RFI repercute Le Monde sobre o Itamaraty olavo-bolsonarista

Diplomatas são perseguidos por Bolsonaro, denuncia jornal Le Monde

Radio France Internationale, programa brasileiro, 04/02/2020 - 20:02

Diplomatas brasileiros afirmam serem vítimas de um clima de "caça às bruxas" e uma "perseguição ideológica"  Reprodução / Le Monde

O texto começa lembrando da tradição diplomática do país, com representações em 222 países. "O Brasil possui o oitavo serviço diplomático mais importante do planeta", explica a reportagem, ressaltando que a presença do Itamaraty no mundo ultrapassa nações como Itália, Espanha ou Reino Unido. 

Além disso, a diplomacia brasileira é formada por profissionais altamente qualificados, aponta o jornal. Quase sempre trilíngues, eles são formados no Instituto Rio Branco, após passarem “um dos concursos mais difíceis do país, com 6.400 candidatos para 20 vagas em 2019”, detalha o jornalista. 

No entanto, ressalta o jornal, o Itamaraty "se tornou um alvo para Jair Bolsonaro". O presidente é apresentado pelo Le Monde como um "modesto capitão da reserva, que despreza o que considera uma ‘aristocracia’ orgulhosa e letrada". Para completar, continua o correspondente, a diplomacia seria “um ninho de partidários da esquerda”, marcado por uma “ideologia marxista”, diz o texto, citando uma declaração de Eduardo Bolsonaro. 

Caça às bruxas

"Desde que a extrema direita de Jair Bolsonaro está no poder, qualquer um que desenvolva um pensamento crítico é punido”, desabafa um diplomata entrevistado pelo jornal francês. “Vivemos um clima de caça às bruxas", denuncia o funcionário do alto escalão do ministério das Relações Exteriores, que preferiu manter o anonimato. 

Para as fontes ouvidas, existe uma tentativa de “destruir o ministério”. Em apenas um ano, cinco embaixadas brasileiras foram fechadas no Caribe e outras duas ou três devem deixar de funcionar na África, contabiliza o correspondente.

Segundo diplomatas entrevistados, uma verdadeira “perseguição ideológica” está acontecendo nesse momento no Itamaraty, visando, principalmente, aqueles que integraram a diplomacia durante as gestões de Lula e Dilma. Os funcionários indesejáveis são geralmente mandados para bases menos importantes e quase sempre substituídos por nomes menos experientes, aponta o texto. 

Um exemplo citado é o do diplomata Paulo Roberto de Almeida, ex-diretor do Instituto de Pesquisas em Relações Internacionais (IPRI), que foi transferido para cuidar dos arquivos do ministério. “Não me deram nenhuma função exata, então eu me ocupo como posso, lendo e escrevendo”, confessa o funcionário, que também teve seu salário reduzido.

Para Almeida, trata-se de uma estratégia de “intimidação”, que ninguém ousa denunciar. “Os corredores estão vazios. As pessoas se trancam em suas salas. A casa ficou silenciosa”, afirma. Outro diplomata diz que tem aumentado o número de casos de depressão entre seus colegas. 

O texto aponta que essa "ofensiva" é liderada pelo chanceler Ernesto Araújo, personagem atípico, capaz de citar Proust e uma réplica de telenovela no mesmo discurso, ironiza o correspondente. E enumera as mudanças de posição da diplomacia brasileira desde o início do novo governo, como o desengajamento na Celac (Comunidade de Estados Latino-Americanos e Caribenhos), a nova postura sobre as questões climáticas, ou ainda o abandono das pautas ligadas à defesa dos direitos humanos, bloqueando discussões sobre imigração, gênero e direito ao aborto. 

Na contramão de Washington?

O embaixador do Brasil em Paris, Luís Fernando Serra, ouvido pelo Le Monde, defende a nova estratégia do Itamaraty e fala de um simples “reequilíbrio”. Segundo ele, o país apenas abandonou, entre outras coisas, o “desalinhamento automático com os Estados Unidos” que primava nas gestões anteriores. O representante brasileiro na capital francesa diz que, com Bolsonaro, o país vive agora “uma diplomacia pragmática e aberta”, que não se submete a Washington, mas também não renuncia à Europa”. 

Mas para o professor de relações internacionais da Universidade de Harvard, Hussein Kalout, o que acontece nesse momento vai além de um simples reequilíbrio. “Há um ano, o alinhamento com Washington é total e incondicional”, afirma, citando como exemplo o voto de Brasília contra o fim de embargo americano em Cuba ou o apoio de Bolsonaro ao assassinato do general iraniano Soleimani. 

“O patrimônio nacional está sendo dilapidado”, insiste um dos diplomatas ouvidos. “Nosso país não é um líder natural, como a França ou os Estados Unidos. Nossa influência é relativa e teve que ser conquistada. Uma hora vamos acordar desse pesadelo e vamos nos dar conta que o soft power brasileiro desapareceu”, desabafa.

