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Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida.

quarta-feira, 24 de julho de 2024

Três perspectivas para compreender a civilização chinesa - Ma Rong

 

Tres perspectivas para comprender la civilización chinaMa Rong es profesor de la Cátedra Boya, Universidad de Beijing

In AnálisisSociedad by Xulio Ríos

La civilización china es una civilización secular

A diferencia de las tradiciones monoteístas del cristianismo, el judaísmo y el islamismo, el antiguo sabio chino Confucio evitaba hablar de fantasmas y dioses, abogando por el principio de que “si no sirves bien a los humanos, ¿cómo sirves a los fantasmas?” y que “si no entiendes la vida, ¿cómo puedes entender la muerte?”.

Como el núcleo de la comunidad nacional china, los regímenes del Zhongyuan (la región de la Llanura Central de China) nunca han experimentado en su historia un régimen combinando lo político y lo religioso ni guerras religiosas. Lo que busca la civilización china sobre el mundo ideal humano es el “Dao” (la Idea Suprema), que algunos eruditos han resumido como “Cielo, Tierra, Soberanía (Estado), Familia y Maestro”, que son la creencia tradicional del pueblo chino.

La manifestación específica del Dao es el “Tianxia Datong” (la Gran Armonía bajo el Cielo). Confucio dijo: “Cuando se pone en práctica el Gran Dao, el mundo es compartido por todos. Se eligen personas de alta moral y talento, se enaltece la honradez y se fomenta una atmósfera de armonía. Así, la gente no solo respeta a sus padres, ni solo ama a sus hijos, sino que también asegura que los ancianos tengan seguridad en su vejez, que los de edad madura puedan hacer uso de sus talentos y servir a la sociedad, que los niños pequeños crezcan sin problemas. Se garantiza el sustento para aquellos que están solos en su vejez, los que han perdido a sus cónyuges, los huérfanos, los que no tienen hijos y los discapacitados que no pueden trabajar. Los hombres tendrán ocupaciones y las mujeres tendrán hogares … Esto es el Datong (Gran Armonía)”. Durante miles de años, el “mundo de Datong” idealizado por los chinos a lo largo de las sucesivas generaciones ha sido este escenario social donde todos los individuos del mundo terrenal puedan desplegar sus talentos al máximo, cumplir con la moral pública, encontrar su propio lugar, y vivir en armonía y orden.

Por lo tanto, a diferencia de la civilización occidental, la civilización china no aboga por las libertades y los derechos individualistas, sino que hace hincapié en la moral social y en el “Dao” que todos los seres deben seguir. Este es otro tipo de sistema ético y moral. En la civilización china, el dicho de que “quien gana el corazón del pueblo gana el mundo” no se refiere a la mayoría en una “elección democrática” al estilo occidental, sino al corazón público, que está de acuerdo con la razón de la naturaleza y para “el bien común”. Este “corazón público” toma en cuenta a todos los pueblos, no a los seguidores de una religión, ni a los súbditos de un régimen, ni siquiera a un partido político, un pequeño grupo o un individuo.

 El principio de igualdad en la civilización china

La civilización china defiende el principio de “No hagas a los demás lo que no quieres que te hagan a ti”, y “respeta a los mayores como respetarías a tus propios mayores, cuida a los jóvenes como cuidarías a tus propios jóvenes”. Sin embargo, no enfatizar los derechos individuales no significa la ausencia del concepto de igualdad. El concepto de “igualdad” entre los chinos se refleja tanto en los intercambios con otras culturas y grupos, como en el respeto por la diversidad de las tradiciones de los distintos grupos étnicos y las culturas locales dentro del país.

Por ejemplo, la herencia de la propiedad en la Llanura Central se divide equitativamente entre los herederos varones, en lugar del sistema de primogenitura adoptado en la sociedad europea o japonesa. De hecho, los chinos no tienen el concepto rígido de “sucesión hereditaria” como en la sociedad europea. “El soberano es como el barco, y el pueblo es como el agua. El agua puede transportar el barco, pero también puede volcarlo”. No solo las dinastías podrían ser “derrocadas” y reemplazadas por otras, sino que también el pueblo y los eruditos aceptarían a diferentes gobernantes de diferentes etnias que respetaran y heredaran la cultura china. Las familias nobles tampoco pueden disfrutar de riquezas y honores eternos. Como dice el dicho: “Los favores legados a sus descendientes por un caballero se agotan en unas pocas generaciones.” y “¿Acaso los nobles y los poderosos, los gobernantes y soberanos, nacieron para ser así?”.

Otro ejemplo es el sistema de examen imperial, el principal canal de selección de talentos de las dinastías de la Llanura Central, que estaba abierto a todos los súbditos. El pensador francés del Siglo de las Luces, Voltaire, apreció mucho el sistema de examen imperial de China y comentó: “Solo los talentos que han pasado rigurosos exámenes pueden ingresar al… gobierno para asumir cargos… Es imposible imaginar un gobierno mejor que éste…”. Consideró que el sistema de examen imperial encarna mejor el espíritu de igualdad que el sistema de herencia de títulos nobiliarios y tierras en Europa.

