O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

terça-feira, 19 de março de 2024

Eslováquia: agente de Putin na UE: evidências da Hungria de Orban (VSquare, ICJK)

  #RUSSIAN INFLUENCE

HOW THE SLOVAK LEADER ASKED FOR THE KREMLIN AND ORBÁN’S HELP (AND GOT IT)

Szabolcs Panyi (VSquare),

Lukáš Diko (ICJK)


InvestigationsOur Investigations


Back in 2020, Slovakia’s then-Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini asked Viktor Orbán to act as a middleman between him and the Kremlin. He aimed for an invitation to Moscow just before Slovakia’s parliamentary election – hoping that it would appeal to the Slovak electorate. A piece of intelligence detailing the Slovak–Hungarian–Russian scheme was obtained by VSquare. Pellegrini eventually got his visit to Russia and still lost the election. However, he is currently the frontrunner in the race to become Slovakia’s next president.


Newly emerged evidence shows how Hungary and Russia worked together during the 2020 Slovak elections to help the Slovak government stay in power, all at the request of Slovakia’s then-prime minister, Peter Pellegrini. Today, the same man is the front-runner to become Slovakia’s next president (the first and second rounds of the country’s presidential election will be held on March 23 and April 6, respectively).

Pellegrini’s candidacy is supported by current Prime Minister Robert Fico, who is heavily criticized for his pro-Russian attitudes as well as for cracking down on NGOs, free media, and the country’s anti-corruption bodies. Were Pellegrini to be elected, he is expected to rubber-stamp Fico’s controversial initiatives as opposed to outgoing president Zuzana Čaputová or Pellegrini’s opposition-backed contender, former foreign minister Ivan Korčok.

According to sensitive, detailed intelligence material obtained by VSquare, Peter Pellegrini, his power slipping away, turned to Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in February 2020 for last-minute help. Due to widespread anti-government sentiment after the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancee Martina Kušnírová, Pellegrini’s government was heading for defeat in the February 29, 2020 Slovak parliamentary elections. Pellegrini secretly asked Orbán to help arrange an official invitation to Moscow, arguing that such a visit would appeal to the Slovak electorate and boost his election chances. He used Orbán as a middleman because of the Hungarian government’s close, well-known ties to the Kremlin.

The intelligence material specifically says that Pellegrini told Orbán that an invitation to Moscow would help him to win the Slovak elections. It also clearly indicates that the Russian and Hungarian governments had high-level discussions on helping Pellegrini stay in power.

After Pellegrini’s plea, Orbán tasked his foreign minister, Péter Szijjártó, with conveying the message through Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, with whom Szijjártó enjoys a friendly relationship. Lavrov then forwarded the request to Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. Subsequently, Pellegrini was received in Moscow just a few days before the Slovak parliamentary elections. The intelligence material also goes into detail about the Orbán government’s own deliberations: For example, they discussed with their Russian counterparts why it is also in Hungary’s own interest for the Pellegrini-led Slovak coalition, including Andrej Danko’s nationalist party, to continue to govern.


The intelligence material on the Hungarian-Russian backing of Pellegrini’s re-election was compiled by a European country’s intelligence agency in February 2020 and obtained by VSquare, then shared with Frontstory.pl and the Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak (ICJK.sk). 

Due to the sensitive nature of the material, as well as for the protection of sources, a representative of this European intelligence agency asked us not to name their country or to disclose certain specific information from the material, which we have seen directly. We also managed to confirm multiple parts of the intelligence material from other sources and have no doubts about its authenticity.

We sent comment requests to the press officers of Peter Pellegrini and Viktor Orbán, the Office of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Only the latter replied, with the following statement by ministry spokesman Máté Paczolay: “As Péter Szijjártó said, if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade receives a request to help establish or maintain contacts with other countries, and the request is not contrary to Hungarian national interests, we are always ready to help. This is called diplomacy.”

The ministry was referring to a recent remark by Szijjártó. When reacting to criticism from Donald Tusk about his frequent meetings with Sergey Lavrov, the Hungarian foreign minister admitted openly that he regularly acts as a middleman between European politicians and the Kremlin. “I think the Prime Minister of Poland would be surprised to know how long the list of European politicians who have asked me in recent years to help them to make contact with the Russians, to set up a meeting or just to get a message across. In fact, there have been countries where representatives of opposing sides have asked me to do this, so if there is a request in the future, I will of course be happy to help,” Szijjártó said.


Moscow is more important than Washington DC

Peter Pellegrini became prime minister of Slovakia in March 2018. Public backlash over the murder of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kušnírová forced Pellegrini’s predecessor, Robert Fico, to resign. In an attempt to calm down tens of thousands of protesters and quell widespread anti-government sentiment, and to prevent early elections, Fico stepped back, opting for a more palatable (but still politically friendly) successor to lead Slovakia until the next elections.

As the 2020 February Slovak parliamentary elections were nearing, on February 13, 2020, Prime Minister Pellegrini visited Hungary at the invitation of Viktor Orbán. The prime ministers traveled together to the southern Hungarian town of Röszke, where they inspected the Hungarian-Serbian border fence and talked about the dangers of illegal migration, according to a press statement. Orbán spoke fondly of Pellegrini and emphasized the help Slovakia provided to Hungary in tackling “illegal migration,” the Hungarian government’s main campaign message at the time. The official readout of the Pellegrini-Orbán meeting did not mention in any way that they discussed Russia-related matters.

However, according to the intelligence material obtained by VSquare, it was at this meeting that Pellegrini asked Orbán to help him secure a last-minute visit to Moscow before the Slovak elections. According to the material, Pellegrini entrusted his Hungarian allies with this request because he knew that both Orbán and Vladimir Putin, as well as Péter Szijjártó and Sergey Lavrov, have good personal relations. Pellegrini also explained to Orbán that an invitation to Moscow was much more important to him than a visit to the White House because of the attitudes of Slovak society. Pellegrini turned to the right people: Orbán immediately delegated the task to Szijjártó, who then quickly forwarded the Slovak leader’s request to Lavrov, who passed it on to Mishustin.

