O que é este blog?

Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;

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quinta-feira, 27 de junho de 2019

Gulag: invenção de Stalin; o escravagismo moderno - revista L'Histoire

Les mondes du Goulag


Mis en place par Staline en 1929, ce fut le plus important et le plus long système de travail forcé du XXe siècle. En vingt-cinq ans, 25 millions de Soviétiques passent par le Goulag.
Que doit-il à l’héritage des tsars ? Dans quelle mesure a-t-il inspiré les nazis ou la sinistre laogai chinoise ? Et pourquoi fut-il si difficile d’en prendre la mesure ?
C’est avec L’Archipel du Goulag de Soljenitsyne (1974) qu’il a pris réalité. Aujourd’hui, le travail des historiens s’appuie sur des archives, la patiente collecte de documents de l’association Memorial, l’archéologie des charniers. Une découverte qui est aussi un enjeu de mémoire pour la Russie de Poutine

Em tempo: recomendo a leitura de Gulag, de Anne Applebaum.

Social justice in the Treaty of Versailles: a very brief history - Ingo Venzke (Social Europe)

Social justice in the Treaty of Versailles: a very brief history

The centenary of the Treaty of Versailles should remind us how closely it connected the fragile promise of peace to the quest for social justice. 
Treaty of Versailles
Ingo Venzke
The Treaty of Versailles, which settled the scores after World War I, also set up the International Labour Organization (ILO) to work towards social justice. The treaty asserted that ‘universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice’. In the background was the Russian revolution of 1917—it was out of fear of communism that the ILO emerged.
After the industrial revolution, transnational labour movements leaned towards strong forms of socialism, stoked fears of communist revolution and paved the way for the ILO. They placed emphasis on the power relations between labour and capital, and the inequitable distribution of gains between them.
For them, the ILO was the bearer of the hope that their broad demands of social justice would be met in practice. In a truly innovative and still unique fashion, the ILO then included the representatives of workers in its tripartite structure, next to the representatives from government and employers.
In substantive terms, however, the ILO bracketed many of the more radical questions about how to organise the economy. The idea of social justice gradually shrank and the injustice of forms of domination and exploitation—let alone their transformation—fell from view.
Today, the ILO’s public-relations tag continues to reflect this reductive understanding when it translates the advancement of social justice into the promotion of decent work. Instead of the distribution of gains remaining central, the focus has been on the minimal protection of workers in an increasingly globalised economy which favours the haves over the have-nots.
True, there has been increasing attention to high levels of inequality. And the idea of social justice is regaining its broader punch—directed at privilege rather than poverty and at power rather than protection. But a sense of why the Treaty of Versailles tied universal and lasting peace to social justice is nowhere to be found. Tracing that sense over time might mitigate the risk that history repeats itself.

Nagging reminder

The spectre of communism was still haunting Europe after World War I. The ILO’s preamble claimed that ‘conditions of labour exist, involving such injustice, hardship and privation to a large number of people so as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world is imperilled’. Like other peace treaties, Versailles longed for the quiet prior to the war. But Soviet Russia was a nagging reminder that communism had cast its spell.

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The link between peace and social justice gradually widened beyond a fixation with communism towards inter-state relations and rising fascism. John Maynard Keynes already argued in his The Economic Consequences of the Peace, published in 1919, that the economic subjugation of Germany would ‘sow the decay of the whole civilised life of Europe’. It was ever more apparent that social injustice within and across countries provided a formidable breeding ground for fascism.
Towards the end of World War II, allied policy once more aimed at shielding western Europe from Soviet influence, through economic reconstruction and a military bloc. But that is only part of the story. The vivid memory of economic crises in the 1920s and 30s, and the political opportunity these provided for fascism in Europe as well as in Asia, pushed social justice to the centre of attention, for a moment even past military security.
It is part of the forgotten foundations of the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) that they originally had a mandate to work towards economic justice in inter-state relations. The so-called World Trade Charter once again closely linked peace and social justice—now with communism and fascism in mind.
Fifty-three out of the 56 states at the time signed the charter on the closing day of the UN Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, Cuba. The charter would have set up the International Trade Organization (ITO), whose first article recognised that the creation of ‘conditions of stability and well-being … are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations’.
It not only aimed at fair labour standards but also at more equitable economic relations generally, for instance through the regulation of primary commodities and industry development. Against expectations, the ITO never came into existence to keep these ideas alive.