Le Monde, sobre o Itamaraty bolsonarista - Bruno Meyerfeld

Le grand blues des diplomates brésiliens

Bruno Meyerfeld

RIO DE JANEIRO (BRÉSIL)- correspondant

Le Monde, 4 février 2020

Matéria original neste link:
 https://www.academia.edu/41858355/Le_grand_blues_des_diplomates_brésiliens_-_Le_Monde_05_02_2020_

Depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, le président Jair Bolsonaro fait tout pour imposer sa vision du monde à cette administration prestigieuse et influente

L’homme nous ouvre la porte, et reçoit tout sourire. Puis il la referme et s’écroule sur une chaise, accablé. « Beaucoup de gens ici sont en dépression. Moi, pour l’instant, je tiens le coup sans médicaments, murmure, les larmes aux yeux ce diplomate haut placé du ministère des affaires étrangères brésilien. Avant, j’allais tous les jours au travail plein d’adrénaline, passionné. Aujourd’hui, j’y vais seulement par obligation. J’ai même pensé à tout quitter. C’est d’une tristesse infinie… »

De lui, nous ne révélerons ni le nom ni la fonction. « Depuis que l’extrême droite de Jair Bolsonaro est au pouvoir, quiconque développe une pensée critique est puni, lâche-t-il. C’est un climat de chasse aux sorcières. »Une demi-douzaine d’autres diplomates ont tout de même accepté de témoigner auprès du Monde, le plus souvent anonymement, sur ce qu’ils considèrent être la « destruction » en cours de leur ministère. Et, avec elle, celle de l’image du Brésil dans le monde.

Avant tout, il convient de rappeler l’importance dans ce pays du ministère des affaires étrangères, surnommé l’« Itamaraty », ce palais des « pierres libres » en langue indienne tupi. Un « temple » de béton conçu par l’architecte Oscar Niemeyer et inauguré en 1970 sur l’axe monumental de Brasilia. Orné d’un jardin aquatique et ceinturé de hautes colonnes, il compte de prestigieux salons et un escalier d’exception, en forme d’hélice, s’élevant vers les étages sans poutre ni rambarde.

Mais la puissance de l’Itamaraty n’est pas seulement une affaire d’architecture. Avec 222 représentations à l’étranger (ambassades et consulats), le pays dispose du huitième service diplomatique de la planète. Mieux que l’Italie, l’Espagne ou le Royaume-Uni. « Peu de pays doivent autant à la diplomatie », écrivit l’ambassadeur et historien Rubens Ricupero (A Diplomacia na Construção do Brasil, 2016, non traduit). Selon lui, l’institution aurait même forgé, au fil du temps, une « certaine idée du Brésil » : celle d’un géant « heureux (…), en paix (…), confiant dans le droit et les solutions négociées (…), force constructive de modération et d’équilibre ».

Le pays voue donc un culte à ses diplomates. Et son Dieu se nomme José Maria da Silva Paranhos Junior, baron de Rio Branco, ministre des relations extérieures de 1902 à sa mort, en 1912, qui donna sa pleine mesure à l’Itamaraty. Cet homme raffiné, moustache taillée à l’anglaise, sécurisa les frontières, signa des traités de paix avec une dizaine de pays voisins, agrandit pacifiquement le territoire de 190 000 km² et légitima la jeune république aux yeux du monde. Lors de son décès, survenu en plein carnaval, on alla jusqu’à repousser les festivités de quelques semaines.

Depuis, à l’image du « baron », l’ambassadeur brésilien se doit d’être charmant, bien mis, cultivé et expert en tout (« Des clones de Philippe II d’Espagne, altiers, barbus, cultivés, sourcilleux et méprisants », s’amuse un diplomate européen). Formés à l’Institut Rio Branco, à Brasilia, les fonctionnaires sont recrutés lors d’un concours considéré comme le plus difficile de la république : 6 400 candidats pour 20 places en 2019. Les « itamaratistes », au minimum trilingues, maîtrisent aussi bien les textes antiques que le droit international et sont souvent « prêtés » aux autres ministères, aux exécutifs locaux, voire aux entreprises publiques. « Nous sommes le “deep state” », résume un ambassadeur. Autrement dit, les vrais maîtres du jeu brésilien.

« Persécutions idéologiques »

Dans ces conditions, il n’est pas étonnant que l’Itamaraty soit devenu la cible de Jair Bolsonaro, modeste capitaine de réserve, qui vomit cette « aristocratie » aussi orgueilleuse que lettrée. Pour ne rien arranger, l’Itamaraty est perçu par le pouvoir comme un nid de gauchistes, « l’un des ministères où l’idéologie marxiste est la plus enracinée », selon les mots d’Eduardo Bolsonaro, influent fils du président. Dès lors, une purge s’imposait, doublée d’une saignée.

