O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

sábado, 10 de setembro de 2022

China: da política de portas abertas a um retorno ao protecionismo? - Wang Xiangwei (SCMP)

 Estaria a China revertendo às posturas isolacionistas e às políticas protecionistas e introvertidas das antigas dinastias Ming e Qing, afastando-se das doutrinas de portas abertas e de livre comércio dos últimos 40 anos?

Um artigo de história, falando do passado, desperta um intenso debate na China e no exterior, como argumenta este artigo no South China Morning Post, o principal jornal de Hong Kong.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 


SCMP Columnist

China Briefing by Wang Xiangwei

Is China closing its doors? Its leaders say no, but actions speak louder than words – and more clarity is needed

  • An otherwise run-of-the-mill academic article on imperial isolationist policy commissioned by a state-affiliated institution has sparked fierce debate
  • It shows the unease being felt at home and abroad over the once-unthinkable: that China’s open-door policy of more than 40 years is now in question

Will China open up more to the wider world, as its leaders have repeated tirelessly in public, or is it about to close its doors, as many have privately feared, because of uncertainties at home and abroad?

These two seemingly contradicting questions have been simmering for nearly three years now, as China has largely isolated itself from the outside world through its tough zero-Covid policies and as tensions with the United Stateshave escalated dramatically.

They matter even more now as China’s Communist Party enters the final stretch of preparations for its 20th congress next month, where Xi Jinping is widely expected to cement his status as the country’s most powerful leader in recent decades by securing a norm-busting third term as party chief.

People walk past a screen showing Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Museum of the Communist Party of China in Beijing. Xi is expected to cement his status as paramount leader at next month’s party congress. Photo: AFP
People walk past a screen showing Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Museum of the Communist Party of China in Beijing. Xi is expected to cement his status as paramount leader at next month’s party congress. Photo: AFP

All this helps explain why a recent academic article on the country’s past closed-door policies has caused such a stir in China and overseas, as it brings into the open concerns about Beijing’s broad policy direction.

=========


The article, whose title can be roughly translated as “A Fresh Look at the Isolationist Policy in the Ming and Qing Dynasties”, argues that China’s feudal rulers from the 16th to the 19th centuries did not pursue a policy of complete isolation, as is widely believed, but one of “self-restriction” designed to protect the country’s national interests and sovereignty, and ward off Western invasion and colonisation.

It concluded that voluntary restrictions on border openings made historical sense, even though those policies contributed to China’s decline because its rulers refused to accept advanced Western technology and weaponry.


The 15,000-word article was first published in an obscure journal called “Historical Research” in June and would have likely remained only of interest to a small circle of academics, had it not been shared on social media by the state-affiliated Chinese Academy of History, which commissioned the article.


Since then, it has gone viral, sparking an intense online debate over not only what the article really means to say, but also China’s commitment to reform and opening up.

For many critics, the article is a brazen revisionist attempt to upend the prevailing official narrative that the feudal rulers of the Ming and Qing dynasties had deliberately pursued closed-door policies, which were responsible for China’s waning status and resulted in it being forced to open up by way of the opium wars and their aftermath.


Some went even further by suggesting that the publication of the article was a sign that the Chinese authorities planned to use historical revisionism to signal that they may have had second thoughts about China’s open-door policy at a time when the party has strengthened authoritarian controls at all levels of society and is faced with a hostile international environment that’s unprecedented in recent times.


Proponents of this theory point to the Chinese Academy of History’s status as a high-level institute formed in 2019 with the top leadership’s blessing.

They argue that China’s extreme zero-Covid policy, which has largely closed the country off from the rest of the world for approaching three years now, could be viewed as an experiment to test the resilience of the Chinese economy.


But other commentators have dismissed those criticisms and worries as people making mountains out of molehills and argued that the article was merely an academic exercise in studying the country’s past.

This author tends to agree with the latter view. In fact, the article in question is well researched and well balanced, succinctly and convincingly articulating the reasons behind and highlighting the failures of those feudal policies. But the worrying sentiment emanating from the debate should not be dismissed out of hand.

As tensions rise, China pivots inwards

The fact that this academic article could elicit such strong reactions at home and abroad is truly remarkable, providing serious food for thought.