 “Armonía en la diversidad” y “educación sin discriminación”

En la comprensión y clasificación de los grupos sociales, el confucianismo, pilar de la civilización china, es un conjunto de valores y normas de comportamiento relacionados con el orden ético de la sociedad secular. Cualquier grupo que aceptaba este conjunto de valores y normas era considerado “Huaxia”, es decir, parte de la comunidad cultural china. Por otro lado, aquellos que aún no lo habían aceptado eran considerados “bárbaros”, en chino se llama los Man, Yi, Rong y Di. Las diferencias entre los bárbaros y los Huaxia en cuanto a lengua, costumbres, métodos de producción económica, etc., representaban solamente los diferentes “niveles de civilización”.

En la interacción con grupos étnicos distintos, la civilización china perseguía el “adoctrinamiento” a través de un “gobierno benevolente”. Se decía: “Atraer a los pueblos extranjeros mediante la elevada cultura y virtud propias.” Se abogaba por usarlas para influir a los bárbaros, en lugar de imponérselas con el apoyo de la fuerza. En los registros históricos occidentales se ven numerosos casos de propagación del cristianismo y del islamismo mediante la fuerza y guerras religiosas. Al contrario, en los documentos históricos chinos no se encuentra ningún ejemplo en que las dinastías de la Llanura Central forzaran a los vecinos a aceptar el confucianismo y la creencia en Confucio.

De hecho, el requisito previo para el “adoctrinamiento” era la gran confianza que tenía la sociedad de la Llanura Central en la superioridad de la civilización china. “Nadie puede resistir a un soberano que unifique el mundo con su gobierno benévolo.” Incluso el pensamiento militar tradicional chino subrayaba que el ejército del “Hijo del Cielo” debía ser un “ejército benévolo y justo”, y que “La mejor victoria es vencer sin combatir.”

Además, en un ambiente cultural tan inclusivo, también se puede observar el fenómeno de la “sinización” en diversos grados de las religiones extranjeras después de ingresar a la Llanura Central, donde las mezquitas generalmente adoptan el estilo arquitectónico de mampostería de ladrillos, casa con patio interno (Sì hé yuàn) y edificios de estilo pabellón (Diàn táng), comunes en los asentamientos chinos Han. El chino mandarín también se convirtió en el idioma común entre los musulmanes Hui en esta área. En la dinastía Ming (1368-1644) un grupo de eruditos musulmanes interpretó el Corán utilizando el pensamiento confuciano. El budismo, que fue introducido en China desde la India durante la dinastía Han Oriental (25-220 d.C.), también se sinizó en sus rituales y sistemas. Durante las dinastías Ming y Qing (1368-1840 d.C.), misioneros como Matteo Ricci y Johann Adam Schall von Bell llegaron sucesivamente a China e interpretaron la doctrina católica para alinearla con los principios confucianos.

Se puede decir que la “armonía en la diversidad” y la “educación sin discriminación” son manifestaciones de la inclusividad de la civilización china, y también son la clave de su perdurabilidad hasta el día de hoy.

 

AutorMa Rong, profesor de la Cátedra Boya, Universidad de Beijing.

Redactora: Qiu Tingting, del texto español, doctorada y maestra de la Universidad Normal de Jiangsu.

Revisores: Zhu Lun, profesor de la Universidad Normal de Jiangsu, investigador del Instituto de Etnología y Antropología de CASS.

Procedencia del artículo: DeepChina


terça-feira, 23 de julho de 2024

A grande dama da democracia americana: Nancy Pelosi - Stephen Collinson, Caitlin Hu and Shelby Rose (CNN)

 CNN Meanwhile in America

What Biden’s Exit Means for American Foreign Policy - A Conversation With Timothy Naftali (Foreign Affairs)

 Q & A

What Biden’s Exit Means for American Foreign Policy

A Conversation With Timothy Naftali

On July 21, following weeks of intense speculation, U.S. President Joe Biden announced that he would not run in the November 2024 presidential election and endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris to take his place. Coming at a time of geopolitical uncertainty, the decision could have large implications for U.S. foreign policy for the remainder of Biden’s term. 
To make sense of what Biden’s decision means for the presidency and U.S. world leadership in the weeks to come, Foreign Affairs’ senior editor Hugh Eakin spoke to the presidential historian Timothy Naftali, a faculty scholar at the Institute of Global Politics at Columbia University, the founding director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, the author of George H. W. Bush (a volume in the Times Books “American Presidents” series), and a general editor of The Presidential Recordings: Lyndon B. Johnson.  

The conversation has been edited for clarity and length.

In his momentous announcement, Biden said that it’s in the best interest of his party in the country for him to focus solely on “fulfilling [his] duties as president for the remainder of [his] term.” I wonder how easy that will be. Will the world, including not only antagonists but also partners and allies, see him as a lame duck?

Timothy Naftali:  I actually think that President Biden’s very difficult decision today has restored some of the luster to the American commitment to Ukraine and to stabilizing other parts of the world.

Leaders see power as always in flux. And in the three weeks since the debate, the Biden administration likely found the world more skeptical about U.S. power, in the sense that it seemed more and more likely that former President Donald Trump would beat Joe Biden in the election this fall. And as a result, countries were already gaming what kind of international political environment they would be contending with starting at the end of January, with Biden no longer in the White House.

But there is now a better chance that a Democrat will win in November. And so I’d argue that, for the moment at least, foreign leaders have to take seriously the possibility that a member of Biden’s team or someone else from the Democratic Party will be leading the United States, meaning that they may be able to count on support for Ukraine, for example. Some of that luster may disappear after the beginning of November. But the fact that the Democrats are no longer likely losers I think will influence the way foreign leaders, particularly American adversaries view the Biden administration.

