O fim da Guerra Fria finalmente revelado: os diários de Anatoly Chernyaev - National Security Archive

 

National Security Archive: The Chernyaev Centennial

by Malcolm Byrne

100th Birthday of Anatoly Sergeyevich marked with latest translated excerpt of his “irreplaceable” diary — the year 1981

 

Architect of “New Thinking,” champion of glasnost, prolific historian, hero of the end of the Cold War, key source for scholars

 

Even as Polish Solidarity crisis peaked, Brezhnev "apparently never seriously considered" sending in troops

 

If Sovietologists got to be a “fly on the wall at the Politburo,” nobody would ever believe this fly

 

Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya

 

Washington, D.C., May 25, 2021 – The National Security Archive marks the 100th anniversary of Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev’s birth with the publication of the first English-language translation of the Chernyaev diary (described as “irreplaceable” by Pulitzer-Prize-winning author David Hoffman) for the year 1981.

 

The new Chernyaev diary publication is the latest in a series of the Archive’s translations and postings covering not only his extraordinary years from 1986 to 1991 at the right hand of Mikhail Gorbachev as his senior foreign policy adviser, but also Chernyaev’s unusually frank view at the highest levels of the Soviet Union over its last 20 years.

 

His diary for 1981, published for the first time in English today, provides remarkable insights into the Brezhnev era, and especially into one of the most critical issues of the year, whether or not the Soviet Union would invade Poland to suppress the Solidarity movement, as it had in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to suppress the Prague Spring, or in 1979 to put its favored Communist in charge of Afghanistan.

 

In perhaps the most remarkable passage from the 1981 diary, Chernyaev remarks, “if the Sovietologists and Kremlinologists’ fantasy came true and they got to be a fly on the wall at a session of our PB [Politburo], later nobody would ever believe this ‘fly.’  They would think he is fooling them or has lost his mind.”

O Brasil e a frustrada invasão de Cuba em 1961 pelos exilados cubanos orquestrados pela CIA - André Duchiade, James Hershberg e Joseph Zelikow (National Security Archive)

Documentos indicam que João Goulart atuou como mediador secreto entre Kennedy e Fidel Castro

A pedido de Washington, governo brasileiro tomou medidas para evitar execuções de prisioneiros da fracassada invasão da Baía dos Porcos, revelam telegramas descobertos por historiador americano; independência da política externa da época qualificou o Brasil como intermediário

André Duchiade

O Globo, 29/04/2021 - 18:17 / Atualizado em 29/04/2021 - 22:16

https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/documentos-indicam-que-joao-goulart-atuou-como-mediador-secreto-entre-kennedy-fidel-castro-1-24994882

Em abril de 1962, um ano depois da fracassada tentativa de invasão da Baía dos Porcos por exilados cubanos patrocinados pelos EUA, o então presidente brasileiro João Goulart atendeu a um pedido do seu homólogo americano John F. Kennedy e intercedeu junto ao líder cubano Fidel Castro para evitar as execuções dos 1.200 prisioneiros envolvidos na operação.

A descoberta foi revelada nesta quinta-feira pelo National Security Archive, instituição de pesquisa ligada à Universidade de George Washington, e tem como fontes documentos inéditos do Itamaraty, do Departamento de Estado americano e (minoritariamente) de Cuba. A pesquisa foi conduzida pelo historiador James Hershberg, da mesma universidade.

Os telegramas secretos, analisados em um artigo publicado no mês em que a tentativa de invasão completa 60 anos, permitem vislumbrar como o Brasil atuou sigilosamente como intermediário entre Washington e Havana em um momento de rompimento diplomático total entre as duas capitais. Também permitem entender como a posição de independência internacional do Brasil permitiu que o país exercesse influência frente aos dois governos, desempenhando importante papel para evitar um conflito.

O estudo se centra em um curto período, entre o final de março e o começo de abril de 1962, quando Havana se preparava para levar a um tribunal especial os 1.179 prisioneiros envolvidos na operação, que enfrentavam acusações de traição e poderiam ser condenados à morte. Kennedy, que herdara os planos da invasão de seu antecessor Dwight Eisenhower, tinha grande interesse na libertação dos detidos, e tentou interceder buscando canais com a então Tchecoslováquia, o Vaticano, o Chile e o México.

Segundo Hershberg, o “Brasil desempenhava um papel especial — não apenas por seu tamanho e importância na América do Sul, mas porque seu líder, o presidente João Goulart, do Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), de centro-esquerda, estava prestes a visitar os Estados Unidos para uma cúpula com presidente Kennedy no início de abril, e buscava obter ajuda econômica dos EUA — e, portanto, tinha um incentivo para fazer um favor a Washington”.

A pesquisa ressalta outro fator que punha o Brasil em posição privilegiada para mediar essa negociação: “Goulart e seu ministro das Relações Exteriores, San Tiago Dantas, tinham preservado laços amigáveis com Havana ao resistir fortemente à pressão dos EUA por severas sanções anti-Cuba”, sobretudo na conferência de chanceleres da OEA no Uruguai em janeiro daquele ano. Na conferência, Cuba foi suspensa da organização, e o Brasil se absteve na votação.

O contato inicial com o governo brasileiro foi feito a partir de Roberto Campos, então embaixador em Washington, que foi contatado, no dia 23 de março, por José Miró, ex-primeiro-ministro cubano, líder da oposição no exílio a Fidel e colaborador da CIA. Naquela mesma noite, o Itamaraty ordenou ao embaixador em Cuba, Luiz Bastian Pinto, que comunicasse imediatamente ao governo de Havana que Brasília desejava o adiamento do julgamento por 30 dias — prazo necessário para Goulart empreender a sua viagem a Washington.

No dia 27 de março, o chanceler cubano Raúl Roa respondeu ao enviado brasileiro que adiar o julgamento não era uma opção, pois anularia uma decisão governamental “de grande gravidade”. Roa incluiu no entanto uma ressalva: “Cuba responderia afirmativamente se Goulart fizesse um apelo público de clemência”, no qual se referisse explicitamente à "magnanimidade ou generosidade" dos "vencedores". Havana, acrescentou, "não responderia a nenhum tipo de apelo feito por qualquer chefe de Estado que não o presidente Goulart".

O julgamento, conduzido em uma fortaleza colonial do século XVIII, começou dois dias depois, uma quinta-feira. Na sexta, o encarregado de negócios americano no Brasil, Niles Bond, que atuava como embaixador em exercício, tomou conhecimento, por meio de informantes no Itamaraty, das exigências cubanas. Em um telegrama a Washington, ele disse que Havana via a iniciativa brasileira com “simpatia”, mas impusera “uma pura chantagem” como condição para ceder. A resposta cubana, disse Bond, fora recebida “com profunda irritação” pelo governo brasileiro, “incluindo o próprio presidente”.