Rather marginalised

The ILO was rather marginalised in that context. Part of its programme had been absorbed by the still-born ITO. The ILO still helped however to enshrine the aim of ‘promot[ing] social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom’ as one of the leading ends of the United Nations. It affirmed its role with its 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia.
Yet, while much praised as a counter-current to what Alain Supiot calls the ‘total market’, the declaration actually showed great ambivalence: it affirmed that ‘labour is not a commodity’ and, at the same time, promoted higher levels production as well as consumption through greater volumes of trade. While it harboured fickle hopes for an equitable way of organising the economy, it foreshadowed a further reduction of what social justice would come to mean.
Developments in the 1970s shaped the beliefs still prevalent today: the contribution of trade to peace was reduced to growth through efficiency gains, and to the intertwining of countries in a global division of labour. A concern for the relationship between labour and capital—and the distribution of power between them—was overtaken by a preoccupation with growth through globalisation.
In that context, the ILO continued to focus its work on worker protection and technical assistance, in a now largely decolonised world. In fact, it spearheaded the move towards an emphasis on basic needs, which was subsequently adopted by other institutions (notably the World Bank) and by human-rights discourses more generally.
This was in sync with an essentially neoliberal outlook: human rights in general, and worker rights in particular, were scaled down to minimal protection. That focus has allowed the injustice of relations within and across societies to be sidelined entirely. The reasons why somebody is poor or needs protection fell from view.
Loaded with symbolism, in 1975 the ILO left its premises on the lake of Geneva to the secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which developed into the World Trade Organization in 1995). The building which once proclaimed that labour is not a commodity now houses the organisation that facilitates global production around the commodity of labour. The spirit of social justice has been left wandering in some despair.

Compelling reminders

The centenary of the Treaty of Versailles should not only evoke images of World War I. It should also prompt us to recover and reconsider venerable beliefs about the link between peace and social justice. The ILO disappointed the hopes of the labour movements at the time—that it would strengthen the position of labour in relation to capital. The organisation’s tripartite structure and its very existence nevertheless still serve as compelling reminders of the widespread conviction that universal and lasting peace is only available if it is based on social justice.
That belief came to the fore even more prominently in the institutional designs of the period after World War II. Postwar plans were shaped by the experience of fascism, adjacent to the continuing fear of communism. But concerns for social justice were again sidelined by arresting military, potentially nuclear, confrontation and then by the neoliberal fixation on efficiency gains in globalised production.
Today, the implosive potential of inequality again captures attention and pushes old questions back on the agenda. Tracing how the Treaty of Versailles linked peace to social justice may allow a recognition that what used to be known should not have to be learned anew.
Ingo Venzke is professor of international law and social justice at the University of Amsterdam and director of the Amsterdam Center for International Law.

Authoritarians Fool the World, But for How Long? - David Dapice (Yale GLobal)

Yale Global, New Haven – 27.6.2019
Authoritarians Fool the World, But for How Long?
The G20 must take bold stands on inequality, climate change and human rights – or risk encouraging authoritarianism
David Dapice

A number of trends contributed to two world wars during the last century: protectionism, delusions about national capabilities, isolationist tendencies on the part of some and expansionism from others, scapegoating ethnic groups, rejection of critical thinking and demonization of the opposition. Similar trends gather strength today as strongmen exploit resentment and fear, promising quick and cruel fixes rather than tackling root causes of real problems. The outlook is bleak for a world with a growing population if world leaders do not push back at authoritarians who emphasize divisions while failing to cooperate on trade, migration, climate change and other global challenges. “Conceivably, authoritarian leaders can cooperate with one another, but this will be an uneasy alliance,” explains economist David Dapice. “Hardliners need enemies and are not reliable allies.” So far, the authoritarians struggle to cow education, legal and media systems and a youthful opposition deeply worried about their future. Dapice concludes that the current down cycle could sow the seeds for a cycle of progressive activism. – YaleGlobal

