Socorros bancários: ajudando bancos falidos e desaprendendo a história

Em 1873, Walter Bagehot (1826-1877), um jornalista econômico britânico e editorialista da revista Economist, escreveu um texto sobre o perigo de um governo imiscuir-se no setor bancário e sobretudo de utilizar o dinheiro público para salvar um banco mal gerido.
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Still less should it [the government] give peculiar favour to any one [bank], and by entrusting it with the Government account secure to it a mischievous supremacy above all other banks. The skill of a financier in such an age is to equalise the receipt of taxation, and the outgoing of expenditure; it should be a principal care with him to make sure that more should not be locked up at a particular moment in the Government coffers than is usually locked up there. If the amount of dead capital so buried in the Treasury does not at any time much exceed the common average, the evil so caused is inconsiderable: it is only the loss of interest on a certain sum of money, which would not be much of a burden on the whole nation; the additional taxation it would cause would be inconsiderable. Such an evil is nothing in comparison with that of losing the money necessary for inevitable expense by entrusting it to a bad bank, or that of recovering this money by identifying the national credit with the bad bank and so propping it up and perpetuating it. So long as the security of the Money Market is not entirely to be relied on, the Government of a country had much better leave it to itself and keep its own money. If the banks are bad, they will certainly continue bad and will probably become worse if the Government sustains and encourages them. The cardinal maxim is, that any aid to a present bad bank is the surest mode of preventing the establishment of a future good bank.

Retirado da biblioteca Online Library of Liberty.