O avanço do julgamento, no entanto, reforçou a preocupação americana, que intensificou os contatos com Campos em Washington. Um comunicado do conselheiro de Kennedy Richard Goodwin transmitido à embaixada brasileira afirmava que “além dos motivos humanitários para evitar a execução de prisioneiros, o presidente Kennedy se preocupa [com] o efeito exacerbante que a execução pode ter na opinião pública americana, [que vinha] ficando mais tranquila e menos emocional em relação a Cuba". A mensagem foi recebida pelo governo brasileiro como um recado direto de Kennedy.

Segundo o estudo do National Security Archive, “apesar de aparentemente se ressentir das condições cubanas anteriores, Goulart, prestes a visitar Washington, dificilmente podia resistir ao apelo interpresidencial direto de Kennedy, transmitido por seu associado íntimo, do topo dos EUA”. A embaixada respondeu que o chanceler San Tiago Dantas estava redigindo um texto a ser assinado por Goulart com um pedido público por clemência.

A carta de Jango, destinada ao presidente cubano Osvaldo Dorticós e ao então premier Fidel, foi enviada no dia 2 de abril, mesmo dia em que ele embarcou rumo a Washington, sendo distribuída também a jornais brasileiros. Sem que os EUA soubessem, a missiva fora cuidadosamente redigida para atender às condições impostas por Havana, incluindo referências à "magnanimidade" e à “vitória” cubana:

“Movido por sentimentos de solidariedade humana que unem todos os povos americanos, tomo a liberdade de dirigir a vossas excelências um apelo de todo o povo brasileiro para que a magnanimidade seja fator decisivo na condenação de pessoas presas na praia de Girón por ocasião de invasão a Cuba”, dizia o texto. “Estou certo de que vossas excelências cuidarão desse assunto conduzido com a clemência que sempre caracteriza a atitude do vencedor para com o irmão derrotado”.

A resposta pública de Havana veio dois dias depois. Dizia que o país esperara por uma indenização americana em função da invasão, que não viera. Acrescentava que, embora o processo fosse avançar, o “apelo à magnanimidade da Cuba revolucionária, em nome do povo brasileiro, e no momento em que se prepara a nação soberana de Cuba para julgar os fatos, pesará muito na mente do povo e do tribunal que tem a decisão em suas mãos”.

A sentença veio no domingo seguinte, 8 de abril, enquanto Goulart viajava pelos Estados Unidos após se encontrar com Kennedy. Os invasores foram considerados culpados, mas escaparam da pena de morte: a sentença era de 30 anos de prisão, ou uma indenização de US$ 62 milhões. A ditadura cubana evitara matar os prisioneiros, deixando uma porta aberta para obter recursos importantes ao novo regime, que de fato viriam mais tarde: em dezembro, os prisioneiros seriam libertados em troca de US$ 53 milhões em comida, remédios e outros itens humanitários.

O estudo cita ainda uma outra informação não confirmada: no dia 12 de abril, os colunistas de Washington Robert Allen e Paul Scott publicaram no Miami News que Goulart havia enviado uma mensagem secreta a Fidel Castro, na qual teria citado “um apelo de emergência de Washington”. O texto acrescentava que Goulart teria dito a Fidel que, se as vidas dos prisioneiros fossem poupadas, “Kennedy continuaria a seguir uma política de 'não intervenção' estrita nos assuntos internos de Cuba". A previsão se provou falsa; ainda em março, Kennedy aprovou a operação Mongoose, com o objetivo de derrubar o regime cubano.

No final do artigo, o historiador Hershberg afirma que o episódio “ofereceu ao governo Kennedy um lembrete oportuno da utilidade potencial da Embaixada do Brasil em Havana — ao contrário dos desejos de alguns funcionários linha-dura dos EUA, que preferiam que o Brasil simplesmente cortasse relações diplomáticas com Cuba”.

Em outubro de 1962, Kennedy ainda buscaria intermediação diplomática do Brasil durante a crise dos mísseis nucleares. As relações entre as partes se deterioriam com o tempo, e, em 1963, Kennedy consideraria apoiar um golpe contra Jango, para evitar "o surgimento de uma nova Cuba no hemisfério". A utilidade do Brasil para negociar com Havana chegaria ao fim com o golpe de 1964, apoiado por Washington.

Segundo Hershberg, antes disso, contudo, o Brasil “pode ter desempenhado um papel importante na limitação do confronto entre EUA e Cuba em um momento perigoso, influenciando Fidel a salvaguardar e, eventualmente, libertar os prisioneiros da Baía dos Porcos (...) evitando assim um ato que poderia muito bem ter desencadeado uma crise e potencialmente uma intervenção militar dos EUA 

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Zelikow response to National Security Archive: Saving the Bay of Pigs Prisoners: Did JFK Send a Secret Warning to Fidel Castro – through Brazil?

by Philip Zelikow

H-Diplo, May 1, 2021

Jim Hershberg's useful documentary compilation adds important context to a critical, yet largely overlooked, episode in President John F. Kennedy's thinking about Fidel Castro and Cuba in March-April 1962. At this time Kennedy made it clear to the leader of the Cuban exiles that the U.S. would not invade Cuba to help them overthrow Castro's government. This news deflated hopes among the exiles, causing considerable anger. Hershberg's work adds a vital clue about why Kennedy took this stance at that time.

In the National Security Archive's new briefing book (#758, 29 April 2021), Hershberg posts documents explaining that, in late March 1962, Kennedy and his key Latin American aide, Dick Goodwin, were very concerned that Castro's government was about to execute a group of Cuban rebels that had been captured in the failed CIA-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. These executions would inflame American opinion against Castro. 

On March 16, Kennedy reviewed the guidelines for the CIA program against Castro, Operation Mongoose, He allowed contingency plans to proceed but "expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action." [Ed. note, "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose," _FRUS_ 1961-1963, vol. 10, doc. 314]. 

On March 28 or 29, the head of the Cuban exiles and their Cuban Revolutionary Council, Jose Miro Cardona, met at the White House with Kennedy's national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy. Hershberg notes this meeting and their discussion about Castro's possible execution of the captives. Cardona and his colleagues pleaded for enough help to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro. Bundy pushed back. He told them that any such action had to be decisive and complete. That meant open involvement of U.S. armed forces. "This," he said, "would mean open war against Cuba which in the U.S. judgment was not advisable in the present international situation." Cardona did not like this answer. He regarded Bundy's stance as "polite but cold." [Memcon, 29 March 1962, _FRUS_ 1961-1963, vol. 10, doc. 317 (drafted on March 13, according to the _FRUS_ editors, but this seems unlikely; Cardona, the next year, dated the meeting as occurring on March 28); Cardona resignation letter, 9 April 1963, Wilson Center Digital Archive]. 