So to the extent that a likely Trump victory was already baked into the international calculus about the United States, Biden’s announcement forces a very different assessment.

And something else needs to be underscored here. Not since the early 1950s, when the internationalist General Dwight Eisenhower won the contest for the soul of the Republican Party over the isolationist Senator Robert Taft, have the two parties presented such fundamentally different worldviews with regard to America’s place in international affairs. Since 1952, both parties have been internationalist in their outlook. President Trump in his first term was an exception, but the Republican Party that he led was divided on this issue. 

As the recent Republican convention demonstrated, Trump has now refashioned the party completely in his own image. His choice of Senator J. D. Vance as his running mate, for example, didn’t represent an attempt to bridge different points of view, but a doubling down of Trumpism. And so were he to return to power—were he to regain the White House, and Republicans to hold the House and regain the Senate—foreign leaders, friends and foes alike, could anticipate a much more isolationist America. So the fact that now the internationalist party has an improved chance to win, will necessarily alter the calculations of foreign leaders. [Russian President] Vladimir Putin can no longer be certain that he can outlast the American commitment to European stability and to the sovereignty of Ukraine.

On the matter of antagonists, however, the United States is closely involved in two major wars, in Europe and the Middle East, and dealing with complicated issues in Asia and elsewhere. Does this announcement come at a perilous moment?

Oh, yes. It’s a perilous moment when the national strategy of a great power is so in question that an election could alter the country’s, or at least its leadership class’s, definition of the national interest. And it’s especially perilous for the international system when the country in question is a superpower. This situation introduces an uncertainty into the political calculations of every leader. It is very rare for an election to decide how the power elite of a nation defines its national interest. And it’s almost unheard of that this should happen for a great power.

During the Cold War, the two parties in the United States disagreed on the means by which to fight the Cold War, particularly in the Vietnam and post-Vietnam era. But they didn’t disagree on the fact that the United States faced a determined adversary and that national security entailed playing a role in defending, protecting, and encouraging regional and international stability. That consensus doesn’t exist anymore across the two parties.

Comparisons are naturally being made with President Lyndon Johnson’s March 1968 announcement that he would not run again. And many have noted that Biden’s decision is coming much later, in late July. But from a foreign policy point of view, it seems that actually, it’s early: we still have six months of the presidency left. What are the real possibilities in terms of what Biden can do during this time?

President Biden can ensure the continuation of the systems that are below the surface that are helping American allies around the world. If Trump is elected, we don’t know what will happen to intelligence cooperation, for example, not only with Ukraine but also with NATO allies and allies in East Asia. We don’t know what will happen to the training that our military is doing to assist allies of freedom around the world. 

All these processes, though they don’t get a lot of attention, matter for the stability of the world. And they don’t usually need special acts of Congress to be sustained; they just need a stable center in the Oval Office, and [under Biden] that’s been guaranteed. Adversaries are very sensitive to the continuation of those activities. It’s these day-to-day activities of the United States that are often the most alarming to them and most reassuring to our allies. International problems are rarely easy to solve, but they can be managed, and it’s that gardening, if you will, that American foreign national security policy makers need to do every day to be effective. 

And so the gardening can continue.

With the president in office focused on American internationalism, that’s a good thing for American allies. It gives them some predictive capacity about what they can expect from the United States between now and the 20th of January. And it’s a terrible thing for American adversaries, who know they are going to have to put up with a lot of American activities in support of aims that they don’t share.

What about the larger Biden record? Inevitably, one thinks of what happened at the end of the Obama administration and Trump coming to office setting out to undo so many of the major Obama policy initiatives. Are there specific ways that Biden can Trump-proof some of his own accomplishments?

By stepping aside, Biden is doing the most important thing that he can do at this point to Trump-proof the United States, in terms of our national security. As the Supreme Court just reminded us, the U.S. president has enormous authority to direct our foreign policy. And so the choice of the next president is so important. Even if Trump were to beat the ultimate Democratic nominee, Biden’s accomplishments in foreign policy might not all completely dissolve. Were Trump not to score a trifecta, and retain the House as well as win the Senate, one might see some pushback from Congress if a future President Trump and Vice President Vance were to try to dramatically rescind American activities abroad and sacrifice Ukraine to the wolf in the Kremlin. 

So how to Trump-proof our international stature will depend on which party the American people choose to lead the two houses of Congress. If Democrats control the House, they would complicate Trump’s efforts, for example, to shut down support for Ukraine. Trump could still veto a bill, but there may be the votes to overturn that veto. There will still be Republican senators and Republican members of the House who will want to vote for aid for Ukraine. So if the Democrats control the House, Congress might be able to pass assistance packages for Ukraine and Israel, despite Trump’s being in the White House.

As a result of this decision, does Biden in fact have a chance to try to shape his legacy, given the timing and that there is a definite endpoint ahead? Are there useful historical analogies for what presidents have done in these final months?

Well, this will be an unusual late presidency because of how this new period we’ve just entered started. In 1968, Johnson attempted to combine two very difficult decisions as a way of strengthening his legacy and improving the well-being of the United States. At the same time that he said in March 1968 he would not be a candidate for reelection in November, he announced a serious commitment to negotiating a way out of the Vietnam War. In that way, he made clear that he was devoting his late presidency to an issue of foreign policy. 

