Temas de relações internacionais, de política externa e de diplomacia brasileira, com ênfase em políticas econômicas, em viagens, livros e cultura em geral. Um quilombo de resistência intelectual em defesa da racionalidade, da inteligência e das liberdades democráticas.
O que é este blog?
Este blog trata basicamente de ideias, se possível inteligentes, para pessoas inteligentes. Ele também se ocupa de ideias aplicadas à política, em especial à política econômica. Ele constitui uma tentativa de manter um pensamento crítico e independente sobre livros, sobre questões culturais em geral, focando numa discussão bem informada sobre temas de relações internacionais e de política externa do Brasil. Para meus livros e ensaios ver o website: www.pralmeida.org. Para a maior parte de meus textos, ver minha página na plataforma Academia.edu, link: https://itamaraty.academia.edu/PauloRobertodeAlmeida;
O que é ficha catalográfica e por que ela é importante?
Se você está interessado em publicar um livro, com certeza já ouviu falar no termoficha catalográfica. Mas afinal, você sabe o que é uma ficha catalográfica? Todos os livros publicados no Brasil possuem ficha catalográfica que é considerada uma parte muito importante em uma publicação. Nesse artigo, iremos te ajudar a entender a sua origem, seu objetivo e quais são as informações que compõem uma ficha catalográfica.
De onde surgiu a ficha catalográfica?
A ficha catalográfica surgiu nas bibliotecas como um documento que ajuda a identificar, catalogar e localizar um livro dentro de um acervo. Inicialmente, feita em um papel resistente, a ficha contém as principais informações sobre um livro como o seu título, nome dos autores, número da edição, local de publicação, data da publicação, dentre outras. Todas as fichas catalográficas possuem um número de identificação único.
Ficha catalográfica de uma biblioteca – Origem
Atualmente, a ficha catalográfica é também uma parte integrante do livro. Obrigatória pelaLei nº. 10.753/2003, seja na publicação de um livro impresso ou digital, a ficha catalográfica é inserida sempre nas primeiras páginas do miolo do livro, comumente na pág 4. O documento é geralmente feito por uma bibliotecária ou pela Câmara Brasileira do Livro que presta este serviço para autores e editoras.
Exemplo de ficha catalográfica de um livro da Paco Editorial
Quais são as informações que compõem a ficha catalográfica? Nos livros impressos, a ficha catalográfica contém as seguintes informações:
Título e Subtítulo da Obra
Nome do autor
ISBN
Assuntos
Número da Edição
Editora
Local de Publicação
Número de Páginas
Classificação por assunto.(CDD e CDU)
Já no livro digital, além das informações acima, é necessário acrescentar:
Formato
Recurso Digital
Requisição do sistema
Modo de acesso
Qual a importância da ficha catalográfica? Além de padronizar a catalogação do livro em âmbito nacional, a ficha catalográfica facilita a busca de informações sobre o livro e o seu controle em bibliotecas e livrarias.
Uma nova postagem, atrasada, do dia 21, e diretamente publicitária, mas ainda assim válida, para homenagear o grande escritor brasileiro universal.
Hoje é Dia do Machado!
Joaquim Maria Machado de Assisnasceu em 21 de junho de 1839, no Morro do Livramento, nos arredores do centro do Rio de Janeiro. Seu pai, Francisco José de Assis, era neto de escravos alforriados; sua mãe, Maria Leopoldina Machado, era açoriana. Ainda criança, perdeu a mãe e uma irmã, e, em 1851, o pai. Muito cedo mostrou inclinação para as letras.
Começou a publicar poesia aos quinze anos, na Marmota Fluminense, e no ano seguinte entrou para a Imprensa Nacional, como aprendiz de tipógrafo. Aí conheceu Manuel Antônio de Almeida e mais tarde Francisco de Paula Brito, livreiro, para quem trabalhou como revisor e caixeiro. Passou então a colaborar em diversos jornais e revistas.
