segunda-feira, 8 de dezembro de 2025

Banks of China in Brazil and Brazilian Banks The capital of a new financial intelligence

Banks of China in Brazil and Brazilian Banks
The capital of a new financial intelligence.


Analysts specializing in the study of the set of Brazil-China relations are unanimous in considering that these are “really peculiar”, different, carefully balanced, strongly rooted in strategic values ​​of mutual security for both countries, and that these aspects work as stabilized of these relationships, they balance themselves as a compass for careful monitoring of this true “case”, of this curious historical fact in the scenario of international geopolitical relations.

In this multiplying scenario of a permanent and challenging creative dynamic for new business opportunities, what is the role of this “machine” to build the present and the future that are the banks, the banking financial system?

In all the power systems of nations, societies as we know them today and which structure us, in all, banks function as axes that strengthen and establish the paths of social mobility, from the primary production of food survival, to the revolutionary creative world of science, from quantum chemistry to cosmic biology. It is the dynamics of financial capital, investment, the multiple penetration of credit that energizes all the forces of human society.

If we deepen the historical research on the exchange mechanisms that moved, over two thousand and three hundred years ago, trade in Asia (gold, silver, jade, amber, wine, spices, transported in mules, horses, camels) on the roads of famous silk route, we can consider that the credit value already worked between the buying and selling parties, measured during the travel time of a new delivery from the markets to their customers. And that was well before the trade between East and West took hold, perhaps retreating perhaps more than four thousand years ago, on the paths traveled by nomadic breeders with their livestock. More than 620 of these trails, crossing Central Asia, have recently been identified by satellite images.

At the end of April 2019, the Second Forum for International Cooperation on the New Silk Road was held in Beijing. More than six thousand representatives from 150 countries and 90 international organizations were present, including 39 heads of state.

As the current Chinese Ambassador to Brazil, YANG WANMING, wrote: This new Silk Road “is an infrastructure investment project, based on the principles of sharing, consultation and joint construction”, among the countries participating in this global platform business, in which Brazil will participate. It is the largest integrated development program since the Marshall Plan.

The New Silk Road or “Belt and Road Initiative” - BRI - expects to move almost one trillion Chinese dollars in more than one hundred countries, which “support a global partnership for the connectivity of land, sea, air and internet communications , building a reliable, affordable and inclusive high-quality infrastructure. ”

During that Second Belt and Road Initiative Forum in Beijing, more than twenty multilateral cooperation mechanisms with China were launched, covering the areas of finance, customs, energy, environmental protection, culture, think tanks and the press. At this event, President XI JINPING announced that China will adopt a series of important reforms and openness measures, such as expanding the inflow of foreign capital in more sectors of the economy, strengthening international cooperation in the protection of intellectual property, increasing imports of goods. and services, more effective alignment of international macroeconomic policies and better implementation of openness policies.

On May 23, 2019, therefore one month after the Second Forum of the New Silk Road, in the Chinese capital, the Vice President of Brazil, General Hamilton Mourão, declared in Beijing, when signing with the Vice President of China , WANG QUI SHAN, the reactivation (four years ago was paralyzed) of COSBAN (Sino-Brazilian Commission of High Level of Consultation and Cooperation), that the Chinese projects in the “Belt and Road Initiative” can be carried out in Brazil through the Program Partnerships and Investments (PPI).

On May 20, 2019, the Vice President of Brazil, who met President XI JINPING on this trip to China, participated in a seminar to promote the Brazilian financial market on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, signed an agreement between B3 (Bolsa do Brasil) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange, to launch an ETF (Exchange Traded Fund), a type of investment fund linked to IBOVESPA indexes, Brazil's main stock indicator. Mourão met with the President of Banco BRICS (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai, a bank that is undergoing market expansion and renovation. In 2019, the NDB approved more than $ 700 million in financing projects for Brazil in the areas of infrastructure. This BRICS Bank already operates in yuan and reais.

- This “giant wheel” of business / investments that stratify, deepen, Brazil-China relations, goes through the backbone of food security for the Chinese people, considering the growing increase, in the last ten years, of imports of Brazilian agricultural and livestock products . More than 150 billion dollars between 2017-2019.

- With the implementation of the “New Silk Road” program in Brazil, China plans to increase its investments in the country by 40%, both in areas where it already has strong positions, and in different other sectors, mainly high technology. Recalling some prominent Chinese business sectors in Brazil: production of wind / solar energy and transmission; also special investments in oil (pre-salt), nuclear, thermal and hydro energy; water (research and production); forests, (central region of Minas Gerais), through China Forestry, the largest branch company in the world; Brazil is the main supplier of cellulose to China, which is the largest importer of this raw material on the planet. More than 2.7 billion dollars she paid in 2019 for Brazilian pulp.

- Inside-information: first week November 2019. Mega auction of large oil reserves (pre-salt, including in the Búzios basin). Prediction of total failure: the oil companies did not submit proposals. President Bolsonaro in official view of China, at the end of October, informs President XI JINPING of this worrying situation. The Chinese president understood the signal.

Petrobras quickly initiated a dialogue with Chinese state oil companies CNOOC and CNODC. Both participated with ten percent of a consortium that bought the huge pre-salt reserve in Búzios.