En un an, cinq ambassades ont été fermées dans les Caraïbes, et deux ou trois autres devraient l’être sous peu en Afrique. Le nombre de « secrétariats » – équivalent des directions générales du Quai d’Orsay – a été ramené de neuf à sept, et l’ensemble de ses chefs remerciés, remplacés par des diplomates moins capés et de grades inférieurs. « Le nouveau ministre Ernesto Araujo a voulu s’entourer de personnes de confiance, se justifie-t-on à la direction de l’Itamaraty. C’est naturel, dans le monde entier c’est comme ça ! » Faux, rétorquent des agents du ministère sollicités par Le Monde.« Démettre tous les chefs d’un coup, c’est inédit, assure l’un d’eux. Araujo a voulu s’entourer de gens sans expérience, qui lui doivent tout et ne peuvent pas le contredire. »

Selon les diplomates interrogés, des « persécutions idéologiques » seraient en cours, orchestrées par un cabinet « semant la terreur », décrit comme « totalitaire » ou « inquisitorial », visant en priorité les « barbudinhos », ces « petits barbus » issus de la gauche et entrés dans cette administration durant les présidences de Lula (2003-2010) et Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Parmi les cas cités, celui du diplomate Audo Faleiro : nommé en octobre 2019 à la tête de la division « Europe » du ministère, il fut démis de ses fonctions au bout de quelques jours, à la suite de pressions venues de groupes d’extrême droite.

« Tous les ministres des affaires étrangères de Dilma ont été envoyés dans des ambassades de second plan », constate une source, citant Luiz Alberto Figueiredo (au Qatar), Mauro Vieira (en Croatie) et Antonio Patriota (en Egypte). Pour certains, c’est une punition. Pour d’autres, un choix. « Je n’allais pas représenter à l’étranger ce gouvernement de clowns ! J’ai préféré me mettre en retrait », confie ainsi un diplomate, marqué à gauche, ayant accepté une fonction subalterne à l’étranger.

A Brasilia, les ex-chefs de service, « recasés à des postes inférieurs ou laissés sans charge précise, viennent au ministère pour prendre un café, s’asseoir sur une chaise, regarder les murs. C’est très humiliant », explique-t-on. Parmi ces fonctionnaires désœuvrés, Paulo Roberto de Almeida est l’un des rares à témoigner à visage découvert. Ancien directeur de l’Institut de recherche des relations internationales (IPRI), il fut débarqué en mars 2019 pour des posts critiques du ministre publiés sur son blog. Depuis, cet homme de 70 ans a été «relégué» aux archives du ministère. « Mais on ne m’a attribué aucune fonction précise… donc je m’occupe comme je peux : je passe mon temps à la bibliothèque, je lis, j’écris des livres… », dit-il.

Dans l’intervalle, M. de Almeida – pourtant marqué à droite – dit avoir perdu sa « gratification », un complément de salaire pour les chefs de service : « Mon revenu a baissé d’un quart, passant de 26 000 reais [5490 euros] à 21 000 reais [4 430 euros] », précise-t-il, dénonçant un climat « de persécution, d’intimidation, doublé de vengeance personnelle». « Plus personne n’ose se parler librement, les couloirs sont vides. Les gens s’enferment dans leur bureau. La maison est devenue silencieuse. »

A l’Itamaraty, dans l’un des salons orné de tableaux de maître et de tapisseries, trônait jusqu’à il y a peu le buste d’un monsieur austère, au crâne dégarni et à la fine moustache : San Tiago Dantas, ministre des affaires étrangères au début des années 1960. Il fut le chantre d’une politique extérieure indépendante, proche des pays en développement et critique à l’égard des Etats-Unis. D’après la presse, sa statue aurait été discrètement retirée.

Car sur le fond aussi, l’offensive idéologique est lancée, menée par le ministre Ernesto Araujo. Climatosceptique assumé, complotiste notoire, ce diplomate un brin farfelu, capable, dans un même discours, de citer Proust et une réplique de télénovela, prône l’édification d’un axe mondial « chrétien-conservateur », mené par l’Américain Donald Trump, « sauveur de l’âme de l’Occident ». Conséquence : à l’Itamaraty, un nouveau secrétariat à la « souveraineté nationale et à la citoyenneté » a été créé, quand celui dédié à l’environnement a disparu.

« De l’antidiplomatie ! »

Auparavant moteur de l’intégration régionale, le Brésil a annoncé début 2020 son retrait de la Communauté d’Etats latino-américains et caraïbes (Celac). Jadis leader dans les négociations climatiques, il a participé à plein au désastre de la COP25 de Madrid. Autrefois très investi dans les droits de l’homme à l’ONU, il y bloque aujourd’hui nombre de discussions sur les migrations, le genre ou le droit à l’avortement.