The material compiled by a European country’s intelligence agency also reveals the Orbán government’s own interests in backing Pellegrini’s request. The Hungarian government thought that, if the Slovak opposition were to win, it would mean the end of pragmatic cooperation between Central European countries, known as the Visegrád Group cooperation. Ironically, during a discussion between Hungarian and Russian government officials, it was the Slovak opposition that was portrayed as being under foreign influence and allegedly funded by Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros, according to the intelligence material.

When discussing the importance of Pellegrini’s possible invitation to Moscow in the final days of the Slovak election campaign, the Hungarians also indicated that it would also be in their interest if Andrej Danko’s Slovak National Party (SNS) – Smer’s junior coalition partner – were to cross the 5 percent threshold and make it into the Slovak parliament again. This suggestion at the time was rather puzzling given that Andrej Danko and his party had a track record of inciting anti-Hungarian sentiment.

On February 26, 2020, just three days before the Slovak election, Pellegrini was finally received by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. “It is very important for us that despite the very busy pre-election period in Slovakia you managed to find the time to come to Moscow and discuss the most pressing issues of Russian-Slovak cooperation,” Mishustin told Pellegrini at their joint press conference, pretending that it was Pellegrini who was doing Russia favor by traveling to Moscow.

Pellegrini was the first European leader to meet Mishustin after the new Russian prime minister was sworn into office in January 2020. They discussed how the Russian Federation and Slovakia might cooperate in areas like gas transmission, supplies of nuclear fuel and decommissioning of nuclear waste. Pellegrini suggested that Russia could also be involved in a project for establishing a nuclear waste dump for Central European countries. The “project” has not been mentioned since that meeting. 

The visit has been seen as a last attempt to stop Smer’s descent in pre-election polls. While leaders of other political parties campaigned, a few days before the elections, Pellegrini was hospitalized with acute respiratory infection. Against the recommendations of his doctors, Pellegrini interrupted the hospitalization, participated in a pre-election debate on the most watched TV, and traveled to Russia the next day.

By that time, Slovakia had already started to turn in Russia’s direction. For example, in the spring of 2018, Danko prevented the expulsion of a Russian diplomat from Bratislava, even as Western allies were kicking out hundreds of them in reaction to Sergei Skripal’s poisoning in Salisbury. Then, in June 2019, Pellegrini had a meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin. But despite all of this, Slovak voters in 2020 were mainly motivated not by fondness for Russia, but by the murder of Ján Kuciak and Martina Kusnirova in 2018. “I think that, at the time, other topics did not work so well. Robert Fico stepped down as prime minister. Peter Pellegrini became the new prime minister. That means even the strength of Smer was divided, at least in the eyes of their voters. But I think that the narrative of anti-Russian versus pro-Russian topics was not as strong then as it has been in recent years,” Václav Hřích of the Slovak agency AKO, which specializes in public opinion surveys, told ICJK.

Pellegrini’s plan did not work out. Not even this last-minute visit to Moscow could save his government in the Slovak parliamentary election on February 29, 2020. His Smer party only came second with 18,3 percent of the votes, while Danko’s SNS dropped out of parliament with a mere 3,16 percent.


Slovakia in the crosshairs of foreign meddling

The specific intelligence obtained by VSquare details only what happened in February 2020. It does not include information on what happened and why in the following years, during which time Russian influence in Slovakia grew remarkably.

A few months after his electoral defeat, Pellegrini quit Smer and founded a more moderate party, Hlas, while Robert Fico stayed at the helm as leader of Smer and steered it into an even more populist, openly anti-vax, pro-Russian direction. Even before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Slovakia was heavily targeted by pro-Russian propaganda. Fico and Smer, supported by a growing disinformation environment peddling Kremlin narratives, strongly opposed the adoption of the US-Slovak Defense Cooperation Agreement, which was ratified in Slovakia in the beginning of 2022, mere weeks before Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine began.

“With the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the Russian Federation focused very strongly on Slovakia and it was actually the main target of that Russian propaganda, which, as a side note, should not surprise anyone. I always say that if I were sitting in the Kremlin and given such an assignment to systematically meddle within the European Union, I would focus on Slovakia as well. Because it is like sports: you always focus on the weakest link of the other team and you try to defeat that team just like that, it’s normal. Well, Slovakia is absolutely clearly the weakest link of what is called the Global West and the European Union,” sociologist Michal Vašečka told ICJK.

Few weeks into the full-scale invasion, Slovak intelligence agencies uncovered networks of Russian spies. Their ranks included a professor at a military academy who had been delivering sensitive information to Russian contacts since 2013 and a contributor to a Slovak disinformation news site who was secretly recorded by Slovak intelligence while receiving money and assignments from the military attaché of the Russian Embassy in Bratislava. Both were charged with espionage, and the Russian “diplomat,” a GRU spy, was expelled from the embassy along with tens of his colleagues.

At the same time, the liberal, right-wing Slovak government that succeeded Fico and Pellegrini and was in power from 2020 to 2023 strongly supported Ukraine and donated important weaponry, including the S-300 surface-to-air missile system that was secretly delivered in the beginning of April 2022. However, this secret transport was disclosed to the public by Fico, who published video footage of the transport on his social media accounts, openly criticizing it and risking the S-300 system’s safe delivery to Ukraine. Fico’s narrative was supported by disinformation and pro-Russian actors on Slovak social media networks.