Publicou seu primeiro livro de poesias,Crisálidas, em 1864.Contos fluminenses, sua primeira coletânea de histórias curtas, saiu em 1870. Dois anos depois, veio a lume o primeiro romance,Ressurreição. Ao longo da década de 1870, publicaria mais três:A mão e a luva,HelenaeIaiá Garcia. Seu primeiro grande romance, no entanto, foiMemórias póstumas de Brás Cubas, publicado em 1881.Papéis avulsos, de 1882, foi sua primeira coletânea de contos dessa fase. Em 1899, publicouDom Casmurro.
Em dezembro de 1881, com “Teoria do medalhão”, começou a colaboração na Gazeta de Notícias. Ao longo de dezesseis anos, escreveria mais de quatrocentas crônicas para o periódico. Em 1897, foi eleito presidente da Academia Brasileira de Letras, instituição que ajudara a fundar no ano anterior.
Morreu em 29 de setembro de 1908, aos 69 anos de idade.
A verdadeira razão de porque Trump retrocedeu na ordem de bombardear o Irã é, como em todos os outros casos, puramente eleitoral: ele não quer perder as eleições do ano que vem, se por acaso ordenar uma nova guerra.
Ele jamais se comoveria em salvar 150 mil vidas iranianas.
Ele só pensa nele mesmo. Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Can Trump put out the fire he started?
Ishaan Tharoor
The Washington Post, June 23, 2019
(Zach Gibson/Bloomberg)
It’s a strange thing for leftist doves to find themselves on the same side of an issue as Tucker Carlson. The right-wing Fox News anchor known for his unabashed white nationalism was among the skeptics whoprivately urged President Trumpnot to launch a military strike against Iran last week. After Iranian authorities downed a U.S. surveillance drone above the Strait of Hormuz, the White Houseplotted retaliatory action. Key figures in the administration — chiefly, national security adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo — were reportedly keen on hitting back. A plan of attack was put into place.
But on Friday, Trump took to social media and congratulated himself on reining back a U.S. military that was “cocked and loaded” to strike at Iranian targets. Carlson’s thinking — that Trump’s nationalist base is uninterested in, if not wholly opposed to, costly military entanglements abroad — appeared to be on the president’s mind. He suggestedthe more effective approachwould be for the United States to maintain its current pressure campaign on Iran, including slapping on more economic sanctions Monday. (The United States didcarry out cyberattacks on Iranian systemslast week.)
“I’m getting a lot of praise for what I did. My expression is, ‘We have plenty of time,’ "Trump told reportersSaturday, referring to his decision to halt an attack that would have claimed Iranian lives. “Everyone was saying I’m a warmonger, and now they’re saying I’m a dove, and I say I’m neither. I didn’t like the idea of them unknowingly shooting down an unmanned drone and we killing 150 people.”
Trump also publicly upbraided Bolton for his “tough posture” and hawkish mentality. In private, Trump was said to be complaining about the assembled hard-liners in his inner circle. “These people want to push us into a war, and it’s so disgusting,” Trump told one confidant about his own advisers,according to the Wall Street Journal. “We don’t need any more wars.”
On one count, Trump is right.He is neither a warmonger nor a dove. If Trump had his way, the United States would likely have a smaller military footprint in the Middle East and lean more aggressively on its allies in the Gulf to execute its regional agenda. But for all Trump’s insistence that he is opposed to war, he still is the one wholaid the powder for a dangerous flare-up.
The showdown over Iran was just the latest instance ofTrump playing both arsonist and fireman. The current state of tensions is a direct consequence of the Trump administration reneging on the terms of the Iranian nuclear deal, reimposing sanctions andenacting other measuresto squeeze the regime in Tehran. All of this was done against the wishes of key U.S. allies in Europe and amid the protestations of much of the foreign policy establishment in Washington.
“Trump’s usual shtick is to paper over the problem of his creation and then declare victory, but this week he added a biblical dimension to the drama-making,”wrote Politico’s Jack Shafer. “First, he assumed the persona of the vengeful god, commanding an attack on Iran in retaliation for its shoot-down of a $200 million Navy surveillance drone. Then he ducked into the wardrobe for a costume change to emerge in the cloak of the Prince of Peace and called off the strike.”