« La nouvelle diplomatie brésilienne, c’est la fin du Forum de Sao Paulo [organisation rassemblant les partis de gauche sud-américains] et du désalignement automatique sur les Etats-Unis », se réjouit Luis Fernando Serra, nommé en 2019 ambassadeur du Brésil à Paris. Un temps pressenti pour diriger l’Itamaraty bolsonariste, il évoque un simple « rééquilibrage » : « A présent, avec Jair Bolsonaro, nous avons une diplomatie pragmatique et ouverte. Nous ne sommes pas soumis aux Etats-Unis et on ne renonce pas à l’Europe : c’est d’ailleurs sous Bolsonaro qu’a été signé l’accord commercial entre l’Union européenne et le Mercosur. L’un n’exclut pas l’autre. »

Pour les experts, le parti pris est pourtant évident : « Depuis un an, l’alignement sur Washington est total et inconditionnel », estime Hussein Kalout, professeur de relations internationales à l’université Harvard, citant le vote récent de Brasilia contre la levée de l’embargo américain sur Cuba ou le soutien de Jair Bolsonaro à l’assassinat du général iranien Soleimani. « Bolsonaro remet en cause l’insertion du Brésil dans le monde et les fondamentaux de notre diplomatie, fondée sur le multilatéralisme, la résolution pacifique des conflits et le respect de la souveraineté nationale. C’est sans précédent », décrypte M. Kalout.

Mais Aurajo n’est pas tout-puissant. A plusieurs reprises, sous la pression combinée de l’agronégoce et de l’armée, il a dû reculer, cesser ses attaques contre la Chine communiste, renoncer à quitter le Mercosur ou à déménager l’ambassade du Brésil de Tel-Aviv à Jérusalem et, surtout, rester dans l’accord de Paris sur le climat. « Sur les sujets-clés, des forces extérieures au ministère se dressent pour dire : “On arrête les conneries!”», observe un diplomate européen.

« Moi, j’appelle ça de l’antidiplomatie! », enrage Celso Amorim, 77 ans, ancien grand chef de la diplomatie de Lula. Pour cet « itamaratiste » raffiné, qui nous reçoit dans son appartement donnant sur la plage de Copacabana, rempli de livres en français et d’objets d’art, « la diplomatie, c’est résoudre les problèmes par la conversation. Aujourd’hui, on a un discours belliciste, guerrier même. Aussi loin que je me souvienne, même au temps de la dictature, je n’ai jamais éprouvé une telle honte de la politique extérieure de mon pays », s’attriste cette mémoire vivante du « palais ».

Mais l’onde passée, que restera-t-il sur le rivage brésilien, mis à part un navire Itamaraty échoué? Avant de rouvrir la porte et de dire au revoir, notre premier diplomate se confie une dernière fois : « C’est un patrimoine national qu’on est en train de dilapider. Notre pays n’est pas un leader naturel, comme la France ou les Etats-Unis. Notre influence est relative. On a dû la conquérir. Et un jour, on va se réveiller de ce cauchemar et on va se demander : il est où le soft power brésilien? Il aura disparu. »

Oil industry and its consequences -IMF review Finance and Development

Dear Colleague, National oil companies (NOCs) are economic giants. They control at least $3 trillion in assets and produce most of the world’s oil and gas. They dominate energy production in some of the world’s most oil-rich countries, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, and they play a central role in the oil and gas sector in many emerging producers. But there's one problem. These companies are poorly understood because of their uneven and often opaque financial reporting practices. And because they are so large, shortcomings in their reporting pose several economic risks. It's time to peel back the curtain on Really Big Oil. In our latest issue of F&D, David Manley, David Mihalyi, and Patrick Heller of the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) pen a very thoughtful and researched look at exactly this challenge and how best to foster (and perhaps mandate) openness. NRGI's new report and accompanying database focuses on the failure to rigorously scrutinize NOCs and the policies their governments employ to manage them, and how this failure carries major risks for dozens of economies around the world that depend on these companies’ sound management of public resources. On average, the authors found that NOCs in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa disclosed the least amount of information. These findings reinforce the results of the institute’s Resource Governance Index, which revealed that 62 percent of the NOCs reviewed exhibited “weak,” “poor,” or “failing” performance in regard to public transparency. That's not so bad, is it? Well, some national oil companies carry huge debts that burden their national economies. Some have debts in amounts higher than 10 percent of their countries’ GDP. Venezuela’s troubled state oil company PDVSA has debt exceeding 20 percent of GDP. Many NOCs have required multibillion-dollar government bailouts in recent years, becoming a costly drain on public finances. At the peak of the oil price boom in 2013, there were at least 25 “NOC-dependent” countries—those where the NOC collects funds equivalent to 20 percent or more of government revenues (Chart 1). In most cases only a fraction of these resource revenues are then transferred to the governments, with the NOCs spending and investing the rest themselves. The median NOC in this sample transferred only 17 percent of its gross revenues to the state in 2015. The key here is that the fiscal health of many countries and their governments’ ability to use oil revenues for development depend heavily on how well the NOC is run, how much revenue it transfers to the state, and the quality of its spending. State-owned enterprises can weigh a country down or help propel growth, and in these countries, subpar governance of national resources perpetuates poverty and inequality.  You're right. This is a real problem. So how do we solve it? To start, NOCs and their governments should ensure that company strategies outline a sustainable vision for their futures. Such a vision can facilitate clear and effective rules on how much these companies are allowed to spend and borrow, and how much they must transfer to the government treasury. To ensure that these rules are followed, citizens and governments need better reporting from NOCs. Separating public relations from reality in company pronouncements about investments in renewables or boosting commercial efficiency requires consistent reporting on spending, production costs, and revenues. Like private oil companies, NOCs should also start assessing and disclosing how prepared they are for the coming energy transition. This should include an analysis of climate-related risks, and progress made in diversifying and mitigating those risks. Finally, in many countries, NOCs are not held sufficiently accountable, either because they don’t disclose enough information, or because formal oversight by government or informal oversight by civil society and the media is inconsistent. Under-scrutinized companies might perform poorly or become vessels for corruption. Increased transparency is a critical lever for holding company leadership accountable and encouraging strong returns on public investment. Drill deeper and read the full 1600-word article, which contains the latest data, charts and examples from around the world and how best to move forward. This piece is also available in pусский, español, français, 中文, and عربي. See you next week,