Biden might view his remaining months in office as an opportunity to do something similar in the Middle East. But the current crisis in the Middle East is hardly a parallel to the U.S. policy failure in Vietnam. The United States is not a direct combatant in Israel’s war with Hamas. It has to work through an ally, Israel. So there isn’t a direct parallel to Johnson, who said to the world, and particularly to Hanoi and Moscow and Beijing, “Take me seriously” in seeking a diplomatic off-ramp from the war in Vietnam. “I’m no longer playing politics. I’m out of politics.” I don’t see there being a direct parallel for Biden, and that’s OK. 

History provides us with echoes, but rarely does it repeat itself; the circumstances of each case are almost always very different though the dilemmas they raise can seem similar. The people, the political culture—those can be similar, the individuals can be similar. But history isn’t a crystal ball. There are unique elements to Biden’s decision that should be appreciated—and should be a source of some humility in trying to figure out what’s going to happen next.

From a historical perspective, is there something you see as particularly striking about the decision and how it happened?

In trying to follow from afar the discussions going on in [Delaware, where the president was at a family home, isolated with COVID-19 and struggling to decide what to do], it seemed that Biden was in part a prisoner to an unfortunate American tradition. This is the idea that only by winning a second term is the president of the United States validated. In the 1840s, James K. Polk made clear that he was seeking only one, very consequential term. Modern presidents, however, have treated their reelection as a referendum on their first terms, when the campaign would be better suited as a test of what they have to offer in a second term.

Presidents should be allowed to rise to greatness in our history simply by serving one term. The moment and the individual can coalesce and that moment may last only four years. George H. W. Bush is a good example. He was supremely qualified and had the right tools to manage the end of the Cold War and the first years of what followed. Yet he didn’t want to be just a one-term president. As a result, when he was defeated in 1992, he left office feeling depressed as if he had somehow failed as president, despite his one term having been so consequential and important. Gerald Ford was another excellent one-term president.

Biden’s one-term presidency is destined to be viewed very positively. How positively will ultimately depend on whether a Democratic successor, whether it’s Kamala Harris or not, is elected in November. But not all of his legacy depends on a Democratic victory in November. He brought us out of Trumpian chaos. He restored America’s role in the world, restored the trust of allies. He pushed adversaries away from goals they were hoping to achieve. Without anything like the majorities of Franklin Roosevelt or Johnson, his deft touch with Congress led to a deepening of the social safety net, brought technology to bear in the problem of climate change without sacrificing American jobs, and made a generational commitment to American infrastructure. 

In sum, the president has had a successfully consequential term. Unfortunately, he felt that he alone could prevent Trump from returning to the White House and so sought reelection. But sadly, he didn’t have enough in the tank. It was his own body that defined that his moment had passed. I hope that, with time, he comes to view his term differently, just as I believe George H. W. Bush did, as one that was extraordinarily successful and a blessing for our country.


Chipre: a divisão iniciada em 1974 continua - Kuwait Times

 

Stark divide on show as Cyprus marks 50 years since invasion


https://kuwaittimes.com/article/16834/world/europe/stark-divide-on-show-as-cyprus-marks-50-years-since-invasion/ 

NICOSIA: Cyprus on Saturday marked 50 years since Turkish troops invaded the Mediterranean island, with comments from the Turkish and Cypriot leaders demonstrating the stark divide that remains. The Greek-Cypriot president of Cyprus, who seeks a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation under a UN framework, said there was no other option but reunification.

But in an address at about the same time on the other side of a UN-patrolled buffer zone, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan rejected a federal solution and said he saw no point in continuing UN-led negotiations on the island’s future. As dawn broke in the internationally recognized south of the island, sirens wailed at 5:30 am (0230 GMT), the time that Operation Atilla began in 1974.

The invasion led to the conquering of one-third of Cyprus and displacement of about 40 percent of the population. The buffer zone, where abandoned buildings crumble, cuts across the island with border controls separating Greek Cypriots in the south from Turkish Cypriots in the north.

The United Nations says around 40,000 Turkish soldiers also remain in the north. Decades of UN-backed talks have failed to reunify the island, and the last round collapsed in 2017 after meetings in Crans-Montana, Switzerland. “We believe that a federal solution is not possible in Cyprus. It is of no benefit to anyone to say let’s continue negotiations where we left off in Switzerland years ago,” Erdogan said in the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is only recognized by Ankara. “The Turkish Cypriot side should sit at the table as equals with the Greek Cypriot side. We are ready to negotiate and achieve lasting peace and a solution,” he said before watching a parade that included marching bands and armored military vehicles.

Turkish and TRNC flags flew side-by-side.

On the other side of Nicosia, the world’s last divided capital, President Nikos Christodoulides unveiled busts of officers killed in the fighting. He also laid a wreath at a war memorial where ceremonial gunfire sounded. “Whatever Mr Erdogan and his representatives in the occupied areas do or say, Turkey, 50 years later, continues to be responsible for the violation of human rights of the entire Cypriot people and for the violation of international law,” Christodoulides told reporters.

Decades on, fresh tears flowed for those who died during the invasion.

Under a hot sun at the war memorial, a mother clad in black cried over the tomb of her son. She ran her hand gently over a photo of the young man attached to a marble cross. Other women wiped their eyes nearby. Greek flags waved on graves that stretched out in rows around them as mourners placed flowers and incense. More than 750 Greek Cypriots and almost 200 Turkish Cypriots remain missing, says the bi-communal Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus which tries to find and return their remains to loved ones.