Despite the Slovak government’s strategic communication and anti-disinformation measures to try to stop the influx of pro-Russian propaganda, Slovak information spaces were flooded with Kremlin narratives. ICJK investigated numerous actors who spread pro-Russian narratives, including on Telegram, and through the Crimea-based NewsFront disinformation network, which has been active throughout Europe

A GLOBSEC poll published in May 2023 showed how successful pro-Russian propaganda had become in Slovakia: According to its findings, more than a half of Slovaks blamed the West or Ukraine for the war, while only 40 percent felt that Russia was responsible. This was the worst result from any of the eight Central Eastern European countries surveyed. The success of pro-Russian propaganda in the country was connected to its amplification by Slovak politicians on social media networks.

The coalition of right-wing and liberal parties that rode an anti-corruption wave and dethroned the Smer-led government gave way to quarreling and eventually collapsed. Robert Fico, the most popular politician on Slovak Facebook, and his Smer party gained momentum thanks in part to pro-Russian sentiment, which he was able to use to win the early parliamentary elections on September 30, 2023. Pellegrini’s Hlas party, which previously topped opinion polls, ended up in third place, and became one of Fico’s junior coalition partners, together with Andrej Danko’s SNS (which found its way back into parliament).

Russian and Hungarian meddling in the September 2023 Slovak election campaign was previously revealed in articles by both VSquare and ICJK. In a previous issue of VSquare’s Goulash newsletter, we revealed that top Viktor Orbán campaign adviser Árpád Habony and the Hungarian government-linked Századvég advisory firm helped Pellegrini’s Hlas party and Fico’s Smer. In another newsletter issue, we wrote about the relatively high number of Hungarian undercover intelligence officers in Slovakia, and revealed that one of them, Ambassador Csaba Balogh, had a confidential meeting with his Russian counterpart during the Slovak election campaign. 


Robert Fico’s anti-migrant campaign message was also bolstered by the Hungarian government’s English-language “anti-migrant” YouTube advertisements, which targeted seven European countries, including (and most significantly) Slovakia, where it started airing in the final days before the election, after the so-called campaign silence period had already begun. Meanwhile, ICJK revealed how pro-Russian actors spread a deepfake hoax  – a fake conversation alleging that the United States conspired to rig the elections — in the final stages of the election campaign. ICJK also identified the Russian spy who, under diplomatic cover, tried to impact the outcome of the election by influencing public opinion (and who got expelled for it).


Pellegrini needs pro-Russian voters to become president

After the 2023 election, Pellegrini became the Slovak parliament’s new speaker. But now, with the support of Robert Fico, he is a presidential candidate, and leading in the polls. As pollster AKO’s Václav Hřích explained to ICJK, before the parliamentary election, Smer and SNS were the ones pushing pro-Russian messages, while Pellegrini and Hlas “tried not to communicate this topic too much.” Moreover, Pellegrini was even seen as supportive of Ukraine. 

However, sociologist Michal Vašečka says that Pellegrini will now have to reach to the pro-Russian and far-right voters if he wants to become president. “The reasoning is very simple. He has no chance of winning in the first round, but only in the second round. If anti-establishment voters who primarily support Štefan Harabin, but also Marian Kotleba, Róbert Švec and Andrej Danko, do not come to the second round, Pellegrini may have a problem. But it looks like, if they come and vote, then Peter Pellegrini will be the president. He has no other chance than to appeal to them if he wants to be elected,” Vašečka added.

According to a recent pre-election poll, conducted by Focus, Pellegrini only leads the other main presidential contender, Ivan Korčok, by 34.4 to 33.1 percent in the first round. However, with the support of the aforementioned candidates’ voters, he could beat Korčok 56-44 percent in the second round.

There is no indication that another last-minute trip to Moscow is in the cards for Peter Pellegrini. However, he already completed his usual pre-election visit to Hungary. On March 11, the government-backed presidential frontrunner received the red carpet treatment in Budapest. Although he is officially just the speaker of Slovakia’s parliament, Pellegrini was not only welcomed by his Hungarian counterpart, but also by President Tamás Sulyok and, most importantly, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. According to usual diplomatic protocol, foreign dignitaries are received on their own level during official visits.

Pellegrini’s warm welcome was understood to be a clear endorsement by the Hungarian government of his Slovak presidential candidacy. At their joint press conference, Orbán openly praised Pellegrini, saying he had had the privilege of working with him when Pellegrini was prime minister, during which time the Hungarian-Slovak friendship gained in strength and they found the common points upon which good neighborly relations could be built. These days, the most important of those common points is, according to Viktor Orbán, that both countries pursue a “pro-peace policy” – meaning opposition to military support for Ukraine and advocating for appeasement with Russia.


The article was also published in Slovak on icjk.sk and in Polish on frontstory.pl.

 

 

O czar de todas as Rússias e seu poder absoluto - Anton Geraschenko

 Putin has (re)established himself as the Russian emperor

Anton Geradchenko

March 18, 2024

His goal is to rule for as long as he possibly can and die his own death in this status.

From now on, Putin is the center and the foundation of all power in Russia. His system of governing has shifted from being based on competition between the different "Kremlin towers" to a "Politbureau" of a small number of people, each of whom is responsible for specific areas, experts believe. Putin holds the final decision-making power, but he won't get into details of things that do not concern his end goal - being in power for as long as he is alive.

Putin as tsar has absolute power. He expects and rewards absolute loyalty. Among other things, this means that social lifts in Russia are non-existent now. Any modernization of the system is impossible. Obedience becomes the key virtue. This will obviously lower the quality of executive decisions made on all levels.

What this might mean for Ukraine and the world?

◾️As it happened with the USSR, this system is not sustainable and will decay. However, that will not happen soon enough as Russia has a lot of resources and its people don't expect much in terms of quality of life.

◾️ The war becomes an important "component" of Putin's power and authority. He will not stop and won't care about any number of Russian losses. He must be stopped with force and power, militarily.

◾️ Putin will look for subtle(ish) ways to undermine NATO and EU as whole institutions and their member states separately. Provocations, propaganda, uncertainty, clashing groups between each other, creating discord and mistrust - these are all tried and tested Russian tools. Russia is prepared to invest huge amounts of money into that.