Rahim Kanani Digital Editor, F&D Magazine International Monetary Fund rkanani@imf.org P.S. I wanted to flag that in our June 2018 issue of F&D, Harvard's David Bloom et al wrote a very detailed and insightful piece on the economics of epidemics. _____ Make a colleague's day: forward this emailWas this newsletter shared with you? Sign up for future updates Update your profile for tailored content (new) Unsubscribe from F&D here

McCloskey’s Brief Against Antiliberalism - James R. Rogers (Law & Liberty)

McCloskey’s Brief Against Antiliberalism

by James R. Rogers1 Comment

Law and Liberty, February 4, 2020

From its very title, Deirdre McCloskey’s new book takes up the mantle of liberalism’s cause against naysayers both left and right. Why Liberalism Worksplays off against Why Liberalism Failed, the title of the much-discussed book by Patrick Deneen. By “liberalism” McCloskey means classical liberalism of one version or another, the ideas which today’s anti-liberals often refer to as “neoliberalism.” McCloskey’s book is the place to start for a vigorous, easy-to-read, fact-based case for the significant benefits provided by market liberalism over the last 200 years.

I cannot recommend it more highly for both liberals and for critics of liberalism. Any reasonable case against liberalism must recognize the tradeoffs that will have to be borne by ordinary people—not just wealthy capitalists—if market liberalism is to be limited or rejected. At the same time, McCloskey shares the deafness of many liberals to antiliberal suggestions that the personal and social losses caused by the market’s “creative destruction” cannot be compensated by material gains, and that philosophical problems remain at liberalism’s core in which liberal principles can lead to illiberal outcomes.

The Great Expansion

McCloskey focuses on the staggering gains in income realized as a result of liberalism in the West and, indeed, realized throughout most of the world over the last two centuries. Most folks in the West recognize living standards have increased over the last century or two. Most underestimate the magnitude of the increase, and to a massive degree. In a poll of informed folk, most guessed that incomes in the U.S. have increased “by around fifty percent” since 1900. That guess is off by a factor of ten. In the last century, U.S. incomes have increased by a multiply of five to seven. Since 1800, per capita income in the U.S. has increased by a factor of 30.

McCloskey calls this the “great expansion.”

These gains are not confined to the West. Both right-wing and left-wing antiliberals habitually refer to incomes stagnating over the last generation, as if the U.S. experience of income stagnation is in fact a global phenomenon. First, incomes have not actually stagnated in the U.S. over the last generation. But it’s even more untrue of the world where over one billion people have escaped “extreme poverty” in the last thirty years. In 1960, half of the world’s populationlived in “extreme poverty.” Today about a tenth do, and this number keeps falling.

McCloskey underscores again and again that if one cares that the poorest among us have more to eat, then one ought to desire market liberalization, not oppose it.

McCloskey also aims several well-placed darts at arguments advanced by proponents of a postliberal order. Modern Romantic antiliberals tend to idealize social relationships that existed in aristocratic and other pre-modern hierarchical societies. They often ignore or minimize the dark side of these societies. Why the idealization in the first place? Neo-Romantic antiliberals of both left and right long for the humane manners of aristocratic societies, manners that leavened all classes of those societies, not simply the aristocratic class. Antiliberals reject liberal-democratic society because it does not, and cannot, generate those manners. Yet this idealization often results in antiliberals minimizing the constriction, even oppression, that also characterized those societies. Karl Polanyi, for example, makes only passing mention of the fact that the economy prior to The Great Transformation necessarily confined the movement of commoners to their lords’ estate. Milbank and Pabst similarly acknowledge only in passing that movement of workers would be restricted in the virtue-economy they envision. McCloskey provides a corrective against the romantic idealization of premodern social relationships, as if pre-modern hierarchical societies reflected only paternalistic nurturing.