Before the anniversary, some Greek Cypriot veterans of the fight against the invasion told AFP they saw no hope for reunification. “Perhaps, what was completely broken in 1974, cannot be fixed,” the English-language Cyprus Mail newspaper wrote in an editorial Saturday.

“They probably consider reunification too big a risk to take,” it said, and most people on both side “have no experience other than that of a divided country.”

A United Nations envoy, Colombian diplomat Maria Angela Holguin, wrote in an open letter this month of a need to “move away” from past solutions and to “think differently”.

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis was set to visit Cyprus on Saturday evening to attend the commemorations alongside Christodoulides.

Mitsotakis in May visited Erdogan in Ankara, the latest sign of warming ties between the NATO neighbors.

On the eve of the anniversary, Turkey’s parliament adopted a resolution calling for an “end to the inhumane isolation imposed on Turkish Cypriots”. The European Union—to which Cyprus belongs—stressed the need for all parties to seek a peaceful resolution “on the basis of relevant UN Security Council resolutions.” Irfan Siddiq, Britain’s high commissioner to Cyprus, said on social media platform X that, “Too many opportunities for re-unification have been missed.”

In a similar vein, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, in a report this month to the Security Council, said “resolution of the Cyprus issue is long overdue”.

Guterres regretted “the gradual militarization that is under way on the island”. The invasion was triggered by a coup in Nicosia backed by the military junta in Athens and aimed at uniting Cyprus with Greece. The treaty that granted Cyprus independence from Britain in 1960 banned union with Greece or Turkey as well as partition and made London, Athens and Ankara guarantors of Cyprus’s independence, territorial integrity and security. – AFP


Banho de sangue e guerra civil na Venezuela? - Rubens Barbosa (Estadão)

  Opinião

Banho de sangue e guerra civil na Venezuela?

Em vista das incertezas que cercam o resultado da eleição presidencial venezuelana, é possível considerar quatro cenários

Rubens Barbosa

O Estado decS. Paulo, 23/07/2024 | 03h00

Na eleição presidencial da Venezuela, que será realizada no próximo domingo, a oposição tem chances reais de vitória contra o regime autoritário de Caracas. As pesquisas mostram vitória tanto da oposição como de Nicolás Maduro (certamente manipuladas).

O governo Maduro dificultou por todas as formas a indicação de um candidato competitivo de oposição. Dissidentes foram presos arbitrariamente, eleições foram fraudadas, eleitores foram cooptados com a distribuição de alimentos, 15 prefeitos contra o governo foram destituídos e 50 cabos eleitorais da oposição, nos últimos meses, foram presos. Por mudança de regras, apenas 1% dos 4,5 milhões de venezuelanos exilados, que poderiam votar no exterior (cerca de 25% do eleitorado nacional), poderá votar.

A oposição venezuelana, sempre dividida, conseguiu, inicialmente, unir-se em torno de María Corina Machado, que havia sido inabilitada pela Justiça Eleitoral de apresentar-se como candidata. Sua substituta, Corina Yoris, professora de 80 anos, por dificuldades técnicas colocadas pelo governo, não pôde inscrever-se, sendo substituída por Edmundo González, diplomata, sem participação política.

A eleição ocorre depois de conversações dos EUA, Brasil e países europeus com Maduro para realização de um pleito transparente e justo em troca da suspensão de algumas sanções econômicas impostas por Washington. Maduro aceitou os entendimentos e assinou com a oposição um acordo em Barbados em outubro, comprometendo-se a realizar uma eleição democrática. Pouco depois, rompeu o acordo com a desculpa de que os EUA não ajudaram a Venezuela a recuperar o acesso às contas internacionais congeladas, e as arbitrariedades continuaram. O presidente da Colômbia, Gustavo Petro, apresentou a Maduro e aos líderes da oposição a ideia de que o vencedor da eleição estendesse ao opositor alguma forma de anistia.

A situação às vésperas do pleito torna-se ainda mais confusa quando se observa que o governo Maduro retomou as conversas com os EUA, desconvidou a União Europeia a mandar observadores para a eleição e segue com os preparativos para eventual ataque à Guiana.

Os problemas com a cúpula do regime – investigação internacional por corrupção e abusos de direito, além de acusações dos EUA de narcoterrorismo – poderão dificultar eventual saída de Maduro, que conta com o apoio de grupos radicais (liderados pelo poderoso deputado Diosdado Cabello) e, até agora, das Forças Armadas.

Em vista das incertezas que cercam o resultado eleitoral, é possível considerar quatro cenários:

1) Vitória de Maduro: pelas informações disponíveis e pesquisas de opinião pública até aqui, a vitória de Maduro só poderá acontecer pela manipulação da apuração e dos resultados eleitorais, aceita pelo Conselho Eleitoral, controlado pelo governo. Com poucos observadores internacionais independentes – Carter Center, Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) brasileiro –, essa atitude geraria forte reação internacional, imposição de novas sanções econômicas à Venezuela e nova onda de refugiados para o exterior.

2) Vitória da oposição: as pesquisas indicam ampla vitória de González, pela maciça participação da população, urbana e rural, votando contra o governo. Esse resultado pode ensejar uma reação antidemocrática de Maduro ao se recusar a aceitar a vitória da oposição, durante o período de transição de seis meses até a posse do novo governo, gerando grave crise institucional. Para acalmar a cúpula do governo, González poderia oferecer garantias confiáveis de segurança e uma possível anistia a Maduro e a algumas autoridades do regime para fazê-los desistir do poder. Sem anistia, dificilmente haverá transição. González não se pronunciou sobre essa questão, afirmando em artigo nesta semana que, se vitorioso, promoverá a reconciliação nacional.

