sexta-feira, 6 de fevereiro de 2026

La Argentina y Estados Unidos firmaron un acuerdo comercial que elimina aranceles clave para el intercambio - La Nación

O Mercosul não possui um mecanismo de revisão de políticas comerciais (como TPRM da OMC), mas exibe, ao que parece, um órgão de solução de controvérsias que deveria ser chamado a se explicar sobre a natureza desse acordo de livre-comércio Argentina-EUA e sua compatibilidade com as regras de política comercial do Mercosul, e com o próprio Tratado de Assunção e decisões do seu Conselho sobre o que parece ser, e é, uma infração a resoluções comandando negociação conjunto de acordos desse tipo. PRA

 La Argentina y Estados Unidos firmaron un acuerdo comercial que elimina aranceles clave para el intercambio

Lo selló el canciller Quirno con un funcionario de Trump en Washington; el acuerdo ampliará el acceso de la carne al mercado norteamericano; también revisará las restricciones para el acero y el aluminio; a cambio, Buenos Aires quitará 221 barreras arancelarias

Guillermo Idiart - Corresponsal EEUU

La Nacion, 5/02/2025

https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/se-firmo-el-acuerdo-comercial-entre-la-argentina-y-estados-unidos-nid05022026/?utm_source=appln

WASHINGTON.- A casi tres meses del anuncio del acuerdo marco de comercio e inversiones entre Estados Unidos y la Argentina, el Gobierno concretó este jueves una de sus mayores apuestas en la alianza estratégica con la administración de Donald Trump al rubricar en Washington la versión final de ese amplio pacto, que ahora pasará a un nuevo proceso para su entrada en vigor. La Casa Rosada informó que será remitido al Congreso para su tratamiento.

Luego de una reunión en la sede de la Oficina del Representante Comercial de Estados Unidos (USTR, por sus siglas en inglés), a cargo de Jamieson Greer, el funcionario norteamericano firmó junto al canciller Pablo Quirno el acuerdo de comercio e inversiones recíproco, un hito para la gestión del presidente Javier Milei en la relación con su principal aliado internacional.

Antes de la publicación del documento final -tiene 37 paginas más los anexos-, la Cancillería publicó los primeros detalles claves, entre ellos lo relativo a los aranceles y la carne, y una postergación de la decisión sobre el aluminio y el acero.

Estados Unidos eliminará los aranceles recíprocos para 1675 productos argentinos en una amplia gama de sectores productivos, “lo que permitirá recuperar exportaciones por 1013 millones de dólares”, señaló el Palacio San Martín, que destacó que el marco mejora la inserción del país en las cadenas de suministro y favorece la apertura de nuevos mercados.

“Además, el gobierno de Estados Unidos concederá una ampliación sin precedentes a 100.000 toneladas para el acceso preferencial de la carne bovina a su mercado. Esto asegura en 2026 un adicional de 80.000 toneladas, que se suman a las 20.000 toneladas con que ya cuenta nuestro país, lo que permitirá incrementar cerca de 800 millones de dólares las exportaciones argentinas de este producto“, informó la Cancillería.

La posibilidad de que Estados Unidos cuadriplicara la cuota de carne que importa desde la Argentina había generado fuertes quejas de sectores agropecuarios norteamericanos el año pasado.

“Asimismo, el gobierno de Estados Unidos ratificó su compromiso de revisar oportunamente los aranceles al acero y al aluminio, establecidos en virtud de la Sección 232 de la Ley de Expansión Comercial de ese país”, amplió. Ese era uno de los puntos más conflictivos del acuerdo -por los impuestos de entre el 25 y 50% que impuso la Casa Blanca- y finalmente ambas administraciones decidieron postergar su resolución.

La Argentina, por su parte, eliminará aranceles para 221 posiciones arancelarias, como máquinas, material de transporte, dispositivos médicos y productos químicos; reducirá al 2% otras 20 posiciones, principalmente autopartes, y otorgará cuotas para vehículos, carne y otros productos agrícolas.

“Estos compromisos apuntan a mejorar la competitividad sistémica mediante la reducción o eliminación de aranceles sobre insumos y bienes de capital y la simplificación de procedimientos, lo cual garantizará condiciones de previsibilidad para los sectores involucrados”, explicó la Cancillería.

Al publicar el documento final del acuerdo, Greer destacó que “la creciente colaboración” entre Trump y Milei “sirve de modelo de cómo los países de América, desde Alaska hasta Tierra del Fuego, pueden impulsar nuestras aspiraciones compartidas y salvaguardar nuestra seguridad económica y nacional”.

“El acuerdo reduce las barreras comerciales existentes desde hace tiempo y proporciona un acceso significativo al mercado para los exportadores estadounidenses, desde vehículos hasta una amplia gama de productos agrícolas”, añadió el funcionario norteamericano.

Respecto a la propiedad intelectual, el acuerdo señala que “la Argentina proporcionará un sólido nivel de protección”, y que “establecerá sistemas eficaces para la aplicación civil, penal y en frontera de los derechos de propiedad intelectual”.

En el capítulo de inversión, el texto señala que la Argentina “permitirá y facilitará la inversión estadounidense en su territorio para la exploración, extracción, refinación, procesamiento, transporte, distribución y exportación de minerales críticos y recursos energéticos, así como para la prestación de servicios de generación de energía, telecomunicaciones, transporte e infraestructura, en condiciones no menos favorables que las que otorga a sus propios inversores en circunstancias similares“.

Además, Estados Unidos, a través de sus instituciones como el Banco de Exportación e Importación (EXIM, por sus siglas en inglés) y la Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo Internacional de Estados Unidos (DFC), “si cumplen con los requisitos, considerará apoyar la financiación de inversiones en sectores claves de la Argentina en colaboración con socios del sector privado estadounidense”.

Poco después de la publicación del anuncio, la Oficina del Presidente señaló mediante un comunicado que el acuerdo “será remitido al Congreso para su tratamiento, conforme a lo establecido por la Constitución”.

“El presidente Milei confía en que los legisladores entiendan la responsabilidad que tienen por delante para estar a la altura de esta oportunidad sin precedentes”, amplió la nota, que destacó la “excelente relación” del mandatario libertario con Trump.