Medford - “Things fall apart. The center cannot hold. Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.” These lines, written in 1919 after the upheaval and carnage of World War I, still apply to many parts of the world today.
The United States, the leader of the post-World War II order, elected a president who is in a competition with Baghdad Bob, the famously delusional spokesperson for Saddam Hussein during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  Donald Trump seems intent on destroying trade agreements and alliances with friends while praising dictators with blood on their hands. And polls suggest he has 40 to 45 percent support from voters while Republican senators dare not oppose policies antithetical to their professed ideology and contrary to the interests of their constituents. The United Kingdom, once a builder of a globe-spanning empire, is undecided on whether or how to sever ties with Europe – ignoring the cries of firms that make plans to relocate and drain the country of future tax revenues. India overwhelmingly reelected a Hindu nationalist whose leadership resulted in economic backsliding. Under his leadership as minister, hundreds of Muslims were killed in Gujarat, and as prime minister, Narendra Modi largely remained silent when innocent Muslims were lynched. China has a supreme leader who tries to fit a dynamic and complex society into a 1960s Maoist mold that had proven disastrous. In doing so, he has made many enemies at home and abroad, likely contributing to the collapse of an integrated global economy that had lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty.
Does Xi Jinping really think that China could lead the world without giving citizens access to information with an ever-tighter great firewall? Can he believe that putting Communist Party cells in private firms increases innovation? Will Trump succeed in making America “great again” by raising walls against immigration?
Creating divisions and building walls is a theme that unites these rulers.
We have entered a post-factual world in which reality is at best a footnote. Voters support symbols who speak to their fears, not to the reality of their problems. Even Denmark, among the most egalitarian and happiest places on earth, has seen rising support for a right-wing anti-immigrant party at a time when immigration has averaged only 20,000 a year since 2010 among a population of 5.8 million. Places with more stresses like central Europe, Turkey or Egypt have turned to “elected” authoritarians who suppress the press and opposition parties and demonize minorities while corruption rises. Leaders like Germany’s Angela Merkel, a liberal internationalist who said she does not like walls is on her way out. France’s Emmanuel Macron is unpopular, and the anti-immigrant National Rally Party of Marine Le Pen took a third of contested seats in the recent European Parliament elections. No wonder the G20 meetings at which these leaders assemble accomplish so little.
If these trends continue without effective pushback, the expectations are bleak. There will be more controls on migration. But if migrants manage to enter target countries, they will form a marginalized underclass, competing for jobs with native-born workers, many less educated. Climate change, already a driving force for migration at the US-Mexico border, could displace millions more in the next decade. There could be immense pressure to stop people fleeing their destroyed or declining livelihoods, especially if they cross borders. This could go in several directions, from militarized efforts to seal borders with “big beautiful” walls, as suggested by Trump, to more constructive attempts such as giving potential migrants secure choices closer to home.
There will also be more tariffs and higher costs. Prices of goods will increase, and people will have fewer children if they anticipate economic difficulty. The US tariffs in 2018 have cost the average family $419, according to the Federal Reserve, and the 2019 tariffs could cost double that. Lower birthrates and an aging society require more migration. Otherwise, costs in the construction, health care and food processing industries climb – a dilemma for those who dislike foreigners but need them.
The foreign policy implications of an authoritarian world in which each nation strives for narrow advantages and fails to coordinate actions on trade, migration, climate change and other cross-border concerns are not promising. With young people becoming more politically active, their “green” positions may check politicians who try to argue that the “burden” of adjustment should not fall on their nation. Since many localities and major companies already confront climate-related issues, there may even be reason for optimism that cooperation on curtailing fossil fuels will be realized – though probably not fast enough to prevent substantial deterioration of the climate. Still, the advance of cheaper renewable technologies, energy storage and the electrification of vehicles will help immensely. Conceivably, authoritarian leaders can cooperate with one another, but this will be an uneasy alliance. Hardliners need enemies and are not reliable allies.
The outlook for trade is harder to predict. Agriculture remains a politically potent force even though the share of full-time farmers is falling and is already low in most rich countries, usually registering in the low single digits. If farming became less export-oriented, it could evolve into something more like factory farms for many crops, grown closer to final markets. Climate change could also lead to more controlled growing environments. Trump’s tariff policies have trashed foreign markets for US farmers, perhaps leading to long-term displacement as nations retaliate and switch to other sources. Yet his political support holds. If senators from farm states like Iowa, Nebraska and Texas reflected the interests of their constituents, waging trade wars would be more difficult. Temporary fixes such as price supports only lead to larger surpluses, budget deficits and more anger directed against government.
Meanwhile, increasing use of smart robots and lower-cost 3D manufacturing may make clothing and shoe production or electronics assembly more economical, returning such factory work to where the purchasing power is.  If so, this will displace millions of workers in the developing world – again spurring migration – but also lower the volume of trade. Perhaps the world will devolve into trading blocs – the EU and North America are obvious examples, but China and India could form their own regions, too. Some regional groupings, such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations have not managed to increase their intra-group trade shares. How these groups manage relations with the various blocs will determine how open the world system remains. But trade and investment also create rules. A fractured set of rules would make trade more costly and difficult – less than anarchy, but much worse than what had been negotiated over a half century.
Then there is the possibility that the embrace of authoritarian leaders is more a passing fever than chronic condition. “You can fool all of the people some of the time and some of the people all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time,” former US President Abraham Lincoln purportedly observed.  Younger people accustomed to diversity will become more dominant, many rejecting the populists and parties who claim to defend against minorities. Healthy societies and economies respond to stimuli and change. This down cycle may sow the seeds for the next upcycle – at least if the world learns how to deal with fake news and those who use it for cynical reasons and personal gain.