On March 29, there was a meeting of the overseers of the CIA Mongoose program. This was a disagreeable meeting in which it was agreed that the U.S. might arrange some deal to get release of the Cuban captives, offering U.S. supplies of food. This decision overrode the objections of the CIA director, John McCone, and the CIA's Mongoose manager, William Harvey. McCone was frustrated at this time, pushing for American military intervention in Cuba. [Memo for the Record, _FRUS_, vol. 10, doc. 318, also doc 319].

Enter Hershberg's findings. Hershberg explains that Dick Goodwin (whom the Cuban exiles disliked) was managing the issue of how to save the captives. The same day, March 29, Bundy and Goodwin agreed that Goodwin would approach Brazil's leader, who was about to visit the White House, and seek his help. Goodwin worked this through the Brazilian ambassador on March 30. In that meeting, Goodwin explained how the executions of the captives would inflame American opinion at a time when Kennedy felt American opinion was "getting more tranquil and less emotional in relation to Cuba." [Hershberg text accompanying note 27, referring to doc. 9 in his EBB].

On April 2, Brazil's president, Joao Goulart, publicly appealed to Castro to spare the captives. Hershberg notes that a pair of journalists for the _Miami News_ later disclosed that this public appeal was accompanied by a secret message from Brazil to Cuba, coming out of the Goodwin channel. In this secret message, the Brazilians reportedly relayed Goodwin's message that execution might cause a harsh U.S. reaction, while clemency might tilt Kennedy against intervention. [Hershberg text accompanying notes 34-37].

On April 8, Cuba announced the sentence -- the captives would be spared. What later ensued was a set of negotiations involving the U.S. lawyer James Donovan, working with Goodwin, that did eventually produce a deal that exchanged American goods for the release of the Cuban captives.

Hershberg speculates about the significance of this secret U.S. offer relayed through Brazil. But he does not comment on the immediate sequel, which certainly adds credence to his speculation.

Two other journalists at the _Miami News_ had arranged for the frustrated head of the Cuban exiles, Cardona, to meet with Robert Kennedy. He promised help on the captives. He arranged for Cardona and his colleagues to meet directly with President Kennedy, on April 10.

On April 10, Cardona met with JFK for an hour. Robert Kennedy and Goodwin were there. A year later, Cardona claimed that JFK had urged the Cubans to keep training their forces, that "your destiny is to suffer" but "do not waver." [Cardona resignation letter, April 1963]. Goodwin's record at the time is different. At this meeting, Kennedy specifically rebuffed Cardona's plea that the U.S. commit itself to intervene in support of another rebel invasion. [Goodwin to JFK, 14 April 1962, and Passavoy to Record, "Topics Discussed during Meeting of Dr. Miro Cardona with the President," 25 April 1962, both in NSF, box 45, Cuba: Subjects, Miro Cardona, Material sent to Palm Beach, JFK Library]. The _FRUS_ editors unfortunately did not include these documents, which record the only meeting in 1962 between JFK and the leader of the Cuban exiles. I published this information in 1999 [_Essence of Decision_, Pearson, revised edition, with Graham Allison, 84 and 132, n. 26) and 2000 ("American Policy in Cuba, 1961-1963," _Diplomatic History_, 24:2, 321)].

There is no question that Kennedy's deflating message to Cardona reinforced what the State Department's Cuban desk officer called the "deep sense of frustration and impatience" in the Cuban exile community "over what it considers 'inactivity' regarding the overthrow of the Castro regime." Cardona came under internal attack because he had "failed to convince the United States to embark on a military operations program." Cardona considered resigning. [Hurwitch to Martin, 19 April 1962, _FRUS_, doc. 329].

In sum, if Hershberg's findings are added to the wider context -- Kennedy's March-April 1962 rejection of both Cuban exile and CIA pleas for a more aggressive U.S. policy against Castro -- his hypothesis seems right. Kennedy, through Goodwin and with the help of the Brazilians, does appear to have communicated, accurately, that Castro's decision on whether to spare the captives was coming at a pivotal moment in U.S. policy, and could reinforce a growing trend against direct U.S. intervention.

It is also important to notice that Castro's intelligence service had penetrated the Cuban exile community and therefore was presumably well aware of their unease and frustration about U.S. plans. According to senior former Cuban intelligence officials, at this time, in April-May 1962, Cuban intelligence concluded that it did not fear a U.S. invasion of Cuba. And the Soviet leadership had already approved, on April 12, a strong defensive arms package for Cuba, despite Castro's actions against the pro-Soviet leader of Cuba's Communist Party. 

Thus, when Khrushchev decided more than a month later, at the end of May, to deploy a force of ballistic missiles to Cuba, Castro assumed that the Soviet leader was doing this for other, global, reasons. I have argued elsewhere that these had much to do with the final phase of the Berlin crisis. This background helps explain why the KGB resident in Havana thought Castro would say no to the Soviet missile request. But, in fact, Castro was willing to take the missiles out of a sense of socialist solidarity. [On the Cuban intelligence views, see Domingo Amuchastegui, "Cuban Intelligence and the October Crisis," in James Blight and David Welch, eds., _Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis_ (Routledge, 1988); see generally the revised _Essence of Decision_, 84-88, including the cited recollections of Fidel Castro himself and other Cuban leaders compiled between 1989 and 1992]. 

Hershberg's findings about the U.S.-Brazilian diplomacy and Castro's well-judged decision to spare the Bay of Pigs captives thus add an important new layer of understanding to this fascinating story.

Philip Zelikow
University of Virginia

A participação do Brasil no golpe de Pinochet contra Allende - Peter Kornbluh (National Security Archive), by Malcolm Byrne

 National Security Archive: Brazil Abetted Overthrow of Allende in Chile 

by Malcolm Byrne

On 57th anniversary of military coup in Brazil, the National Security Archive Posts Declassified Documentation on Brazilian Regime's Effort to Subvert Democracy and Support Dictatorship in Chile 

 

New Book Reveals Brazilian Intervention to Undermine Allende, Bolster Pinochet 

 

Edited by Peter Kornbluh

 

Washington D.C., March 31, 2021 – The Chilean ambassador to Brazil, Raúl Rettig, sent an alarming cable in March 1971 to his foreign ministry titled “Brazilian Army possibly conducting studies on guerrillas being introduced into Chile.” Multiple sources had informed the Embassy that the Brazilian military regime was evaluating how to instigate an insurrection to overthrow the Allende government. The military had established a “war room” with maps and models of the Andean mountain range along the Chilean border to plan infiltration operations, stated the cable, classified “strictly confidential.” According to Rettig’s report, “the Brazilian Army apparently sent a number of secret agents to Chile who would have entered the country as tourists, with the intention of gathering more background on possible regions where a guerilla movement might operate.” No date had yet been set, one informant said, to initiate this “armed movement.” 