Until recently, it was almost unthinkable that China’s open-door policy, adopted by Deng Xiaoping more than 40 years ago, could be called into question. After all, the policy of reform and opening up paved the way for China’s economic lift-off. Now the country has the world’s second-largest economy and is the largest goods-trading nation.

China’s top leaders including Xi and Premier Li Keqiang have repeatedly offered reassurances that the country will not close its doors. They have in fact said it will open up wider to the outside world.

But in recent years, their vows have been met with increasing scepticism. Xi has constantly stressed self-reliance and self-sufficiency when it comes to economic and technological development, while pushing for a dual circulation economy which would rely less on foreign technology and consumption.

China’s inward economic shift has come amid rising geopolitical and trade tensions with the US, which has started to impose restrictions on exports of critical components including semiconductors.


The inward pivot is also accompanied by an array of domestic policies, including the common prosperity campaign and regulatory crackdowns on sectors from technology to private education, mainly targeted at non-state enterprises.

Moreover, China’s tight zero-Covid policies have reduced interactions with the international community to a bare minimum.

All these developments have helped conjure up a frightening perception that China is retreating into isolation.

China’s top leaders are under growing pressure to counter this perception. On Wednesday, Li Zhanshu, China’s third-ranked leader, visited Russia, becoming the country’s most senior official to travel abroad since the earliest days of the pandemic. Xi is reportedly set to attend the G20 leaders summit in Bali in November.


Meanwhile, the party congress, which is scheduled to begin on October 16, is expected to hear a policy address from Xi that will outline China’s priorities for the next five years or even longer.

Unless China’s leaders provide much-needed clarity and match their promises with concrete actions, unease and worry emanating from the debate on past isolationist policies will continue unabated.






sexta-feira, 9 de setembro de 2022

A morte da rainha Elizabeth II: entrevista à Rádio BandRS - Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Guilherme Macalossi

 A morte da rainha Elizabeth II: entrevista à BandRS  

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Diplomata, professor

(www.pralmeida.org; diplomatizzando.blogspot.com)

Notas para participação na emissão de Guilherme Macalossi, “Bastidores do Poder”, na Rádio BandRS, em 9/09/2022, 14:30 hs.

  

Perguntas: 

1. A Rainha Elizabeth II e seu papel na renovação da monarquia de 1952 para cá

PRA: Elizabeth II como rainha acidental, bem diferente, mas tão decidida quanto sua predecessora de quatro séculos antes, a primeira Elizabeth, que rechaçou a Armada espanhola e nem precisou do Francis Drake para isso.

A segunda Elizabeth foi, por assim dizer, uma “rainha acidental”, pois seu pai era o segundo da lista e não estava previsto que se tornasse rei. Foi aquele rei gago, do filme “O Discurso do Rei”. O primogênito, príncipe Edward, desistiu para casar-se com uma americana divorciada duas vezes, e ele era um pouco nazista. O novo rei George VI não gostava do Winston Churchill, mas teve de convidá-lo para ser primeiro-ministro na hora mais sombria da Grã-Bretanha, ameaçada pela invasão das forças nazistas. Se George VI tivesse se alinhado com os pacifistas do gabinete britânico, que consentiram na vergonha de Munique em 1938, o Reino Unido teria se transformado num império tutelado pelo regime nazista.

Ao assumir o trono com apenas 27 anos, tendo assistido e participado das horas mais sombrias da IIGM, Elizabeth nunca perdeu o bom-humor e a simpatia que caracterizaram todo o seu reinado, o mais longo da história das monarquias britânicas.

Ela presidiu, com non chalance, pode-se dizer, ao desmantelamento do Império Britânico, depois que seu pai, ex-vice-rei na Índia, teve de se desfazer de uma das joias da coroa britânica, que a Rainha Vitória tinha ganho de presente da Companhia das Índias Orientais Britânicas, em meados do século XIX. Primeiro foi Suez, em 1957, uma humilhação, quando Grã-Bretanha e França tiveram de retirar as tropas do Sinai, em apoio a Israel numa das raríssimas ocasiões em que URSS e EUA atuaram de acordo, contra o velho colonialismo europeu. Depois foram as colônias africanas, e só restaram algumas no Caribe, poucas pérolas na Ásia, pertencentes à Commonwealth, onde ainda estão Canadá, Austrália e Nova Zelândia, e alguns outros. O último desfazimento do Império, o maior do mundo um século atrás, ocorreu em 1997, quando Hong Kong foi devolvida à China, depois de conquistada nas horrendas guerras do ópio contra o Império do Meio, no século XIX.