McCloskey also makes the important point that many of the problems antiliberals ascribe to markets would be replicated in non-market social economies. Modern socialists seem ignorant of the extended debate in the 1930s over pricing and production decisions in socialist economies. This debate effectively ended with socialist economists conceding that centrally-controlled production decisions advancing the common good would necessarily replicate a market pricing system.

Oskar Lange, a socialist economist and communist functionary of note, declared that for Mises’s role in making the point clear, “a statue of Professor Mises ought to occupy an honorable place in the great hall of the Ministry of Socialization or of the Central Planning Board of the socialist state.”

So, too, non-market economies would need to take advantage of the efficiencies inherent in the division of labor and scale economies. While antiliberals may romanticize pre-modern small-is-beautiful economies, those economies can be replicated only with significantly lower living standards or a much smaller world population.

Of note as well, and contrary to antiliberal snarking on both the right and the left, is McCloskey’s observation that modern market economies do not in fact require ever-expanding consumption and debt in order to sustain themselves.

There are any number of additional points McCloskey makes in the book that any serious antiliberal will want to engage. I don’t mean that liberalism necessarily “wins.” But engaging McCloskey’s arguments, and the tradeoffs they imply, would create a more honest, more-productive debate over liberalism.

That said, there are several points at which I would challenge McCloskey’s argument.

Polanyi’s “Great Transformation” in Light of McCloskey’s “Great Expansion”

The first requires that we look across McCloskey’s work rather than simply within this book. There is an inconsistency in McCloskey’s treatment of the uniqueness of the period that saw the heyday of the rise of market liberalism. McCloskey identifies this heyday as occurring uniquely in the first half of the 1800s. Yet in other venues McCloskey takes Karl Polanyi to task for arguing for the historical uniqueness of market liberalization during this very same period.

This may seem an obscure quibble to take up. But Polanyi’s 1944 book, The Great Transformation, plays an outsized role in the arguments of today’s antiliberals on both the left and the right. Recently, for example, right-wing antiliberals such as Patrick Deneen cite and rely on Polanyi’s argument, as do Milbank and Pabst. On the left, antiliberals such as Wendy Brown, Eugene McCarraher, and others, also rely on Polanyi’s analysis.

Polanyi argues that a “great transformation” occurred in the early 1800s that made economic life after this transformation discontinuous with the experience of economic life before this transition. He argues that Western economies transitioned from non-market economies based on hierarchical and horizontal “gift” exchange to economies in which the “autonomous” market ruled. Polanyi argues that this transition to market rule ran roughshod over the more human and humane scale of social and economic life in the earlier era and caused untold human misery. The political and economic history of the West in the following century, Polanyi argues, can be understood as a reaction to the unleashing of this autonomous market.

In reviewing Polanyi’s book, McCloskey, with co-author Santhi Hejeebu, takes issue particularly with Polanyi’s historical argument that the post-1800s market economy stood in essential discontinuity with economies before 1800. McCloskey summarizes her signal argument against Polanyi in her review of Deneen’s book:

Deneen swallows whole Karl Polanyi’s “classic study” of economic history The Great Transformation (1944). Polanyi’s claim . . . is that the evil “liberal” market is a Western novelty of the nineteenth century. That way we can set aside modern liberalism as a lamentable aberration and get back to God or community and be truly happy. Though conservatives and socialists believe the tale and accept its moral, historians have since the 1950s shown over and over that it is entirely, even embarrassingly, wrong. Markets of supply and demand have existed since the caves . . .

Here’s the thing. McCloskey’s central criticism of Polanyi is that, contrary to Polanyi’s historical claim, the rise of market society is NOT a Western novelty of the nineteenth century. Continuity reigns with earlier economies. But McCloskey’s central claim in Why Liberalism Works is that the rise of the market in the first half of the nineteenth century was a unique historical event: The development of the market during this period was fundamentally discontinuous from the economic life before this period, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Polanyi thinks the Great Transformation is a bad thing; McCloskey thinks “the great expansion” is a good thing. But contrary to McCloskey’s criticism of Polanyi, they both now seem to agree that this historical period was qualitatively unique and pivotal for markets and for society. The argument is not whether the great transformation occurred, the argument is over the consequences of that transformation.

Polanyi’s black and white line between the pre-market economy before 1800 and the market economy after 1800 is incorrect. But taking issue with Polanyi’s rhetorical excess is just a debater’s point if Polanyi’s central historical claim can be made substantially true with the addition of a few weasel words.

McCloskey too confirms Polanyi’s argument that after huge gains by market liberalism in the first half of the nineteenth century there was a dramatic retrenchment. Polanyi cheers this pullback while McCloskey laments it. Yet while McCloskey discusses several hypotheses to account for this pullback, she doesn’t consider Polanyi’s hypothesis, that the speedy transition to market liberalism ran roughshod over the lives of many ordinary people and disrupted traditional life. In essence, McCloskey is too sanguine about the personal and social costs of the market’s creative destruction, costs that can arise along side the market’s massive material benefits.