 

The revealing Rettig cable is one of hundreds of documents obtained from Brazilian, Chilean and U.S. archives by investigative reporter Roberto Simon for his new book, Brazil against Democracy: the Dictatorship, the Coup in Chile and the Cold War in South America. Published in Brazil last month, the book exposes the clandestine role Brazil’s military regime played in the September 11, 1973, coup that brought General Augusto Pinochet to power, as well as the Brazilian contribution to Chile’s apparatus of repression during his 17-year dictatorship. The book highlights the infamous Oval Office meeting in 1971 between President Nixon and the head of the Brazilian military dictatorship, a conversation originally revealed by the National Security Archive's publication of the Top Secret White House memcon and cited by Brazil's truth commission. 

 

"The book shows how the Brazilian military dictatorship actively worked to undermine Chile's democracy during the Allende years and, after 1973, to help the Chilean junta consolidate its power,” Simon noted in an interview with the National Security Archive. “Brazil provided direct support to, and a model for, the Pinochet dictatorship." 

 

“This book is a game changer for the historical narrative on imperial intervention in Chile,” according to Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Chile and Brazil documentation projects at the Archive. “It provides a far fuller understanding of the history of foreign violations of Chile’s sovereignty, and suggests there is more to be learned.” 

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Golpe militar de 1964 no Brasil: mais documentos dos EUA - NSArchives

Continuando a postagem de alguns documentos relevantes para nossa própria história.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida

LBJ Library Photo by Yoichi Okamoto (Image Number: W1-20)

BRAZIL MARKS 40th ANNIVERSARY OF MILITARY COUP DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHED LIGHT ON U.S. ROLE Audio tape: President Johnson urged taking "every step that we can" to support overthrow of Joao Goulart U.S. Ambassador Requested Pre-positioned Armaments to aid Golpistas; Acknowledged covert operations backing street demonstrations, civic forces and resistance groups Edited by Peter Kornbluh peter.kornbluh@gmail.com / 202 994-7116

Washington D.C., 31 March 2004 - "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do," President Johnson instructed his aides regarding preparations for a coup in Brazil on March 31, 1964. On the 40th anniversary of the military putsch, the National Security Archive today posted recently declassified documents on U.S. policy deliberations and operations leading up to the overthrow of the Goulart government on April 1, 1964. The documents reveal new details on U.S. readiness to back the coup forces.
The Archive's posting includes a declassified audio tape of Lyndon Johnson being briefed by phone at his Texas ranch, as the Brazilian military mobilized against Goulart. "I'd put everybody that had any imagination or ingenuity…[CIA Director John] McCone…[Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara" on making sure the coup went forward, Johnson is heard to instruct undersecretary of State George Ball. "We just can't take this one," the tape records LBJ's opinion. "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little."
Among the documents are Top Secret cables sent by U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon who forcefully pressed Washington for direct involvement in supporting coup plotters led by Army Chief of Staff General Humberto Castello Branco. "If our influence is to be brought to bear to help avert a major disaster here-which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s-this is where both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed," Gordon wrote to high State Department, White House and CIA officials on March 27, 1964.
To assure the success of the coup, Gordon recommended "that measures be taken soonest to prepare for a clandestine delivery of arms of non-US origin, to be made available to Castello Branco supporters in Sao Paulo." In a subsequent cable, declassified just last month, Gordon suggested that these weapons be "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence," to be used by paramilitary units and "friendly military against hostile military if necessary." To conceal the U.S. role, Gordon recommended the arms be delivered via "unmarked submarine to be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in state of Sao Paulo south of Santos."
Gordon's cables also confirm CIA covert measures "to help strengthen resistance forces" in Brazil. These included "covert support for pro-democracy street rallies…and encouragement [of] democratic and anti-communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business." Four days before the coup, Gordon informed Washington that "we may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in the near future." He also requested that the U.S. send tankers carrying "POL"-petroleum, oil and lubricants-to facilitate the logistical operations of the military coup plotters, and deploy a naval task force to intimidate Goulart's backers and be in position to intervene militarily if fighting became protracted.
Although the CIA is widely known to have been involved in covert action against Goulart leading up to the coup, its operational files on intervention in Brazil remain classified-to the consternation of historians. Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh called on the Agency to "lift the veil of secrecy off one of the most important episodes of U.S. intervention in the history of Latin America" by completely declassifying the record of CIA operations in Brazil. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations conducted significant declassifications on the military regimes in Chile and Argentina, he noted. "Declassification of the historical record on the 1964 coup and the military regimes that followed would advance U.S. interests in strengthening the cause of democracy and human rights in Brazil, and in the rest of Latin America," Kornbluh said.

On March 31, the documents show, Gordon received a secret telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk stating that the Administration had decided to immediately mobilize a naval task force to take up position off the coast of Brazil; dispatch U.S. Navy tankers "bearing POL" from Aruba; and assemble an airlift of 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment including "CS agent"-a special gas for mob control. During an emergency White House meeting on April 1, according to a CIA memorandum of conversation, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told President Johnson that the task force had already set sail, and an Esso tanker with motor and aviation gasoline would soon be in the vicinity of Santos. An ammunition airlift, he reported, was being readied in New Jersey and could be sent to Brazil within 16 hours.
Such U.S. military support for the military coup proved unnecessary; Castello Branco's forces succeeded in overthrowing Goulart far faster and with much less armed resistance then U.S. policy makers anticipated. On April 2, CIA agents in Brazil cabled that "Joao Goulart, deposed president of Brazil, left Porto Alegre about 1pm local time for Montevideo."
The documents and cables refer to the coup forces as "the democratic rebellion." After General Castello Branco's takeover, the military ruled Brazil until 1985.

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Hear/Read the Documents
l) White House Audio Tape, President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball, March 31, 1964

This audio clip is available in several formats:
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In this 5:08 minute White House tape obtained from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, President Johnson is recorded speaking on the phone from his Texas ranch with Undersecretary of State George Ball and Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Thomas Mann. Ball briefs Johnson on that status of military moves in Brazil to overthrow the government of Joao Goulart who U.S. officials view as a leftist closely associated with the Brazilian Communist Party. Johnson gives Ball the green light to actively support the coup if U.S. backing is needed. "I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do" he orders. In an apparent reference to Goulart, Johnson states "we just can't take this one." "I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little," he instructs Ball.

2) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Rio De Janiero, March 27, 1964

Ambassador Lincoln Gordon wrote this lengthy, five part, cable to the highest national security officers of the U.S. government, including CIA director John McCone and the Secretaries of Defense and State, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk. He provides an assessment that President Goulart is working with the Brazilian Communist Party to "seize dictatorial power" and urges the U.S. to support the forces of General Castello Branco. Gordon recommends "a clandestine delivery of arms" for Branco's supporters as well as a shipment of gas and oil to help the coup forces succeed and suggests such support will be supplemented by CIA covert operations. He also urges the administration to "prepare without delay against the contingency of needed overt intervention at a second stage."