Junto com os Beatles, a rainha trouxe bilhões de libras ao povo britânico, pela atração que ambos exercerão no mundo inteira, pela música da banda e pelo charme da Coroa.

 

2. A monarquia constitucional como sistema de governo

PRA: Trata-se do mais estável e mais democrático regime conhecido em toda a história mundial, ainda que oligárquica no início, ou um pouco menos aristocrático no século XX, quando os trabalhistas do Labour substituíram os Whigs, ou Liberais, como segundo maior partido do regime, dividindo os gabinetes com o Tories, ou Conservadores. 

A monarquia constitucional começa mais de 800 anos atrás, com a Magna Carta, de 1215, segundo a qual ninguém está acima da Lei, nem mesmo o Rei, junto com o habeas corpus, ou justiça independente, e o princípio do no taxation without representation, ou seja, o soberano não pode criar impostos ou taxar os súditos sem o seu consentimento.

A Magna Carta foi completada pelo Bill of Rights, de 1689, segundo o qual “o rei reina, mas não governa”, consolidando assim o sistema de governo parlamentar, sob uma monarquia constitucional não escrita, mas costumeira. Desde a Revolução Gloriosa, a Inglaterra, Grã-Bretanha desde 1703 – com a unificação com a Escócia – e depois Reino Unido no século XX (ainda que os irlandeses não concordassem, até 1921), os governos parlamentares se sucederam ininterruptamente nas ilhas britânicas, sem qualquer descontinuidade desde então. É, para os britânicos, o melhor sistema possível, que projeta raízes retrospectivamente desde os tempos medievais, ou pelo menos desde a invasão dos normandos em 1066, Guilherme o Conquistador.

 

3. A importância do Reino Unido na Europa Moderna

PRA: Foi relevante, mais pelo que impediu de fazer, do que pelo que fez. Impediu Napoleão de submeter toda a Europa, resistiu à tirania de Hitler, que poderia ter dominado toda a Europa por várias décadas se vencesse a resistência de Churchill, e também resistiu, já como sócio menor dos Estados Unidos, à dominação soviética sobre a mesma Europa nos tempos de Stalin. E resistiu contra a Comissão de Bruxelas, nas suas tentativas de enquadrar todos os países membros da CEE e depois UE, sobretudo no caso da moeda comum.

Depois do Brexit, no entanto, ela vai enfrentar um declínio relativo, isolada de uma das locomotivas da economia mundial. Veremos se haverá renegociação com a Comissão e o Conselho europeu.

 

4. A integridade do Reino Unido e os movimentos separatistas a partir do reinado de Charles

PRA: Existem sinais de possível fragmentação do Reino agora Desunido, sobretudo vindos da Escócia e da Irlanda do Norte. Como sempre, tudo depende de quem paga o quê. O plebiscito escocês de separação foi derrotado porque os escoceses pensaram nas suas pensões.

 

5. Relação entre Reino Unido e Brasil

PRA: A mais velha relação do Brasil, remontando a Portugal desde os Descobrimentos e a Restauração de 1640, com o mais antigo tratado bilateral ainda em vigor. No século XIX, as elites brasileiras eram financiadas em libras britânicas, mas tinha manias francesas. Depois, os britânicos foram substituídos pelos EUA. 

Mas são relações ainda importantes em todos os domínios. 

A Rainha esteve no Brasil em 1968, e diversos presidentes brasileiros efetuaram visitas de trabalho ou de Estado ao Reino Unido.

 

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 4235: 9 setembro 2022, 3 p.


Os EUA não possuem teto de gastos para ajudar a Ucrânia, na sua defesa da guerra de agressão da Rússia - Olivier Knox (The Washington Post)

 

The Washington Post, September 9, 2022

 By Olivier Knox
with research by Caroline Anders

Welcome to The Daily 202! Tell your friends to sign up here. On this day in 1776, the Second Continental Congress dropped “United Colonies” in favor of “United States of America.”