Here’s where things get complicated because antiliberals miss the upshot of Polanyi’s argument: In agreement with McCloskey, Polanyi argues that the market transformation was incredibly productive. His criticism is that the transformation took place more rapidly than people and communities could accommodate without harmful disruption.

Polanyi argues that the response to this disruption then not only birthed modern, big-state liberalism, but more pathologically also birthed nationalism and fascism.

McCloskey’s and Polanyi’s arguments are not as contradictory as they initially seem: Markets producing fabulous advances in wealth can occur in tandem with harmful disruptions of traditional life and communities. The spread of markets provides diffuse gains to all people as consumers in the form of lower prices and more goods and services. But individual workers and entrepreneurs typically work in only one or a few markets. The individual cost of disruption in these particular markets can outweigh diffuse gains of competition, prompting a political backlash. Liberalization causes both the gain and the backlash.

The antiliberal case then is this: That it is possible people in a society can judge the disruption caused by liberalism to traditional social and economic life to be so significant that they would forgo the disruption even at the cost of significant losses in material well-being. McCloskey shows that the material tradeoff would be huge. Antiliberals need to deal with the argument head-on.

Tensions Between Liberal Principles and Liberal Outcomes

McCloskey also glosses over philosophical tensions at the heart of liberalism. At the center of liberalism is the ideal of “voluntary arrangements”; that contract and consent should structure human interaction. McCloskey writes, “The classic definition of liberty/freedom is the condition of being liberated/free from physical interference by other human beings. It means . . . not being a slave.”

There are a couple of problems with McCloskey’s analysis.

First is the problem of the materialism inherent in the traditional liberal definition of freedom. That is, that only harms of “physical interference” count. It is arbitrary to limit recognition of “interference” to physical harm unless one denies that important aspects of humanity—perhaps the most important aspects of humanity—derive from incorporeal aspects of what it means to be human. Even if one does not believe in the soul, the human mind cannot be reduced without loss to mere physical matter. To be sure, the liberal limitation to “physical interference” serves a very practical purposes in liberal philosophy in limiting the domain over which the state can interfere. But while practical, the limitation is arbitrary and anthropologically indefensible.

Even more problematic is McCloskey’s repeated treatment of “slavery” as the definitional opposite of “voluntary arrangements.” The philosophical question is whether “liberty” itself is an alienable or an unalienable right. Locke and the Declaration of Independence hold liberty to be an unalienable right, a right that individuals cannot consent away. Philosopher Robert Nozick, whom McCloskey commends, holds that liberty includes the freedom to sell oneself into slavery. The problem for liberal theory is this: Holding that some rights are unalienable is a restriction on the freedom of the individual.

This may sound irrelevantly abstract. Who would choose voluntarily to become a slave? Yet well-known examples exist. In the Bible, the book of Deuteronomy recognizes that people might sell themselves into slavery if they become too poor. So, too, in the book of Genesis almost the entire civilian population of Egypt voluntarily alienate their liberty to Pharaoh. Less draconian, McCloskey praises the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Yet why on classical liberal principles should the government be allowed to restrict private property owners from voluntarily choosing to discriminate on the basis of race, religion or other characteristics?

Irrespective of these and other problems, McCloskey’s book is a welcomed addition to the debate over liberalism. She provides a largely fact-based account of the advantages that liberalism has conferred on the modern world. Modern antiliberals on both the right and the left must account for these benefits, recognizing that antiliberalism necessarily posits there are fundamental, even tragic, tradeoffs at stake.

James Rogers is associate professor of political science at Texas A&M University, and a fellow with the Institute for Science, Technology and Public Policy at the Bush School of Government and Public Service. He served as editor of the Journal of Theoretical Politics from 2006 through 2013.

Brazil’s biggest economic risk is complacency - Otaviano Canuto (Brookings)

Brazil’s biggest economic risk is complacency

Otaviano Canuto

Brookings Institution, Thursday, January 30, 2020

Brazil’s economy has endured a difficult few years: after a deep recession in 2015-2016, GDP grew by just over 1 percent annually in 2017-2019. But things are finally looking up, with the International Monetary Fund forecasting a 2.2-2.3 percent growth in 2020-21. The challenge now is to convert this cyclical recovery into a robust long-term expansion.

Two problems have undermined Brazil’s economic dynamism: anemic productivity and a bloated public sector. As weak productivity growth has constrained the economy’s overall growth potential, steadily rising public spending has become increasingly unsustainable.

This is not a new problem. But in the first decade of this century, it was obscured by the commodity-price super-cycle, which drove annual growth above 4 percent. In 2012-2014, pro-cyclical fiscal and (public-bank-driven) credit expansion fueled growth further, but exacerbated imbalances that would come back to haunt Brazil when the commodity boom ended.

Now, Brazil is shifting to a new economic model, in which lower-for-longer interest rates and increased private finance and investment make up for more restrained fiscal policies and reduced public-bank credit. This year could bring substantial progress in this transition, but only if the government remains committed to fiscal and structural reforms.