Some connections to new paths of capital


- Tire manufacturers in China plan to control between 45% and 50% of the Brazilian market in 2021. Apollo Tires, from India, will be the most active competitor of the Chinese.

The Chinese industry produces high-quality technological cars in Brazil and has already dominated up to 25% of the national market, with a sedan with six airbags.

- The African swine fever that reached 40% of China's pig herd in 2019-2020, did not bring a substantial increase in soybean meal imports from Brazil. Chinese breeders are not on an industrial scale of consumption. The feed used by them uses little bran. But interest in the import of pork increased by another 25% / year.

The Development Bank of China (CDBII) has developed a program to finance projects in the health sector in Brazil. Its executive president, LEI ZEYM, was in July 2017, on an official visit to Ceará, securing contracts. It plans to create an industry for the production of medicines.

- China's business and investment in Brazil created around 700,000 jobs in 2018-2019. In Rio Grande do Norte, Chinese participation in energy, ports, tourism and services businesses will add seven thousand new jobs.


- Railways and transport: The Chinese BYD, the first automaker to produce cars with a plug-in (powered by the electric network) is the supplier of the VLT (vehicle on rail) equipment, in Salvador, Bahia.

Chinese companies are partners in railroads, road construction, airports and drone factories (in Barueri, São Paulo), for use in refineries and oil platforms.

- Flat steel production: the ChinesePC (China Communications Construction Company) joined Vale in 2019 to build a steel plant in Marabá (Pará), an investment of 1.5 billion reais.

China and Vale have been developing commercial relations for decades, especially iron ore; the import of several other minerals is of primary interest to the Chinese. Niobium is one of them. In August 2001, a high-level mission from the Shanghai Baostel Group, met, in Rio, with directors of CBMM (Companhia Brasileira de Mineração e Metalurgica), the world's largest producer of niobium, proposing a mega business project related to this ore. 

The negotiations did not evolve to the dimension desired by Baostel. Currently the production of niobium in Brazil has been expanded, it is less concentrated. More flexible for new investments.

In five years of construction, China opened a second mega-airport in September 2019. The other was 11 years ago. It has 700 thousand square meters. It cost almost 12 billion dollars. It is the largest passenger terminal in the world: 45 million travelers today, 72 million in 2025. It is Beijing International Airport - DAXING. Chinese investments and technologies.

The “New Silk Road” opens spaces for participation in the construction projects of some fifty medium-sized regional airports in Brazil.

COMAC (Comercial Aircraft Corporation of China) foresees a 20% increase in the production of its aircraft between 2021 and 2025. In the military area, a 10% increase in the production of new aircraft carriers. Steel is the raw material for these industries. The Chinese do not have good relations with the United States in negotiations with steel. Brazil could be a decisive competitor. The agreement with Vale for the Marabá steel industry opens a safe path.

Considering this multiple strategic Brazil-China political-economic platform, already in full swing, it is imperative to activate, move forward immediately, in the creation of a specific, innovative agenda, of decisive co-participation between Brazilian and Chinese banks, maintaining the factor of competition between them , but through an intelligent cooperation program, fostering new ways of strengthening its positions, confirming the social sense of capital, credit and investment, in building safe foundations that continuously feed the growth of human development indices, such as income, employment, education, well-being, rates whose positive growth are reversed, always revert, in favor of other renewed investments, greater financial movement, more credit, etc., etc., values ​​that are the bases of the very existence of capital . Financial capital is the very essence of the global banking system. If this capital intelligently dares to be a historical force motivating just social equilibriums, it will be creating opportunities for the sustainable development of nations, contributing to a broader understanding aiming at building the bases for an economic geopolitics of the multilateralism of nations ...

The growing results of the Brazil-China business over the past ten years are well known and fantastic. The bases strengthened by Chinese imports from the Brazilian agricultural and mineral sectors, the matured trust between the partners created space for a huge volume of Chinese capital investments in Brazil, implementing projects for the development of sectors essential to Brazilian infrastructure, in a continuous and renewed expansion values ​​in different business areas in Brazil. More than ten thousand companies have handled almost three hundred thousand entrepreneurs, technicians, consultants, scientists, specialized workers, researchers, official and private institutions, universities and more than 270 billion dollars in the general set of relations between the two countries in the last three years. Only a significant number stands out; curiosity about a Chinese travel project to Brazil, starting next 2024: China National Tourism Administration is studying a plan to transport and host twelve million visitors a year. It is almost double the number of tourists that traveled around Brazil in 2017-2018.

Another figure to compare: WANGFUJING, Beijing's busiest popular shopping street alone, received more than four million visitors in 2018. Almost two hundred thousand of them were served at the WUYUTAI TEA SHOP, the most prestigious tea house in the country.

Banks China - Brazil: expanding power and roots in the same system

In an interview with a TV channel in São Paulo, on August 2, 2020, the current Minister Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Brazil, QI YUHUI, a careful diplomacy expert, qualified analyst of Brazilian economic policy, advanced a wide step in the projection of relations between the two countries. So far, "these relationships revolve like two wheels at high speed," he said, symbolized as import-export and investment. Now it is necessary for a strong, renewing and safe engine to take action: “the financial engine”. This was the new focus pointed out by him, expanding the Brazil-China potential, highlighting the urgent need for an intelligent master line, a project for structuring new spaces for the use of available financial capital. This initiative must be advanced by banks in both countries, exploring the multiple business opportunities, from the domains of food security to the high tech digital worlds, etc, etc.