 

The big idea

New U.S. aid, front-line testimonials, Russian defiance – and Congress

Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks to media before departure at the railway station in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Thursday. The sign on the train reads "The Victory Train". (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)

Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks to media before departure at the railway station in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Thursday. The sign on the train reads "The Victory Train". (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)

It’s been a big week for the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II, and for The Washington Post’s coverage of Russia’s expanded invasion of Ukraine. Let’s look at some of the critical developments — and a big looming test for President Biden’s policy.

I teased it in the headline, so let’s get right to that test, which you may have missed because it was more of a bureaucratic development than a battlefield conundrum, a diplomatic breakthrough, or a viral social media post featuring the explosive demise of a Russian tank.

Ready? One week ago, Biden asked Congress for another $13.7 billion in new money for the Ukraine war — $7.2 billion to provide Kyiv more weapons and military gear, and replenish U.S. stockpiles of arms sent to Ukraine, $4.5 billion to help the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky, and $2 billion to mitigate energy supply disruptions.

  • This week, some lawmakers, including Democrats hemmed and hawed at the request and asked the administration for more informationbefore they would commit to supporting it, as Joe Gould and Bryant Harris documented for Defense News.

That included, they reported, Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee chairman Jon Tester (D-Mont.). “I’m not opposed to it; I just want to know what’s in it,” they quoted him as saying.

Others raising questions included Senators Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Thom Tillis(R-N.C.) who both sit on the Senate Armed Services Committee. The panel’s top Republican, James M. Inhofe (Okla.) expressed reservations and pushed Biden to use his authority to send another $2.8 billion in arms to Ukraine before that authority lapses when the new fiscal year opens Oct. 1.

 
FUNDING FIGHT

The White House requested the money as part of a broader $47 billion emergency package that would also help combat covid, bolster monkeypox vaccine stocks and address disaster needs after floods in Kentucky, my colleague Tony Romm reported.

“The official request sets up a fierce fight on Capitol Hill, where warring Democrats and Republicans face a looming, end-of-September deadline by which they must fund the government — or risk a catastrophic shutdown weeks before the midterm elections,” Tony noted.

The test for the Biden administration comes in two parts: Can they resist calls for the Ukraine package to come in the form of a stand-alone bill? And can they overcome congressional skepticism — as well as growing outright oppositionfrom House Republicans?

Odds are some kind of Ukraine aid legislation will pass. But it’ll require some skillful congressional navigation with threatening government shutdown clouds on the horizon and closing fast.

A WAVERING ALLIANCE?

Meanwhile, the Biden administration is toiling to reassure Ukraine of long-lasting support from Washington and to hold together the coalition of allies and partners even as Russia cuts off energy supplies to Western Europe, sending prices soaring with winter approaching.

My colleagues John Hudson and Missy Ryan chronicled the latest on Thursday: Secretary of State Antony Blinken made an unannounced visit to Kyiv and the administration promised another $675 million in U.S. military aid and $1 billion in military financing.

“We will support the people of Ukraine for as long as it takes,” Blinken said in a statement.

John and Missy noted the visit “focused partly on a major new operation that Ukrainian leaders hope can dislodge Russian forces from occupied areas in the country’s east and south, and that U.S. officials believe would put Kyiv on a better footing for potential negotiations with Russia.”

 
  • “We know this is a pivotal moment, more than six months into Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as your counteroffensive is now underway and proving effective,” they quoted Blinken as saying.

“While the Ukrainians have made some gains, they are taking heavy losses, and soldiers say that despite huge foreign support, they desperately need more weapons and ammunition to prevail over the better-equipped Russians,” they reported.

And here, I want to strongly recommend John’s searing, searching report from a day earlier, when he told the painful stories of wounded Ukrainian troops describing their ordeal fighting to retake the strategic southern city of Kherson from Russian forces.

Beyond the tragic human toll, they told John of:

  • Russian drones tracking Ukrainian forces from so high up in the sky that their targets never heard the unmanned vehicles’ buzz.
  • Russian tanks emerging from newly built cement shelters, firing on Ukrainian targets, then slipping back into cover, protected from mortars and rockets.
  • Russian counter-battery radars that let Moscow’s forces target Ukrainian artillery.
  • Russian hackers taking over Ukrainian drones.

John’s piece serves as something of a corrective to the social-media narrative of the war, in which videos show plucky Ukrainian forces getting the better of heavier but hapless Russians. It’s a reminder that the war looks far from over.