It’s a somewhat unconvincing act, especially as Trump’s hawkish advisers remain on the warpath. Both Bolton and Pompeo journeyed to the Middle East over the weekend, talking tough on Iran and vowing to prevent Tehran from building nuclear weapons — a prospectthe U.N.'s atomic agencyand the other permanent members of Security Council all believed had been avoided by the nuclear deal Trump rejected.
Bolton appeared in Israel alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who hailed the “crippling American sanctions” placed on Iran. Pompeo is slated for a whirlwind set of talks about Iran on Monday in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two Arab monarchies most bent on countering the Islamic Republic.
“Pompeo, who last year issued a list of 12 broad demands for change in Iran, shows no signs of softening his outreach to the Islamic Republic,” wrote my colleague Carol Morello. “He began his travels lashing out at Tehran, belittling its explanation of why it downed a U.S. drone last week as ‘childlike’ and not worthy of belief.”
Pompeotried to steer Trumptoward military action last week, and he retains significant influence within the White House. “In an administration that churns through cabinet members at a dizzying pace, few have survived as long as Pompeo — and none have as much stature, a feat he has achieved through anuncanny abilityto read the president’s desires andtranslate theminto policy and public messaging,”noted the New York Times. “He has also taken advantage of a leadershipvoid at the Defense Department, which has gone nearly six months without a confirmed secretary.”
America’s top diplomat alsorubbished claimsthat Trump had sent a message to Iran via a diplomatic backchannel run by Oman. The president says that he is open to talks with the regime in Tehran, but few experts believe this administration is on track to lead Iran to the table.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a former spokesman for Iranian nuclear negotiators and a scholar at Princeton University,told the Atlanticthat, “by destroying the deal, Trump destroyed confidence and any chance for future negotiations.”
And tensions seem bound to spike again.
“Avoiding further escalation will be difficult, given both sides’ determination not to back down,” Philip Gordon, a former Obama administration official,wrote in Foreign Affairs. “A new nuclear negotiation, which Trump claims to want, would be one way to avoid a clash. But Iran is not likely to enter talks with an administration it does not trust, and even less likely to agree to the sort of far-reaching deal Trump says is necessary.”
America is no fan of Huawei. Its officials have spent months warning that the Chinese giant’s smartphones and networking gear could be Trojan horses for Chinese spies (something Huawei has repeatedly denied). They have threatened to withhold intelligence from any ally that allows the firm in. On May 15th they raised the stakes. President Donald Trump barred American firms from using telecoms equipment made by firms posing a “risk to national security”. His order named no names. But its target was plain.
For all the drama, the import ban hardly matters. Huawei has long been barred from America, in practice if not on paper. More significant was the announcement by the Commerce Department, on the same day, that it was adding Huawei to a list of firms with which American companies cannot do business without official permission. That amounts to a prohibition on exports of American technology to Huawei.
It is a seismic decision, for no technology firm is an island. Supply chains are highly specialised and globally connected. Cutting them off — “weaponising interdependence”, in the jargon — can cause serious disruption. When ZTE, another Chinese technology company, received the same treatment in 2018 for violating American sanctions on Iran, it was brought to the brink of ruin. It survived only because Mr Trump intervened, claiming it was a favour to Xi Jinping, China’s president.
Huawei matters more than ZTE. It is China’s biggest high-tech company, and is seen as a national champion. Its name translates roughly as “Chinese achievement”. Revenues of $105bn put it in the same league as Microsoft. Only Samsung, a South Korean firm, sells more smartphones. Huawei holds many crucial patents on superfast 5G mobile networks, and is the largest manufacturer of telecoms equipment. Were it to go under, the shock waves would rattle all of tech world.
By May 20th the impact of the ban was becoming clear. Google said it had stopped supplying the proprietary components of its Android mobile operating system to Huawei. A string of American chipmakers, including Intel, Qualcomm and Micron, have also ceased sales. Later that day the Commerce Department softened its line slightly, saying that firms could continue to supply Huawei for 90 days, but for existing products — for instance, with software updates for Huawei phones already in use. New sales, on which Huawei’s future revenue depends, remain banned.