David Dapice is the economist of the Vietnam and Myanmar Program at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.  

Theory Talks: exposições sobre Relações Internacionais


Theory Talks


Theory Talks is an interactive forum for discussion of debates in International Relations with an emphasis of the underlying theoretical issues. By frequently inviting cutting-edge specialists in the field to elucidate their work and to explain current developments both in IR theory and real-world politics, Theory Talks aims to offer both scholars and students a comprehensive view of the field and its most important protagonists.


We invite you to react and leave any kind of comment, question or suggestion – the invitees frequently respond to comments and welcome any contribution to ongoing debate. Learn how you can participate on the page ‘You Talk!’.



 
Theory Talk #2: Martin Shaw - War & World State
 
Theory Talk #4: John Agnew - Power & Geopolitics
 
Theory Talk #6: Klaus Dodds - Visual Geopolitics & South Pole
 
Theory Talk #8: Arend Lijphart - Democracy & Power Sharing
 
Theory Talk #10: Timothy Shaw - BRICs & Global South
 
Theory Talk #12: Robert Jervis - Realism & Bush Administration
 
Theory Talk #14: Geoffrey Underhill - State-Market Condominium & Adam Smith

Theory Talk #16: Robert Hayden - Constitutional Anthropology & Balkans
 
Theory Talk #18: James Fearon - Ethnicity & Security Council

Theory Talk #19: Fredrik Söderbaum - NRA & Africa
 
Theory Talk #21: Stephen Krasner - Sovereignty & Failed States
 
Theory Talk #23: Kees van der Pijl - Empires & Left-Wing
 
Theory Talk #25: Antonio Marquina - Energy & Security
 
Theory Talk #27: Christian Reus-Smit - Re-thinking IR & Cultures
 
Theory Talk #29: Peter Singer - Private Soldiers & Robots

Theory Talk #31: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita - Game Theory & Fear
 