We know that China would like to sign a free trade agreement with Brazil. For the Chinese ambassador to the USA, CUI RIANKAI, (who confronted President TRUMP's positions on steel policy with Beijing), this issue will always be on the negotiating table with the Brazilians.

Nine of the largest banks in China have been installed in Brazil for over twenty years. In 1998, Bank of China opened an office in São Paulo.

A curious fact: BOCOM (Bank of Communication / Bank of Communication of China), associated itself in 1858, therefore, more than 160 years ago, in Salvador, with Banco da Bahia, in agricultural credit operations.

Currently, nine large Chinese banks are officially operating in Brazil, developing operations in all sectors of the international banking system. In June of this year (2020), the Chinese company XUZHOU Construction Machinery Group announced that it had received a license from the Central Bank to install XCMG Bank Brazil, which will develop different financial operations.

Brazil is a partner of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, headquartered in Beijing, which has China as its main associate. It has 82 members and 21 other countries want to join. Each member can handle a loan of US $ 100 million per year.

Brazil is also one of the five partners of the BRICS Bank (the NDB). This bank develops an active line of project financing for Brazilian companies and is expanding strongly. The NDB is expected to have five more members this year. Uruguay, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates are expected to be next.

- The Central Bank of China (PBOC), Vice-Governor PAN GONG SHENG, has defined new rules for the operation of financial holding companies in the country, rules that will become effective in the coming months. They were developed by the regulatory body of China's banking system, CBCR, considering previous consultations with dozens of institutions in the international financial market.
- PBOC injected US $ 242 billion into the country's domestic financial market, during the first week of February 2020, as a precaution to "insure" investments.
- FANG QIUCHEN, Director of the China International Contractors Association, former Minister of Commerce, predicts that China will sign during 2021 a hundred new major investment contracts in Latin America. One of them will increase the purchase of concentrated orange juice from Brazil by more than 20%, which will become the second largest exporter of this product to China. The leadership is from Belgium. The consumption of concentrated orange juice has grown by more than 50% in the last three years.

Silks from one ocean, the other Amazon
In late November 2014, a delegation from the Chinese Parliament held meetings with Brazilian deputies at the Federal Chamber, in Brasília. This group was led by the Vice Minister of Culture and Vice President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National People's Assembly of China, deputy ZHAO SHOUHUA. In addition to the parliamentary diplomacy agreements between the two institutions, the Chinese leader highlighted her government's official interest in collaborating in the construction of the transoceanic railroad, which would interconnect the Atlantic to the Pacific, with the decisive participation of Brazil. This transoceanic project, of high relevance for the country, will be part of China's investments in the “New Silk Road” (“Belt and Road Initiative”) in its construction map with Brazil.
January 2015, Beijing. First ministerial meeting of the China Latin America and Caribbean Cooperation Forum (CELAC). End of January 2018, Santiago Chile, Second Forum. President XI JINPING had announced an investment of over 100 billion yuan, strengthening investments of the “New Silk Road” program in the China-CELAC Cooperation relations, suggesting that banks should begin to carry out financial operations in yuan abroad, through loans granted by China worth 400 billion in Chinese currency. Cooperation in infrastructure, electricity, agriculture, communication, heavy machinery and construction of logistics channels.
At the beginning of the 17th century, China and Latin America opened a “Maritime Silk Route in the Pacific Ocean”. A free flow of trade and capital. More than four hundred years later, the possibility of building an Atlantic-Pacific transoceanic railway is now resumed, with the “new face” of the Silk Road.
- An Atlantic power of three and a half million square kilometers of sea, oil, gas, minerals, fishing, renewable energy, biological wealth, is the domain of Brazil, called the Blue Amazon. Completely virgin, unexplored, the Blue Amazon in honor of the immense capital of the Amazon Forest. It accompanies almost the entire Brazilian sea coast.
Geostrategic area of ​​utmost importance, safety of coastal navigation in the South Atlantic, world trade in goods, a mega economic project of hundreds of billions of dollars. Area of ​​world greed, enterprise for financial consortia of large banks ...
Unexplored, unknown, surface, soil and subsoil of the Blue Amazon.

