor Olavo de Carvalho

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