Interdependence, of course, cuts both ways (see chart). Shares in American technology firms fell after the announcement, because Huawei is a big customer. Qorvo, which employs 8,600 people and makes wireless communication chips, derives 15% of its revenue from Huawei. Micron is in the memory business, of which Huawei is a big consumer. A report from the Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, a think-tank, also released on May 20th, guessed export controls could cost American firms up to $56bn in lost sales over five years.
Unlike Intel, Qualcomm or ZTE, Huawei is privately owned, so lacks listed shares whose price swing would hint at the extent of its distress — though the price of its listed bonds has dropped to 94 cents on the dollar. In public, the firm is staying calm. Ren Zhengfei, Huawei’s founder, said it would be “fine” without access to American technology. Huawei has spoken of activating a “Plan B” designed to keep it in business despite American sanctions. It has been stockpiling crucial components for months, and has made a conscious push to become less reliant on American technology over the past few years. Its phones in particular make extensive use of chips designed by HiSilicon, its in-house chipdesign unit.
Yet few analysts are as sanguine as Mr Ren. Three business areas in particular look vulnerable. Without Google’s co-operation, new Huawei phones will lack the latest versions of Android, and popular apps such as Gmail or Maps. That may not matter in China, where Google’s apps are forbidden. But it could be crippling in Europe, Huawei’s second-biggest market. Its telecoms business needs beefy server chips from Intel. The supply of software to manage those networks could dry up too. Huawei is developing replacements for all three, but they are far from ready.
Two questions will determine whether or not Huawei can weather the storm, says Dieter Ernst, a chip expert and China-watcher at the East-West Centre, a think-tank in Honolulu. The first concerns America’s motives. The timing of the ban, a few days after broader trade talks between China and America had broken down, was suggestive. On one reading, it is a tactical move designed to wring concessions from China. If so, it might prove short-lived, and Huawei’s stockpiles may tide it over.
Paul Triolo of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, is doubtful. Rather than a negotiating tactic, he sees the ban as “the logical end-game of the US campaign to take down Huawei”. A long-lasting ban would force the firm to look for alternative chips and software that Chinese suppliers would struggle to provide.
The second question concerns the reach of American power. The tangled nature of chip-industry supply chains, says Mr Ernst, means that many non-American companies make use of American parts or intellectual property. They may therefore consider themselves covered, wholly or partially, by the ban. Take Arm, a Britain-based firm whose technology powers chips in virtually every phone in the world, including those made by HiSilicon. Arm says that it will comply with the Commerce Department’s rules. That suggests that Arm will not grant Huawei new licences. It is unclear if Arm will offer support for existing licences, however. As Arm’s technology advances, Huawei risks being left behind.
Other non-American companies are as important. One industry insider with contacts in Taiwan says that American officials are pressing Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), a big and cutting-edge chipmaker, to drop Huawei, which is its third-biggest customer. That would be a crushing blow, for Chinese chip factories are not up to the task of manufacturing HiSilicon’s sophisticated designs. TSMC’s only peer is Samsung — and South Korea is another of America’s allies. TSMC said on May 23rd that it would continue supplying Huawei for now.
Even if the optimists are right, and the ban is lifted in exchange for trade concessions, a return to business as usual seems unlikely. America has twice demonstrated a willingness to throttle big Chinese companies. Trust in American technology firms has been eroded, says Mr Triolo. China has already committed billions of dollars to efforts to boost its domestic capabilities in chipmaking and technology. For its rulers, America’s bans highlight the urgency of that policy. Catching up will not be easy, believes Mr Ernst, for chips and software are the most complicated products that humans make. But, he says, if you talk to people in China’s tech industry they all say the same thing: “We no longer have any other option.”
George Orwell escreveu 1984, em 1948, contemplando o mundo terrível do stalinismo, então em pleno triunfo paranoico (tanto que Stalin inventou um "complô de médicos judeus" para assiná-lo, apenas para continuar fazendo o que mais fez na vida: eliminar supostos adversários).