3) State Department, Top Secret Cable from Amb. Lincoln Gordon, March 29, 1964

Ambassador Gordon updates high U.S. officials on the deterioration of the situation in Brazil. In this cable, declassified on February 24, 2004 by the LBJ Presidential Library, he reiterates the "manifold" need to have a secret shipment of weapons "pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence" to be "used by paramilitary units working with Democratic Military groups" and recommends a public statement by the administration "to reassure the large numbers of democrats in Brazil that we are not indifferent to the danger of a Communist revolution here."

4) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Plans of Revolutionary Plotters in Minas Gerias," March 30, 1964

The CIA station in Brazil transmitted this field report from intelligence sources in Belo Horizonte that bluntly stated "a revolution by anti-Goulart forces will definitely get under way this week, probably in the next few days. The cable transmits intelligence on military plans to "march toward Rio." The "revolution," the intelligence source predicted, "will not be resolved quickly and will be bloody."

5) State Department, Secret Cable to Amb. Lincoln Gordon in Rio, March 31, 1964

Secretary of State Dean Rusk sends Gordon a list of the White House decisions "taken in order [to] be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Goulart forces if it is decided this should be done." The decisions include sending US naval tankers loaded with petroleum, oil and lubricants from Aruba to Santos, Brazil; assembling 110 tons of ammunition and other equipment for pro-coup forces; and dispatching a naval brigade including an aircraft carrier, several destroyers and escorts to conduct be positioned off the coast of Brazil. Several hours later, a second cable is sent amending the number of ships, and dates they will be arriving off the coast.

6) CIA, Secret Memorandum of Conversation on "Meeting at the White House 1 April 1964 Subject-Brazil," April 1, 1964

This memorandum of conversation records a high level meeting, held in the White House, between President Johnson and his top national security aides on Brazil. CIA deputy chief of Western Hemisphere operations, Desmond Fitzgerald recorded the briefing given to Johnson and the discussion on the progress of the coup. Defense Secretary reported on the movements of the naval task force sailing towad Brazil, and the arms and ammunition being assembled in New Jersey to resupply the coup plotters if necessary.

7) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable on "Departure of Goulart from Porto Alegre for Montevideo," April 2, 1964

The CIA station in Brazil reports that the deposed president, Joao Goulart, left Brazil for exile in Uruguay at l pm, on April 2. His departure marks the success of the military coup in Brazil.

Brasil 1962-1964: documentos americanos sobre o processo politico nos anos Goulart - Dept. State, CIA, etc.

Graças a meu amigo James Herschberg, e ao embaixador Rubens Ricupero, minha atenção foi despertada para este conjunto de documentos americanos, referenciados abaixo, com uma ênfase na dramática conversação entre Robert Kennedy, enviado especial do seu irmão, presidente John F. Kennedy, e o presidente João Goulart. 
O relato foi feito pelo embaixador Lincoln Gordon, uma vez que nenhum outro interlocutor brasileiro esteve presente, sequer como "note taker" (Goulart não queria testemunhas brasileiros, talvez por desconfiar do Itamaraty, ou por não desejar que nenhum outro brasileiro ouvisse o que ele iria dizer, sinceramente ou não, ao enviado especial, já num processo de desgaste inevitável de Goulart junto aos americanos).
O National Security Archive, projeto mantido pela George Washington University, mantém dezenas, centenas, milhares de documentos como estes, liberados pelas autoridades americanos, ou a pedido do NSA, usando o FOIA (Freedom of Information Act).
Aproveitem. Todos os links estão devidamente transcritos por inteiro.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Brazil Marks 50^th Anniversary of Military Coup

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/

On 50^th anniversary, Archive posts new Kennedy Tape Transcripts on coup plotting against Brazilian President Joao Goulart

Robert Kennedy characterized Goulart as a "wily politician" who "figures he's got us by the ---."

Declassified White House records chart genesis of regime change effort in Brazil

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 465

Posted April 2, 2014

Edited by James G. Hershberg and Peter Kornbluh

For more information contact:
James G. Hershberg, 202/302-5718
Peter Kornbluh, 202/374-7281
nsarchiv@gwu.edu

Washington, DC, April 2, 2014 – Almost two years before the April 1, 1964, military takeover in Brazil, President Kennedy and his top aides began seriously discussing the option of overthrowing Joao Goulart's government, according to Presidential tape transcripts posted by the National Security Archive on the 50^th anniversary of the coup d'tat. "What kind of liaison do we have with the military?" Kennedy asked top aides in July 1962. In March 1963, he instructed them: "We've got to do something about Brazil."

The tape transcripts advance the historical record on the U.S. role in deposing Goulart — a record which remains incomplete half a century after he fled into exile in Uruguay on April 1, 1964. "The CIA's clandestine political destabilization operations against Goulart between 1961 and 1964 are the black hole of this history," according to the Archive's Brazil Documentation Project director, Peter Kornbluh, who called on the Obama administration to declassify the still secret intelligence files on Brazil from both the Johnson and Kennedy administrations.

Revelations on the secret U.S. role in Brazil emerged in the mid 1970s, when the Lyndon Johnson Presidential library began declassifying Joint Chiefs of Staff records on "Operation Brother Sam" — President Johnson's authorization for the U.S. military to covertly and overtly supply arms, ammunition, gasoline and, if needed, combat troops if the military's effort to overthrow Goulart met with strong resistance. On the 40^th anniversary of the coup, the National Security Archive posted audio files of Johnson giving the green light for military operations to secure the success of the coup once it started.

"I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do," President Johnson instructed his aides regarding U.S. support for a coup as the Brazilian military moved against Goulart on March 31, 1964.

But Johnson inherited his anti-Goulart, pro-coup policy from his predecessor, John F. Kennedy. Over the last decade, declassified NSC records and recently transcribed White House tapes have revealed the evolution of Kennedy's decision to create a coup climate and, when conditions permitted, overthrow Goulart if he did not yield to Washington's demand that he stop "playing" with what Kennedy called "ultra-radical anti-Americans" in Brazil's government. During White House meetings on July 30, 1962, and on March 8 and 0ctober 7, 1963, Kennedy's secret Oval Office taping system recorded the attitude and arguments of the highest U.S. officials as they strategized how to force Goulart to either purge leftists in his government and alter his nationalist economic and foreign policies or be forced out by a U.S.-backed putsch.

