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Mostrando postagens com marcador Russia MUST be defeated. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador Russia MUST be defeated. Mostrar todas as postagens

sábado, 8 de junho de 2024

Russia can be defeated. And Russia MUST be defeated. - Immanuel Niven

Russia can be defeated. And Russia MUST be defeated. 

Immanuel Niven

Here are FIVE logical considerations for an imperative policy of the West.

1) To say that one is against the Russian war of aggression, but one refuses to provide Ukraine with the weapons needed to destroy the supply routes of this war, would be illogical. Because THERE IS NO WAR WITHOUT SUPPLY ROUTES.

2) The capabilities of the Russian defense industry are directly related to the capabilities of the Russian macroeconomy. In case of Russia, this macroeconomy is disproportionately dependent on a functioning oil and gas industry. The more of this industry is destroyed by Ukraine, the more unfinanceable the Russian arms industry becomes, since the constantly INCREASING military expenditure is then offset by a constantly DECREASEING revenue side of the state budget. This negative relationship becomes increasingly dangerous for the Russian macroeconomy... until military spending can no longer be financed and the system collapses.

By the way, as I have been pointing out repeatedly, WITH EXACTLY THIS APPROACH of a "toxic negative relation" President Ronald REAGAN brought the USSR (the "invincible nuclear power USSR") to implosion: Reagan forced the USSR into an extreme arms race until the "Russian" state budget could no longer afford military spending... and the system collapsed.

It would be ILLOGICAL to be against a war of aggression, but to leave the macroeconomics - which makes this war financeable - fully functional.

3) The Russian threats of "escalation and nuclear war" are a classic bluff. The fact is that the Russian Air Force does not even have full air sovereignty over Ukraine. The Russians wanted to storm the Ukrainian capital within two weeks, and now, after more than two years, they are busy laboriously maintaining air defense in occupied Crimea. And all this despite the fact that the Russian Air Force is far superior to the Ukrainian one. The NATO Air Force, in turn, is FAR superior to the Russian one, so Putin knows that in the event of a nuclear emergency he does NOT have the means to keep NATO bombers and their tactical nuclear weapons away from Moscow and St. Petersburg (or from any other city, or from missile silos). Since Putin knows this, he himself knows that he can only threaten and bluff - but nothing more. Falling for a bluff, despite of knowing better, would be ILLOGICAL.

4) In the so-called "Budapest Memorandum" of 1994, Russia recognized the territorial integrity of Ukraine and renounced the use of force, citing the UN Charter. Putin's predecessor Yeltsin signed the memorandum, but Putin did not comply with it. He also does not comply with the UN Charter, as his military operations in Syria and Chechnya, for example, prove. Furthermore, Putin was seemingly open to deepen the "Minsk Agreements"... while his troops were already deployed along the border with Ukraine, of course "only for a maneuver," as he promised. This "harmless maneuver" has since been called a "special military operation" and is the most brutal slaughter in Europe since World War II. Conclusion: it is ILLOGICAL to trust in negotiations with Putin.

5) Putin's doctrine "Russkiy Mir" is well known (or at least it should be well known, just as the contents of "Mein Kampf" should have been known to Chamberlain). This doctrine "Russkiy Mir" demands Russian expansion beyond Ukraine. It is ILLOGICAL to know the implications of "Russkiy Mir" but still IGNORE what this doctrine means - namely further Russian expansion. Such ignorant behavior is just as stupid as believing that you can appease Hitler with the Sudetenland, even though you know exactly what expansion plans are written in Hitlers "Mein Kampf".

The LOGICAL conclusion:

❗️There is only one path to real peace, namely victory for Ukraine.

#ArmUkraineToWin

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From Tendar:

The Russian incursion in northern Kharkiv is now one month ongoing and it is time to summarize the intermediate results.

When the Russian offensive started, the Russian advance was initially - at least when compared to the creeping in the east - relatively fast. Vovchans'k was obviously their primary target in that sector. Russians were superior in numbers, shells and had absolute freedom to strike Ukrainians from Russian territory, since Western weapons were restricted from being used there. 

But the Russian incursion was eventually bogged down. On May 18, Ukrainian missiles hammered several Russian positions in the northern quarters of Vovchans'k. This was also the day when the last Russian advance was recorded in that sector. The development at the western Kharkiv advance was quite similar. 

From a tactical point of view, Russians didn't make any noteworthy gains. Vovchans'k continues to be primarily under Ukrainian control, and in fact Ukrainians have already regained some previously lost parts. The Russian dream to come any closer to Kharkiv City itself in order to position tubed artillery in range of Ukraine's second largest city, is but only a fever dream. So, even this tactical objective of the Russian army is nowhere near to materialize. 

Much more important, however, is the strategic situation. Again, Russians couldn't break the Ukrainian lines and are now even compelled to defend this area. Far worse are the political implications of that adventure. The biggest Russian miscalculation has been that the West authorized the usage of Western weapons against Russian targets in Russia, not only exposing countless Russian targets but also Russian bluffs when it comes to red lines. I have mentioned this several times, before. It showed the Russian emperor's new clothes in such an obvious fashion.

There was also the assumption that the Kharkiv incursion was a diversion for operations in the east and, indeed, Russians tried multiple times to advance near Chasiv Yar. But the results there were even smaller than before Kharkiv incursion. The attempted Russian crossing of the Siversky-Donets Canal failed multiple times and the Russian armored spearheads along their manpower were swiftly eliminated. Russians haven't spent all their cannon fodder there yet, but if Kharkiv was a diversion then this intention failed as well.

All in all, the last 4 weeks, but even more the last 8 months have shown us that even under best fighting conditions Russians perform abysmally low. They have the numbers, the shells, the air planes, their industry completely set for war and, most of all, the Ukrainian shell drought. Yet, despite this huge advantage, the results regarding territorial gains are extremely meager, at best. When nothing changes and when comparing those meager results with the huge resources Russians have allocated and eventually squandered, then we can easily call this a strategic Russian defeat. Seriously, Russians cannot even take Vovchans'k, a city merely 3 miles behind their own border. Just keep this in mind and try not to laugh.

Ukrainians severely degraded Russian manpower and resources. They performed exceptionally well, despite the harsh conditions and in the process exposed Russia's weakness over and over, again. It is latest episode for the fact that Russia can be defeated.