Parece que o mundo de "1984" não terminou em 1989, como otimisticamente proclamou Timothy Gartob Ash, ao constatar o fim da era soviética.
A China reproduz alguns dos piores traços do Ministério da Verdade, com sua dominação totalitária sobre a vida dos cidadãos chineses (e agora apontando em Hong Kong).
Líderes totalitários, espíritos autoritários, não conseguem conviver com a liberdade de pensamento e de expressão.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
How the world of ‘1984’ haunts our present
Wendy Smith
The Washington Post, June 21
The Ministry of Truth
The Biography of George Orwell's 1984
By Dorian Lynskey
Doubleday. 368 pp. $28.95
(Doubleday)
“The World ofNineteen Eighty-Fourended in 1989,” historian Timothy Garton-Ash declared optimistically in 2001. Communism, fascism and European imperialism “were all either dead or mortally weakened. Forty years after his own painful and early death, Orwell had won.”
If only. Orwell’s portrait of a world in which the truth is irrelevant and the powerful rewrite the past is, regrettably, not at all out of date. “I hesitate to say thatNineteen Eighty-Fouris more relevant than ever,” British journalist Dorian Lynskey writes in his alarming exegesis of the novel’s significance and enduring impact, “but it’s a damn sight more relevant than it should be.” Indeed, the most powerful pages of “The Ministry of Truth” quote Orwell in the 1940s describing a state of public affairs all too familiar today.
While he was engaged in the Spanish Civil War, Orwell wrote in 1942 that he saw “history being written not in terms of what happened but of what ought to have happened according to various ‘party lines.’ ” When this occurs, he wrote, “the general uncertainty as to what is really happening makes it easier to cling to lunatic beliefs.” In a 1945 essay, he bleakly concluded about such beliefs: “To attempt to counter them with facts and statistics is useless.”
These cautionary words echo throughout Lynskey’s text. Part One explores the political and intellectual experiences that formed Orwell’s worldview. Lynskey briefly recaps his life, paying particular attention to Orwell’s six months in Spain, where he had gone to fight fascism but encountered equal ruthlessness and dishonesty in Stalin’s communists.
Orwell went home a staunch member of the anti-communist left, unalterably opposed to imperialism and fascism but committed to calling out lies on all sides. The left-wing publishers who refused to print “Homage to Catalonia” or his essays about Spain — because, they argued, the truth could be used as fascist propaganda — in his view had failed a moral test. “For Orwell, the truth mattered even, or perhaps especially, when it was inconvenient,” Lynskey writes.
“Animal Farm,” published in 1945, was Orwell’s opening fictional salvo in his battle for inconvenient truths, an allegory that suggests how the tyrannical one-party state Oceania in “1984” came into being. “Animal Farm” also marked the beginning of Orwell’s appropriation by conservatives, whom he was forced to keep reminding that he was a socialist. “1984” moved beyond satire of the Soviet Union to make a broader, more unsettling point.
In his outline for the novel, Orwell described the mood he wanted to create as, “the nightmare feeling caused by the disappearance of objective truth.” Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were pioneers in this sort of campaign against reality, but Lynskey argues persuasively that Orwell knew that they would not lack successors. “Totalitarianism, if not fought against, could triumph anywhere,” Orwell wrote shortly after “1984” was published in 1949.
He died less than a year later, leaving his most famous book to be interpreted by others. Part Two of “The Ministry of Truth” addresses “the political and cultural life ofNineteen Eighty-Four” since Orwell’s death, in scattershot fashion. The problem isn’t Lynskey’s judgments, which are generally sound, but the rambling way he develops them and the odd tangents he wanders into. A generally capable, if abbreviated, account of the novel’s influence in the 1950s, when it was narrowly seen as a warning against Soviet-style totalitarianism, contains a detour into “Orwell’s genius for snappy neologisms” and a belated, strained defense of the list of Soviet sympathizers Orwell gave to the British government’s controversial Information Research Department in 1949.