3) Suspensão da eleição: o governo Maduro denunciou supostos “planos violentos e desestabilizadores”, com a interferência de agentes externos, especialmente dos EUA, e a ameaça de guerra civil, fatos que, junto com uma ação militar contra a Guiana, podem ser invocados para adiar a eleição.

4) Contestação da eleição: com as ameaças do governo e as denúncias da oposição de prisões e restrições violentas ao voto livre e democrático, é muito provável que qualquer resultado da eleição seja contestado por um dos lados, o que torna incerto o reconhecimento do vencedor no período de transição.

A reação do governo Maduro à voz das urnas pode representar um forte constrangimento ao governo do PT. Lula da Silva sempre apoiou Hugo Chávez e Maduro, classificando o regime atual de democrático, mas procurou influir junto ao governo de Caracas para garantir legitimidade das eleições pela transparência e lisura. Lula teria apoiado a proposta de anistia apresentada pelo presidente da Colômbia e teria insistido para que a União Europeia enviasse observadores para acompanhar a eleição e a apuração. Maduro agora fala em “banho de sangue e guerra civil” em caso de derrota na eleição. Lula declarou que vai reconhecer o resultado da eleição e que “se assustou com” a ameaça de Maduro. O governo brasileiro vai manter o apoio a Maduro se o resultado for contestado? A repercussão internacional poderá respingar na credibilidade do governo Lula e deixar exposta a baixa influência do Brasil na região.

PRESIDENTE DO INSTITUTO DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS E COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR (IRICE), É MEMBRO DA ACADEMIA PAULISTA DE LETRAS

https://www.estadao.com.br/opiniao/rubens-barbosa/banho-de-sangue-e-guerra-civil-na-venezuela/

In Kirov, people say Russia must defeat Ukraine and the West at any cost - Francesca Ebel (The Washington Post)

 In this city, people say Russia must defeat Ukraine and the West at any cost

The Post visited Kirov, in western Russia, where residents say President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine is a fight for Russia’s survival against the U.S. and NATO. 

By Francesca Ebel

The Washington Post, July 20, 2024 at 2:57 a.m. EDT


KIROV, Russia — In Kirov, a small city in the heart of western Russia, about 1,000 miles from the front lines in Ukraine, the war that initially few people wanted continues to fill graves in local cemeteries. But most residents now seem to agree with President Vladimir Putin that the bloodshed is necessary.

“The U.S. and NATO gave us no choice,” said Vlad, the commander of a Russian storm unit who has been wounded three times since signing a contract to join the military a year ago. He spoke on the condition he be identified only by first name because he is still an active-duty soldier.

After fighting in Ukraine this spring left him with 40 pieces of shrapnel in his body, Vlad was sent home to recover. Once healed, he plans to return to battle. “I’m going back because I want my kids to be proud of me,” he said. “You have to raise patriotism. Otherwise, Russia will be eaten up.”

Elena Smirnova, whose brothers have been fighting in Ukraine since they were conscripted in September 2022, said she is proud they “serve the motherland” rather than sit on the couch at home.

Nina Korotaeva, who works every day at a volunteer center sewing nets and anti-drone camouflage blankets, said that she feels “such pity” for the young men dying but that their sacrifice is unavoidable. “We don’t have a choice,” Korotaeva said. “We have to defend our state. We can’t just agree to being broken up.”

A visit to Kirov last month revealed that many Russians firmly believe that their country is fighting an existential war with the West, which has sent Ukraine more than $100 billion in military aid, including sophisticated weapons, to defend against Russia’s invasion — assistance that has sharply increased Russia’s casualties.

Interviews showed that the Kremlin has mobilized public support for the war while also masking the full, horrific consequences of it. Some residents of Kirov said they still find the war incomprehensible, while others who have lost relatives insist that the fighting must be serving a higher purpose.

Olga Akishina, whose boyfriend, Nikita Rusakov, 22, was killed with at least 20 other soldiers when a U.S.-provided HIMARS missile slammed into their base this spring, said she found it too difficult to speak about him. Instead, she spoke for nearly an hour in an unbroken torrent about NATO bases in Ukraine and “the extermination” of Russian-speakers there — echoing the Kremlin’s unfounded justifications for the war, which are repeated frequently on state television.

“Of course, if he hadn’t died, it would certainly be much more pleasant for me and his family,” Akishina said. “But I am aware that this was a necessary measure — to protect those people.”

Washington Post journalists traveled to Kirov at the invitation of Maria Butina, a Russian citizen who served 15 months in a U.S. federal prison after being convicted of operating as an unregistered foreign agent. Butina had been an advocate for gun rights and other conservative causes during her years in the United States. Deported after her release, she was embraced as a hero in Russia and now represents Kirov in the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament.

Butina’s office organized interviews with soldiers on leave from active duty, wounded servicemen, soldiers’ families, volunteers, local medical staff and young police cadets. Butina insisted that one of her assistants, Konstantyn Sitchikhin,sit in on most of the conversations, which meant some people may have felt unable to speak freely. At times, Sitchikhin interrupted, telling young cadets, for example, to speak “carefully and patriotically.”

The Post also interviewed several people independently, in person or by phone.