On September 21, 2020, China launched a high-tech satellite, HY2C, for meteorological studies. One of the highlights of this mission: analysis of the dynamics of the oceans ... It will certainly be a very useful source of information for the development of the “New Silk Road” program, which involves a strategic project of integrated global development, of the financial and economic interest of more than hundred countries associated with China's leadership.
File note: In the 15th century, some 600 years ago, the Chinese emperor ZHU GAOCHI, who ruled for only ten months, did not like China looking in the oceans for growth and expansion. Currently, they pass through one of their most delicate positions in the strategic scenario of global geopolitics.
The Chinese Navy is today a high-tech military defense and attack power; it has evolved permanently in this direction, has a priority and growing budget, and makes use of Artificial Intelligence sciences for all its operations.
Reading note: political scientist LEE KAI FU's book “IA Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley and the New World Organization.”
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China is currently and actively experiencing the awakening of a new and multiple power that results from a refined strategy, of how investment capital is applied. The capital of a new financial intelligence. The portentous international integrated development plan “New Silk Road” (“Belt and Road Initiative” - BRI) will make China transit / co-participate in almost all economic routes of world growth, investments guided by the principles of sharing, consultations and consensual construction, involving more than one hundred acceding countries and hundreds of technical, scientific and financial institutions
And remember that in December 2009, CHEN DEMING, then Minister of Commerce of China, was thinking about a kind of Chinese Marshall Plan, transferring heavy factories from his country to produce in Africa. The strategic evolution for a participatory policy of China in the process of international investment development “jumped” to a more aggregating concept of co-association, of business participation of nations that, with it, China, wish to carry out business projects structured in essence of social market capitalism, aligned with the values ​​of a multilateral policy. Then, in 2013, the “New Silk Road” was born, announcing a trillion dollars, until 2027, for the construction of ports, railways, roads, new energies, in Latin America, Africa, Asia, Europe, qualifying China as an entrepreneurial leader in structuring social investments.
And, in parallel, seeking to place its currency, the yuan, as a direct payer for some of its essential imports, iron ore, for example, a contract signed in November 2019, fully active between Vale and the Chinese steelmaker Yongfeng. Two weeks earlier, the Anglo-Australian mining company Rio Tinto was receiving in yuan the sale of a large iron ore shipment. And in Shanghai, future oil contracts were signed, paid with the Chinese currency. China's policy of “de-dollarizing” trade in strategic commodities has been active in order to reduce the dollar's hegemony. China plans to import more than twenty-four trillion dollars worth of goods over the next 15 years.
“With more than 80 million scientists and 170 million qualified professionals, an investment in research and development that accounts for 2% of its GDP, and the strict regulatory framework in the field of intellectual property, China is printing higher quality in its growth and giving new impetus to the shared prosperity of the world ”. (As he wrote in July 2018, Former Chinese Ambassador to Brazil, LI JINZHANG).
Values ​​that are really a drop of water in an ocean, compared to the 270 billion dollars that were handled between 2017-2019, in the total set of China-Brazil trade and investment relations, involving more than 300 thousand people, five thousand companies , etc., etc.
What could be the number and its multiple strategic geo-social results when financial operations, their means and ends, come to fruition from a supremely intelligent strategic plan for collaboration between Chinese banks operating in Brazil and Brazilian banks? Certainly a plan structured in confluent and intelligent investment operations, which will bring about successful business and social results for all who will be the new next merchants in the New Silk Road. Also always counting on the natural alternative and creative routes that other “silk paths” can be built on.

A Short History on a K-like style - By PRA (adora abreviaturas)

A Short History on a K-like style

By PRA (adora abreviaturas)

Z é um menino malvado. Está impedindo o titio T de ganhar um merecido prêmio por uma paz mais hobbesiana do que tolstoiana. Tudo isso porque P tropeçou em excesso de maquiavelismo de baixa extração e também porque esqueceu de ler direito o seu Sun Tzu, o Clausewitz e o Aron. Achou que seria um novo Napoleão e descobriu que seu Waterloo está mais próximo do que se pensa. Sua Santa Helena pode ser na Sibéria ou, pior, num país que já foi conquistado por um dos seus modelos de triste figura, um tal de H, que admirava seu colega S por ser mais duro de roer do que ele.  E tudo isso a despeito da grande ajuda de seu amigo e devoto servidor T, que acaba de publicar um manual muito comentado: An Idiot’s Guide about Practical Lessons on How to Destroy an Empire in Less Than Twelve Months (written with a little help from M and X).

Os entendidos entenderão… (mas faltou um L)

Putin deveria ter aceitado o acordo de Trump. Agora, a economia em colapso da Rússia pode levar à sua queda - Simon Tisdall (The Guardian)

Putin deveria ter aceitado o acordo de Trump. Agora, a economia em colapso da Rússia pode levar à sua queda

Simon Tisdall

The Guardian, 07 Dez 2025

A guerra contra a Ucrânia atingiu duramente os russos comuns, e a situação em deterioração tende a inflamar tensões.

As pessoas no Reino Unido que acham que são governadas por tolos deveriam olhar mais de perto para os presidentes da Rússia e dos Estados Unidos. Vladimir Putin está arruinando sistematicamente seu país. Sua guerra de escolha na Ucrânia é uma calamidade econômica, financeira, geopolítica e humana para a Rússia, que piora a cada dia. Por seus motivos obscuros, Donald Trump, outro perigo nacional, ofereceu-lhe uma tábua de salvação na semana passada. No entanto, Putin a rejeitou. Esses dois tolos merecem um ao outro.