◾️The importance of sanctions increases further, especially in cutting Russia off from technological advances - equipment, technologies, specialists.

◾️Timely and full military and financial assistance to Ukraine is key. 

There is no time for lingering and hoping Russia will collapse on its own or something unexpected will happen that will alter the course of history. Challenging times require sturdy leaders who think strategically.


segunda-feira, 18 de março de 2024

Venezuelanos lideram ranking global de asilados - Janaina Figueiredo O Globo

Trata-se da maior proporção de refugiados do mundo. 

Mas, como disse Lula, tudo é relativo, e depende da narrativa...


Venezuelanos lideram ranking global de asilados


Janaina Figueiredo - BUENOS AIRES

O Globo, 18 de março de 2024

 

Estima-se que 7,7 milhões de cidadãos saíram do país nos últimos anos, provocando o maior deslocamento forçado do mundo; Brasil é a terceira nação que mais recebe migrantes na região, com 128.551 refugiados, e é visto como exemplo.

 

Entre meados de 2018 e meados de 2023, dados da Agência da ONU para os Refugiados, a Acnur, indicam que 1,18 milhão de venezuelanos solicitaram asilo em outros países, superando amplamente os 324.529 afegãos, 319.170 cubanos, 217.740 nicaraguenses, 223.834 iraquianos e 160.209 sírios. Somente no ano passado, 161.700 venezuelanos pediram asilo em algum país, um crescimento de 51% em relação aos 106.900 do ano anterior. A Venezuela não está em guerra, seu governo se diz democrático e nega ter cometido ou continuar cometendo violações dos direitos políticos e humanos. Porém, 7,7 milhões de venezuelanos abandonaram sua terra natal nos últimos anos, e muitos deles recorreram a um pedido de asilo para contar com proteção internacional.

 

PROTEÇÃO INTERNACIONAL

O tema é tratado no filme Simón, lançado recentemente na plataforma Netflix e baseado na história real de um estudante venezuelano que esteve preso e foi torturado em 2014, após participar de protestos contra o governo de Nicolás Maduro. Depois de ser liberado, o personagem principal foge para os Estados Unidos, onde lida com o dilema de pedir asilo ou programar um retorno a seu país, onde ficaram vários companheiros de luta.

O direito ao asilo foi estabelecido pela Convenção das Nações Unidas relativa ao Estatuto dos Refugiados, também conhecida como Convenção de Genebra, aprovada em 1951. O texto estabelece que o refugiado é "toda pessoa que, em razão de fundados temores de perseguição devido à sua raça, religião, nacionalidade, associação a determinado grupo social ou opinião política, encontra-se fora de seu país de origem e que, por causa dos ditos temores, não pode ou não quer regressar".

Na América Latina, a Convenção foi reforçada em 1984 pela Declaração de Cartagena, que amplia o significado internacional de refugiado. Há 40 anos, foram incluídas na definição pessoas que fugiram de seus países porque sua vida, segurança ou liberdade foram ameaçadas pela violência generalizada, agressão estrangeira, conflitos internos, violações em massa dos direitos humanos ou outras circunstâncias perturbadoras.

- Não estamos em guerra, mas é como se uma bomba tivesse destruído nosso país. Na Venezuela as pessoas morrem por desnutrição, falta de medicamentos ou de recursos para pagar tratamentos. Os jovens vão embora e ficam os mais velhos e as crianças conta a advogada e defensora dos direitos humanos Lublanc Pietro, diretora da Fundação Refugiados Unidos.

 

PAÍS DESTRUÍDO

Há nove anos, Lublanc migrou para a Colômbia, onde ajuda outros compatriotas a se integrarem e conseguirem a documentação necessária para começarem uma nova vida. Alguns pedem asilo, outros, como ela, preferem uma brecha na legislação local e tramitam um documento chamado Proteção Temporária, que tem vigência de dez anos e permite que as pessoas tenham um trabalho formal. Isso porque, no país que mais recebe venezuelanos na América Latina, refugiados não podem ser contratados.

 

- Saí da Venezuela porque sou diabética e não conseguia medicamentos. Há um ano, meu irmão morreu por negligência médica num hospital público conta a advogada, que lamenta não poder solicitar refúgio, já que a Proteção Temporária não garante proteção internacional e ela poderia, eventualmente, ser deportada.

- Muitos venezuelanos, apesar de sentirem pânico pelo que viveram e terem decidido não voltar para a Venezuela, não pedem asilo aqui pois não conseguem trabalhar. Nossa luta é melhorar as condições para refugiados.

 

7,7 milhões de venezuelanos deixaram o país nos últimos cinco anos. Número supera o de refugiados de países em guerra.

 

Segundo uma fonte da Acnur, a proteção temporária, considerada complementar, "é eficiente em contextos de deslocamentos em grande escala". No primeiro semestre de 2023, quase meio milhão de ucranianos receberam proteção temporária, por exemplo.

O Brasil, que hoje ocupa o terceiro lugar no ranking de países para onde emigram os venezuelanos - superado só por Colômbia e Peru - , é considerado, diz a advogada, um exemplo a seguir em matéria de acolhida a refugiados. Sua opinião é compartilhada por William Clavijo, presidente da ONG Venezuela Global, com sede no Rio, que promove a integração de migrantes.

 

Entre janeiro de 2017 e o mesmo mês deste ano, 1.044.293 venezuelanos entraram no Brasil, dos quais 548.579 permaneceram no país, de acordo com dados da Operação Acolhida, implementada em 2018 pelo governo federal, em parceria com ONGs locais e internacionais, entre elas a Acnur. Do total de venezuelanos que ficaram no Brasil, 128.551 foram reconhecidos como refugiados.

 

- Sofremos a maior crise de deslocamento forçado do mundo, isso é inegável. Alguns especialistas calculam que o número de venezuelanos que saíram do país nos últimos anos já chega a quase 10 milhões - aponta Clavijo, presidente da ONG e que mora há vários anos no Rio. Muitos países se negam a criar mecanismos para regularizar a situação dessas pessoas. Mas o Brasil é um exemplo. O que faltam são políticas de apoio à integração social dessas pessoas.