Butina said she extended the invitation because she still believes in dialogue with the West and wanted The Post to report “the truth.” But she insisted that Sitchikhin’s presence in interviews was necessary. “We need to feel that we can trust you,” Butina said. “I advise you to build bridges, not walls.”

The Post accepted Butina’s invitation because it allowed access to a city outside Moscow where reporting might otherwise have proved risky. Since the invasion, Russian authorities have outlawed criticism of the war or the military and have arrested and charged journalists with serious offenses including espionage. Journalists also are routinely put under surveillance.

Sitchikhin, Butina’s aide, cited a climate of fear. “You need to understand that we are at war and people here see you as the enemy,” he said. “I am just trying to protect the people I care about.”

A day after speaking to The Post, Akishina, whose boyfriend was killed in the missile strike, sent a text message saying that she regretted talking to an American newspaper.

“You will most likely be asked to present the material in the article in a way that will be beneficial to the newspaper’s editors,” she wrote.

“I would not want there to be a headline under my story and our photographs that would blame our country and our President for the death of our military,” she wrote, adding that the 78 percent of Russians who voted to reelect Putin in March were proof of widespread public support for the war. (Independent observers said the Russian election failed to meet democratic standards, with genuine challengers blocked from running and Putin controlling all media.)

“The truth is that the United States and the European Union countries that supply weapons to Ukraine are to blame for the death of our guys, as well as civilians in Donbas and Belgorod,” Akishina wrote.

On Wednesday, June 12, thousands of people crammed onto Kirov’s main square to celebrate Russia Day, swaying to patriotic rock songs in the warm sunshine. Among them was Lyubov, tears streaming down her face as she cradled a portrait of her son, Anton, in uniform.

“I cry every single day,” Lyubov said of Anton, 39, who was confirmed dead this spring.

Lyubov said she had joined the festivities hoping to take her mind off her grief. But the dancing, happy families, and rousing music that at times drowned out her words proved too much. “I don’t want everyone to join us in our sadness,” she said, “but I can’t take this.”

Anton was killed by machine-gun fire near Avdiivka, a city in eastern Ukraine that Russia captured in February after months of fierce fighting. Anton called her the night before the assault and told her that he was “on a one-way ticket” — a suicide mission. When she finally got her son’s body back, she was warned not to open the coffin.

Lyubov said she did not understand the reasons for the war, who Russia is fighting or why her son volunteered to join the army. But she insisted that his death was not in vain. “He did it for us,” she said, smiling a bit, “and for Russia.”

The Post arranged the interview with Lyubov independently by contacting her through a social media page for soldiers’ families. The Post is identifying her and her son by first name only because of the risk of backlash from the authorities.

The interviews — with Lyubov, and more than a dozen others in Kirov — highlighted a striking duality: Many Russians are struggling with the deaths of loved ones or their return with grievous injuries, and some are deeply engaged in volunteer efforts, but many others are largely untouched by the war, which has killed thousands of Ukrainian civilians and destroyed entire cities.

At the entrance to the Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, a pamphlet written by Kirov’s chief bishop, Mark Slobodsky, tells worshipers that this is not a fight over territory but a war to defend Orthodox Christian values. “It is a sacred and civilizational conflict,” Slobodsky wrote. “No one can stand to the side of these events.”

Inside, priests blessed an icon that Butina’s office had commissioned by an artist from Donetsk, in Russian-occupied eastern Ukraine, to honor Kirov’s soldiers. The icon bore an odd combination of images: Czar Nicholas II, Russian Prince Alexander Nevsky and the former head of the Russian-backed Donetsk People’s Republic, Alexander Zakharchenko, standing in various positions of piety before the slag heaps of Ukraine’s coal-mining Donbas region.

At a small concert organized by a local volunteer group, people sang patriotic songs about victory and love for the motherland. Three men, the fathers of soldiers either killed or still fighting in Ukraine, were awarded medals for raising “heroes of Russia.”

“Each fighter is a hero for us, and today we wish them the fastest victory,” the concert’s host proclaimed. “It’s thanks to them that we are able to hold such events like this today.”

Public unity behind the war was fully on display in Kirov, including a little girl, whose father is fighting in Ukraine, in a T-shirt that said: “I am the daughter of a hero.”

Several elderly residents said they donate their pensions to the war effort. Many are children of soldiers who fought in World War II and now view Russia as fighting a new war against fascism.

Young cadets in their teens and early 20s, who are training to be police officers and emergency workers, spoke eagerly of volunteer stints they had just completed in occupied Ukraine. One cadet said: “Young people shouldn’t stay on the sidelines.” Asked how they would explain the war in Ukraine, they requested to skip the question.

Some young people who joined the fight, however, are disillusioned by it. Denis, 29, a former Wagner mercenary whose left foot was amputated because of a war injury and who participated in a short-lived mutiny last year when Wagner fighters marched toward Moscow, said he was still enraged at “the corrupt and decaying” Defense Ministry.

Post journalists encountered Denis by chance, independently of Butina’s office, and he agreed to meet to talk about his experiences in the war on the condition that he be identified only by first name because criticizing the military is now a crime in Russia.

Speaking as fireworks marked the end of Russia Day, Denis complained that there was “not enough truth about the war and not enough real, organic involvement.”

“Why are people still partying? Why are they spending money on fireworks and this concert?” he said. “It’s as if nothing is going on. Everyone should be helping, but most people do not feel the war concerns them, and politicians are using it to cleanse themselves and increase their ratings.”

Denis said he planned to return to Ukraine once he is fitted with a prosthesis.