Estava sobre a mesa em Moscou um acordo de “paz” que, em linhas gerais, recompensava a agressão da Rússia entregando grandes porções de território ucraniano, comprometendo a independência de Kyiv e enfraquecendo suas defesas contra futuros ataques. O acordo de Trump, se imposto, teria dividido os EUA e a Europa; rompido a Otan, talvez fatalmente; salvado a economia pária da Rússia; e provavelmente derrubado o governo de Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Esses são objetivos-chave da guerra russa. Mas Putin, sofrendo de fantasias neo-imperiais e obsessões de legado, disse “não”. Ele acha que pode conseguir tudo — e mais — continuando a lutar. Ele convenceu o idiota Trump de que a vitória da Rússia é inevitável — e de que os europeus conspiradores são os verdadeiros fomentadores da guerra. Mas sua premissa é fundamentalmente falha. Fatos duros o contradizem. Quase quatro anos depois, ele ainda está preso na lama e no gelo de Donbas. E, em casa, as coisas começam a desmoronar.

Depois de dois anos de crescimento artificialmente impulsionado pelo aumento dos gastos militares, a receita de petróleo e gás da Rússia — que representa até 50% da receita do Estado — caiu 27% em relação ao ano anterior, e a recessão se aproxima. A inflação subiu para 8%; as taxas de juros ultrapassam 16%. O déficit orçamentário está aumentando, mais da metade do fundo soberano líquido da Rússia foi gasto desde 2022, os monopólios estatais enfrentam enormes dívidas, o investimento estrangeiro despencou, os custos de importação de bens estratégicos subiram 122%, e os impostos ao consumidor estão aumentando — tudo para financiar a guerra de Putin. Os russos até têm de pagar mais para afogar as mágoas: o preço da vodca subiu 5%.

A dor só aumenta. A Ucrânia identificou um ponto fraco: as refinarias, oleodutos e a “frota-sombra” de petroleiros russos que transportam exportações ilícitas. Um terceiro navio-tanque foi incendiado no Mar Negro na semana passada por ataques com drones navais. Kyiv está atingindo regularmente instalações de energia no interior da Rússia, causando pânico e escassez de combustível. Enquanto isso, as duas gigantes de energia russas, Rosneft e Lukoil, estão cambaleando à medida que compradores asiáticos, inclusive no mercado vital da China, correm para evitar sanções secundárias dos EUA.

A ruína econômica da Rússia promovida por Putin, embora ainda em andamento, é acompanhada por um declínio vertiginoso de influência geopolítica. Empantanhado na Ucrânia, Moscou só pôde observar enquanto a Síria, um aliado precioso no Oriente Médio, se voltou para o Ocidente, e o Irã sofreu ataques dos EUA e de Israel. Agora a Venezuela também procura apoio em vão. Os laços com a China foram virados de cabeça para baixo, com uma Rússia humilhada relegada ao papel de parceiro júnior dependente. Em visita à Índia na semana passada, Putin exibiu uma postura necessitada em um país que, após pressão dos EUA, agora boicota o petróleo russo.

A narrativa de que “a Rússia está vencendo” depende de supostos sucessos no campo de batalha. Yuri Ushakov, um dos assessores de Putin, afirmou que avanços territoriais recentes “impactaram positivamente” as negociações em Moscou — significando que teriam fortalecido a posição da Rússia. Isso é delirante. Os ganhos são marginais. Apesar de sua invasão-surpresa em grande escala e de vantagens esmagadoras em mão de obra e material bélico, Putin fracassou totalmente em subjugar a Ucrânia — um fracasso medido em números chocantes de baixas russas: mais de 280.000 mortos ou feridos apenas nos primeiros oito meses de 2025; cerca de um milhão no total.

Por quanto tempo o povo russo tolerará seu presidente-ditador assassino em massa — o envenenador de Salisbury, o criminoso de guerra indiciado — que, recusando todas as ofertas de paz, agora ameaça guerra com a Europa? Essa pergunta é fundamental. A disposição de Putin de arriscar a vida e o bem-estar dos russos comuns é mais do que evidente, simbolizada pelos cínicos bônus de alistamento e benefícios pagos a voluntários de infantaria de áreas rurais pobres — cuja expectativa média de vida na linha de frente é de 12 dias. Para piorar, os pagamentos foram reduzidos devido a cortes no orçamento.

Esses esquemas de dinheiro de sangue refletem profunda indiferença a problemas arraigados de pobreza e colapso demográfico, argumentou o jornalista independente Alexey Kovalev: “Os gastos militares mascaram temporariamente décadas de negligência, proporcionando mobilidade social por meio da carnificina.” Quando a luta finalmente parar, uma “vasta crise social” pode emergir, sugeriu ele — e o Kremlin teme isso, daí sua repressão à dissidência pública e online. Para Putin, essa é mais uma razão para não encerrar a guerra. Seus crimes contra seu próprio povo podem ainda ser sua ruína.

Um novo relatório de especialistas da LSE, Against the Clock: Why Russia’s War Economy is Running Out of Time, concluiu que, embora a guerra tenha “melhorado dramaticamente” a renda de 20% dos russos, ela é profundamente divisiva socialmente. “Para a maioria dos russos, a renda real caiu de 16% a 42%”, diz o estudo. Citando a rebelião do grupo Wagner em 2023, o relatório prevê que as condições econômicas em deterioração podem intensificar tensões “intra-elite e intra-regime”.