 

SÓ ASILO NÃO BASTA

Quando um venezuelano solicita asilo no Brasil seu pedido é analisado pela Comissão Nacional para os Refugiados (Conare). ONGs estimam que 98% dos cidadãos que residem no Brasil estão nessa situação, sejam com residência aprovada ou status de refugiado. O problema, insiste o presidente da Venezuela Global, "é a vulnerabilidade dessas pessoas".

 

- Muitos passam fome, e há discriminação, sobretudo contra mulheres e negros.

 

Para o jovem venezuelano, que há anos promove ações para ajudar compatriotas no Rio e em outros estados, "é preciso que o mundo entenda que a situação na Venezuela não melhorou, e que por isso as pessoas não voltam".

 

- Não é suficiente estabilizar a economia, as pessoas querem poder exercer direitos políticos e ter liberdade para opinar e pensar. Existe muito temor - assegura Clavijo.

 

O país terá eleições em julho, mas a candidata favorita para enfrentar o presidente Nicolás Maduro que anunciou oficialmente sua candidatura no sábado - , é Maria Corina Machado, política conservadora que aparece à frente nas pesquisas e foi eleita de forma avassaladora nas primárias opositoras. Ela, no entanto, foi inabilitada e não poderá disputar o pleito.

 

 

A Petrobras vive de DESMENTIR notícias publicadas na mídia...

Não sou investidor da Petrobras, mas sigo todas as notícias da companhia.

Pois bem, nos últimos tempos vivemos de teorias conspiratórias...

A Petrobras vive de DESMENTIR notícias publicadas na mídia... 

PRA

Petrobras esclarece notícia divulgada na mídia

Rio de Janeiro, 18 de março de 2024 – A Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. – Petrobras, em relação à notícia divulgada na mídia e conforme já divulgado em 12/03 e 15/03, reafirma ser inverídica a afirmação de que houve qualquer promessa de pagamento de dividendos extraordinários no evento realizado com analistas e investidores nos dias 30/01/2024 e 31/01/2024 (Deep Dive) realizado pela companhia.

A Petrobras reitera que o material apresentado no encontro com analistas e investidores não sinaliza o pagamento de dividendos extraordinários. A parte da apresentação que cita o processo de dividendos contém informações públicas sobre parâmetros, diretrizes e o processo que suporta as decisões de remuneração do acionista. O material está disponível no site de investidores da companhia, bem como na CVM e na SEC.

O material utilizado na apresentação ressalta que a decisão de distribuir dividendos segue o mesmo processo (framework), ao considerar diversos fatores e variáveis como resultados, condição financeira, necessidades de caixa, perspectivas de mercado atual e potencial, além de oportunidades de investimento. Manter o mesmo processo de análise de tais variáveis não configura promessa ou sinalização de pagamento, sendo que tais eventos estão sujeitos a uma série de riscos e incertezas. 

Além disso, é de conhecimento público que diversos bancos publicaram suas projeções de dividendos extraordinários antes mesmo do evento realizado em janeiro. Desde outubro de 2023, já circulam relatórios de analistas com expectativa de pagamento de dividendos extraordinários, com bases em suas próprias avaliações. Nesse contexto, importante destacar que a companhia não tem controle sobre as publicações de tais analistas, nem o conteúdo.

A proposta da Diretoria Executiva de distribuir 50% do montante que foi destinado à reserva como dividendos extraordinários foi suportada por documentos preparados pelas áreas técnicas conforme processo previsto pela governança da Petrobras. Como prática em todas as deliberações, foi apresentado, entre outras informações, o histórico de decisões realizadas nos anos anteriores. 

Os parâmetros utilizados para pagamento de dividendos extraordinários em 2022 dizem respeito às condições operacionais e financeiras da Petrobras nesse ano, bem como condições externas favoráveis, e, portanto, não constituem regra ou norma e não constam da política de remuneração ao acionista da Petrobras. Não procede a suposição ou afirmação de que o não atendimento dos referidos parâmetros em 2023 tenha sido apontado pela área técnica como impeditivo à proposta de pagamento de dividendos extraordinários, uma vez que em 2023 temos um cenário diferente.

A adoção do índice de confiança utilizado em 2022, como já referido, estava diretamente relacionada ao cenário do respectivo ano. Tal recomendação foi levada ao Conselho de Administração (CA) com as análises de diversos cenários possíveis, conforme o rito de governança previsto.

Importante destacar que a decisão sobre o pagamento de dividendos extraordinários seguiu a governança prevista. A matéria é de competência do CA da companhia, que apreciou e decidiu, no dia 07/03, sobre a proposição de dividendos à Assembleia Geral de Acionistas.


E aqui uma notícia pronta para ser desmentida:


A boquinha e a fome: as estatais e seus conselhos - Bruno Carazza (Valor)

A boquinha e a fome: as estatais e seus conselhos 

Bruno Carazza*

image001.png

Valor Econômico, segunda-feira, 18 de março de 2024

Conselhos de administração de empresas atendem a diversos interesses no governo

A semana passada foi repleta de episódios envolvendo a governança corporativa de estatais e de empresas privadas nas quais a União ainda detém algum tipo de ingerência, mesmo que indiretamente.

O retorno de Lula ao poder representou a retomada da visão de que as estatais têm um papel estratégico na promoção do desenvolvimento nacional. Nesse sentido, a nova administração da Petrobras tem sinalizado com a ampliação de seu plano de investimentos e novas diretrizes a respeito de refino, distribuição de combustíveis e transição energética. O episódio mais recente dessa história se deu na atual crise sobre os dividendos.