“We have to end this, otherwise the West will see us as weak,” he said. “I thought this war would be short, that it would last six months maximum. We have really been screwed. And I’m disappointed that everyone who tells the truth about the war, about the Russian Defense Ministry, is immediately jailed.”

Meanwhile, Kirov’s social media pages are flooded daily with funeral notices and pleas to help find missing fathers, sons or husbands.

At the cemetery outside Kirov where Lyubov’s son is buried, there are about 40 graves of soldiers killed since 2022, adorned with wreaths and flags. Thirty freshly dug graves await bodies.

Next to one grave, a family gathered to say a few words and raise a glass. “Thank you, Seryoga, for defending us,” said a man, who gave his name only as Mikhail. “You were only there for three days, but at least you tried your best.”


Anastasia Trofimova contributed to this report. 

 

Os dois lados da moeda: versões e revisões sobre 1964 e os Anos de Chumbo no Brasil, livro de Gustavo Marques (Amazon)

 

Unlocking IMF Reform - Barry Eichengreen (Project Syndicate)

Unlocking IMF Reform

Sketching a reform agenda for the International Monetary Fund is easy; implementing reform is hard. It will require, among other things, the US to give up its veto in the institution, and China to assume more responsibility for global stability and the problems of other economies.

In July 1944, exactly 80 years ago, representatives of 44 countries met in an obscure New Hampshire village to negotiate the Bretton Woods Agreement establishing the International Monetary Fund. For many, reaching the ripe old age of 80 would be cause for celebration. For the IMF, the anniversary only highlights the urgency of reform.

Some necessary reforms are straightforward and widely agreed, raising the question of why they haven’t been adopted. First, the IMF should provide its members with regular annual allocations of its in-house financial instrument, special drawing rights. This would provide an alternative to the US dollar as a source of global liquidity while also addressing the problem of chronic global imbalances. Second, the IMF needs to do better at organizing debt restructurings for low-income countries. Its latest attempt, the rather grandly named Common Framework for Debt Treatments, has fallen short. The Fund needs to push harder for cooperation from China’s government and financial institutions, which are unfamiliar with the responsibilities of a sovereign creditor. It should support reforms to speed up restructurings and endorse initiatives to crack down on holdout creditors.

In terms of its surveillance of countries’ policies, the IMF needs to address its perceived lack of evenhandedness; whereas emerging and developing countries are held to demanding standards, high-income countries like the United States are let off the hook. It needs to reinvigorate its analysis of the cross-border spillovers of large-country policies, a process the US has managed to squelch. 

As for its lending policies, the IMF needs to decouple loan size from an anachronistic quota system and reduce the punitive interest rates charged middle-income countries. To ensure the best possible leadership, the managing director should be selected through a competitive process, where candidates submit statements and sit for interviews, after which shareholding governments vote. The victor should be the most qualified individual and not just the most qualified European, as has historically been the case.

Most of all, the IMF must acknowledge that it can’t be everything for everyone. Under recent managing directors, it has broadened its agenda from its core mandate, preserving economic and financial stability, to encompass gender equity, climate change, and other nontraditional issues. These are not topics about which the IMF’s macroeconomists have expertise. The IMF’s own internal watchdog, the Independent Evaluation Office, has rightly warned that venturing into these areas can overstretch the Fund’s human and management resources. Admittedly, the IMF can’t ignore climate change, since climate events affect economic and financial stability. Women’s education, labor force participation, and childcare arrangements belong on its agenda insofar as they have implications for economic growth and hence for debt sustainability. Fundamentally, however, gender-related policies and climate-change adaptation are economic-development issues. They require long-term investments. As such, they fall mainly within the bailiwick of the World Bank, the IMF’s sister institution across 19th Street in Washington. 

An advantage of an agenda focused on the IMF’s core mandate is that national governments are more likely to give the Fund’s management and staff the freedom of action needed to move quickly in response to developments threatening economic and financial stability. The IMF lacks the independence of national central banks. Currently, decision-making is slow by the standards of financial crises, which move fast. Decisions must be approved by an executive board of political appointees who in turn answer to their governments. But central-bank independence is viable only because central bankers have a narrow mandate focused on price stability, against which their actions can be judged. For a quarter-century, observers have argued that a more independent, fleet-footed IMF would be better. But the more the institution dilutes its agenda, the more such independence resembles a pipedream. The other factor underpinning the viability of central-bank independence is that monetary policymakers at the national level are accountable to legitimate political actors, generally parliaments and ministers. The legitimacy of IMF accountability is more dubious, owing to the institution’s governance structure. For antiquated reasons, the US – and only the US – possesses a veto over consequential IMF decisions. Europe is overrepresented in the institution, while China is underrepresented. Until these imbalances are corrected, the Fund’s governance will remain under a shadow. This not only makes the prospect of operational independence even more remote; it also stands in the way of virtually all meaningful reforms, including the straightforward changes listed above. Sketching a reform agenda for the IMF is easy. Implementing it is hard. Real reform will require the US to give up its veto in the institution. It will require China to assume more responsibility for global stability and the problems of other economies. And it will require the US and China to work together. For two countries that haven’t shown much ability to cooperate in recent years, IMF reform would be a good place to start. 

Barry Eichengreen

Writing for PS since 2003 
195 Commentaries

Barry Eichengreen, Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is a former senior policy adviser at the International Monetary Fund. He is the author of many books, including In Defense of Public Debt (Oxford University Press, 2021).