Indeed, the very first Oval Office meeting that Kennedy secretly taped, on July 30, 1962, addressed the situation in Brazil. "I think one of our important jobs is to strengthen the spine of the military," U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon told the President and his advisor, Richard Goodwin. "To make clear, discreetly, that we are not necessarily hostile to any kind of military action whatsoever if it's clear that the reason for the military action is…[Goulart's] giving the country away to the...," "Communists," as the president finished his sentence. During this pivotal meeting, the President and his men decided to upgrade contacts with the Brazilian military by bringing in a new US military attaché-Lt. Col. Vernon Walters who eventually became the key covert actor in the preparations for the coup. "We may very well want them [the Brazilian military] to take over at the end of the year," Goodwin suggested, "if they can." (Document 1)

By the end of 1962, the Kennedy administration had indeed determined that a coup would advance U.S. interests if the Brazilian military could be mobilized to move. The Kennedy White House was particularly upset about Goulart's independent foreign policy positions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although Goulart had assisted Washington's efforts to avoid nuclear Armageddon by acting as a back channel intermediary between Kennedy and Castro — a top secret initiative uncovered by George Washington University historian James G. Hershberg — Goulart was deemed insufficiently supportive of U.S. efforts to ostracize Cuba at the Organization of American States. On December 13, Kennedy told former Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek that the situation in Brazil "worried him more than that in Cuba."

On December 11, 1962, the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the National Security Council met to evaluate three policy alternatives on Brazil: A. "do nothing and allow the present drift to continue; B. collaborate with Brazilian elements hostile to Goulart with a view to bringing about his overthrow; C. seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government." [link to document 2] Option C was deemed "the only feasible present approach" because opponents of Goulart lacked the "capacity and will to overthrow" him and Washington did not have "a near future U.S. capability to stimulate [a coup] operation successfully." Fomenting a coup, however "must be kept under active and continuous consideration," the NSC options paper recommended.

Acting on these recommendations, President Kennedy dispatched a special envoy — his brother Robert — to issue a face-to-face de facto ultimatum to Goulart. Robert Kennedy met with Goulart at the Palacio do Alvarada in Brazilia on December 17, 1962. During the three-hour meeting, RFK advised Goulart that the U.S. had "the gravest doubts" about positive future relations with Brazil, given the "signs of Communist or extreme left-wing nationalists infiltration into civilian government positions," and the opposition to "American policies and interests as a regular rule." As Goulart issued a lengthy defense of his policies, Kennedy passed a note to Ambassador Gordon stating: "We seem to be getting no place." The attorney general would later say that he came away from the meeting convinced that Goulart was "a Brazilian Jimmy Hoffa."

Kennedy and his top aides met once again on March 7, 1963, to decide how to handle the pending visit of the Brazilian finance minister, Santiago Dantas. In preparation for the meeting, Ambassador Gordon submitted a long memo to the president recommending that if it proved impossible to convince Goulart to modify his leftist positions, the U.S. work "to prepare the most promising possible environment for his replacement by a more desirable regime." (Document 5) The tape of this meeting (partially transcribed here for the first time by James Hershberg) focused on Goulart's continuing leftward drift. Robert Kennedy urged the President to be more forceful toward Goulart: He wanted his brother to make it plain "that this is something that's very serious with us, we're not fooling around about it, we're giving him some time to make these changes but we can't continue this forever." The Brazilian leader, he continued, "struck me as the kind of wily politician who's not the smartest man in the world ... he figures that he's got us by the---and that he can play it both ways, that he can make the little changes, he can make the arrangements with IT&T and then we give him some money and he doesn't have to really go too far." He exhorted the president to "personally" clarify to Goulart that he "can't have the communists and put them in important positions and make speeches criticizing the United States and at the same time get 225-[2]50 million dollars from the United States. He can't have it both ways."

As the CIA continued to report on various plots against Goulart in Brazil, the economic and political situation deteriorated. When Kennedy convened his aides again on October 7, he wondered aloud if the U.S. would need to overtly depose Goulart: "Do you see a situation where we might be—find it desirable to intervene militarily ourselves?" The tape of the October 7 meeting — a small part of which was recently publicized by Brazilian journalist Elio Gaspari, but now transcribed at far greater length here by Hershberg — contains a detailed discussion of various scenarios in which Goulart would be forced to leave. Ambassador Gordon urged the president to prepare contingency plans for providing ammunition or fuel to pro-U.S. factions of the military if fighting broke out. "I would not want us to close our minds to the possibility of some kind of discreet intervention," Gordon told President Kennedy, "which would help see the right side win."

Under Gordon's supervision, over the next few weeks the U.S. embassy in Brazil prepared a set of contingency plans with what a transmission memorandum, dated November 22, 1963, described as "a heavy emphasis on armed intervention." Assassinated in Dallas on that very day, President Kennedy would never have the opportunity to evaluate, let alone implement, these options.

But in mid-March 1964, when Goulart's efforts to bolster his political powers in Brazil alienated his top generals, the Johnson administration moved quickly to support and exploit their discontent-and be in the position to assure their success. "The shape of the problem," National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy told a meeting of high-level officials three days before the coup, "is such that we should not be worrying that the [Brazilian] military will react; we should be worrying that the military will not react."

"We don't want to watch Brazil dribble down the drain," the CIA, White House and State Department officials determined, according to the Top Secret meeting summary, "while we stand around waiting for the [next] election."

---

THE DOCUMENTS

Document 1: White House, Transcript of Meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin, July 30, 1962. (Published in The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One (W.W. Norton), edited by Timothy Naftali, October 2001.)

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%201%20kennedy%20brazil%20meeting%20July%2030,%201962.pdf

The very first Oval Office meeting ever secretly taped by President Kennedy took place on July 30, 1962 and addressed the situation in Brazil and what to do about its populist president, Joao Goulart. The recording — it was transcribed and published in book The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Volume One — captures a discussion between the President, top Latin America aide Richard Goodwin and U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon about beginning to set the stage for a future military coup in Brazil. The President and his men make a pivotal decision to appoint a new U.S. military attaché to become a liaison with the Brazilian military, and Lt. Col. Vernon Walters is identified. Walters later becomes the key covert player in the U.S. support for the coup. "We may very well want them [the Brazilian military] to take over at the end of the year," Goodwin suggests, "if they can."

Document 2: NSC, Memorandum, "U.S. Short-Term policy Toward Brazil," Secret, December 11, 1962

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%202%20US%20short%20term%20policy%20toward%20brazil.pdf

In preparation for a meeting of the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) of the National Security Council, the NSC drafted an options paper with three policy alternatives on Brazil: A. "do nothing and allow the present drift to continue; B. collaborate with Brazilian elements hostile to Goulart with a view to bringing about his overthrow; C. seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government." Option C was deemed "the only feasible present approach" because opponents of Goulart lacked the "capacity and will to overthrow" him and Washington did not have "a near future U.S. capability to stimulate [a coup] operation successfully." Fomenting a coup, however "must be kept under active and continuous consideration," the NSC options paper recommended. If Goulart continued to move leftward, "the United States should be ready to shift rapidly and effectively to…collaboration with friendly democratic elements, including the great majority of military officer corps, to unseat President Goulart."