El anuncio de la firma

“Acabamos de salir de la firma del acuerdo de comercio e inversión recíproco entre la Argentina y Estados Unidos. Felicitaciones a nuestro equipo y gracias al equipo del USTR por construir juntos este gran acuerdo. La Argentina será próspera“, había sido el anuncio de Quirno en su cuenta de X.

De acuerdo al preámbulo, el acuerdo busca “fortalecer la reciprocidad mediante la reducción de barreras arancelarias y no arancelarias" y “mejorar su alineamiento para abordar prácticas comerciales desleales que amenazan nuestra prosperidad“.

En la reunión con Greer en la sede del USTR, Quirno estuvo acompañado por el embajador argentino en Estados Unidos, Alec Oxenford; el secretario de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales, Luis Kreckler, jefe negociador del acuerdo; el subsecretario de Mercados Agroalimentarios, Agustín Tejeda, y el jefe de Misión Adjunto de la legación diplomática, Juan Cortelletti.

Luego, el equipo de funcionarios argentinos -muy satisfechos con el anuncio- regresó a la sede de la embajada. Quirno emprendió esta misma tarde el regreso a Buenos Aires. El canciller calificó como “un día histórico” el combo de la firma del pacto comercial con Estados Unidos y que el acuerdo Mercosur–Unión Europea (UE) haya sido enviado al Congreso. “La Argentina vuelve al mundo”, se congratuló.

Entre otros funcionarios y militantes libertarios, la publicación de Quirno fue rápidamente replicada por Milei; el ministro de Economía, Luis Caputo, y el jefe de Gabinete, Manuel Adorni, que señaló: “Otro gran día histórico”.

El acuerdo también forma parte de una gran apuesta de Trump por Milei, a quien considera un aliado estratégico trascendental de Washington en América Latina, después de que Estados Unidos le brindara a la Argentina un auxilio financiero de 20.000 millones de dólares, entre otras medidas de apoyo para apuntalar al gobierno antes de las elecciones legislativas del 26 de octubre.

El anuncio, por el que había fuertes expectativas en el Gobierno luego de varios meses de negociaciones, también supone una victoria política para Milei, quien se posicionó como uno de los líderes más cercanos de Trump en el ámbito internacional.

Durante la negociaciones hubo varios funcionarios argentinos involucrados, entre ellos de la Cancillería, del Ministerio de Economía, de la embajada argentina en Washington y del Ministerio de Desregulación y Transformación del Estado.

Aunque en un primer momento se había apostado a que la firma final del acuerdo comercial entre la Argentina y Estados Unidos fuera entre Trump y Milei, fuentes al tanto de las negociaciones consultadas por LA NACION no habían descartado que finalmente fuera otro el funcionario argentino que pusiera la rúbrica final, como finalmente ocurrió.

En los últimos días, Greer también había sido el funcionario norteamericano encargado de sellar los primeros pactos comerciales con países de la región: El Salvador, el 29 de enero, y Guatemala, un día después.

La Argentina y Estados Unidos firmaron un acuerdo comercial histórico. Ambas naciones, juntas como verdaderos socios, serán más seguras, fuertes y prósperas. MAAGA”, celebró en su cuenta de X el embajador norteamericano, Peter Lamelas.

l acuerdo involucra los aranceles mutuos -“los países abrirán sus mercados recíprocamente para productos claves”, señala- e indica que la Argentina otorgará “acceso preferencial a los mercados de exportación de bienes de ciudadanos estadounidenses, incluidos ciertos medicamentos, productos químicos, maquinaria, productos de tecnologías de la información, dispositivos médicos, vehículos automotores y una amplia gama de productos agrícolas”.

Estados Unidos, por su parte, se compromete a eliminar los aranceles recíprocos sobre “ciertos recursos naturales no disponibles y artículos no patentados para uso en aplicaciones farmacéuticas”.

El texto prevé, entre muchas otras cuestiones, ciertas flexibilizaciones en materia de acceso a mercados agrícolas e incluía un compromiso a mejorar las condiciones de acceso bilateral y recíproco a los mercados de carne. Además de vehículos, alimentos y medicamentos, el país abre su mercado al ganado bovino vivo estadounidense, productos avícolas y quesos.

Estados Unidos es el mayor país inversor extranjero directo en la Argentina. En 2024, en tanto, más de la mitad de las exportaciones argentinas a Estados Unidos, en valor, fueron combustibles y derivados (US$2284 millones, 35,3%), minerales (US$762 millones, 11,8%) y aluminio y sus manufacturas (US$529 millones, 8,2%).

Mediante el acuerdo comercial, la Argentina y Estados Unidos también se comprometieron a cooperar para facilitar la “inversión y el comercio de minerales críticos”, recursos que el gobierno de Trump ha buscado también en otros países, en el marco de su disputa geopolítica con China.

La Casa Rosada “colaborará con los gobiernos provinciales para facilitar la inversión de empresas estadounidenses en proyectos de minerales críticos”, señala el acuerdo, que busca facilitar el acceso al sector minero a las empresas estadounidenses.

Además, en este sector, la Argentina se compromete a “agilizar la tramitación de las solicitudes para proyectos elegibles a través del Régimen de Incentivos para Grandes Inversiones (RIGI)”.

El país “priorizará a Estados Unidos como socio comercial y de inversión para el cobre, el litio y otros minerales críticos, incluyendo productos en bruto, procesados ​​y terminados, por encima de las economías o empresas que manipulan el mercado", en una velada alusión a China.

En ese sentido, Quirno firmó el miércoles en Washington junto al subsecretario de Estado norteamericano, Christopher Landau, un “instrumento marco para el fortalecimiento del suministro en minería y procesamiento” de minerales críticos, cruciales para distintos sectores estratégicos.

La rúbrica se concretó en una cumbre global de minerales críticos convocada por el Departamento de Estado que lidera Marco Rubio, de la que participaron 54 países y la Comisión Europea. Además de la Argentina, otros 10 países firmaron acuerdos o memorandos de entendimiento bilaterales.