Se uma mudança de rumos em relação à administração anterior é válida e legítima, ela não deve ser feita à revelia dos demais sócios privados da empresa. Assim, todas as decisões da Petrobras que possam afetar a distribuição de dividendos aos acionistas precisam ser comunicadas com muita transparência, para se evitar as turbulências que vimos no preço das suas ações na última semana.

Em resposta à crise do Petrolão, o governo aprovou a Lei nº 13.303/2016, para reforçar a estrutura corporativa das estatais e torná-las mais resistentes à interferência política. No entanto, num de seus últimos atos no Supremo Tribunal Federal, o atual ministro da Justiça, Ricardo Lewandowski, suspendeu muitas das suas determinações numa canetada. Quem semeia vento colhe tempestade, como estamos vendo agora.

Situações ainda mais graves, porém, são as insinuações de interferência política do processo sucessório na Vale, apresentadas na carta de renúncia do conselheiro independente José Luciano Penido, e as pressões de Lula para emplacar Guido Mantega primeiro na própria Vale e, mais recentemente, na Braskem.

Por se tratar de empresas privadas, nas quais a União não detém o controle direto, a intromissão do governo nas suas decisões extrapola os limites da opção estratégica desenvolvimentista.

Em 2011, o pesquisador Sérgio Lazzarini publicou um livro demonstrando, com fartura de dados, as relações umbilicais entre as grandes empresas brasileiras e o Estado. “Capitalismo de Laços” explicita como o BNDES e outros bancos oficiais, as maiores estatais e os fundos de pensão de seus empregados constituem uma teia de participações societárias cruzadas que se espalha pelo tecido dos maiores símbolos do setor privado nacional.

A se pautar pelas manchetes da última semana, o governo Lula está mais do que disposto a estender seus laços sobre o mercado brasileiro.

**********

Embora pouco se comente a respeito, a distribuição de vagas nos conselhos de estatais também está no centro da crise envolvendo a diretoria e o sindicato dos servidores do Banco Central e o governo Lula.

Os pagamentos feitos pelas estatais aos membros de seus conselhos (os famosos jetons) sempre foram uma forma de complemento salarial bastante generosa que atende a diversos fins: atração de profissionais do mercado para colaborarem por um tempo no governo, premiação à dedicação de alguns servidores públicos e remuneração extra para quadros partidários do governo de plantão.

Segundo dados do Portal da Transparência, durante o exercício financeiro de 2023, 76 empresas estatais distribuíram R$ 16.572.796,30 para 590 servidores públicos e ocupantes de cargos comissionados a título de jetons.

Para ficar apenas nas indicações técnicas, diversos integrantes da cúpula do Ministério da Fazenda fizeram jus ao recebimento de jetons de estatais no ano passado: o chefe de gabinete, Laio Morais (R$ 65.075,34), o secretário de Política Econômica, Guilherme Mello (R$ 47.390,78), o secretário do Tesouro, Rogério Ceron (R$ 47.295,88), e o secretário-executivo adjunto, Rafael Dubeux (R$ 42.404,88).

Os pagamentos de jetons também agraciaram dezenas de servidores de carreiras dos ministérios da Fazenda e do Planejamento - alguns deles chegaram a engordar seus contracheques em até R$ 106.842,97 em 2023.

Não há nada de errado e muito menos de ilegal nesses pagamentos. O problema é que, no contexto de tratamentos diferenciados dispensados pelo governo federal na política salarial, essa questão dos jetons gera ainda mais distorções entre as carreiras.

No caso específico do Banco Central, em função da legislação sobre conflitos de interesses, diretores e servidores da instituição não podem integrar o conselho de instituições públicas ou privadas. A regra faz todo o sentido, pois decisões sobre crédito ou taxas de juros afetam as estratégias de empresas que atuam no mercado, e por isso não seria salutar que um integrante do Bacen fizesse parte de seu corpo de aconselhamento.

A norma, contudo, gera um efeito colateral. Os diretores e técnicos do Banco Central não deixam nada a desejar em preparo técnico a um alto dirigente do Ministério da Fazenda ou um servidor qualificado do Tesouro Nacional ou da Receita Federal. No entanto, por não poderem ser contemplados com os jetons das estatais, os integrantes do Bacen acabam se sentindo preteridos em relação a seus pares.

Na elite do funcionalismo, quanto mais o governo procura agraciar uma carreira com penduricalhos como honorários, bônus e jetons, mais desagrada às demais.

*Bruno Carazza é professor associado da Fundação Dom Cabral e autor de “Dinheiro, Eleições e Poder: as engrenagens do sistema político brasileiro” (Companhia das Letras)”. 


A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government - Nakae Chomin

 


A Discourse by Three Drunkards on Government

By Nakae Chomin

Translated by Nobuko Tsukuba

Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1984 (9th printing, 2015)

Um livro curioso, escrito por um cientista político do inicio da era Meiji, Nakae Chomin, que teve um papel preeminente nas reformas daquele período, com base na sua cultura francesa – ele era chamado de "Rousseau do Oriente – e na sua adesão aos princípios do governo constitucional, com amplas liberdades para a livre expressão do pensamento. 

Foi censurado diversas vezes, dado o autoritarismo dos governos da era Meiji, e vários dos seus jornais foram fechados pelas autoridades da vigilância política. Ainda assim foi eleito para o Parlamento, mas renunciou quando constatou que pouco poderia fazer para levar o Japão a uma situação de governo democrático, não militarizado e não autoritário.

Os três "bêbados" consistem no Mestre Nankai, e dois interlocutores, um, de modos e pensamento europeus, por ele chamado de Gentleman, o outro de tendências militaristas, dito Champion. Ele trocam opiniões sobre como seria melhor o Japão se preparar para sustentar os desafios externos.


Eles bebem e trocam ideias sobre o que o Japão deveria fazer para se defender das potências agressoras mais avançadas, e também sobre como ele poderia se organizar internamente para conquistar a democracia e os princípios constitucionais dos países mais avançados do Ocidente.