On the fiscal front, Brazil has already taken significant steps. In 2016, the government passed a 20-year public-spending ceiling. Last year’s pension reform is an important example of this new regimen.

But the pension reform alone is not nearly enough to restore fiscal health, not least because the associated reductions in public spending will be spread out over several years. Meanwhile, other mandatory public expenditure continues to rise.

To enable needed discretionary spending, such as on public infrastructure, all levels of government will have to curb mandatory expenditures. At the federal level, the World Bank has identified two additional areas where significant spending cuts would be possible.

First, Brazil has many subsidies and tax exemptions that bring no macroeconomic or social benefits. Second, the public-sector wage bill is high by international standards, owing not to an excessive number of employees, but to public officials’ disproportionately high salaries, relative to their private-sector counterparts.

Here, progress may be on the horizon. Last year, the government unveiled a reform package—yet to receive congressional approval—that includes sweeping changes to the terms and conditions of federal employment.

If Brazil’s government respects the public-spending cap, real interest rates (now at record lows) do not rise significantly, and annual GDP growth averages around 2 percent, the public-sector gross-debt-to-GDP ratio could decline from over 77 percent in 2018 to 66 percent in 2030. If GDP growth averages 3 percent, that ratio could fall to just 49 percent. The extent to which the government manages to make space for pro-growth discretionary spending will play an important role in determining which scenario prevails.

Financial markets offer further reason to hope that Brazil’s macroeconomic recovery will succeed. Beyond low interest rates, the country’s risk spreads have fallen to their lowest level in nearly a decade. While capital flowed out of the country in net terms in 2019, that mainly reflected the unwinding of the interest-rate premium paid on domestic debt, as well as prepayment of foreign debt by Brazilian corporates.

Meanwhile, domestic funding to Brazilian non-financial corporates has returned to pre-recession levels, and corporate-debt securities and equities have grown significantly. Capital markets have begun to compensate for the decline in subsidized credit from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), and bank lending to businesses has picked up.

In addressing weak productivity gains, Brazil has a longer way to go. Over the last two decades, labor-force expansion has accounted for more than half of Brazil’s per capita income growth. But as Brazil’s demographic dividend ends, continued progress will require existing workers to become more productive.

Since the mid-1990s, productivity has been increasing at an average annual rate of just 0.7 percent. Inadequate physical investment has contributed to this inertia, but the main culprit has been a lack of progress in total factor productivity (TFP)—a result of poor education, weak infrastructure, and a challenging business environment.

To spur TFP growth, Brazil’s government should use concessions and privatization to convince the private sector to channel its large savings—now in search of yields—toward infrastructure. To this end, fine-tuning the regulatory framework governing private investment in areas like transport and sanitation is essential.

At the same time, the government must improve the business environment. Reforms that simplify tax administration, including by harmonizing the tax base across levels of government, are particularly urgent. Moreover, trade-opening measures and agreements—which may run up against political obstacles abroad relating to environmental and other concerns—must be pushed forward.

This year can be a decisive one for Brazil’s transition to a more robust and sustainable growth path—but only if the government commits to reform. If, instead, Brazil’s leaders simply reap the short-term benefits of improved macroeconomic performance without laying the foundations for long-term prosperity, it may not be long before the economy stalls again.

O assalto à nação pelo mandarinato estatal - Ricardo Bergamini

Reformas não corrigem imoralidades reinantes no poder público brasileiro (Ricardo Bergamini).

Prezados Senhores

Em 2002 os gastos com pessoal consolidado (união, estados e municípios) foi de R$ 198,7 bilhões (13,35% do PIB), representando 41,64% da carga tributária que era de 32,06%.  Em 2018 foi de R$ 1.129,0 bilhões (16,53% do PIB). Crescimento real em relação ao PIB de 23,82% representando 50,97% da carga tributária de 2017 que foi de 32,43%. Em relação à carga tributária o crescimento foi de 22,41%. Nenhuma nação do planeta conseguiria bancar tamanha orgia pública.

Em 2005 existiam 4.767.602 servidores municipais, correspondente a 2,6% da população do Brasil, que custaram R$ 51,9 bilhões (2,39% do PIB). Em 2018 eram 6.531.554, correspondente a 3,1% da população do Brasil, que custaram R$ 351,0 bilhões (4,59% do PIB). 

Comparativo entre 2005 até 2018:

1 - cresceu no quantitativo de servidores 19,23% acima do crescimento da população brasileira;

2 - aumentaram 92.05% os gastos reais com pessoal em relação ao PIB. Quase dobrou os gastos em % do PIB.

3 - aumentou a carga tributária de 1,57% do PIB em 2005, para 2,03% do PIB em 2017. Crescimento real em relação ao PIB de 29,30%. 

4 - essa maldita irresponsabilidade fiscal continua crescendo, e a estupidez coletiva brasileira omissa, covarde e conivente, “batendo palmas para bêbados dançarem”. 

5 - A administração pública era a principal atividade econômica em 3.062 municípios, ou 55,0% do total, em 2016.

Ricardo Bergamini