Um debate sobre a ordem mundial com proponentes das teses russas sobre as ameaças do Ocidente - Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Um debate sobre a ordem mundial com proponentes das teses russas sobre as ameaças do Ocidente

Paulo Roberto de Almeida 

Participei, nesta sexta-feira 5/02/2026, da TV GGN, a convite de seu organizador Luiz Nassif, de um debate, ou melhor de uma sessão de perguntas e respostas, sobre a ordem mundial, programa que pode ser visto neste canal: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qPZEaWfhnwg 

Suspeito que nem o Luiz Nassif, nem a sua audiência gostaram de meus argumentos, que não se casavam muito bem com certas convicções ingênuas, para não dizer completamente equivocadas, sobre a OTAN como uma ameaça à segurança da Rússia, que estaria sendo supostamente ameaçada pela Europa e pela Otan. Relembrei alguns fatos básicos da história mundial do século XX e das últimas décadas.

Existe em certos meios no Brasil essa ideia de que a “dominação ocidental” representa um perigo existencial à segurança da Rússia, daí a sua “defesa” contra a Ucrânia, pessoas que aliás desconsideram completamente os crimes de guerra e contra a humanidade que Putin e as forças russas estão perpetrando continuamente na Ucrânia, o que representa um sério desafio às concepções e posturas da diplomacia brasileira tradicional, comprometida com a Carta da ONU, os princípios mais elementares do Direito Internacional e as próprias cláusulas de relações internacionais da CF-1988.

O debate foi interrompido no meio pelo próprio Luiz Nassif, que provavelmente não apreciou meus comentários que não se alinham a um certo conjunto de teses típicas de um diplomacia partidária atualmente em vigor no governo brasileiro. Apenas recomendo às pessoas que pretendam conhecer meu pensamento e postura, que leiam alguns de meus artigos disponíveis no blog Diplomatizzando, ou no site da revista digital Será?, com a qual colaboro regularmente desde outubro de 2025. 

Vou postar uma lista desses artigos no meu blog. Estou, como sempre, aberto ao debate, com uma certa aderência a fatos, mais do que a certas concepções ideologicamente determinadas.

Paulo Roberto de Almeida

Brasilia, 6/02/2026


quinta-feira, 5 de fevereiro de 2026

210 anos do nascimento de Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, Sorocaba, SP, 1816: Homenagem do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de Sorocaba


 210 anos do nascimento de Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, Sorocaba, SP, 1816

Comemoração pelo Instituto Histórico e Geográfico de Sorocaba

Convite recebido:

Sorocaba, 04 de fevereiro de 2026

Prezados confrades, amigos e autoridades,

O IHGGS (Instituto Histórico, Geográfico e Genealógico de Sorocaba), juntamente com a Academia de História Militar Terrestre do Brasil/São Paulo e o Conselho Estadual da Ordem do Ipiranga, por intermédio do seu presidente, o Exmo. Prof° Adilson Cézar, tem a honra de convidá-los para a solenidade alusiva aos 210 anos do nascimento de Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen – Visconde de Porto Seguro, patrono da História do Brasil e natural de Sorocaba.

- Hasteamento do Pavilhão Nacional;
- Pronunciamento explicativo sobre o evento;
- Aposição Floral;
- Apresentação Musical;
- Participação da Banda Regimental do CPI-7;

LOCAL: Largo de São Bento, Centro – Sorocaba/SP
DATA: 24 de Fevereiro (terça-feira)
HORÁRIO: 09H00
TRAJE: Esporte Fino;

Contamos com a honrosa presença de Vossa Senhoria!

Atenciosamente,
Herman da Costa Oliveira
2° Secretário do IHGGS

quarta-feira, 4 de fevereiro de 2026

O que aconteceria na política externa e na diplomacia se os antiglobalistas voltassem ao poder? Paulo Roberto de Almeida e Madame IA (intermediada por Airton Dirceu Lemmertz)

 Madame IA discute, a pedido de Airton Dirceu Lemmertz, meu alerta sobre o horror que seria uma volta da tropa esquizofrênica, patética, submissa, no campo da política externa, decorrente de eventual vitória nas eleições de outubro de 2026 e sua volta ao poder em 2027, a partir das considerações que efetuei, todas altamente depreciativas, a respeito da "dipromacia" olavo-bolsonarista, e seu festival de absurdos como o antiglobalismo, a sujeição ao destruidor do multilateralismo econômico, o megalomaníaco desequilibrado, narcisista maligno, psicopata, paranoico e sádico (alguém tem outros qualificativos?), que recebeu um "I Love You" do golpista hoje preso merecidamente:

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Minha postagem original:
Pouca gente, hoje, se lembra dos despautérios que foram, no domínio da política externa, os anos do bolsonarismo diplomático. Eu divulguei quatro livros contra os amadores que destruíram a nossa política externa, nomeadamente os seguintes:
1) Miséria da diplomacia: a destruição da inteligência no Itamaraty (2019);
2) O Itamaraty num labirinto de sombras (2020);
3) Uma certa ideia do Itamaraty: a reconstrução da política externa e a restauração da diplomacia brasileira (2020);
4) O Itamaraty sequestrado: a destruição da diplomacia pelo bolsolavismo (2021).
Mas, no meio de todo aquele horror nas relações exteriores do Brasil, um colega anônimo ofereceu uma série de crônicas desabusadas, sob o pseudônimo de “Ereto da Brocha”, que eu coletei e editei num volume da série humor diplomático, digamos assim: "Memorial do Sanatório ou Ernesto e seus Dragões no País de Bolsonaro", por Ereto da Brocha, Ombudsman do Itamaraty. Convido todos a lerem essas crônicas: depois de minhas análises cáusticas conduzidas naqueles livros, nada como um pouco de diversão para aliviar as agruras daqueles anos sombrios. (PRA: Procurem no meu blog, acharão.)