 

Document 3: NSC, "Minutes of the National Security Council Executive Committee Meeting, Meeting No. 35," Secret, December 11, 1962

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%203%20Excomm%20minutes.pdf

The minutes of the EXCOMM meeting record that President Kennedy accepted the recommendation that U.S. policy "seek to change the political and economic orientation of Goulart and his government."

Document 4: U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, "Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President Joao Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Brasilia, 17 December 1962," December 19, 1962

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%204%20Airgram%20from%20Rio%20de%20Janeiro%20December%2019%201962.pdf

In line with JFK's decision at the Excom meeting on December 11 to have "representative sent specially" to talk to Goulart, the president's brother made a hastily-prepared journey to "confront" the Brazilian leader over the issues that had increasingly concerned and irritated Washington-from his chaotic management of Brazil's economy and expropriation of U.S. corporations such as IT&T, to his lukewarm support during the Cuban missile crisis and flirtation with the Soviet bloc to, most alarming, his allegedly excessive toleration of far left and even communist elements in the government, military, society, and even his inner circle. Accompanied by US ambassador Lincoln Gordon, RFK met for more than three hours with Goulart in the new inland capital of Brasília at the modernistic lakeside presidential residence, the Palácio do Alvorada. A 17-page memorandum of conversation, drafted by Amb. Gordon, recorded the Attorney General presenting his list of complaints: the "many signs of Communist or extreme left-wing nationalists infiltration" into civilian government, military, trade union, and student group leaderships, and Goulart's personal failure to take a public stand against the "violently anti-American" statements emanating from "influential Brazilians" both in and out of his government, or to embrace Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Turning to economic issues, he said his brother was "very deeply worried at the deterioration" in recent months, from rampant inflation to the disappearance of reserves, and called on Goulart to get his "economic and financial house in order." Surmounting these obstacles to progress, RFK stressed, could mark a "turning point in relations between Brazil and the U.S. and in the whole future of Latin America and of the free world." When Goulart defended his policies, Kennedy scribbled a note to Ambassador Gordon: "We seem to be getting no place." JFK's emissary voiced his fear "that President Goulart had not fully understood the nature of President Kennedy's concern about the present situation and prospects."

 

Document 5: Department of State, Memorandum to Mr. McGeorge Bundy, "Political Considerations Affecting U.S. Assistance to Brazil," Secret, March 7, 1963

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%205%20political%20considerations%20affecting%20us%20assistance%20to%20brazil.pdf

In preparation for another key Oval office meeting on Brazil, the Department of State transmitted two briefing papers, including a memo to the president from Amb. Gordon titled "Brazilian Political Developments and U.S. Assistance." The latter briefing paper (attached to the first document) was intended to assist the President in deciding how to handle the visit of Brazilian Finance Minister San Tiago Dantas to Washington. Gordon cited continuing problems with Goulart's "equivocal, with neutralist overtones" foreign policy, and the "communist and other extreme nationalist, far left wing, and anti-American infiltration in important civilian and military posts with the government."

 

Document 6: Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon on Friday March 8, 1963 (Meeting 77.1, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston)

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%206%20brazil-jfk%20tapes-030863-revised.pdf

On March 8, 1963, a few days before Dantas' arrived, JFK reviewed the state of US-Brazilian relations with his top advisors, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, his ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, and his brother Robert. Unofficially transcribed here by James G. Hershberg (with assistance from Marc Selverstone and David Coleman) this is apparently the first time that it has been published since the tape recording was released more than a decade ago by the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston. As the comments by Rusk, Gordon, and RFK make clear, deep dissatisfaction with Goulart persisted. "Brazil is a country that we can't possibly turn away from," Secretary of State Rusk told the president. "Whatever happens there is going to be of decisive importance to the hemisphere." Rusk frankly acknowledged that the situation wasn't yet so bad as to justify Goulart's overthrow to "all the non-communists or non-totalitarian Brazilians," nor to justify a "clear break" between Washington and Rio that would be understood throughout the hemisphere. Instead, the strategy for the time being was to continue cooperation with Goulart's government while raising pressure on him to improve his behavior, particularly his tolerance of far-leftist, anti-United States, and even communist associates-to, in JFK's words, "string out" aid in order to "put the screws" on him. The president's brother, in particular, clearly did not feel that Goulart had followed through since their meeting a few months earlier on his vows to put a lid on anti-U.S. expressions or make personnel changes to remove some of the most egregiously leftist figures in his administration. Goulart, stated RFK, "struck me as the kind of wily politician who's not the smartest man in the world but very sensitive to this [domestic political] area, that he figures that he's got us by the---and that he can play it both ways, that he can make the little changes…and then we give him some money and he doesn't have to really go too far."

Document 7: CIA, Current Intelligence Memorandum, "Plotting Against Goulart," Secret, March 8, 1963

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%207%20Plotting%20against%20Goulart.pdf

For more than two years before the April 1, 1964 coup, the CIA transmitted intelligence reports on various coup plots. The plot, described in this memo as "the best-developed plan," is being considered by former minister of war, Marshal Odylio Denys. In a clear articulation of U.S. concerns about the need for a successful coup, the CIA warned that "a premature coup effort by the Brazilian military would be likely to bring a strong reaction from Goulart and the cashiering of those officers who are most friendly to the United States."

 

Document 8: State Department, Latin American Policy Committee, "Approved Short-Term Policy in Brazil," Secret, October 3, 1963

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%208%20proposed%20short%20term%20policy%20in%20brazil.pdf

In early October, the State Department's Latin America Policy Committee approved a "short term" draft policy statement on Brazil for consideration by President Kennedy and the National Security Council. Compared to the review in March, the situation has deteriorated drastically, according to Washington's point of view, in large measure due to Goulart's "agitation," unstable leadership, and increasing reliance on leftist forces. In its reading of the current and prospective situation, defining American aims, and recommending possible lines of action for the United States, the statement explicitly considered, albeit somewhat ambiguously, the U.S. attitude toward a possible coup to topple Goulart. "Barring clear indications of serious likelihood of a political takeover by elements subservient to and supported by a foreign government, it would be against U.S. policy to intervene directly or indirectly in support of any move to overthrow the Goulart regime. In the event of a threatened foreign-government-affiliated political takeover, consideration of courses of action would be directed more broadly but directly to the threatened takeover, rather than against Goulart (though some action against the latter might result)." Kennedy and his top aides met four days later to consider policy options and strategies--among them U.S. military intervention in Brazil.