Lynskey leaps from the Cold War to “1984” in the 1970s, which muddies some interesting analysis of Orwell’s reclamation by the left with a bewilderingly excessive amount of material about “Diamond Dogs.” David Bowie’s album may include material from an aborted opera of “1984,” but it doesn’t deserve more space than Terry Gilliam’s neo-Orwellian masterpiece “Brazil” or Margaret Atwood’s chilling feminist variant, “The Handmaid’s Tale.” Part Two is a mess; it reads like a magazine article that grew but never matured into a coherent overview of the shifting ramifications of Orwell’s most famous novel.
Lynskey redeems himself in his final chapter, “Oceania 2.0.” He builds on his central focus throughout the text — Orwell’s forecast of a world where objective truth does not exist — to paint a portrait of the “toxic cocktail of cynicism and credulity” with which too many people today dismiss what they don’t want to hear as “fake news” and embrace “alternative facts” that buttress their convictions. We can’t blame Russian trolls for the 2016 election, he comments grimly: The “architects of dezinformatsiya found that they were pushing at an open door.”
Despite its faults, Lynskey’s jeremiad remains valuable and terrifying for the blistering spotlight it shines on Orwell’s overriding purpose, defined in its title, “The Ministry of Truth.” It closes, ringing and goading, with Orwell’s exhortation when asked what moral should be drawn from “1984”: “Don’t let it happen. It depends on you.”
Wendy Smith is the author of “Real Life Drama: The Group Theatre and America, 1931-1940.”
Eu fui um dos usuários mais frequentes, sobretudo para pesquisa bibliográfica.
Parabéns Biblioteca do Congresso, a melhor biblioteca do mundo.
Gostaria de viver nela, à condição que houvesse uma boa ducha de um lado, e uma máquina de espresso do outro.
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
What does the Library of Congress website have in common with Justin Bieber, Harry Styles, Amazon.com, the TV show “Friends” and Netscape’s first web browser? Give up? They were all born 25 years ago. (Did you have other guesses?)
Wedebuted our websiteat the American Library Association (ALA) annual conference in Miami on June 22, 1994. By the way, the ALA conference is in Washington, D.C. this week and today we expect thousands of attendees to visit the Library!
We now receive two million visits each week to Library websites.
Even before the debut of our site in 1994, the Library was connecting with users via the Internet usingGopher, TELNET and File Transfer Protocol (FTP). The loc.gov domain was registered in 1990. Tom Littlejohn, an information technology specialist (who thankfully still works here), sent the first loc.gov e-mail in September 1990.
First loc.gov e-mail sent September 7, 1990. Do you know what your first e-mail was?
Ourweb archivesallowed me to pull together this trip down memory lane ofprevious versions of the loc.gov home page. You can explore the history of thousands of websites thanks to ourweb archiving program. Do you remember any of these loc.gov looks from the past? Click on the image caption to explore the web archive.
Whew, that was a long trip. Thanks for taking it with us. I’m not making any predictions about what this timeline will look like in another 25 years, or how we’ll be communicating with each other, but you can!
Michelle Rago is a digital content strategist at the Library of Congress.
Since their first publication, the four volumes of The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations have served as the definitive source for the topic, from the colonial period to the Cold War. This third volume of the updated edition describes how the United States became a global power - economically, culturally and militarily - during the period from 1913 to 1945, from the inception of Woodrow Wilson's presidency to the end of the Second World War. The author also discusses global transformations, from the period of the First World War through the 1920s when efforts were made to restore the world economy and to establish a new international order, followed by the disastrous years of depression and war during the 1930s, to the end of the Second World War. Throughout the book, themes of Americanisation of the world and the transformation of the United States provide the background for understanding the emergence of a trans-national world in the second half of the twentieth century.
'A clear overview of American ascendance - cultural, military, and economic - in an era punctuated by war and economic crisis. Iriye's global perspective helps us understand the rise of the United States in the context of wider challenges to European power; his analysis of deglobalizing forces and reglobalizing efforts casts new light on American leadership in this tumultuous time.' Kristin Hoganson, author of Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity