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Pedido a Madame IA:

DE MODO DETALHADO E CRÍTICO, RESPONDA A SEGUINTE INDAGAÇÃO:
Se a Direita ganhar [as eleições brasileiras] em outubro [de 2026], vamos ter um retorno aos horrores que foram, na diplomacia, os anos do Capitão hoje preso por golpismo incompetente?
[PRA:] https://diplomatizzando.blogspot.com/2026/02/se-direita-ganhar-em-outubro-vamos-ter.html

Essa é uma indagação que toca no cerne do debate sobre a resiliência das instituições brasileiras. A análise do período que você tão bem documentou em suas obras — o "sequestro" do Itamaraty pelo pensamento olavista e a ruptura com a tradição do barão do Rio Branco — serve como o principal parâmetro para projetarmos o futuro.
Para responder se um eventual governo de direita em 2026 repetiria o "Memorial do Sanatório", precisamos distinguir entre a Direita Institucional e o Bolsonarismo Ideológico.
1. O Risco da Reedição: O Modelo "Antidiplomático":
Se a vitória em 2026 representar o retorno do grupo que governou entre 2019 e 2022, o risco de retorno ao isolacionismo é elevado. Os pilares desse "horror" diplomático foram:
- Ideologização Messiânica: A substituição do pragmatismo comercial e geopolítico por uma "cruzada ocidentalista" contra o multilateralismo.
- Ataque às Instituições de Carreira: O esvaziamento da inteligência do Itamaraty em favor de influenciadores e assessores paralelos.
- Alinhamento Automático e Unilateral: A abdicação da soberania decisória em favor de potências estrangeiras (especificamente a ala Trumpista dos EUA), sem reciprocidade tangível.
Nesse cenário, o Brasil voltaria a ser o "pária internacional", perdendo assentos em fóruns decisivos e comprometendo acordos comerciais vitais (como o Mercosul-UE) por questões puramente retóricas.
2. A "Direita Civilizada": Uma Alternativa de Continuidade Institucional:
Existe, contudo, uma ala da direita (composta por governadores e líderes do Legislativo) que observa a diplomacia sob um prisma liberal-pragmático. Caso esse setor prevaleça, a política externa tenderia a:
- Focar em Mercados, não em Costumes: Priorizar a OCDE e acordos bilaterais sem o componente de "guerra cultural".
- Recuperar o Profissionalismo: Devolver o protagonismo aos diplomatas de carreira para limpar a imagem do país no exterior, visando atrair investimento direto estrangeiro.
- Pragmatismo Ambiental: Entender que a pauta climática não é apenas um "complô globalista", mas uma barreira não-tarifária que o Brasil precisa superar para exportar.
3. O Fator "Aprendizado" e as Amarras Institucionais:
Dificilmente veríamos uma repetição exata dos anos de Ernesto Araújo por dois motivos críticos:
- O Custo do Erro: O agronegócio e a indústria brasileira sentiram o peso do isolamento e do conflito desnecessário com a China. Esses setores hoje exercem uma pressão muito mais organizada para evitar que "amadores" assumam o leme.
- O Judiciário e o Legislativo: Após o trauma democrático recente, os mecanismos de controle sobre a política externa e as nomeações diplomáticas tendem a ser mais rigorosos.
* Perspectiva Crítica:
O "retorno aos horrores" depende menos da vitória da direita em si e mais da natureza da coalizão que chegará ao poder. Se o vencedor for um herdeiro direto do "bolsolavismo", a diplomacia voltará a ser um teatro de sombras e crônicas satíricas. Se for uma direita de matiz conservadora-liberal clássica, o Brasil pode manter sua tradição de Estado, ainda que com uma mudança de prioridades econômicas.
O perigo reside na "vontade de destruição" que você apontou em seus livros: se o objetivo for novamente destruir a inteligência para reinar sobre as cinzas, o Itamaraty sofrerá uma nova e profunda cicatriz.

Fonte (IA Gemini):
https://www.google.com/search?q=Pouca+gente%2C+hoje%2C+se+lembra+dos+despaut%C3%A9rios+que+foram%2C+no+dom%C3%ADnio+da+pol%C3%ADtica+externa%2C+os+anos+do+bolsonarismo+diplom%C3%A1tico.+Eu+divulguei+quatro+livros+contra+os+amadores+que+destru%C3%ADram+a+nossa+pol%C3%ADtica+externa%2C+nomeadamente+os+seguintes%3A+1%29+Mis%C3%A9ria+da+diplomacia%3A+a+destrui%C3%A7%C3%A3o+da+intelig%C3%AAncia+no+Itamaraty+%282019%29%3B+2%29+O+Itamaraty+num+labirinto+de+sombras+%282020%29%3B+3%29+Uma+certa+ideia+do+Itamaraty%3A+a+reconstru%C3%A7%C3%A3o+da+pol%C3%ADtica+externa+e+a+restaura%C3%A7%C3%A3o+da+diplomacia+brasileira+%282020%29%3B+4%29+O+Itamaraty+sequestrado%3A+a+destrui%C3%A7%C3%A3o+da+diplomacia+pelo+bolsolavismo+%282021%29.+Mas%2C+no+meio+de+todo+aquele+horror+nas+rela%C3%A7%C3%B5es+exteriores+do+Brasil%2C+um+colega+an%C3%B4nimo+ofereceu+uma+s%C3%A9rie+de+cr%C3%B4nicas+desabusadas%2C+sob+o+pseud%C3%B4nimo+de+%E2%80%9CEreto+da+Brocha%E2%80%9D%2C+que+eu+coletei+e+editei+num+volume+da+s%C3%A9rie+humor+diplom%C3%A1tico%2C+digamos+assim%3A+%22Memorial+do+Sanat%C3%B3rio+ou+Ernesto+e+seus+Drag%C3%B5es+no+Pa%C3%ADs+de+Bolsonaro%22%2C+por+Ereto+da+Brocha%2C+Ombudsman+do+Itamaraty.+Convido+todos+a+lerem+essas+cr%C3%B4nicas%3A+depois+de+minhas+an%C3%A1lises+c%C3%A1usticas+conduzidas+naqueles+livros%2C+nada+como+um+pouco+de+divers%C3%A3o+para+aliviar+as+agruras+daqueles+anos+sombrios.+DE+MODO+DETALHADO+E+CR%C3%8DTICO%2C+RESPONDA+A+SEGUINTE+INDAGA%C3%87%C3%83O%3A+Se+a+Direita+ganhar+%5Bas+elei%C3%A7%C3%B5es+brasileiras%5D+em+outubro+%5Bde+2026%5D%2C+vamos+ter+um+retorno+aos+horrores+que+foram%2C+na+diplomacia%2C+os+anos+do+Capit%C3%A3o+hoje+preso+por+golpismo+incompetente%3F&rlz=1C2GCEA_enBR1094BR1098&sca_esv=f8674ab91ffef830&sxsrf=ANbL-n4emmMiUQ9ndHeTWVAV5bvW_BK5Tg%3A1770229063122&source=hp&ei=R42Dac6kBLeY5OUPmozZ8As&iflsig=AFdpzrgAAAAAaYObV_zRCfUX2FGtWEQ09o_1dHnpOFfz&aep=22&udm=50&ved=0ahUKEwiO5OaTucCSAxU3DLkGHRpGFr4QteYPCBc&oq=&gs_lp=Egdnd3Mtd2l6IgBIAFAAWABwAHgAkAEAmAEAoAEAqgEAuAEByAEAmAIAoAIAmAMAkgcAoAcAsgcAuAcAwgcAyAcAgAgA&sclient=gws-wiz&mstk=AUtExfCdHCKsto7MwIRaDdAzZm6eZpL3V9RIhvrNC3jEtWvyCjAIuSfBh1fiqN2E4AvNvwQEC_qiUzhQKy2Ex5sVUnadsFOEczNs4ILIbxkdhOJF2QlKEhVDbTIWAJRSc86xNRnkK8Wtc9-bySd4jG_ASaWGLll4BWot9_apvh3Zd-V00vx7KWzDPO0EY08ztrGiIfkTSqXm_KJXWXJAdhOc4O272ksrpHaonq_qt3ZJMdzWcJTPtY9ivRvHMZ9rqENJrtJX6tSSpn0JwOAAEyyS-UwVcnVTqYiMx3M&csuir=1&mtid=co6DaceDJb-B5OUPpdTkmA0

The Cold War: by Paulo Roberto de Almeida, in: Routledge Resources Online (2025)

 An online publication:

The Cold War: by Paulo Roberto de Almeida
in: Routledge Resources Online
Edited By: Ruud van Dijk
Published Online30 March 2025
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780367199838-1

ABSTRACT
Brazil entered its own Cold War precociously, after a Comintern attempted coup in 1935, which was the starting point of its official anti-communist state doctrine in force until the late 1970s. Having allied itself with Western powers during the Second World War, Brazil underwent an ‘americanisation’ process, most visible during the 1950s, at the height of the international Cold War, when convergence with the US diplomacy at multilateral organisations was expected. But even the military rightist regime of the 1960s and 1970s, openly anti-communist, experienced frictions with the US, mostly in commercial matters, non-proliferation, and development issues. A highly qualified diplomatic corps, together with high-ranking military, kept Brazil far away from super-power confrontations and just as an observer in the non-aligned movement. Cold War spirit was already absent at the end of the military regime (1985), as Brazilian diplomacy struggled to maintain an effective autonomy in foreign policy.

1 – An early cold warrior and an early retreat from the Cold War?
Brazil is a curious case of being a ‘cold warrior’ avant la lettre: as early as the 1930s, due to an attempted coup d’État by foreign Comintern agents in 1935 – aiming to take advantage of a domestic crisis among political forces opposing the constitutional government of Getulio Vargas – the foreign policy elite of the country devised and implemented a defensive, sometimes aggressive, stance towards the Soviet Union, with which there were to be no bilateral diplomatic relations between 1918 and 1961, except for a very brief period after the Second World War. The unacceptable Bolshevik regime was identified at its inception as a powerful enemy of the establishment – an oligarchic political system dominated by the powerful coffee planters – and served as an easy legitimation for the 1937 coup that started a dictatorship for the next eight years, called Estado Novo – the New State – modelled after the European rightist authoritarian regimes.

After the ‘official’ beginning of the Cold War in 1947, state intelligence officers – most of them high-ranking military and senior diplomats – replaced the previous collaboration with Gestapo agents in Brazil with a sympathetic allegiance to similar Western institutions, mostly military and diplomatic representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. For the duration of first half of the Cold War, up to the 1970s, Brazil maintained a swift collaboration with the main Western partners, mainly US intelligence. The Brazilian elite, both military and diplomatic officers, tried to keep its distance from the Soviet Union. They did so in order to defend Brazil’s autonomy in foreign policy, and to have the country benefit economically from cooperation with the West.

2 – In the beginning was the Comintern
Brazil became a trusted partner of the United States and of other Western powers very early in the interwar period. Having sent a modest military force to France late during the Great War, and performed some naval surveillance by means of a small task force in the South Atlantic, a Brazilian delegation participated in the Paris Peace negotiations, early in 1919, led by a distinguished jurist, Epitacio Pessoa, who was elected president while in Paris (the sole case in the country’s history). Diplomatic relations with Russia were curtailed after the Bolshevik putsch and reestablished only, and only for a brief period, at the request of the Western ‘United Nations’, just after World War II. Modernisation of the srmy was conducted by a French Mission led by General Gamelin during the 1920s.

In the meantime, governments of the ‘Old Republic’ (1889–1930) adopted a staunch anti-communist posture, which became official state policy after the communist coup attempt in 1935. The existence of the Comintern – created by Lenin in 1918 to control the new communist parties arising from ruptures of established socialist parties after the Bolshevik putsch – was the political legitimation for the quick prohibition of the Communist Party of Brazil in 1922, the very year of its foundation. The Soviet Union occupied a unique place in the political imagery of the Brazilian rural and urban elites, as a source of Moscow-directed subversion of their conservative state, to be followed by expropriation and communist slavery and debauchery.

The experience of the 1935 Communist coup attempt in Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian capital at that time, formed a strong inducement for a rightist coup by Getulio Vargas in 1937, abolishing civil liberties and establishing an authoritarian ‘New State’ modelled on the Salazarist regime in Portugal. Early in the 1930s, when President Roosevelt was testing his ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ towards the Southern hemisphere, Brazilian officials became active participants in the International Anticommunist Entente, based in Geneva (also known as Entente Internationale contre la IIIème Internationale).

Following an initial neutral stance at the beginning of the European war that started in 1939, Oswaldo Aranha, the democratic foreign minister of the dictatorship, convened an extraordinary diplomatic conference of the Western hemisphere in Rio de Janeiro, in January 1942, claiming total solidarity with the United States after Pearl Harbor. Next steps were the breaking of diplomatic relations with the three Axis countries, adherence to Lend Lease agreements, an air base for the American forces in the Northeast Brazil (a trampoline to the North Africa counteroffensive), and a decision, in 1943, to send a military expeditionary force integrated with the US Fifth Army, operating in Italy. The conference at Bretton Woods (1944) and Paris Peace conference in 1946 already found Brazil in a strict political alliance with the United States: as early as 1947, a diplomatic conference in Rio de Janeiro closed with the formal signing – by President Truman himself – of an Interamerican Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, the conceptual basis of the Washington treaty of 1949, establishing NATO, including its core principle of collective security. Almost all of the Latin American countries followed the American leadership into this pact, still in force today.

3 – The americanisation of Brazil
The postwar years corresponded to a thorough process of, in the words of Gerald Haines, ‘americanisation of Brazil’, starting with the creation of a Joint Economic Commission (under the Truman administration’s Point IV programme), the foundation of a ‘Escola Superior de Guerra’ (modelled on the National War College), and culminating, in 1953, in the signing of a Military Assistance Treaty, which was maintained until the late 1970s. Already since the inception of the United Nations, however, Brazilian representations in New York and Geneva were strictly instructed by Rio de Janeiro to closely follow American votes in all organs of the new organisation. As president of the second session of the General Assembly, former foreign minister and close friend of Washington, Oswaldo Aranha, worked closely with the Americans. In 1947, this led, among other things, to the approval of the partition plan for Palestine (the same year when strongly anti-communist President Eurico Dutra broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union). In early 1950s, at the very heart of the Cold War, a McCarthyist-like persecution sidelined progressive diplomats; they were later reintegrated by judicial revision. Despite the new democratic regime, the official doctrine of anti-communism persisted, as well as the formal prohibition of the Brazilian Communist Party, then under the guidance of the Cominform, the Soviet-led Communist Information Bureau, created in 1947 by Stalin to replace the former Comintern.

At the 1948 Bogota Conference, which transformed the Pan-American Union into the Organization of American States (OAS), Brazilian diplomats pleaded with the United States for a Marshall Plan for Latin America. In spite of Brazil’s anti-communist policies, Washington did not support the idea. In the 1950s, Brazilian diplomacy also pressed President Eisenhower to enlarge assistance programmes and governmental investments in national development programmes. An American request to send Brazilian troops to the Korean theatre of war, even under UN Security Council approval as a peacemaking mission, was respectfully declined by the same former dictator Getulio Vargas, constitutionally elected president in 1950. Since the early Cold War, the three branches of the armed forces maintained very large representations in Washington for equipment acquisition, as well as for education and training at the National Defense University and other special courses; most of the syllabi and manuals adopted at the Escola Superior de Guerra were directly translated from the materials produced by their American colleagues.

During the first three decades after the Second World War, Brazilian diplomacy, national parties, and political elites sustained the canons of the Cold War, defining Brazil as a Christian, Western country, integrated with a succession of ‘geopolitical circles’, encompassing first the Western hemisphere, then the democratic European states, and finally other Western-oriented anti-communist countries. National development policies and state-centred industrialisation became a kind of organising vector for the new nationalists of the late 1950s, with the creation of state companies for steel, oil, energy, and other components of a strong protectionist industrial import substitution process. A new attempt at a US-funded development programme for Latin American countries resulted in the creation of the Interamerican Development Bank in 1960, a practical result of the first truly multilateral Brazilian initiative, the Pan-American Operation of the progressive president Juscelino Kubitschek, also the creator of the new capital, Brasília, in the same year.

Kubitschek was the real founder of the famous Brazilian ‘Independent External Policy’, but it received a new conceptual formulation under his successor, President Janio Quadros, a bizarre populist in diplomacy, to compensate for his austere economic adjustment policies. In 1961, before renouncing his office after only six months of tenure, Quadros ordered the diplomatic recognition of Soviet Union, of other socialist regimes, and newly independent African and Asian countries. His last controversial gesture – especially provocative among the military establishment – was the award of the National Order of Southern Cross to the Argentinian-Cuban revolutionary Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. A sensible recommendation by the diplomatic staff limited Brazil’s relationship with the non-aligned movement to a status of observer. The advice anticipated perceptively that the new body would serve much more the cause of international communism than Western and American interests, to which Brazil was strongly attached.

4 – The years of the anti-communist military dictatorship
Vice-president João Goulart became president in 1961, when Quadros renounced; he was not a communist, as accused by the rightist opposition, but opened the operation of state policies and government agencies to leftist leaders and trade unionists affiliated with the Brazilian Communist Party. After its prohibition in 1922, it had been legalised in 1945, but then banned again in 1947. Notwithstanding a broad convergence with American diplomacy at the world level, Brazilian diplomats overtly opposed the US request to suspend Cuba from the OAS in 1962, using the juridical principle that nothing, not one single article, under its Charter, defined what political regime American countries should adhere to. Despite the legitimacy of the argument, Cuba was suspended, but Brazil maintained diplomatic relations with the only Soviet ally in the hemisphere. This recognition induced President John Kennedy to secretly ask Brazil to transmit a letter to Fidel Castro during the very critical days of the Soviet missile crisis in October 1962; however, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev blinked at the crucial moment of the US naval blockade before a special Brazilian envoy could deliver the American proposal. Goulart, suspected by the US government of being too soft towards the communists embedded in trade unions, was overthrown by the military coup of April 1964.

One of the first diplomatic measures of the new military government in 1964 was the severing of any relationship with Cuba, which was already supporting revolutionary movements in various Latin American countries, including urban guerrillas in some big Brazilian cities and among poor peasants in the Northeastern region. As the US favoured the rightist coup, the anti-communist stance of the military regime (1964–85) was reinforced, albeit without interrupting the diplomatic relationships established with many of those socialist countries already recognised between 1961 and 1964. The exception was China, loosely supporting a small peasant guerilla base, very far away from the coast, in the heart of the Amazon region; it was the sole Maoist revolutionary experiment in Brazil, the other being of Cuban inspiration, but it existed in the cities rather than in forests or mountains; at that juncture, many radical student opposition groups engaged in urban guerrilla movements, but were easily dismantled by the repressive apparatus of the regime. For its part, the Brazilian Communist Party, still operating underground, recommended, to its followers, peaceful resistance against the military regime, in alliance with the ‘national Bourgeoisie’ and other democratic forces.

Disentangling Brazil from the Cold War spirit
In 1974, one of the most repressive presidents of the military regime, Ernesto Geisel (1974–79), decided to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China, cutting off a long-standing relationship with Taiwan. Ironically, in this way he exposed himself to the threat of an extreme-rightist revolt from within the military.

Nonetheless, he also approved an ambitious nuclear cooperation agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, supposedly for energy purposes, thus circumventing the American opposition towards nuclear proliferation in Brazil. Brazil refused to sign the NPT until 1996. Nonetheless, even during the dictatorship of the generals, Brazilian diplomacy always had a preference for multilateral legitimacy; it was against unilateral decisions by the great powers. Before accepting to lead a ‘pacification mission’ in the Dominican Republic, in 1965, the first president of the regime, General Humberto Castelo Branco, required from the OAS the approval of a multilateral resolution creating a ‘Interamerican Peace Force’. The general also refused the ‘invitation’ by President Lyndon Johnson to send troops or give support to American military intervention in the Vietnam war, given the absence of a UN Security Council decision.

Thus, at the height of the Cold War, Brazil’s civil and military regimes always aligned the country within the Western camp, but more in a theoretical fashion than in the practical domain, adopting a cautious diplomatic approach, so as not to be involved in the struggles of the great powers on other continents. Notwithstanding this search for diplomatic autonomy, during the 1960s and 1970s, with the spread of urban and rural guerilla groups in South America, both the military and diplomats intervened against leftist governments or movements in close proximity to Brazil, cooperating in a limited manner with the anti-leftist Condor operation conducted by the extreme right governments in the region. Brazil approved and took part in the Kissinger initiative to undermine Salvador Allende of Chile in 1973. At the same time, though, it refused to join Argentina’s dictators and the Apartheid regime of South Africa to create an explicitly anti-communist South Atlantic Organization Treaty. In 1975, general Geisel recognised the pro-Soviet, Cuban-supported MPLA government in Angola, against the pro-Chinese and American-supported guerilla movements and South African troops.

The end of the Cold War was contemporaneous with the end of the military regime in Brazil, in 1985; the new civil government reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba, and both Communist parties, the pro-Soviet (PCB) and its pro-China variant (PCdoB, founded in 1962), were recognised as legal entities in a democratised country. Overall, Brazil was somewhat marginal in the great struggles during the whole Cold War period, mostly due to the consistent commitment of its professional diplomacy with multilateral decision-making processes and a true respect for international law and the UN Charter. Brazil’s real Cold War – that is, an official state policy of anti-communism directed against Soviet Union – was much more effective during the Estado Novo dictatorship (1937–45), than at the height at the Cold War at the 1950s and 1960s, and perhaps much more in force than during the military dictatorship from the 1960s and 1970s, despite still preserving its anti-communist doctrine.

References and further reading
Betthell, Leslie and IanRoxborough, eds. Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War: Crisis and Containment, 1944–1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Chilcote, Ronald H.The Brazilian Communist Party: Conflict and Integration 1922–1972. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Dulles, John W. F.Brazilian Communism, 1935–1945: Repression during World Upheaval. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983.

Dulles, John W. F.Anarchists and Communists in Brazil, 1900–1935. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973.

Haines, Gerald K.The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945–1954. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.

Hershberg, James. The United States, Brazil, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Parts 1 and 2). Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 2 and no. 3 (2004): 3–20 and 5–67.

Hilton, Stanley E.Brazil and the Soviet Challenge, 1917–1947. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991.

Patti, Carlo. Brazil in the Global Nuclear Order, 1945–2018. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2021.

Sarzynski, Sarah. Revolution in the Terra do Sol: The Cold War in Brazil. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018.

Links to online primary documents
The Wilson Center Digital Archive (under the Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) and the National Security Archive, of the George Washington University, both have collections of documents on Brazil, pertaining to the Cold War period: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org and https://nsarchive.gwu.edu.

The series Foreign Relations of the United States has many volumes with material relevant for this entry: is there a particular volume, or document(s), we can list here for users as guidance for possible further research: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments.

Ricardo Seitenfus: Écrits à contre-courant au fil du temps: Haïti, 2007-2025 (Port-au-Prince: C3 Éditions, 2026)

Novo livro de Ricardo Seitenfus:

Écrits à contre-courant au fil du temps: Haïti, 2007-2025
(Port-au-Prince: C3 Éditions, 2026)

Présentation
Table de matières
1. Le maintien de la paix et les leçons haïtiennes : effondrement
ou reconstruction de l’État ?
2. Le Brésil au chevet d’Haïti
3. Haïti est la preuve de l’échec de l’aide internationale
4. Le représentant de l’OEA rappelé au Brésil – Le Nouvelliste
5. Une vérité qui ne plait pas à l’OEA – Haiti Libre
6. Réactions des lecteurs
7. La bataille contre le choléra – Fidel Castro
8. Fidel Castro soutient l’ex-représentant spécial de l’OEA en
Haïti remercié – Fidel Castro
9. Un diplomate brésilien en Haïti a-t-il été renvoyé pour avoir
critiqué l’ONU et les ONG ? – Georgianne Nienaber
10. Le représentant de l’OEA dénonce l’impérialisme – Haiti
Liberté
11. Une denrée rare : un diplomate honnete sera licencié pour
avoir critiqué, l’ONU, l’OEA et les ONGs en Haïti – Fabrícia
Peixoto
12. Une sorte de cannibalisme politique
13. La critique d’un initié sur ce qui s’est passé en Haïti –
Gabriel Elizondo
14. Les raisons de mon départ inopiné d’Haïti
15. Une autre star du Tea Party – Fidel Castro
16. Un diplomate de l’OEA s’insurge – Roger Annis
17. Ricardo Seitenfus décoré par René Préval – Roberson
Alphonse
18. La verité qui dérange en Haiti – Jonathan Katz
19. L'OEA « again » ! – Roberson Alphonse
20. Haïti: du péché originel à l’intervention électorale
21. René Préval, le florentin des Caraïbes
22. Edmond Mulet, le proconsul
23. Quo vadis Haïti?
24. Préface au livre «L’échec de l’aide internationale à Haïti
: dilemmes et égarements » – Robert Fatton Jr.
25. Postface au même livre – Cary Hector
26. Missions d’observation électorale et ingérence étrangère
en Haïti – Mark Phillips
27. « Quand on est mal intronisé, il faut s’assurer de bien
partir », conseille Ricardo Seitenfus à Michel Martelly
28. Hillary Clinton et le coup d'État électoral en Haïti
29. Coups de massue contre l’empire Clinton en Haïti –
Roberson Alphonse
30. Le nœud gordien d’une crise sans fin
31. Haïti - Pacte pour les Libertés et les Garanties
Démocratiques
32. Préval mort, vive le Prévalisme
33. L’ONU récidivera-t-elle?
34. Ricardo Seitenfus signe son retour avec un ouvrage sur
l’épidémie du choléra en Haïti – Patrick Saint-Pré
35. Préface au livre « Les Nations Unies et le choléra en
Haïti: coupables, mais non responsables? » – Jean Hugues
Henrys
36. Le procès est fait (Préface au même livre) – Mario
Joseph
37. Espoir (Postface au même livre) – Brian Concannon
38. Choléra : Ricardo Seitenfus éclabousse les Nations unies
avec son nouveau livre – Patrick Saint-Pré
39. L’énigme haïtienne
40. Crise politique : Ricardo Seitenfus pour un dialogue
inter-haïtien afin d’éviter le spectre d’une nouvelle
intervention militaire – Le Nouvelliste
41. L’opposition déloyale – Frantz Duval
42. Pourquoi la CIRH a échoué?
43. Les rendez-vous manqués de l’Histoire: les relations
entre Haïti et l'Amérique latine
44. Les dés sont jetés
45. A double tranchant
46. Débat constitutionnel
47. Bourreau ou bon samaritain ?
48. Transition et démocratie : un couple infernal
49. Adieu Igor Kipman, véritable ami d’Haïti
50. L’Histoire en 2004
51. Où est-il l’Adolfo Suárez haïtien ?
52. 4.235 jours perdus
53. Les quatre issues
54. Le peignoir de l’Ambassadrice
55. Le chemin de croix électoral
56. La sémantique de l’exclusion
57. Haïtianité versus haïtianite
58. Renvoi d’ascenseur ?
59. À l’horizon point de salut
60. Le trop plein
61. La crise haïtienne : une lecture
62. Honneur et respect au diplomate João Clemente Baena
Soares
63. C’est la croix et la bannière ?
64. Préface au livre « Aristide et la France » d’Alexandra
Breaud
65. Le réveil de Mussolini
66. MINUSTAH, le retour ?
67. Lavalas et le désamour de Lula
68. Pour la survie d’Haïti
69. L’étreinte du noyé
70. La feuille de route de l'OEA, une nouvelle planche de
salut ?
71. Pour comprendre le droit de veto
72. Qualification d’Haïti pour la Coupe du monde 2026 : le
regard de l’ami étranger
Conclusion

Présentation
Les pages qui vont suivre sont marquées par maintes caractéristiques. D’abord, il s’agit d’écrits autour d’un seul sujet ; Haïti, ses multiples défis et propositions pour les relever. Ils ont été publiés au long de dernières 18 années (2007-2025) et la plupart peu accessibles.
On y trouve des articles scientifiques adressés aux collègues académiques ainsi que les textes de vulgarisation afin de rendre compréhensible au non-spécialiste des connaissances scientifiques et techniques. Il est a remarquer car remarquable, que la majorité des articles de presse publiés en Haïti, spécialement dans Le Nouvelliste, et aussi dans la presse internationale, subissent le sceau du silence, une sorte de boycott, pratiqué par les destinataires, notamment l’Organisation des Nations unies.
Adressée aux Ambassades et aux responsables du système onusien, les services de l’ONU en Haïti publient au quotidien une revue de presse, laquelle, de façon systématique et récurrente, écarte mes publications. Quand bien meme elles touchent le coeur de leurs préoccupations et activités en Haïti. Il faut croire que pour etre immune aux critiques et suggestions, la toute puissante ONU en Haïti n’a qu’une seule arme: réduire au silence les émisseurs.
Or, je ne suis point un acteur politique ou quelqu’un muni d’un double agenda. Non. Je ne suis qu’un universitaire ayant eut une expérience au sein d’une organisation internationale, en l’occurrence l’OEA. Par ailleurs, je suis spécialiste dans l’étude des organisations internationales et une de mes publications sur le sujet connait un grand succès étant a sa septième édition.
Par conséquent, fonctionnaires internationaux, ambassadeurs, chargés d’affaires, diplomates de tout poil et de tout genre, professionnels des ONGs, vous etes tous les destinataires privilegiés. Ce livre vous est destiné tout autant que pour les Haitiens.
A part mes articles, on trouve également les répercussions de mes écrits et de mes positions publiques, sous la plume soit des journalistes, haitiens et étrangers, soit des spécialistes. Leurs auteurs sont clairement identifiés ainsi que leur publication. Tandis que tous les textes dépourvus de nom d’auteur a la suite du titre, ont été rédigés par moi. Il y a également des interviews accordés a des journalistes haitiens et étrangers. Enfin, des textes inédits composes pour cette publication, notamment
le texte numéro 14 (Les raisons de mon départ inopiné d’Haïti).
Tout n’étant pas un livre de mémoires, sa ligne du temps, sa chronologie, l’actualité des sujets élus et mes rapports directs avec eux, font que l’exercice recèle certains aspects des mémoires ou, tout au moins, de réddition de comptes.
Par évidence, l’ensemble de ces textes est complémentaire aux trois livres que j’ai publié en Haïti, deux étant consacrés a celle que je considère ma deuxieme patrie.
Il y a une nette coupure entre les trois premiers textes et les suivants. Cela est du a mon devoir de réserve en raison de mes responsabilités fonctionnelles, comme envoyé en Haïti du Président Lula (2004-2008) et de représentant de José Miguel Insulza, Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des États Américains (2009-2011). Tout en étant critiques et constructifs, les autres écrits sont empreints d’une totale liberté d’écriture et du respect intransigeant des canons méthodologiques qui soutienent la recherche scientifique (observations, expériences, raisonnements et calculs théoriques).
D’une certaine façon ce chapelet de textes, au-dela de procéder a un décorticage d’Haiti et de ses rapports avec le monde, est également le récit d’un vécu et témoignage des transformations subies par l’auteur au long de son apprentissage.

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