Theory Talk #32: Miriam Elman - Lakatos & Progress
 
Theory Talk #34: James Ferguson - Foucault & Lesotho

Theory Talk #36: Michael Shapiro - Pictures & Political Philosophy

Theory Talk #38: James Scott - Agriculture & Resistance

Theory Talk #40: Kenneth Waltz - Economic Theory & International Politics

Theory Talk #42: Amitav Acharya - ASEAN & Bhagavad Gita

Theory Talk #44: Patrick Jackson - IR & Philosophy of Science
 
Theory Talk #46: David Lake - International Hierarchy & Open Economy Politics

Theory Talk #48: Cynthia Enloe - Militarization & Bananas

Theory Talk #50: Beate Jahn - Classical Theory & the State of Nature

Theory Talk #52: Iver Neumann - Practices & Diplomacy

Theory Talk #53: Ned Lebow - Self-Esteem & Foxes
 
Theory Talk #55: Mary King - Arab Awakening & Nonviolence

Theory Talk #56: Keith Hart - Informal Economy & Nollywood
 
Theory Talk #58: Daniel Levine - Vocation & Critique

Theory Talk #59: Timothy Mitchell - Technopolitics & Oil
 
Theory Talk #62: Karen Litfin - Ecovillages & Gaia Theory
 
Theory Talk #64: Gabrielle Hecht - Postcolonial Technopolitics & Nuclearity
 
Theory Talk #65: Jordan Branch - Cartography & State Formation
 
Theory Talk #67: Dirk Messner - Science, Technology & Global Change

Theory Talk #69: Eyal Weizman - Architecture & Forensics

Theory Talk #71: John Hobson - Eurocentrism & Historical Sociology
 
Theory Talk #73: Kimberly Hutchings - Quiet & Critique




 
Theory Talk #1: Michael Doyle - Markets & Institutions

Theory Talk #3: Alexander Wendt - Social Constructivism & UFO's

Theory Talk #5: Timothy Sinclair - Social Forces & Transnational Corporations
 
Theory Talk #7: Joseph Nye - Soft Power & The US
 
Theory Talk #9: Robert Keohane - Institutions & Innovation
 
Theory Talk #11: Peter Haas - Environment & Governance
 
Theory Talk #13: Immanuel Wallerstein - World-System & Capitalism
 
Theory Talk #15: Peter Katzenstein - Anti-Americanism & Analytical Eclecticism
 
Theory Talk #17: Jerry Cohen - Currency Wars & Systemic Change
 
Theory Talk #20: David Harvey - Marxism & Urbanization
 
Theory Talk #22: Kevin Dunn - Identity & Africa
 
Theory Talk #24: Robert Bates - Coffee & Small-N
 
Theory Talk #26: Jennifer Mitzen - Ontological Security & Addictive Wars
 
Theory Talk #28: Marysia Zalewski - Gender & War
 
Theory Talk #30: Mary Kaldor - Old & New Wars
 
Theory Talk #33: Stephen Walt - Israel Lobby & Obama
 
Theory Talk #35: Barry Buzan - Security & International Society

Theory Talk #37: Robert Cox - World Order & Historical Change

Theory Talk #39: Abrahamsen & Williams - Private Security & Global Assemblages
 
Theory Talk #41: Mark Duffield - Liberal aid & Fortified Compounds

Theory Talk #43: Saskia Sassen - Sociology & Global Cities

Theory Talk #45: Qin Yaqing - Chinese IR & International Balance

Theory Talk #47: Jean-François Bayart - Historicity & State Formation

Theory Talk #49: John Mearsheimer - Structural Realism & Disciplining the US

Theory Talk #51: Yan Xuetong - China & Harmony
 
Theory Talk #54: Ann Tickner - Feminism & Critical Theory

Theory Talk #57: Siba Grovogui - Theory & Theology

Theory Talk #60: Daniel Deudney - Mixed Ontology & Republican Greenpeace
 
Theory Talk #61: Pinar Bilgin - Civilization & Monsters
 
Theory Talk #63: Siddarth Mallavarapu - Multiple Voices & India
 
Theory Talk #66: Alexander Dugin - Eurasianism & Multipolarity
 
Theory Talk #68: Loet Leydesdorff - Triple Helix & Innovation
 
Theory Talk #70: Nicholas Onuf - Social Constructivism & Turns

Theory Talk #72: Robert Wade - World Bank & Zombie Ideas

Theory Talk #74: Bertrand Badie - Power & Suffering