O mais recente fiasco de negociações dos EUA expôs mais uma vez a estratégia “idioticamente desequilibrada” de Trump para a Ucrânia. Apaziguando a Rússia desde o início, ele minou a Ucrânia ao atacar Zelenskyy e interromper o fornecimento de armas. A ânsia egotista de Trump de posar de pacificador e ganhar dinheiro rápido, sua escolha de parentes e comparsas ineptos como enviados amadores, e suas tentativas de marginalizar e afrontar a Europa ajudam e encorajam Putin.

A intromissão de Trump está prolongando a guerra. Ele deveria se retirar antes de causar mais danos — e a Europa (e a Otan) devem intervir com mais armas para a Ucrânia, empréstimos de reparação usando ativos russos confiscados, sanções energéticas plenamente aplicadas, respostas cinéticas mais duras a sabotagens e ataques cibernéticos, e uma determinação mais unida de ajudar a pôr fim à era de terror de Putin.

A nação russa é grande demais para fracassar. Sua orgulhosa história de luta mostra que ela não pode ser derrotada. Mas Putin pode. Ele está perdendo, não vencendo. E, cedo ou tarde, como os czares e totalitários de outrora, aquela mesma Rússia eterna cujo nome ele glorifica irá mastigá-lo e cuspir.

Simon Tisdall é comentarista de assuntos estrangeiros do Guardian.

domingo, 7 de dezembro de 2025

Correspondência secreta de Putin a Trump neste sábado 6 de dezembro (interceptada pelo Anonymous)

 Correspondência secreta de Putin a Trump (interceptada pelo Anonymous) neste sábado 6 de dezembro:


"Caro amigo, desde nosso encontro no Alaska (um velho território russo como você deve saber, que cedemos a vocês amistosamente), tenho ficado cada vez mais reconfortado pela sua muito bem-vinda compreensão pelas razões russas de segurança nacional de nos opormos à expansão da Otan sobre nosso entorno imediato, primeiro pela proposta americana para um cessar fogo na Ucrânia, à qual o Zelensky continua a se opor irracionalmente, e agora pelo seu excelente documento sobre a Estratégia de Segurança Nacional, que reconhece plenamente que o meu país, a Rússia, não representa nenhuma ameaça aos Estados Unidos e a seus interesses no Hemisfério Ocidental. Estamos prontos e dispostos a iniciar imediatamente nossa colaboração econômica e entendimento político com o G7 e restabelecer nossos laços econômicos e de negócios com os Estados Unidos. Não deixe que os loucos de Kyiv destruam o seu plano tão bem construído.
O abraço do seu amigo Vladimir, com saudações a Melania, Jared e todos os seus."

O pessoal do Anonymous ainda não sabe o que Trump respondeu.

Could Brazil’s mega-election herald the end of polarisation? - The Economist, Comment Paulo Roberto de Almeida

A Economist pergunta na sua edição de final de ano dedicada aos "prognósticos" para 2026:


The Americas in 2026
Could Brazil’s mega-election herald the end of polarisation?
Brazilians are tiring of both Jair Bolsonaro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
The Economist, December 6, 2025

PRA: Fim da polarização? Seria muito otimismo. Ainda não vejo luz no fim do túnel.
A esquerda é persistentemente equivocada na economia, não tanto em direção ao desastre, mas confirmando nos sa tendência de quatro décadas de estagnação.
A direita, hoje dominada pelos idiotas bolsonaristas e por uma direita extrema, radical na sua oposição não só ao lulopetismo, mas ao próprio país, assim como pelos traficantes de emendas parlamentares de maneira geral, não tem respostas aos problemas do país, e pretende continuar extorquindo a nação por vias legais, assim como os aristocratas do Judiciário e o alto mandarinato do Estado.
Desculpem ser pessimista, mas não vejo homens aos quais eu poderia chamar de estadistas, NENHUM!
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 7/12/2026

Minas e as formigas - Ary Quintella, sobre o livro de Dawisson Lopes, De Bonifácio a Amorim (Estado de Minas)