O autor cita todos os filósofos europeus, os pensadores mais respeitados no mundo, na esperança de que o Japão caminhasse pela via do governo democrático.

Depois de muita conversa, e muita bebida, os dois visitantes se despedem. Dez dias depois, Mestre Nankai completou o seu livro:

"The two guests never returned. According to rumor, the Gentleman of Western Learning went to North America and the Champion went to Shanghai. Master Nankai, as always, keeps drinking." (p. 137)

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasília, 18 de março de 2024




ABRI: 12º Concurso Nacional ABRI de Dissertações e Teses Universitárias em Relações Internacionais - Prêmio Professor Marcos Costa Lima

 Estão abertas até o dia 12 de abril as incrições para o 12º Concurso Nacional ABRI de Dissertações e Teses Universitárias em Relações Internacionais - Prêmio Professor Marcos Costa Lima.

O Concurso Nacional ABRI de Dissertações e Teses Universitárias em Relações Internacionais visa incentivar a produção científica e cultural no país e assegurar a difusão de trabalhos de excelência acadêmica e intelectual junto à comunidade e ao público em geral. O concurso está aberto a todas as autoras/es de dissertações de mestrado e teses de doutorado que se situem na área de Relações Internacionais, desde que não tenham sido publicadas por editora comercial, que tenham sido defendidas no ano de 2023.

Neste ano o Prêmio acolherá propostas de Dissertações e Teses de Centros de Pesquisa e Programas de Pós- Graduação vinculados à área de Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais da Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Capes) do Ministério da Educação.

O resultado do Concurso será divulgado durante a Assembléia do 7º Seminário de Graduação e Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais da ABRI a realizar-se na UFRGS, em Porto Alegre.  

OBS: NÃO SERÃO ACEITAS PROPOSTAS INCOMPLETAS. TODA A DOCUMENTAÇÃO EXIGIDA DEVERÁ SER ENVIADA JUNTAMENTE COM O FORMULÁRIO DE INSCRIÇÃO DEVIDAMENTE PREENCHIDO.

Para acessar o edital, clique aqui.

Para acessar o formulário, clique aqui.

Adam Tooze repercute matéria sobre o dilema brasileiro em relação à China

 "Brazil’s industry ministry has launched a number of investigations into the alleged dumping of industrial products by China as Latin America’s largest economy reels from a wave of cheap imported goods. China’s exports grew 7.1 per cent in the first two months of this year, far outpacing growth in imports. “Prolonged declines in China’s export prices may cause trade tensions between China and some major economic powers to rise,” analysts at Nomura said in a research note on Friday. China’s exports to and imports from Brazil both rose by more than a third in the first two months of the year, according to Chinese customs data. The trade tensions create a dilemma for leftwing president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who has sought to both nurture relations with Beijing and protect and develop Brazil’s national industries."

Crises dos grandes bancos, e o salvamento com dinheiro do contribuinte - Tobias Adrian e Marc Dobler (Blog do FMI)


More Work is Needed to Make Big Banks Resolvable

image of high rise office buildings, shot from ground level up

(Credit: Seibertfilm/iStock by Getty Images)

By Tobias Adrian and Marc Dobler

Almost a year ago, Credit Suisse, a globally systemic bank with $540 billion in assets and the second-largest Swiss lender, founded in 1856, failed and was sold to UBS. In the United States, Silicon Valley BankSignature Bank and First Republic Bank failed at around the same time amid Federal Reserve interest rate hikes to contain inflation. With a combined $440 billion of assets, these were the second, third, and fourth biggest bank resolutions since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was created during the Great Depression.

This banking turmoil represented the most significant test since the global financial crisis of ending too-big-to-fail—whereby a systemic bank can be resolved while preserving financial stability and protecting taxpayers.

So, what’s the verdict? In short, while significant progress has been made, further work is required.

On the one hand, as we note in a recent report, the actions of authorities last year successfully avoided deeper financial turmoil, and the financial soundness indicators for most institutions signal continued resilience. In addition, unlike many of the failures during the global financial crisis, this time significant losses were shared with the shareholders and some creditors of the failed banks.

However, taxpayers were once again on the hook as extensive public support was used to protect more than just the insured depositors of failed banks. Amid a massive creditor run, the Credit Suisse acquisition was backed by a government guarantee and liquidity nearly equal to a quarter of Swiss economic output. While the public support was ultimately recovered, it entailed very significant contingent fiscal risk, and created a larger, more systemic bank. Use of standing resolution powers to transfer ownership of Credit Suisse, after bailing in shareholders and creditors, rather than relying on emergency legislation to effect a merger would have seen Credit Suisse shareholders fully wiped out and potentially less public support extended. We expect to learn more in the coming days when a Swiss report on the too-big-to-fail regime is issued.

In the United States, in addition to easing collateral requirements for liquidity support, the authorities cited systemic concerns to invoke an exception allowing protection of all deposits in two of the failed banks. This significantly increased costs for the deposit insurer which will need to be recouped from the industry over time. Even very large and sophisticated depositors were protected—not just the insured.

What we’ve learned

Intrusive supervision and early intervention are critical. Credit Suisse depositors lost confidence after prolonged governance and risk management failures. In the US, the failed banks pursued risky business strategies with inadequate risk management. Supervisors in both cases should have acted faster and been more assertive and conclusive. Our recent review of supervisory approaches found that the ability and will to act remain critical—and can suffer from unclear mandates or inadequate legal powers, resources, and independence as well as powerful financial sector lobbies. Policymakers need to better empower banking supervisors to act early and with authority if needed.

Even smaller banks can be systemic. Supervisory and resolution authorities should ensure sufficient recovery and resolution planning for the sector. This should include banks that may not be systemic in all circumstances but could be in some. This was a key recommendation of our latest Financial Sector Assessment Program for the US.