 

Document 9: Excerpts from John F. Kennedy's conversation regarding Brazil with U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon on Monday, October 7, 1963 (tape 114/A50, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston)

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%209%20brazil-jfk%20tapes-100763-revised.pdf

"Do you see a situation where we might be-find it desirable to intervene militarily ourselves?" John F. Kennedy's question to his ambassador to Brazil, Lincoln Gordon, reflected the growing concerns that a coup attempt against Goulart might need U.S. support to succeed, especially if it triggered an outbreak of fighting or even civil war. This tape, parts of which were recently publicized by Brazilian journalist Elio Gaspari, has been significantly transcribed by James G. Hershberg (with assistance from Marc Selverstone) and published here for the first time. It captured JFK, Gordon, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and other top officials concluding that the prospect of an impending move to terminate Goulart's stay in office (long before his term was supposed to come to an end more than two years later) required an acceleration of serious U.S. military contingency planning as well as intense efforts to ascertain the balance between military forces hostile and friendly to the current government. In his lengthy analysis of the situation, Gordon — who put the odds at 50-50 that Goulart would be gone, one way or another, by early 1964 — outlined alternative scenarios for future developments, ranging from Goulart's peaceful early departure ("a very good thing for both Brazil and Brazilian-American relations"), perhaps eased out by military pressure, to a possible sharp Goulart move to the left, which could trigger a violent struggle to determine who would rule the country. Should a military coup seize power, Gordon clearly did not want U.S. squeamishness about constitutional or democratic niceties to preclude supporting Goulart's successors: "Do we suspend diplomatic relations, economic relations, aid, do we withdraw aid missions, and all this kind of thing — or do we somehow find a way of doing what we ought to do, which is to welcome this?" And should the outcome of the attempt to oust Goulart lead to a battle between military factions, Gordon urged study of military measures (such as providing fuel or ammunition, if requested) that Washington could take to assure a favorable outcome: "I would not want us to close our minds to the possibility of some kind of discreet intervention in such a case, which would help see the right side win." On the tape, McNamara suggests, and JFK approves, accelerated work on contingency planning ("can we get it really pushed ahead?"). Even as U.S. officials in Brazil intensified their encouragement of anti-communist military figures, Kennedy cautioned that they should not burn their bridges with Goulart, which might give him an excuse to rally nationalist support behind an anti-Washington swerve to the left: Washington needed to continue "applying the screws on the [economic] aid" to Brazil, but "with some sensitivity."

 

Document 10: State Department, Memorandum, "Embassy Contingency Plan," Top Secret, November 22, 1963

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2010%20memorandum%20contingency%20plan%20november%2022%201963.pdf

Dated on the day of President Kennedy's assassination in Dallas, this cover memo describes a new contingency plan from the U.S. Embassy in Brazil that places "heavy emphasis on U.S. armed intervention." The actual plan has not been declassified.

 

Document 11: NSC, Memcon, "Brazil," Top Secret, March 28, 1964

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2011%20brazilnscdocument.pdf

As the military prepared to move against Goulart, top CIA, NSC and State Department officials met to discuss how to support them. They evaluated a proposal, transmitted by Ambassador Gordon the previous day, calling for covert delivery of armaments and gasoline, as well as the positioning of a naval task force off the coast of Brazil. At this point, U.S. officials were not sure if or when the coup would take place, but made clear their interest in its success. "The shape of the problem," according to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, "is such that we should not be worrying that the military will react; we should be worrying that the military will not react."

Document 12: U.S. Embassy, Brazil, Memo from Ambassador Gordon, Top Secret, March 29, 1964

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2012%20top%20secret%20cable%20dated%20march%2029%201964.pdf

Gordon transmitted a message for top national security officials justifying his requests for pre-positioning armaments that could be used by "para-military units" and calling for a "contingency commitment to overt military intervention" in Brazil. If the U.S. failed to act, Gordon warned, there was a "real danger of the defeat of democratic resistance and communization of Brazil."

 

Document 13: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cable, [Military attaché Vernon Walters Report on Coup Preparations], Secret, March 30, 1964

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2013.pdf

U.S. Army attaché Vernon Walters meets with the leading coup plotters and reports on their plans. "It had been decided to take action this week on a signal to be issued later." Walters reported that he "expects to be aware beforehand of go signal and will report in consequence."

Document 14 (mp3): White House Audio Tape, President Lyndon B. Johnson discussing the impending coup in Brazil with Undersecretary of State George Ball, March 31, 1964.

http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/LBJ-Brazil.mp3

 

Document 15: White House, Memorandum, "Brazil," Secret, April 1, 1964

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2014%20memorandum%20for%20bundy.pdf

As of 3:30 on April 1^st, Ambassador Gordon reports that the coup is "95% over." U.S. contingency planning for overt and covert supplies to the military were not necessary. General Castello Branco "has told us he doesn't need our help. There was however no information about where Goulart had fled to after the army moved in on the palace.

 

Document 16: Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Cable, "Departure of Goulart from Porto Alegre for Montevideo," Secret, April 2, 1964

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2015%20Departure%20of%20Goulart%20for%20Montevideo%20April%202%201964.pdf

CIA intelligence sources report that deposed president Joao Goulart has fled to Montevideo.

================

Transcrição complete de um documento revelador:

Document 4: U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Airgram A-710, "Minutes of Conversation between Brazilian President Joao Goulart and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Brasilia, 17 December 1962," December 19, 1962
In line with JFK's decision at the Excom meeting on December 11 to have "representative sent specially" to talk to Goulart, the president's brother made a hastily-prepared journey to "confront" the Brazilian leader over the issues that had increasingly concerned and irritated Washington-from his chaotic management of Brazil's economy and expropriation of U.S. corporations such as IT&T, to his lukewarm support during the Cuban missile crisis and flirtation with the Soviet bloc to, most alarming, his allegedly excessive toleration of far left and even communist elements in the government, military, society, and even his inner circle. Accompanied by US ambassador Lincoln Gordon, RFK met for more than three hours with Goulart in the new inland capital of Brasília at the modernistic lakeside presidential residence, the Palácio do Alvorada. A 17-page memorandum of conversation, drafted by Amb. Gordon, recorded the Attorney General presenting his list of complaints: the "many signs of Communist or extreme left-wing nationalists infiltration" into civilian government, military, trade union, and student group leaderships, and Goulart's personal failure to take a public stand against the "violently anti-American" statements emanating from "influential Brazilians" both in and out of his government, or to embrace Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Turning to economic issues, he said his brother was "very deeply worried at the deterioration" in recent months, from rampant inflation to the disappearance of reserves, and called on Goulart to get his "economic and financial house in order." Surmounting these obstacles to progress, RFK stressed, could mark a "turning point in relations between Brazil and the U.S. and in the whole future of Latin America and of the free world." When Goulart defended his policies, Kennedy scribbled a note to Ambassador Gordon: "We seem to be getting no place." JFK's emissary voiced his fear "that President Goulart had not fully understood the nature of President Kennedy's concern about the present situation and prospects."

Ver cable neste link: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%204%20Airgram%20from%20Rio%20de%20Janeiro%20December%2019%201962.pdf