Minas e as formigas

Os mineiros são um povo privilegiado, ao poder contar com a Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. Alguns dos diplomatas brasileiros mais preparados e competentes que conheço nas novas gerações do Itamaraty lá estudaram. Para minha sorte, alguns já trabalharam comigo.
Pela editora da UFMG, lançou-se este ano o livro De Bonifácio a Amorim, de Dawisson Belém Lopes, professor de Política Internacional e Comparada naquela universidade. Antes de encomendar a obra, eu supusera que se trataria de uma história da política externa brasileira. Não tinha ainda tomado conhecimento do subtítulo: “Elementos de uma teoria social da política externa brasileira”.
Foi uma boa surpresa constatar que o enfoque adotado é diferente de uma análise histórica, porque a obra que será o texto clássico, nesta geração, sobre a história da política externa já existe — trata-se do estupendo livro do embaixador Rubens Ricupero, A diplomacia na construção do Brasil, de 2017, que mereceu no ano passado uma segunda edição.
Diferentes pontos de vista sobre a evolução da política externa brasileira serão sempre úteis e bem-vindos, e Dawisson Belém Lopes está plenamente preparado para um dia apresentar o seu, se assim quiser, mas a tarefa a que ele se dedicou em De Bonifácio a Amorim é outra e é igualmente importante. O autor do prefácio é justamente Rubens Ricupero e ele o inicia com a frase: “Originalidade é a impressão predominante de quem abre e folheia este livro”. Recolhi da leitura o mesmo sentimento.
É uma análise sociológica da diplomacia brasileira e do Itamaraty o que nos propõe Dawisson Belém Lopes, e é daí que decorre o ineditismo de seu novo livro.
Discute o autor como a diplomacia brasileira tem-se adaptado, ao longo dos duzentos anos desde a Independência, para lidar com fatores internos e circunstâncias externas que provocaram, com maior ou menor sucesso, mudanças ou permanências no Itamaraty. É na Conclusão que encontro a definição mais clara do objetivo do livro, em frase colocada em itálico pelo próprio autor: pensar o bicentenário do Brasil a partir das raízes sociais de sua política exterior.
Cito um trecho que me parece ilustrar bem o sabor da singularidade do estudo de Belém Lopes: “Embora a fama meritocrática do Itamaraty não fosse infundada, dado seu histórico de recrutamento rigoroso e excelência profissional, a era pós-golpe [de 64] viu essa imagem ser manipulada para servir aos interesses do regime militar. O Ministério propalou imagem de neutralidade e eficiência burocrática para o mundo externo, o que ajudou a mascarar a natureza profundamente política de suas operações reestruturadas”.
Um tema, sobretudo, o do elitismo e conservadorismo, serve para que o autor analise o longo processo de continuidades no Itamaraty. Em coluna anterior neste jornal, que intitulei “Um Brasil consciente e forte”, tratei de uma entrevista que meu pai conduziu, em 1970, com o senador e ex-chanceler Afonso Arinos, em que o político mineiro explicitava a frustração que experimentara ao chefiar o Itamaraty. “Só encontrei resistências, incompreensões e obstáculos às minhas ideias”, relatava Afonso Arinos, que enfrentou da parte dos diplomatas brasileiros, e apesar de suas impecáveis credenciais aristocráticas, obstinada oposição para implementar a chamada “Política Externa Independente”.
Na avaliação de Belém Lopes, há uma “interação entre interesses econômicos dominantes e a gestão diplomática”. Entende, por exemplo, que “Não se explica o comportamento histórico do Brasil na arena internacional, tampouco as orientações contemporâneas do Itamaraty ao chefe de Estado, sem recorrer à base econômica do poder nacional, responsável, ademais, por construir uma identidade de país exportador da periferia capitalista global”.
Em vários momentos de sua narrativa, Dawisson Belém Lopes insere “estudos de caso”, todos fascinantes, nos quais examina de maneira mais concreta até que ponto fatores domésticos podem afetar a formulação da política externa. Ao frisar nossa “identidade de país exportador de gêneros agrícolas”, importador de fertilizantes, sustenta que a resposta brasileira à guerra na Ucrânia seria “profundamente informada pelo desproporcional peso político da velha elite agrária”. Esse é um ponto em que não compartilho inteiramente de seu diagnóstico, pois vejo razões geopolíticas sólidas para embasar a posição brasileira tendente ao apaziguamento das tensões. O próprio autor matiza sua opinião ao comentar, corretamente, que o Brasil “vê a paz e a estabilidade como pré-requisitos para o desenvolvimento econômico e a prosperidade global”.
Os “estudos de caso” criados pelo professor Belém Lopes, particularmente apropriados, permitem que ele se debruce de forma profunda e detalhada sobre determinado fato ou momento para iluminar aspectos da práxis externa brasileira. Gostei particularmente do estudo de caso referente ao BRICS, em que ele apresenta uma verdade fundamental, mas nem sempre assim percebida, sobre a história da política externa brasileira: “As mudanças de direção que houve, via de regra, resultaram de cálculo e determinantes estruturais, não de idiossincrasias e frivolidades”. Sua conclusão é de que termina geralmente por prevalecer, no caso brasileiro, um componente de neutralidade e não-alinhamento às superpotências e de universalismo diplomático do país.
Se eu tivesse de fazer alguma crítica a uma obra de análise tão rica, oportuna e inovadora como a do professor Dawisson Belém Lopes, seria a de que, considerando ser a sua uma abordagem sociológica, ele poderia talvez ter investigado de maneira mais extensa as ramificações de dois outros temas que aborda, as questões de gênero e raça.
Ao final da leitura, fica a dúvida se o livro é elogioso ou crítico em relação ao Itamaraty. Ao refletir a respeito, chego à conclusão de que os admiradores e os detratores da diplomacia brasileira se sentirão igualmente justificados com essa obra, e nisso reside um de seus méritos.
Para mim, como diplomata, foi uma curiosa sensação deparar-me com um estudo em que a instituição na qual se desenrola minha atividade profissional é observada e analisada com verdadeiro talento de entomologista.