Resolution regimes and planning need sufficient flexibility. Policymakers should ensure resolution rules and plans are flexible enough to balance financial stability risks and taxpayer interests. Government support may still be required in some circumstances—for example, to avoid a systemic financial crisis. IMF staff recommended the equivalent of a systemic risk exception for the euro area, for example. While authorities should continue pursuing plan A, they need the flexibility to depart and from, and for example combine different resolution tools, as necessitated by the specific circumstances at the time of failure.

Liquidity in resolution is crucial. Banks typically fail because creditors lose confidence, even before the balance sheet reflects potential losses. Rebuilding capital buffers in resolution may not be sufficient on its own to restore confidence. Authorities must make further progress on how quickly banks heading into resolution could receive liquidity support—including prepositioning of collateral and testing preparedness—while still protecting central bank balance sheets.

Authorities in many countries need to strengthen deposit insurance regimes—as we recommended to Switzerland. New technology like 24/7 payments, mobile banking, and social media have accelerated deposit runs. Last year’s failures followed rapid deposit withdrawals, and deposit insurers and other authorities should be ready and able to act more quickly than many currently can. The US banks that failed were outliers—with balance sheets that had grown very rapidly, funded by a high degree of uninsured deposits. Where wider coverage is being considered, it would need to be adequately funded. Particularly in countries with deposit insurance that is not backed by a sovereign with deep pockets, policymakers should be careful not to overextend deposit insurance coverage. If not backed by a commensurate rise in deposit insurance funding, depositors could quickly lose confidence.

chart showing the size of deposit outflows in banks that failed in 2023 versus those that failed during the global financial crisis

The bottom line is that progress has been made, but there is still further to go in putting an end to too-big-to-fail. Last year’s bank failures provided a valuable check on the progress that policymakers are making on the reform agenda and to set course for the remaining ground to be covered.

IMF staff are working actively to support efforts in member countries to strengthen their supervision, resolution, liquidity assistance and deposit insurance frameworks including through FSAPs, technical assistance. We are also contributing to policy formulation at the international level, including a recently announced review of the international deposit insurance standard, and by earlier this year hosting with the Financial Stability Board a workshop for policy makers on the use of transfer powers in resolution.

—See the recent Global Financial Stability Note, The US Banking Sector since the March 2023 Turmoil: Navigating the Aftermath, for more analysis of affected banks and a deeper discussion of remaining vulnerabilities.


 

"Espionner, mentir, détruire. Comment le cyberespace est devenu un champ de bataille" - Martin Untersinger (Le Monde)

Comment la France a découvert une cyberattaque de haute volée et démasqué la Russie : extraits du livre « Espionner, mentir, détruire »

Martin Untersinger, journaliste au service Pixels du « Monde », publie, le 20 mars chez Grasset, « Espionner, mentir, détruire. Comment le cyberespace est devenu un champ de bataille ». Il y raconte la guerre désormais ininterrompue que se livrent les grandes puissances dans l’univers numérique. 

Le Monde, 18 Mars 2024


https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2024/03/18/comment-la-france-a-decouvert-une-cyberattaque-de-haute-volee-et-demasque-la-russie-extraits-du-livre-espionner-mentir-detruire_6222648_4408996.html?lmd_medium=pushweb&lmd_campaign=pushweb&lmd_titre=comment_la_france_a_decouvert_une_cyberattaque_de_haute_volee_et_demasque_la_russie_extraits_du_livre_espionner_mentir_detruire&lmd_ID=6222714

Bonnes feuilles. Ce 14 décembre 2022, [Guillaume Poupard] est las. Les traits tirés derrière son costume gris, il est auditionné par les députés pour la dernière fois. Dans deux jours, il quittera ses fonctions de directeur de l’Anssi [l’Agence nationale de sécurité des systèmes d’information, organisme chargé de la protection numérique de l’Etat]. Mais il a un ultime message à faire passer. Un refrain qu’il a souvent entonné mais qui n’imprime pas. Ou pas assez. Alors, il se lance dans une longue tirade.

« Il y a une menace dont on parle très peu car elle est très dérangeante. C’est celle de l’espionnage. Les victimes n’ont pas envie d’en parler, les attaquants encore moins. On est condamnés à dire que c’est très grave sans pouvoir donner beaucoup de détails, mais sachez que la pression qui est mise sur notre économie, sur nos institutions et sur nos administrations est absolument colossale. Face à nous, on a affaire à des Etats qui ont bien compris que l’information se trouvait au fin fond des systèmes informatiques et que la manière la plus rapide et la moins risquée d’aller chercher l’information la plus sensible, c’était l’attaque informatique. Je suis incapable de vous faire un bilan des conséquences de cet espionnage. En mettant bout à bout ce que j’ai eu à connaître, ça donne froid dans le dos. En termes d’impact économique, mais aussi en termes d’impact sur notre sécurité nationale. Nos adversaires savent où il faut attaquer. Cet espionnage est massif, il nous coûte très cher et il nous met probablement en danger. »

En quelques phrases, Guillaume Poupard a décrit les caractéristiques de l’espionnage informatique contemporain : omniprésent, ultra-sophistiqué, inlassable et extraordinairement difficile à repérer. A l’époque [des piratages] de Bercy, d’Areva ou de Safran, les Chinois ne se cachaient pas. Ils n’en avaient pas besoin, tant les défenses étaient abaissées. Désormais, c’est une autre histoire. Les espions sont de plus en plus nombreux, infiniment talentueux, repoussant les limites de ce que l’on pensait possible.



Call For Papers: Comparative Empire: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, 1750-1914 - Global Nineteenth-Century Studies

 Creio que até um império luso-brasileiro, com capital no Rio de Janeiro, como imaginado, ou desejado por alguns estadistas luso-brasileiros (inclusive José Bonifácio e Hipólito da Costa) poderia entrar nessa iniciativa de estudos especiais sobre os impérios (nem citam Portugal ou Espanha).

Greetings Paulo Roberto Almeida,
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