Coluna publicada no Estado de Minas ontem, 6 de dezembro


 


Opinion - Sadly, Trump is right on Ukraine - Alan J. Kuperman (The Hill)

Não concordo com a exposição de fatos trazidos nesta matéria, assim como com a opinião do autor, mas creio relevante apresentar aos meus poucos leitores todos os elementos de informação que recebo diariamente sobre assuntos relevantes. Este é um deles: a guerra de agressão da Rússia contra a Ucrânia.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

=============

 

Opinion

Opinion - Sadly, Trump is right on Ukraine

Alan J. Kuperman, opinion contributor

The Hill, Tue, March 18, 2025 at 4:00 PM EDT

Source: https://www.yahoo.com/news/opinion-sadly-trump-ukraine-200000471.html

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I rarely agree with President Trump, but his latest controversial statements about Ukraine are mostly true. They only seem preposterous because western audiences have been fed a steady diet of disinformation about Ukraine for more than a decade. It is time to set the record straight on three key points that illuminate why Ukrainians and former President Joe Biden — not merely Russian President Vladimir Putin — bear significant responsibility for the outbreak and perpetuation of war in Ukraine.

First, as recently documented by overwhelming forensic evidence, and affirmed even by a Kyiv court, it was Ukrainian right-wing militants who started the violence in 2014 that provoked Russia’s initial invasion of the country’s southeast including Crimea. Back then, Ukraine had a pro-Russia president, Viktor Yanukovych, who had won free and fair elections in 2010 with strong support from ethnic Russians in the country’s southeast.

In 2013, he decided to pursue economic cooperation with Russia rather than Europe as previously planned. Pro-western activists responded with mainly peaceful occupation of the capital’s Maidan square and government offices, until the president eventually offered substantial concessions in mid-February 2014, after which they mainly withdrew.

Just then, however, right-wing militants overlooking the square started shooting Ukrainian police and remaining protesters. Police returned fire at the militants, who then claimed bogusly that the police had killed the unarmed protesters. Outraged by this ostensible government massacre, Ukrainians descended on the capital and ousted the president, who fled to Russia for protection.

Putin responded by deploying troops to Crimea and weapons to the southeast Donbas region on behalf of ethnic Russians who felt their president had been undemocratically overthrown. While this backstory does not justify Russia’s invasion, it explains that it was hardly “unprovoked.”

Second, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky contributed to a wider war by violating peace deals with Russia and seeking NATO military aid and membership. The deals, known as Minsk 1 and 2, had been negotiated under his predecessor President Petro Poroshenko in 2014 and 2015 to end fighting in the southeast and protect endangered troops.

Ukraine was to guarantee Donbas limited political autonomy by the end of 2015, which Putin believed would be sufficient to prevent Ukraine from joining — or serving as a military base for — NATO. Regrettably, Ukraine refused for seven years to fulfill that commitment.

Zelensky even campaigned in 2019 on a promise to finally implement the accords to prevent further war. But after winning election, he reneged, apparently less concerned about risking war than looking weak on Russia.

Zelensky instead increased weapons imports from NATO countries, which was the last straw for Putin. So, on Feb. 21, 2022, Russia recognized the independence of Donbas, deployed troops there for “peacekeeping,” and demanded Zelensky renounce his quest for NATO military assistance and membership.

When Zelensky again refused, Putin massively expanded his military offensive on Feb. 24. Intentionally or not, Zelensky had provoked Russian aggression, although that obviously does not excuse Moscow’s subsequent war crimes.

Third, Joe Biden too contributed crucially to the escalation and perpetuation of fighting. In late 2021, when Putin mobilized forces on Ukraine’s border and demanded implementation of the Minsk deals, it seemed obvious that unless Zelensky relented, Russia would invade to at least form a land bridge between Donbas and Crimea.

Considering that Ukraine already was existentially dependent on U.S. military assistance, if President Biden had insisted that Zelensky comply with Putin’s request, it would have happened. Instead, Biden lamentably left the decision to Zelensky and pledged that if Russia invaded, the U.S. would respond “swiftly and decisively,” which Zelensky read as a green light to defy Putin.

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Had Trump been president, he would not have provided such a blank check, so Zelensky would have had little choice but to implement the Minsk deals to avert war. Even if Zelensky had still refused and provoked Russia to invade, Trump would have denied him a veto over peace negotiations, which Biden recklessly gave by declaring, “There’s nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.”

That pledge tragically emboldened Ukraine to prolong the war in expectation of eventually decisive U.S. military aid, which Biden then refused to supply due to fear of nuclear escalation. In that way, Biden raised false hopes in Ukraine, needlessly perpetuating a war that has killed or wounded hundreds of thousands in the last two years alone during which the frontlines have shifted by less than 1 percent of Ukraine’s territory.

The basic outlines of a deal to end the fighting are obvious even if details remain to be negotiated, as Trump and Putin started doing today in a phone call. Russia will continue to occupy Crimea and other portions of the southeast, while the rest of Ukraine will not join NATO but will get security guarantees from some western countries. The sad thing is that such a plan could have been achieved at least two years ago if only President Biden had made military aid conditional on Zelensky negotiating a ceasefire.

Even more tragic, whatever peace deal emerges after the war will be worse for Ukraine than the Minsk accords that Zelensky foolishly abandoned due to his political ambitions and naïve expectation of bottomless U.S. support.


Alan J. Kuperman is a professor at the University of Texas at Austin, where he teaches courses on military strategy and conflict management.

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